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China's Bet on Physical AI

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Live from Morgan Stanley's Asia Pacific Summit in Singapore, our China Equity Strategist Laura Wang joins Chief China Economist Robin Xing to explore how physical AI could rewire China's factories and what it takes for that investment to translate into stronger profits and higher incomes.

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----- Transcript -----

Laura Wang: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Laura Wang, chief China Equity Strategist at Morgan Stanley Research. And on this very special episode of the podcast, we're coming to you directly from Morgan Stanley's Asia Pacific Summit in Singapore to discuss the physical AI revolution, how China is bringing AI to the real world.

I'm joined by Robin Xing, Chief China Economist. Let's get started.

So AI's next chapter is not just about what it says to us. It's about what it can do in the physical world, from vehicles on our roads to robots on factory floors. Our emerging frontiers research points roughly at 12 trillion US dollars of incremental industry 5.0 investment over the next 10 years. Across the broader frontier industries, we actually forecast addressable market to expand from the current 1.4 trillion US dollars to 3.2 trillion by 2030.

And China's manufacturing depth and deployment scale could give it a distinctive advantage. But we all know that more investment is not necessarily more value. We expect the broader productivity payoff to become more visible from 2028. And today, we want to explore what turns smarter machines into better economics, stronger profits, and higher incomes.

So how China can build physical AI and actually make it pay off. So I want to start with the big picture. Much of the AI debate focuses on who builds the best model. When AI moves into the physical world, what changes in the competitive equation, and what do you think will give China an edge?

Robin Xing: Thank you, Laura. So phase one of AI revolution is probably some people will call it a chat box helping you writing emails, right? But when we call physical AI, that's the second chapter of AI revolution, is industry-wide adoption of AI. It's AI shifting from just staying in the clouds, going into the real world, factories, ports, logistics, and that could rewire the existing industry and try to unleash productivity for all these scenarios China is good at.

China is largely a manufacturing-based economy, so simply working from the cloud is not so helpful for their productivity. Instead, they are betting on in the next five years it will be robotics, it would be industrial factories upgrade, it would be these drones and the cars helping them to unleash productivity.

But on its macro impact, I see a two-stage macro equation because at this moment, China still faces a bottleneck. That's chips, that's upstream, equipment, semiconductor, GPUs. So they are still investing in these bottleneck enablers, which you call it, picks and shovels. That's booming, but that's only a small portion of the Chinese economy, about low single digit of their total CapEx.

So its contribution to China's potential growth is still limited. But from 2028 onwards, we are expecting a series of moments in China's AI computing power, in China's hardware be it a GPU memory or the super pod interconnector, pulling them together to use some engineering innovation to bypass single chip limits.

So that would give China the wider opportunity of using these, using these AI brains into robotics and the industries, upgrading their factories. That's why we do see much broader implication for the economy from 2028 onwards, contributing about .3 percentage points in terms of productivity gain.

And the CapEx contribution will also triple from today's investment in those bottlenecks. But in near term, it's still muted in terms of helping China to break out the deflation trap, because right now it's still about investing in upstream bottleneck enablers.

Laura Wang: Thanks, Robin. We understand that the investment spending doesn't necessarily take place together with the productivity gains. And as you and I just published our 2027 New Year outlook, we both understand that the Chinese macroeconomy will continue to be challenged by some of the macro concerns.

So when do you think we would start to see some of that real impact on the macroeconomy, and what would need to happen for that to take place?

Robin Xing: That's a good question. In the past cycles, China was able to make a lot of technology progress, winning global market share, but that does not translate to profits for corporates or income for households.

But three structural factors are helping us to break this deflation trap, making this new physical AI investment different from previous cycles. Number one is the nature of investment. Out of this twelve trillion dollar incremental investment in Industry 5.0 or physical AI in China, more than half of that will be rewiring existing factories about making them more intelligent, making this more passive automation into proactive, adaptive production.

And that means, robotic industrial software. The second factor here is policy. Eighty percent of China's industrial policy, this subsidy for capacity, was done by local government in the past.

But since late last year, there has been two initiatives. One is the so-called anti-involution, changing the KPI, the promotion metrics for local authorities. So now the local mayors don't have the mandate to subsidize all these factories. Number two, they are also running out of money given the land revenues rank a lot.

So local government basically reduced the export rebates and also claw back some of these high tech tax privileges for firms. In near term, that's probably negative for certain firms, but over the medium to longer run, that's encouraging firms to consolidate the factories to, not just to keep expanding, but try to keep efficiency and the profit margins.

That's why we think with both policy and the different nature of industry investment, over the next three to five years, the profit margin of industrial firms in China could improve from today's five percent to eight percent.

Laura Wang: Robin, as you and I worked, through the blue paper on emerging frontiers, I think one conclusion we have reached is that the corporate earnings actually can improve ahead of the household effect when the benefit can trickle down and spill over to household consumption. So, how do you think about this? When can we and how can we start to see that positive feed into the household consumption?

Robin Xing: That's a very good question because robotics, they don't drink lattes, they don't wear sneakers, so it's not directly creating consumption demand. And in the past, when China created so much supply, the spill over to household income was limited partially because of excess supply.

So we need to see three things happening before consumers can really benefit from the technology upgrade. One is investment discipline. The same we mentioned, they have to spend this money on rewiring existing factory, making them more intelligent, cost reduction, more efficient, rather than doing all this greenfield capacity build out to create more redundant factories.

That's something they need to avoid. Number two is China's housing problem. Part of this weak consumption is due to the deflation triggered by housing adjustment. Recently they have further tightened the rule, which is a negative for growth in near term, but it's also limiting new supply.

And by second half next year, our property team believe housing prices in large cities will stabilize. So the wealth effect channel for consumers will largely normalize. Finally, it's also domestic reform on social welfare. And the Chinese consumers save a lot, partially because the lack of a proper social welfare system for migrant workers and the farmers.

If they can make a pivot towards consumers with a social safety net reform, that's going to really unlock this precautionary saving. So we are looking for these three factors, but 2027 is still tough. They are still in a stage of very slowly healing from the balance sheet, be it local government fiscal consolidation, the household deleveraging, and the anti-evolution in near term current CapEx.

But by 2028 and onwards, we do believe they may have healed from this balance sheet repair, and that spillover to household income will be stronger onwards.

Laura Wang: Thanks very much. And hopefully partly of that household incomes spillover effect can come from the equity market investment as a opportunity. When we look at how the equity market could potentially benefit from this Industry 5.0 and the frontier, emerging frontier space development, we actually think the earnings growth for Chinese equity market can actually jump from the current 6% on annual basis to above 10% by 2030.

And we actually think the ROE level for investors who invest in Chinese equity market, the ROE can jump from the current 10%-ish level back to above 12%, close to 13% level. So hopefully more investment opportunities and the wealth effect can be created also in the capital market together with the direct effect on household consumption and the wage growth.

Robin, I want to bring this back to you and wrap it up. So, so far we've been talking about all the great changes that's happening within China on technology, on hardware, on software, on deployment in different industries. How will this change China's role on a global basis?

Robin Xing: Yes, that's also an important debate, if China is so good at the industrial revolution, it's gaining more market share, will that trigger more geopolitical or trade barriers from other trading partners, and that could derail China's rise in manufacturing?

We don't think so, because number one, China is shifting from made in China to made by China. China is working on upgrading with intelligent factories, with more industrial software, the ecosystem. So with that super cycle happening globally on reshoring, on re-industrialization, other countries are also building more and more factories.

But the foreign factories are running based on Chinese components and machinery. That's actually helping China to gain further market share. But end of the day, China is facing unbalanced growth model. Too much supply, too few consumer demand. They have to work on domestic reform, on social welfare to rebalance that growth model. That could create more demand opportunity for global firms as well. Only by doing that, I think it could try to manage the trade tensions in a better way.

Laura Wang: Thank you for a great discussion.

Robin Xing: Thank you.

Laura Wang: For those at home, if you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, feel free to share with a friend or colleague today.

Robin Xing: Thank you.

Narrator: You've been listening to Part One of a special two part episode from Morgan Stanley's 25th Annual Asia Pacific Summit. Join us Monday for Part Two of the conversation.

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