Dhruva Jaishankar: India’s Re-alignment

Dhruva Jaishankar discussed India’s evolving relationships with China and the United States, its economic prospects, and its broader strategic priorities. Despite worsening political optics, Dhruva argues that India-US relations have improved in substantive ways, even as Trump accelerates longer-running American shifts on trade, immigration and alliances. India is increasingly seeking to reduce its economic dependence on both China and the US, but extending that strategy into security matters is more difficult when Western countries remain heavily dependent on Washington. Dhruva is also sceptical of describing India’s approach as “multi-alignment”, which can imply that all its major relationships are equally important. We discuss India’s priorities, from balancing power in the Indo-Pacific and managing its relationship with Pakistan to reforming global governance; its prospects for developing strategic and digital industries; and its use of forums such as BRICS and the SCO. Finally, we examine the sources of India’s tensions with China, including border disputes and economic competition, and consider the longer-term trajectory of Indian strategic thought and domestic stability. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

Jersey LeeWelcome to this episode of Pacific Polarity. Today we’re speaking with Dr. Gabriela Bernal. She is a Korean affairs analyst based in Seoul, South Korea, and a non-resident fellow at the European Center for North Korean Studies. She is also an associated research fellow at the Institute for Security and Development Policy. She has a PhD from the University of North Korean Studies and has published work in various media and online outlets. Dr. Bernal, great to have you on.Gabriela BernalThanks for having me.Jersey LeeThe major recent news—part of the reason why we’re even speaking at this moment—was Trump’s Truth Social announcement last month, stating that due to his great relationship with Kim Jong-un, as well as South Korea’s lack of help against Iran, America scaled down the joint Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise with South Koreans. Was this intended as an olive branch towards North Korea leverage against South Korea, or something else, or some mix of that, what’s the mix in your mind?Gabriela BernalI think definitely Trump is trying to get back on Kim Jong-un’s good side. I think it was relevant for a few reasons. Because Trump has said since he came back to office, he said on multiple occasions that he’s interested in meeting Kim Jong-un and that he’s open to talking with him, and he’s spoken a lot about their good relationship. But this is the first time that Trump really backed up those words with some kind of action, with something tangible beyond just words. So I think in that sense, it is notable. It sends a message to North Korea, yes, that Trump is interested in keeping the tensions lower.And specifically, I thought it was interesting that he mentioned how the drills are seen are a hostile signal to Pyongyang; because he didn’t have to say that, he could have just ended it with, “South Korea didn’t help us with Iran and they’re not helping us, and therefore why should we help, why should we invest so much money with you guys in terms of these joint military exercises”, he could have just ended it in terms of criticizing South Korea and left that way. But the fact that he brought in North Korea specifically, and pretty much echoed what Kim Jong-un and North Korean leaders have been saying for so many years about the drills being exercises for war and very hostile—he used that same kind of vocabulary that North Korea uses. And I thought that’s very notable because that shows definitely it’s not just about perhaps punishing Seoul for not cooperating so much on Ukraine or Iran; that’s partly it, but it is more a message to North Korea, so yeah, an olive branch, I think it is.Now, whether North Korea will accept that olive branch, that remains to be seen. But, yeah, I do think Trump, especially seeing how things are not going his way in the Middle East, in Europe, with Ukraine, maybe North Korea could be his last kind of hope for a major foreign policy achievement before he leaves office. So he might really switch his focus more on North Korea in the near future.Jersey LeeLike the Nobel Peace Prize, you mean?Gabriela BernalI’m sure he would love that. He tried during his first term. In practice, I don’t think that’s going to happen. But we’ll see. Because really, it’s not that much up to Trump now, unlike last time. Last time was very different. The tables have turned significantly since his first term. I think Trump or the US, they don’t hold all the cards anymore. Now, North Korea is not nearly as vulnerable or weak or isolated as it was back in 2017, 2018. So even if Trump shouts and screams that he wants to have diplomacy with North Korea and resume talks with Kim or even hold a summit, it doesn’t mean that North Korea is going to accept it.Jersey LeeAs someone who only casually observes peninsula affairs—I’m referring to myself—it seems that no matter what South Korea or the US does or says, North Korea has over the past few decades remained implacably hostile, at least in its public statements. Could anything, including President Trump or South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s efforts change this dynamic and get North Korea to show some more diplomatic flexibility than they have previously?Gabriela BernalI think from the outside, that is how it usually looks, because North Korea always has these very dramatic rhetoric and statements that they make, with the vocabulary that they use, it’s always very extreme. But in practice, in the past, North Korea has been diplomatically flexible on multiple occasions. We’ve seen it during the 90s. We’ve seen it during the six party talks and we’ve seen it during inter-Korean talks under multiple administrations, and most recently under Trump’s first term. The very fact that they would engage in in such diplomacy, and really they did bring concessions to the table to the US. So it’s hard to say that they have not been completely—that they have not been flexible at all.But of course, they hold their cards closely, because again, the Korean Peninsula is technically still at war. So the war is still ongoing. The United States is on paper still North Korea’s main enemy, and it represents a real existential threat to North Korea. So they can’t afford to be too flexible or open, unlike maybe other countries, because—this thinking has been reconfirmed again and again over the decades by the U.S.’s foreign policy, and especially its wars in the Middle East and deposing of dictators and all of that. And most recently in Iran, it’s been confirmed to North Korea repeatedly that they can’t fully trust the U.S. and they cannot afford to just negotiate away their nuclear weapons without getting a significant concrete security guarantee in exchange.To your point about what could make them more flexible, or make them resume diplomacy in a serious way, I think it’s the same thing that they’ve been looking for since the beginning. North Korea has always been looking for the same things. That has not changed. Their goals have remained much the same for over the decades. Namely, they need a security guarantee to guarantee the survival of the regime. And I think for them, they concluded early on that the only way this would be possible is if they had nuclear weapons. History has proven them quite correct, if we look at so many examples of other countries.So I think for now, in the current context, the main thing for the beginning—what would make Kim Jong-un want to go back to talks—it would have to be a significant change in the U.S. position, because the U.S. position on North Korea has remained much the same across administrations, despite there having been attempts at diplomacy here and there, attempts under Trump last time, under Obama, under Bush, during the six-party talks. But overall, the position on CVID, Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Denuclearization, that issue—and it has softened a bit in recent years because of how things have changed so rapidly. I think the U.S. knows that in practice it is not possible to start negotiations on that basis, from that footing of CVID, it is not going to work anymore. I mean, it wasn’t going to work in the past; it’s definitely not going to work now.So I think the first thing would be to put that to the side. It doesn’t mean to abandon denuclearization, because ultimately the goal should remain a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, the whole peninsula, for the safety and security, not just of the Koreas, but of the region and the wider world, and to prevent further nuclear proliferation, which is already a threat in the region and beyond. I think for those reasons, that’s very important. And whether the US, mainly, is willing to change its position publicly on deferring denuclearization in favor of an arms control centered approach, and also somehow, somewhat, in some way recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state. Now, does that mean officially making a giant speech and saying that, OK, we, as the United States, we recognize North Korea as a nuclear state? No, no, no.B… This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

Tom Wright joins Pacific Polarity to discuss the emergence of "two Americas", the consequences of America's political volatility for its allies, and what a future US strategy towards China might look like. Wright argues that allies cannot simply wait for the next administration to restore the old order, but need alliances that are structurally resilient to changes in Washington. He also argues that Trump is less interested in strategic competition with China than his predecessors, while defending the Biden administration's approach as responsible competition rather than a new Cold War. Using rare earths as a case study, he discusses America's difficulty in responding to China's economic leverage, the need for greater strategic industrial policy, and working with allies at an "allied scale". He also shares his thoughts on Trump's transactional approach to alliances, his meetings with Xi Jinping, and the emerging debate over the future of Democratic foreign policy. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

On the latest episode of Pacific Polarity, Jersey Lee spoke with Australian Senator Dave Sharma about Australia's role in the Indo-Pacific, its relationships with the United States and China, and the Coalition's approach to international development and climate policy. Sharma argues that Australia should support continued American engagement in global conflicts rather than begrudge Washington's attention beyond the Indo-Pacific, while using its own development assistance more strategically in the region. He discusses the challenge of speaking clearly about China while avoiding unfair treatment of Australians of Chinese heritage, and advocates a nuanced approach that combines partnership and trade with firm resistance to actions that threaten Australia's security. Sharma also argues that China's military buildup is the primary driver of regional tensions, while noting that both major Australian parties broadly share a pragmatic approach to the Indo-Pacific. He also shared his views on the Coalition's climate policy, especially as it relates to Pacific Island nations This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

Professor Adam Lockyer joins Pacific Polarity to discuss his new book "Conventional Maritime Deterrence", arguing that deterrence at sea operates fundamentally differently from deterrence on land. He explains how concepts such as sea control, sea denial and "maritime sparring" shape competition in the Indo-Pacific, why Australia needs both offensive and defensive options—including AUKUS—and why emerging technologies such as drones may be reshaping maritime warfare. Drawing on Cold War history, Lockyer suggests Australia's evolving strategy may increasingly resemble Soviet rather than traditional American maritime doctrine, while arguing that Australia's greatest strategic weakness lies not in its plans but in its failure to convincingly demonstrate the capabilities and resilience it claims to possess. The discussion also explores the lessons of the Iran and Ukraine wars, industrial preparedness, societal resilience, and how policymakers can avoid learning the wrong lessons from history. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

The Wall Street Journal’s Jonathan Cheng discusses his forthcoming book Korean Messiah and the deeper ideological foundations of North Korea. Moving beyond conventional analyses, the conversation explores how Kim Il-sung’s Christian upbringing helped shape the regime’s quasi-religious political culture, and how this—alongside hereditary rule—sets it apart from orthodox Marxism. Cheng situates North Korea within a longer arc of Korean history, highlighting its strategic autonomy, ideological evolution under Kim Jong-un, and surprising continuity with the past. The discussion also examines why the regime may feel vindicated in its choices, and what its trajectory reveals about leadership, legitimacy, and survival in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

Note: This episode was recorded on March 15 Australia time (March 14 US time). On March 16 Australia time (March 15 US time), Trump threatened to delay his upcoming visit to China, if China doesn’t help unblock the Strait of Hormuz. In response to this news, James Zimmerman provided the following additional comment: China is unlikely to respond to the threat, and it’s not in their best interest to jump into the fray of the hostilities, which is not their battle. They’ll likely say that if Trump cancels, that is on his own volition and unfortunate as Beijing is able and willing to proceed with the planned Summit. But, overall, my guess is that Trump will proceed with the visit knowing that the US-China relationship is too important to postpone.Jersey LeeWelcome to this episode of Pacific Polarity. Today we’re speaking with James Zimmerman. He is a seasoned lawyer with more than three decades of diverse legal experience based in China since 1998 and is currently a partner at the law firm Loeb & Loeb where he advises foreign companies on corporate, transactional regulatory litigation and white collar criminal defense matters. He is also the chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in China and had previously served in this position four times over the past two decades. He is also the author of the acclaimed nonfiction book, The Peking Express: The Bandits Who Stole a Train, Stunned the West and Broke the Republic of China. James Zimmerman, great to have you on.James ZimmermanThank you so much. It’s great to be here. I appreciate the opportunity.Jersey LeeAs I understand, you’ve been involved in the preparations surrounding Trump’s upcoming visit to China. To the extent that you can share, how have these preparations progressed and what can we expect from the visit?James ZimmermanThis might actually be overstating our role, but we, the chamber and its members, are very much engaged with different departments in the U.S. administration, just providing our suggestions and input on the upcoming presidential visits. And we’re doing so because we want to make sure that the business communities, American business community’s agenda is part of that discussion. We are making sure that we’re having conversations with the administrations to let them know that we’re supportive. We’re here. And we’ve got ideas on what we want to see in terms of deliverables, outcome. And so, I mean, that’s why we’ve been making ourselves available.I was in Washington, D.C. two weeks ago meeting with a number of the teams that are participating in the presidential summit and to make ourselves available and to be supportive in any way we can.Jersey LeeWhat might be some of the expectations from the business community that you represent?James ZimmermanWell, I think the best way I’d characterize it is the expectations are generally low. We’re not expecting a grand bargain. We’re not expecting significant deliverables, although I do know that there is some discussions at this point to try to come up with some purchases that may result from the discussions. But overall, I think the goal of the summit is to continue to maintain a stable relationship between the United States and China. And the goal of this summit is not to reach a whole new bargain, a whole new agreement, the key issue is maintaining the stability in the relationships, which I feel is very, very important from the business community’s perspective. So long as the parties continue to talk and the relationship is stable, I think that’s something that’s very important for not just the business community, but the global economy as well, because if the bilateral relationship is stable, that supports stability across the globe and is good for the global economy.Jersey LeeThere’s been quite a number of reports that have noted issues with the preparation process, or at least, as you say, playing down expectations for the visit. There’s reports that there might not be a corporate delegation from America, and some other reports suggest that the preparation process has been a bit rushed, which is why there’s low expectations for outcomes. What do you think of such reporting?James ZimmermanWell, I think that there is some truth to the fact that, yeah, this has all been late discussions and we’re trying to put something together without a whole lot of planning time. But keep in mind, too, the delegation that Trump led to Saudi Arabia that was all put together at the last minute where CEOs got on board. And I think that there is some discussions that he will be bringing forward to China maybe 20, maybe 30 CEOs that have an interest in ongoing trade and investment in China.I think the expectations and the reporting in general is accurate. I think they’re trying to put something together where we’re going to have some business that will be participating in some way, but the actual outcomes and the actual purchases is something that’s left for observation.Jersey LeeSo it sounds like this is something that’s common in Trump’s visits, instead of specific to this upcoming visit to China. Is that what you’re saying?James ZimmermanYeah, I mean, I think it would be—There are things specific to the U.S.-China relationship that we’re trying to put together, but the last-minute planning is nothing new with this administration, they seem to be doing things quite often at the last minute. Even when I was in Washington, when I met with the Chinese embassy the DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) there had said to me that, wow, we haven’t heard what the plan is, and it’s so hard to have outcomes, so we have to play down expectations because we just don’t have a whole lot of time. That’s the situation here, but we may be surprised, there are some last minute preparations that will, may pull things together, so Trump brings along a real solid group with him, but we’ll have to see what happens.The fact that Secretary of Treasury percent is meeting with Vice Premier He Lifeng in Paris as we speak, a lot of those discussions in Paris are planning the logistics and planning some of the outcomes that will come out of this meeting. So in the next few days, we may be hearing more information.Jersey LeeBeyond the usual conversation over trade and investment, which lots of people have talked about, some reporting suggests that the US might push China to reduce purchases of oil from Russia and Iran, or to push China to exert pressure on Iran to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. Meanwhile, there are suggestions that China may in turn push the U.S. to weaken its support for Taiwan or to significantly weaken export controls. Do you think any of these proposals might find a receptive counterpart here, or are they just thought bubbles, trial balloons?James ZimmermanNo, I don’t think there’s going to be any progress in either direction on the more sensitive topics. Those things take a lot of time to work through, and I think the parties, both the U.S. and China, are more interested in keeping the general stability of the relationship and not throwing a monkey wrench in either direction that’s going to cause any kind of complications. If the U.S. was to pressure China to reduce its purchases of oil or if China was to put pressure on the U.S. to weaken its support for Taiwan, I think you’re opening up a whole week of discussions, a month of discussions, and it just complicates things. And I don’t think either party really wants to go down that path. I think it’s more of, let’s just continue to stabilize the relationship, let’s talk in general terms, and let’s keep things at a very simple pace right now. And I think that’s the direction we’re going in.There’s been a lot of issues that have come up in the past few months that could very easily have derailed the pending truce that’s between the U.S. and China since the presidents met in South Korea back in October, a lot of things have happened, not just Iran, but Venezuela and so forth. But there’s been quite a bit of discipli… This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

Rushali Saha explores the uncertain state of U.S.–India relations following the rollback of Trump-era tariffs and the announcement of what she characterizes as more framework than finalized agreement. While strategic alignment between Washington and New Delhi remains strong in principle, implementation has long been uneven. India, she argues, is careful not to flatter Trump, mindful of its self-image as an aspiring great power—particularly evident in its insistence that tensions with Pakistan were resolved bilaterally, despite U.S. claims of mediation. On Russia, India resists U.S. pressure to curb oil imports, viewing energy security and strategic autonomy as paramount, while also seeing value in preventing a tighter Russia–China alignment. Regionally and globally, India’s ambitions are constrained by domestic politics, limited state capacity, and reluctance to take hard positions, even as it seeks recognition as a major power. Rushali suggests that India’s consensus-based diplomacy and long-term strategic signalling—especially in the Middle East—may yet bear fruit, but that true great power status will require translating economic scale into sustained global responsibility. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

William Reinsch dissects Trump’s tariff strategy—framed as revenge, revenue, and reshoring—and its implications for the global trading system. He argues that while the U.S. is the greatest short-term threat to rules-based trade, Trump is unlikely to permanently remake the international order, even as resilience increasingly displaces efficiency as a core trade objective. Reinsch is sceptical of breakthrough U.S.–China trade deals, seeing recurring cycles of confrontation that ultimately favour China, while U.S. debates over export controls reflect uncertainty about how to compete with a technologically capable rival. Looking ahead, he suggests middle powers may play a crucial role in holding the system together, even as China’s overcapacity remains the most serious long-term risk to global trade. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com