Chullin 136 - 2nd Day of Rosh Hashana - September 13, 2 Tishrei

Reconciling Rav's two rulings on the required fleece yield, where he states "a mane and a half" (mane v'pras) in one context and "sixty" in another, the Gemara explains that Rav refers to a mane of forty sela'im, making a mane and a half equal to sixty sela'im. Regarding the five-sela'im gift, a braita clarifies that the owner is not required to bleach the wool before giving it; rather, he must provide enough wool so that five sela'im remain after the kohen bleaches it. Deriving from "l'amod l'sharet" ("to stand and serve"), Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi explains that the gift must yield enough processed wool to weave a small priestly garment - specifically identifying the belt (avnet) as the smallest garment used in Temple service. If one shears each sheep and immediately sells it before shearing the next, Rav Chisda obligates the owner because shearing occurred under one's ownership, whereas Rabbi Natan bar Hoshaya exempts because complete flock ownership was lacking when the total required quantity was met (when all five sheep were sheared). In sales where a buyer purchases shearings from a flock, if the seller keeps some of the shearings, the seller is obligated in the mitzva. The amoraim try to find a tannaitic opinion by which to explain this ruling. Rav Chisda's suggestion is rejected, and Rava connects it with a Mishna regarding the priestly gifts. A seller cannot sell the kohen's portion as it does not belong to the seller, but to the kohen. Thus, if the seller retained any shearings, the liability remains with the seller, but if no shearings were retained, liability falls upon the buyer. Beginning Chapter 12, the Mishna defines the mandate to send away the mother bird (shiluach haken), contrasting its scope with the commandments in the previous chapters. Rabbi Avin and Rabbi Meisha compare the structure of the previous chapters and highlight which laws were necessary, and which were brought just as a foil. The Gemara explains why consecrated birds as well as a kosher bird condemned by a court are exempt from this commandment.

Study Guide The obligation of reshit ha'gez (first shearing) applies exclusively to sheep. Although the Gemara initially suggests a gezeira shava comparing "gez" in Deuteronomy 18:5 to Job 31:20 ("m'gez kvasai yitchamam"), it ultimately derives the requirement from the phrase "l'amod l'sharet", establishing that the material must be fit for priestly service. This excludes goat hair - which is used for sackcloth rather than garments - as well as coarse wool. Washing sheep, which causes some wool to be removed, is subject to a Tannaitic debate: Rabbi Yosi exempts washing from the commandment to give the first shearing because it is not the typical method of shearing, whereas the rabbis obligate it as it does remove the wool. The Tannaim dispute the minimum flock size required: Beit Shammai require two sheep based on the plural "tzon", Beit Hillel require five ("chamesh tzon asuyot"), and Rabbi Yishmael b'Rabbi Yosi requires four based on the laws of theft of "tzon" where the penalty is four "tzon". Rebbi shows preference to the ruling of Rabbi Yishmael b'Rabbi Yosi for a number of reasons, and Rabbi Yochanan explains that there is an established tradition from Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi to hold like him. Addressing fleece quantities, the rabbis disagree with Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas, ruling that any amount of shearing from five sheep triggers liability, which the Amoraim quantify through various minimum amounts, and only one of the three positions takes their words literally that there is no minimum. Rav requires 37.5 sela'im, Shmuel requires sixty, while requiring 1:60 for the kohen, Rabbi Yochanan requires six sela'im with five going to the kohen. The Gemara tries to reconcile these views with the Mishna's rule requiring five sela'im given to the kohen. Rav and Shmuel compare this rabbinic 1:60 baseline to the standards for teruma and peah, prompting a discussion in the Gemara reconciling these baselines against conflicting sources. When Isi bar Hini travels to Eretz Yisrael, Rabbi Yochanan criticizes him both for errors in his text of the Mishna and for not demonstrating enough respect toward Rav. Rabbi Yochanan also presents his position on the Rabbis' view of "any amount" (kol shehu), which initially appears to contradict his earlier statement in the sugya. When Rav Dimi arrives from Eretz Yisrael and transmits Rabbi Yochanan's teaching, Abaye deduces from it how to resolve the contradiction.

Study Guide

Rav Chisda's requirement for complete mastery of all twenty-four priestly gifts is rejected based on Rabbi Simeon's standard: any kohen who acknowledges the validity of the Temple service (modeh b'avoda) is eligible to receive gifts. Deriving from "v'natan" ("and he shall give"), kohanim are forbidden from grabbing gifts, prompting Abaye to outline his personal practice that developed from seizing gifts to eventually refusing them altogether, except on the Eve of Yom Kippur to demonstrate his priestly lineage. Rav Yosef rules that a kohen can assign gifts to an impoverished scholar even before taking physical possession. However, when Rava insisted a host's servant assign gifts to himself and Rav Safra, Rava ate while Rav Safra refrained; Rav Safra subsequently experienced a troubling dream regarding improper conduct, prompting the Gemara into a broader ethical discussion condemning the instruction of an unworthy student who will misconstrue the teacher's words. Addressing mixed partnerships with a non-Jew or kohen, the Gemara clarifies contradictory sources regarding when marking the animal is required to prevent public suspicion (mar'it ayin). Resolving a dispute between Rav Huna and Chiya bar Rav, the Gemara rejects Chiya bar Rav - explaining his misinterpretation of the braita listing the twenty-four priestly gifts - and concludes that a kohen's partial ownership in a specific section of an animal exempts only that corresponding gift, such that partial ownership of the head exempts the jaw, while the foreleg and abomasum remain obligated. Where an Israelite owns the head and a kohen owns the rest of the body, the Gemara establishes that halakhic liability follows the locus of obligation, requiring the Israelite to give the jaw.

The eligibility of a Kohen's daughter (kohenet) to receive priestly gifts (matanot) is disputed between Rava (forbidding) and Ulla (permitting), reflecting a broader Tannaitic disagreement between the academy of Rabbi Yishmael (excluding a kohenet) and the academy of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov (including her). Following common practice where several amoraim received and ate matanot on account of their wives, Marimar codifies four definitive rulings: the halakha follows Rav regarding the unenforceability of Levite obligations, Rav Chisda regarding exemption from restitution for destroyed gifts, Ulla permitting gifts to a kohenet, and Rav Adda bar Ahava regarding pidyon haben exemptions for a Levite woman's son. Regarding crossbred animals (kil'ayim) and a koy, the Sages obligate matanot while Rabbi Eliezer exempts them. Addressing the underlying doubt over paternal seed (zera ha'av), the Gemara questions why the Sages require full gifts rather than half-gifts, ultimately explaining that the obligation of the rabbis is only for half. However an alternative explanation is brought concluding that explicit scriptural inclusions ("im shor", "im seh") mandate full obligation. This discussion also establishes Rava's rule that legal recourse for unseparated gifts lies directly against the butcher (hadin im hatabach). The Mishna notes that a blemished firstborn (bechor) mixed among non-sacred animals or slaughtering for a non-Jew or kohen creates exemptions from matanot. However, a kohen slaughtering for someone else is obligated in matanot. A kohen who sets up a slaughterhouse is exempt from giving gifts for two to three weeks, but becomes obligated once his business is more established. To ensure compliance, courts may penalize non-compliant butchers by excommunication. Matanot must be eaten roasted with mustard as they should be eaten like royalty, and may be given to any kohen who acknowledges the validity of the Temple service (modeh ba'avoda). 

Rav Chisda rules that anyone who destroys or eats priestly gifts (zero'a, lechayayim, keva) prior to distribution is exempt from financial restitution, whether derived from the word "zeh" in the verse or because these gifts constitute property with no specific claimant (mamon she-ein lo tove'in). The Gemara raises seven challenges from various Tannaitic sources (including rulings on other priestly gifts and poor-person's gifts)—some directed against Rav Chisda's overall exemption from restitution, and others against the explanation that it constitutes property with no specific claimant. The Gemara resolves all of these challenges, upholding Rav Chisda's position. The Gemara then turns to evaluate whether Levites are obligated to give priestly gifts when slaughtering their own non-sacred animals. Rav remains in doubt as to whether Levites are legally included in the biblical description of "from the nation" (me'et ha-am) or whether their tribe's distinct status exempts them from giving matanot; consequently, while Levites are technically obligated to give them, this obligation cannot be legally enforced against them. The Gemara presents three challenges against Rav's uncertainty from explicit braitot, but answers all of them, leaving Rav's underlying doubt intact. Mareimar rules halakhically in accordance with both Rav Chisda and Rav's doubt. Finally, Ulla permitted giving priestly gifts to a kohen's daughter, even if she is married to an Israelite. Rava challenges Ulla's ruling from the laws regarding the meal-offering (minchah) of a kohen's daughter, which differs from that of a male kohen in that it is not completely burned on the altar, demonstrating that her status as a priestess is not entirely identical.

The Mishna rules that the priestly gifts of the foreleg, cheeks, and abomasum (zeroa, lechayayim, v'keiva) apply both in the Land of Israel and abroad, during the Temple period and after its destruction, regarding non-sacred animals (chullin), but not consecrated animals (mukdashin). Although a logical inference (kal v'chomer) suggests consecrated animals should require gifts since they require the breast and thigh (chazeh v'shok), scripture excludes them by specifying that kohanim receive from consecrated animals only what is explicitly written in that context because of the limiting word "otam". The Mishna differentiates between two cases of animals with blemishes based on the underlying nature of their sanctity. In the first category, if a permanent blemish preceded consecration, the animal only attains monetary sanctity (kedushat damim); once redeemed, it remains obligated in priestly gifts and firstborn animal (bechora), and its shearing, work, offspring, and milk are permitted. In the second category, if consecration preceded the permanent blemish, the animal possesses intrinsic bodily sanctity (kedushat haguf). Even after redemption, the animal is exempt from priestly gifts and bechora, its shearing and work remain forbidden, and its offspring and milk are prohibited. Analyzing the Mishna, the Gemara asks how one could have even thought that consecrated animals (kodshim) might be obligated in priestly gifts (matanot), given that non-sacred animals (chullin) initially seem to possess various unique severities. After addressing a slew of suggestions for stringency, they ultimately establish that no true element of stringency exists in chullin that does not also exist within the broader category of kodshim, it validates the need for a scriptural derivation. Conversely, the Gemara asks whether chullin should be obligated in the breast and thigh (chazeh v'shok) through a reverse kal v'chomer, since chullin possess the obligation of matanot which kodshim lack. Although the Gemara initially attempts to exclude chullin from chazeh v'shok using the word "zeh" in "v'zeh yihyeh mishpat hakohanim", it rejects this derivation and prefers to explain the reason for the exemption based on the fact that waving (tenufah) is practically impossible for chullin: performing it outside violates the requirement of "lifnei Hashem", while performing it inside violates the prohibition against bringing non-sacred items into the Temple courtyard (chullin ba'azara). With "zeh" freed from excluding non sacred items from the law of chazeh v'shok, it is applied to Rav Chisda's ruling that one who damages or consumes priestly gifts prior to their distribution is exempt from financial restitution. The Gemara explains that this exemption is either derived directly from the word "zeh" in the verse, or an alternative reasoning is brought—that priestly gifts constitute property with no specific claimant (mamon she'ein lo tove'in). The Gemara presents several challenges against the second explanation of Rav Chisda's exemption from restitution and some against Rav Chisda's exemption.

A braita rules that if one cuts an olive-bulk of flesh from a limb attached to a living animal, designating it for food only after cutting renders it pure, whereas designating it prior to cutting renders it susceptible to food impurity, as it touches the limb (which has high level impurity) as it is being cut. The Gemara presents Rav Asi's challenge to Rabbi Zeira as to why prior designation causes impurity, given that the cut site is a concealed place (tumat beit ha-satarim) and concealed impurity does not transmit impurity. Rava clarifies that the case involves a situation where liquids (hechsher) came upon it and Rabba bar Rav Chanan questions that, noting that it should not even require hechsher under the rule of an item destined to transmit severe impurity does not need hechsher, since here it came from a limb with a high level of impurity. Rava responds with a fundamental principle that when food functions as a connection or for a purpose other than food, it is considered "when used, it functioned like wood" and thus the rule of "destined to transmit severe impurity" does not apply. The Gemara presents five challenges that are resolved by applying this same explanation – "when used, it functioned like wood." Returning to the Mishna dealing with a dangling limb and flesh on an animal, the Gemara asks for the rationale of Rabbi Shimon, who rules them pure in the case of the animal's death, challenging his view as completely illogical. The Gemara suggests that Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the reisha (opening clause) of the Mishna when the animal is still alive, based on Rabbi Yochanan's explanation that Rabbi Shimon derives from scripture "מכל אשר יאכל"  that food is defined as such only if you can feed it to others; since a dangling limb or flesh from a living animal is forbidden to consume even for non-Jews, it cannot transmit food impurity. However, Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty, explaining that if Rabbi Shimon disagrees with that case, it is because the flesh and limb are still somewhat attached, as learned from a Mishna in Uktzin (3:8). Thus, Rabbi Yochanan's explanation of Rabbi Shimon's view must apply to another case. The Gemara suggests it might apply to the metzi'ata (middle clause) where the animal was slaughtered, but this resolution is also difficult. In light of these difficulties, the Gemara returns to understand Rabbi Shimon's statement and Rabbi Yochanan's explanation, concluding that they actually refer to the seifa (final clause), not regarding the dangling limb (from which the difficulty was raised), but rather regarding the dangling flesh. The Mishna discusses a dangling limb and flesh on a living human, ruling that they are pure during the person's lifetime. Upon the person's death, the flesh is pure from food impurity, while the dangling limb transmits impurity as a limb from a living person, but not as a limb from a corpse, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon considers it pure. The Gemara again challenges Rabbi Shimon's view in the same manner as before. As a first resolution, it explains that Rabbi Shimon disagrees with a general underlying premise of Rabbi Meir's view. Subsequently, however, the Gemara successfully understands Rabbi Shimon's position in a different manner, based on a Mishna in Eduyot 6:3.