Bekhorot 2 - September 20, 9 Tishrei

The Mishna rules that if a Jew buys a donkey embryo from a non-Jew, sells one to him, enters into a partnership with him, or receives or gives an animal under a sharecropping agreement (kabala), the offspring is exempt from bekhora. The Gemara questions why the Mishna needs to enumerate all these individual cases. It explains that each is necessary: selling must be taught so we do not fine a Jew who removes an animal from sanctity; partnering excludes Rabbi Yehuda's view that a joint partnership with a non-Jew is obligated in bekhora; and sharecropping is needed as the primary animal remains his own, and if we exempt it from firstborn, we might have thought it could cause others to think that in a regular animal, there is no law of firstborn. The Gemara then inquires into Rabbi Yehuda's position regarding selling an embryo to a non-Jew, given that he elsewhere permits selling a broken animal (shevura). Is an embryo considered like a broken animal because it cannot perform work, or is selling an embryo forbidden because it is a typical situation? The Gemara first attempts to prove it from the Mishna, which mentions that a sale of a feuts is forbidden, and there is no mention of a dissenting opinion. However, this suggestion is rejected as rabbi Yehuda clearly disagrees with a different part of the Mishna, and it is not mentioned in the Mishna. but that is unsuccessful. Then a braita is brought detailing fines for sharecropping transactions to show that Rabbi Yehuda forbids it. However, the Gemara rejects this proof, clarifying that the fine in the braita applies specifically to a pregnant animal given to be fattened. Ultimately, Rav Ashi proves from Rabbi Yehuda's own rationale in another braita - that a broken animal is permitted because it cannot heal which implies that selling an embryo is forbidden, as it naturally grows and "heals." That whole sugya was taught elsewhere in a different manner as a question on whether the sale of a fetus mentioned in the Mishna is only according to the rabbis or also Rabbi Yehuda agrees. As in the previous version, the conclusion is that Rabbi Yehuda forbids it as well. Next, the Gemara inquires whether selling a healthy animal solely for its fetus is permitted, analyzing the doubts according to both Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis.

Introduction to Masechet Bekhorot

Hadran Ceremony Text

Study Guide The Gemara explains that the word "tzipor" includes only kosher birds, excluding non-kosher birds from the commandment of shiluch haken. Four additional verses are brought (supplementing the four from Chullin 139) in an attempt to disprove this premise. However, each verse is explained in a different manner, demonstrating that "tzipor" indeed refers exclusively to kosher birds. If the eggs are non-kosher, the commandment also does not apply, as derived from Rav Kahana's exposition of "take for yourself" - and not for your dogs. Rav Kahana's exposition was originally cited to derive the rule that if the chicks are a treifa, the mitzva does not apply, whereas if the mother is a treifa, the mitzva remains in effect. Various Sages raise several questions regarding situations where the obligation to send away the mother bird might not apply, such as when a barrier exists between the mother and the eggs, or when the mother bird broods over eggs of a different species. While Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagree concerning a male pheasant, Rabbi Elazar clarifies that their disagreement is strictly limited to that specific case. For a female pheasant, all agree the mitzva applies, while for a standard male of another species, all agree it does not apply. The Mishna rules that if a bird is hovering over the chicks or eggs without touching them, the commandment is in effect only if her wings touch the nest. Rav Yehuda rules in the name of Rav that in a case where the mother bird is sitting on tree branches such that if they were removed she would fall onto the eggs, the commandment is in effect even if she is not presently touching them. A braita is brought to contradict his ruling, but the contradiction is resolved. The Gemara then presents an alternative version in which the braita is cited to support his statement, though this support is ultimately rejected.

Ravina derives from "shaleach teshalach" that a kosher bird that killed a human, before it is convicted, it is exempt from shiluach haken because one is commanded to bring it to court rather than send it away. The Mishna ruled that consecrated birds are exempt from the mitzva of shiluach haken. The Gemara attempts to find a case of sanctified birds that would require an exemption. After four failed attempts, Rav and Shmuel each bring a possible explanation. Rav explains that it refers to one who consecrated the offspring of his dovecote for a sacrifice, which subsequently escaped, retains its sanctity and it is exempt from the mitzva of shiluach haken. Shmuel explains that it refers to one who consecrated a domestic hen to Temple maintenance (bedek habayit) which then escaped, which retains its sanctity as wherever it is, it belongs to God, based on the principle "l'Hashem haaretz u'mlo'ah." Rabbi Yochanan agrees with Shmuel and Reish Lakish with Rav. However, Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree in a different case and their positions are reversed. The Gemara works to resolve the contradictions. Analyzing the verse in the Torah, Devarim 22:6, the braita shows the derivation of the different laws listed in the Mishna while adding others, and the Gemara analyzes and somewhat edits the braita. The braita derived from the word "tzipor," that the law applies only to kosher birds. The Gemara explains that this word always refers to kosher birds, while the word "עוף" includes not kosher birds as well. Several verses are brought to challenge this theory, but are resolved. 

Reconciling Rav's two rulings on the required fleece yield, where he states "a mane and a half" (mane v'pras) in one context and "sixty" in another, the Gemara explains that Rav refers to a mane of forty sela'im, making a mane and a half equal to sixty sela'im. Regarding the five-sela'im gift, a braita clarifies that the owner is not required to bleach the wool before giving it; rather, he must provide enough wool so that five sela'im remain after the kohen bleaches it. Deriving from "l'amod l'sharet" ("to stand and serve"), Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi explains that the gift must yield enough processed wool to weave a small priestly garment - specifically identifying the belt (avnet) as the smallest garment used in Temple service. If one shears each sheep and immediately sells it before shearing the next, Rav Chisda obligates the owner because shearing occurred under one's ownership, whereas Rabbi Natan bar Hoshaya exempts because complete flock ownership was lacking when the total required quantity was met (when all five sheep were sheared). In sales where a buyer purchases shearings from a flock, if the seller keeps some of the shearings, the seller is obligated in the mitzva. The amoraim try to find a tannaitic opinion by which to explain this ruling. Rav Chisda's suggestion is rejected, and Rava connects it with a Mishna regarding the priestly gifts. A seller cannot sell the kohen's portion as it does not belong to the seller, but to the kohen. Thus, if the seller retained any shearings, the liability remains with the seller, but if no shearings were retained, liability falls upon the buyer. Beginning Chapter 12, the Mishna defines the mandate to send away the mother bird (shiluach haken), contrasting its scope with the commandments in the previous chapters. Rabbi Avin and Rabbi Meisha compare the structure of the previous chapters and highlight which laws were necessary, and which were brought just as a foil. The Gemara explains why consecrated birds as well as a kosher bird condemned by a court are exempt from this commandment.

Study Guide The obligation of reshit ha'gez (first shearing) applies exclusively to sheep. Although the Gemara initially suggests a gezeira shava comparing "gez" in Deuteronomy 18:5 to Job 31:20 ("m'gez kvasai yitchamam"), it ultimately derives the requirement from the phrase "l'amod l'sharet", establishing that the material must be fit for priestly service. This excludes goat hair - which is used for sackcloth rather than garments - as well as coarse wool. Washing sheep, which causes some wool to be removed, is subject to a Tannaitic debate: Rabbi Yosi exempts washing from the commandment to give the first shearing because it is not the typical method of shearing, whereas the rabbis obligate it as it does remove the wool. The Tannaim dispute the minimum flock size required: Beit Shammai require two sheep based on the plural "tzon", Beit Hillel require five ("chamesh tzon asuyot"), and Rabbi Yishmael b'Rabbi Yosi requires four based on the laws of theft of "tzon" where the penalty is four "tzon". Rebbi shows preference to the ruling of Rabbi Yishmael b'Rabbi Yosi for a number of reasons, and Rabbi Yochanan explains that there is an established tradition from Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi to hold like him. Addressing fleece quantities, the rabbis disagree with Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas, ruling that any amount of shearing from five sheep triggers liability, which the Amoraim quantify through various minimum amounts, and only one of the three positions takes their words literally that there is no minimum. Rav requires 37.5 sela'im, Shmuel requires sixty, while requiring 1:60 for the kohen, Rabbi Yochanan requires six sela'im with five going to the kohen. The Gemara tries to reconcile these views with the Mishna's rule requiring five sela'im given to the kohen. Rav and Shmuel compare this rabbinic 1:60 baseline to the standards for teruma and peah, prompting a discussion in the Gemara reconciling these baselines against conflicting sources. When Isi bar Hini travels to Eretz Yisrael, Rabbi Yochanan criticizes him both for errors in his text of the Mishna and for not demonstrating enough respect toward Rav. Rabbi Yochanan also presents his position on the Rabbis' view of "any amount" (kol shehu), which initially appears to contradict his earlier statement in the sugya. When Rav Dimi arrives from Eretz Yisrael and transmits Rabbi Yochanan's teaching, Abaye deduces from it how to resolve the contradiction.

Study Guide