De-dehumanization: practicing humanity

There is today an idea of a single humanity, with each member equally valued, and a global legal framework exists to prevent needless human suffering, including in war. Dehumanization arises as the negation of a common, positive, and mutually supportive humanity, though there is no single definition, and it certainly predates its opposite. Research indicates that dehumanization increases the risk of conflict and violence, increases the risk of abuses therein, and makes it harder to resolve conflict. In this post – an overview of a forthcoming article written in her personal capacity – Natalie Deffenbaugh posits mirror definitions of humanity and dehumanization and what they mean, especially in relation to conflict and violence. She looks at why and how dehumanization happens and the real-world harm that can result when espoused or tacitly condoned by those holding power. She closes with an overview of how humanity, in global legal frameworks and as a Fundamental Principle, can curb and push back against some of the worst that dehumanization can do.

Based on the ICRC’s firsthand observations in and around cities in conflict across the globe, an evolved form of one of the oldest methods of warfare – siege and encirclement – remains a persistent feature of today’s urban battles. Civilians trapped within besieged areas or those displaced from them endure some of the most horrific humanitarian conditions. In this post, ICRC Legal Adviser Abby Zeith takes a closer look at contemporary urban siege and encirclement and the civilian harm that they cause, how international humanitarian law (IHL) regulates such methods of warfare, and why states and their policymakers and militaries need to do more to understand, prepare for, and mitigate civilian harm caused by such operations in the future.

For more than a decade, states have met at the UN in Geneva to discuss the governance of autonomous weapon systems (AWS). One pandemic, several real-world cases of artificial intelligence (AI) being used in targeting decisions, and numerous meetings later, there is a growing consensus among states that the challenges posed by AWS should be addressed through both prohibitions and restrictions, a so-called ‘two-tier’ approach. But while there is progress on the basic structure (i.e. two tiers), the actual content of these tiers is debated. To help states elaborate on possible elements of a two-tiered approach to the governance of AWS, Laura Bruun from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) points to three lessons from past arms control negotiations that can be applied to the AWS debate: First, a prohibition does not need to be grounded in a clearly defined class of weapons, second, restrictions can be used to clarify what international humanitarian law (IHL) requires in the specific context of AWS, and third, if there is will (and a need), two-tiered instruments can be grounded in concerns beyond IHL.

The Fourth Geneva Convention was the first humanitarian law convention dedicated to protections for civilians during armed conflict. Amongst its numerous protective rules, it also provides the main rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) governing the exceptional practice of internment of protected persons – detention of such persons for security reasons during international armed conflict. In this post, part of a series that delves into the grounds and procedures for internment contained in the Fourth Geneva Convention, Camilla Guldahl Cooper, Associate Professor at the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College, gives some context to certain rules in the Fourth Geneva Convention which apply to the initial decision to intern a protected person. She elaborates on what these rules require and how they have been taken into account in Norway’s military manual.

The legal and practical issues related to the exceptional practice of internment of protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention are complex. One such question is when internment begins. The treaty provides guidance on grounds for internment and the procedural safeguards to be applied, as well on the requisite conditions of internment, but is silent on when this type of detention actually starts. This gap in the law, which is the focus of examination, has proven time and again to have pernicious effects on the protection of detained civilians. In this post, and as part of a series on the rules governing the grounds and procedures for the internment of protected persons, former ICRC Senior Legal Adviser Jelena Pejic suggests that a detained civilian should be deemed an internee no later than two weeks after being deprived of liberty for reasons related to an armed conflict, if not released earlier or designated a criminal suspect.

The Fourth Geneva Convention, adopted 75 years ago, was the first humanitarian law convention dedicated to humanitarian protections for civilians during armed conflict. Amongst its numerous protective rules, it provides the main rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) governing the exceptional practice of internment of protected persons – i.e. the detention of such persons for security reasons during international armed conflict. In this post, and in the lead up to the 75th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions later this year, ICRC Legal Adviser Mikhail Orkin introduces a new series on how the rules governing the grounds and procedures for the internment of protected persons – the primary source for which is the Fourth Convention – have been interpreted, presenting a range of questions and challenges that states have faced in implementing these rules.

Can military training in international humanitarian law (IHL) lead to greater adherence to IHL and increased protection for civilians in war? In this post, Andrew Bell, a researcher in the ICRC’s Centre for Operational Research and Experience (CORE), outlines recent findings from his work reviewing results from U.S. Army surveys on the effects of IHL training on combatant views and behaviour in war. He demonstrates that training in IHL and norms of restraint can achieve significant effects in military forces, shaping both combatant attitudes and behaviour and generating more restraint in battlefield operations.

Today, there are over 120 armed conflicts around the world, involving over 60 states and 120 non-state armed groups. The majority of these armed conflicts are of a non-international character, the number of which has tripled since the turn of the millennium. To know what rules regulate an armed conflict, there is one crucial first step to take: its classification. In this post, and in the run-up to the 75th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions, ICRC Legal Advisers Samit D’Cunha, Tristan Ferraro, and Thomas de Saint Maurice introduce the latest ICRC Opinion Paper, which restates the rules, approaches and interpretations the organization uses to classify and declassify armed conflicts. They argue that, despite the many contemporary challenges, IHL remains today fit-for-purpose for the classification of armed conflicts.

Efforts to address the ethical challenges posed by autonomous weapon systems are growing. In December 2023, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution requesting the Secretary-General to seek states’ views for addressing, among other issues, the ethical challenges posed by these systems, and in April 2024 Austria is hosting the conference ‘Humanity at the Crossroads: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Challenge of Regulation’, with the aim of bringing ethical challenges to the fore. In this post, Alexander Blanchard, Senior Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), argues that while ethics has been a prominent part of international regulatory debate on autonomous weapon systems for years, the promise and potential of ethics for advancing that debate is still far from being realized. He holds that, for progress to happen, new efforts must be coupled with work to clarify the role of ethics for regulation.

The widespread use of heavy explosive weapons has reached alarming levels, exacting a staggering toll on civilian lives. From Gaza to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan to Syria, and Ukraine to Yemen and Myanmar, the suffering of civilians and destruction is immense, scarring communities long after the bombing stops – but it is also preventable. The Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, endorsed by 86 states worldwide, brings hope of long-term change for civilians caught in conflict. Yet if it is to bring about meaningful impact, it demands resolute action from endorsing states. In this post, a group of experts from organizations gathering alongside the global community of states to assess progress and challenges and discuss future prospects at the first international follow-up conference hosted by the Norwegian government in Oslo urgently call on states to faithfully implement their commitments and broaden the support for the Political Declaration. They argue that the success of the Declaration hinges on translating political will into meaningful action among endorsing states, including comprehensive policy reforms, enhanced training for military personnel, improved operational planning processes, and robust exchanges of experience and best practices to ensure better protection of civilians and compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL).