Menachot 15 - January 26, 8 Shvat

If one of the loaves of the two loaves for Shavuot or one of the sets of six loaves of the showbread become impure, are the others to be burned as well? Rabbi Yehuda holds that public offerings are all treated as one unit and therefore they are all disqualified and are burned. The rabbis disagree and permit them to be eaten. Rabbi Elazar limits their debate to a case where they became impure before the blood was sprinkled. According to Rav Papa, the debate centers on whether the tzitz atones for items that are to be eaten. If it atones for the bread, then the blood can be sprinkled and is effective to permit the other (pure) bread to be eaten. But if it does not atone for food items, the blood can be sprinkled, but since the bread was not complete at the time, it is forbidden to eat, as per Rabbi Yochanan's opinion in Menachot 9b. However, Rav Papa's explanation is rejected on three counts. First, Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis also disagree in a case where the item that was to be offered on the altar becomes impure. Second, Rabbi Yehuda's position by the Paschal sacrifice, as appears in the braita, demonstrates that the phrase "the communal offerings are not divided" has no connection at all to the tzitz atoning. Third, the Mishna states explicitly the reason for Rabbi Yehuda's position and it is because the communal offerings are not divided and not on account of the tzitz. In a thanksgiving (toda) offering, if there is a pigul thought about the meat, the breads are disqualified, but a pigul thought about the bread only disqualifies the bread, but not the meat. The same holds true for the two sheep regarding the accompanying breads. After attempting one explanation, which is rejected, the Gemara explains the reasoning behind the law – the bread comes on account of the animal offering, but the animal offering does not come on account of the bread. Both cases were necessary to bring, as one may have thought that the sheep and the accompanying breads are waved together and therefore might be considered completely one unit, but they are not. There are three different versions of a question Rabbi Elazar asked Rav. The first version: if one slaughters the animal for the toda offering with a thought to eat a half an olive-bulk of the meat and half an olive-bulk of the bread, do they combine to make the bread pigul? Rav answers that it is. The Gemara asks why a kal v'chomer reasoning isn't employed to lead us to say that the bread wouldn't be pigul, as it cannot even make the meat pigul. A difficulty is raised against that suggestion as in a similar situation regarding mixed breeds in a vineyard, that kind of kal v'chomer isn't used. But they distinguish between the two cases, resolving the difficulty. The second version has the same type question asked but regarding the two sheep offering and the accompanying breads. The third version of the question is about the meaning of someone's language if they slaughtered the sheep to "eat an olive-bulk of its friend tomorrow." Does "its friend" refer to the other sheep (it would not be pigul, as the sheep is a "permitter") or to the bread (it would be pigul as bread is not a "permitter")? Rav brings a tannaitic source which makes it clear that the meaning was the other sheep. The Gemara rejects this proof of Rav. What is the relationship between the sacrifice and its libations regarding pigul? Rabbi Meir holds that if the libations were already placed in a sanctified vessel and the sacrifice is brought with a pigul intent, the libations are disqualified as well. But a pigul thought regarding the libations only disqualifies the libation, not the sacrifice. In the Tosefta Zevachim 5:1, the rabbis bring counter arguments to Rabbi Meir. First, they view the libations as completely separate and do not agree with Rabbi Meir that they become disqualified if the sacrifice becomes pigul, as they can be brought up to ten days later. When Rabbi Meir qualifies his ruling to a case where the libations are brought together with the offering, the rabbis continue with another claim. Since the libations can be designated to a different sacrifice, that proves that they are not inherently connected. Rava explains that Rabbi Meir must have held that the libations cannot be designated for a different sacrifice. In the Tosefta, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree as well regarding the oil of the leper – if the guilt offering becomes pigul, does the oil become pigul as well, and the same discussion ensues.

Rabbi Yosi and the rabbis debate in the Mishna whether a pigul thought about eating one of the two loaves, while slaughtering both sheep of the Shavuot offering, would render only one loaf pigul or both. Rav Huna explains that Rabbi Yosi, who held that only one loaf is disqualified, would hold the same for a pigul thought about one limb of an animal sacrifice - and only that limb, and not the others, would be pigul. The Gemara brings a braita as a difficulty against Rav Huna. Since the braita cannot be explained according to the rabbis, it can only be explained according to Rabbi Yosi; however, the braita shows that the two breads combine to a requisite amount of an olive-bulk. That implies that the breads are viewed as one unit, and all the more so regarding parts of an animal's body. They attempt to emend the braita to fit with the rabbis' position, but that attempt is rejected due to the language of the braita. Rav Ashi and Ravina each raise difficulties for Rav Huna's position from other tannaitic sources. Rabbi Yochanan explains Rabbi Yosi's position and finds a way to reconcile it with the braita as well, by using drashot on the verses that lead to halakhot regarding the breads, which show that sometimes they are viewed as one unit and sometimes as two. Likewise, in the Mishna and braita—if the kohen does not combine them in his thoughts, they are treated as separate. If he does, they are considered combined. A braita explains that a thought during slaughtering can combine with a thought about sprinkling the blood to reach a requisite amount. A difficulty is raised from a braita of Levi. Rava tries to reconcile the braita with Rebbi's position, but Abaye rejects his suggestion. Even though a difficulty is raised against Abaye, he resolves it.  

Study Guide The Mishna states that an intent to eat half an olive-bulk and an intent to burn half an olive-bulk do not combine to create a status of pigul. The Gemara infers from this Mishna that two intents regarding eating - one concerning an item meant to be eaten and one concerning an item not meant to be eaten - would indeed combine to render the item pigul. This inference, however, contradicts the previous Mishna. Rabbi Yirmia simply rules that this Mishna follows a different opinion than the previous one, while Abaye rejects the inference entirely. The second chapter begins with a debate between Rabbi Yosi and the Rabbis regarding whether a pigul thought about burning the incense beyond the proper time would disqualify the mincha and render the remainder pigul. Reish Lakish explains the basis for Rabbi Yosi's position, that it is not pigul, as he holds that one permitter (matir) cannot turn another matir into pigul. A difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's explanation, but it is ultimately resolved. Rabbi Yannai rules that a kohen must collect the frankincense, and if this was performed by a non-kohen, it is disqualified. Rabbi Yirmia explains the reasoning by comparing it to holacha (conveying the offering to the altar), which requires a kohen. A difficulty is raised against this comparison, but it is resolved. Rav Meri brings a proof for Rabbi Yannai, but it is rejected. The Mishna raises a debate concerning offerings that consist of several parts—such as the two lambs and two loaves of bread (on Shavuot) or the two bowls of frankincense and two sets of six loaves of the showbread (Lechem HaPanim). The question is whether pigul thoughts during the sacrificing of the lambs or the burning of the frankincense regarding only a portion of the bread (e.g., one of the loaves) render all the loaves pigul.

The Mishna details the cases in which a meal-offering (mincha) becomes pigul (disqualified due to improper intent), carrying the penalty of karet (divine excision), and the cases where it is merely disqualified (pasul) without the liability of karet. A question is raised: According to the opinion that if the remnants (shirayim) were diminished between the removal of the handful (kemitza) and the burning of the handful (haktara), one still burns the handful - even though the remnants may not be eaten - does this act of burning still "count" regarding the laws of pigul (such that it is considered as if the rest was offered according to the law)? Furthermore, does it function to remove the prohibition of meila, misuse of consecrated property from the remaining remnants? Rav Huna and Rava both compare this case to a disqualification caused by the offering "leaving" its designated area (yotzei), but they do so from opposite directions - disputing whether yotzei is a more stringent or more lenient type of disqualification. Rava proves his position based on an emendation made by Rabbi Hiyya to the text of our Mishna. Abaye, however, rejects this proof. Ultimately, Rava retracts his initial stance based on a different source. Abaye rejects this argument as well.  

When a Kohen performs the kemitza, the presence of a pebble, a grain of salt, or a shard of frankincense within the handful renders the offering invalid. This is because the Torah requires a precise "handful," and these foreign objects either displace the necessary flour (making it "missing"). The Gemara explains the need for the Mishna to bring all these examples. Rava explains that kemitza is performed with all five fingers. Abaye questions this from a braita that explains the need for all five fingers, as can be seen from the name of each of the fingers. The fourth finger is called kemitza, implying that only the three middle fingers are used for kemitza. To resolve this Rava explains that all five fingers are used but not all for the scooping. The kohen extends his three middle fingers over his palm to gather the dough, while simultaneously using his thumb and pinky to level the scoop by wiping away any excess flour protruding from the edges. This ensures the volume is exactly the capacity of his palm. This is one of the most difficult actions to be performed in the Temple, among them melika and chafina. Rav Papa questions whether non-traditional methods - such as scooping with the fingertips facing down, or in other atypical ways, are valid, ultimately leaving these queries unresolved. He also questions different methods of chafina of the incense that the kohen gadol does on Yom Kippur. Rav Papa and Mar bar Rav Ashi question atypical ways of placing the kometz in the sanctified vessel. All these questions are left unresolved. If there is too much oil or too little added to the mincha offering it is disqualified. There is a discussion about how much is too much and in what cases does it disqualify. Regarding the frankincense (levona), there is a dispute regarding the minimum amount required for the offering to remain valid. Rabbi Meir holds that a full handful must be present, while Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon allow for a reduction to two granules or even a single granule, respectively. There is a debate about whether these three opinions are only relevant in frankincense brought as a supplement to a meal offering or also when the frankincense is brought as its own offering. The validity of the meal offering is also tied to the kohen's mental intent (machshava). If the kohen intends, while taking the kometz (parallel to the act of slaughtering an animal) to eat the remains or burn the handful of the meal offering or the frankincense outside the Temple courtyard, the offering is disqualified but does not carry the penalty of karet. However, if he intends to consume or burn the offering outside its designated timeframe (the following day), the offering becomes pigul. This status not only invalidates the sacrifice but also makes anyone who eats it liable for the punishment of karet.

Study Guide The section of the Torah concerning the metzora (leper) details two distinct tracks for sacrifices: one for the wealthy, who bring three animal offerings, and a modified track for the poor. The purification process involves pouring oil into the kohen's left hand, followed by sprinkling it toward the parochet and placing it on the leper's right ear, thumb, and toe. Notably, the text contains several seemingly superfluous phrases in the wealthy leper's section, as well as extensive repetitions in the poor leper's section that could have been simplified with a cross-reference like "as mentioned above." Rabbi Zeira and Rava offer different explanations for these repetitions. Both scholars derive that the kemitza of the mincha (meal offering) must be performed with the right hand, but they reach this conclusion via different paths. Rabbi Zeira learns it from the fourfold mention of the word "left" in the leper section. In contrast, Rava utilizes a gezeira shava based on the word "right" used in the context of placing oil on the leper's ear, thumb, and toe, applying that requirement to the kemitza. Reish Lakish teaches a broader principle: whenever the Torah uses the words "finger" (etzba) or "kohen" the service must be performed with the right hand. While the Gemara initially assumes both words must appear together to trigger this requirement, Rava clarifies that either word alone is sufficient. However, following a challenge from Abaye, Rava distinguishes between two scenarios: in cases where the action is essential for atonement, either word indicates the right hand; in cases where the action is not essential for atonement, both words must be present to mandate the right hand. A difficulty is raised against Rava's explanation based on the position of Rabbi Shimon. To resolve this, the Gemara suggests that Rabbi Shimon requires both words in all instances. Two subsequent challenges to this theory and one is resolved by further refining Rabbi Shimon's position: the appearance of the word "finger" alone necessitates the right hand, but the word "kohen" does not, unless it appears in conjunction with "finger." If Rava holds that "finger" or "kohen" already serves as an indicator for using the right hand, why did he originally use a gezeira shava to learn this regarding kemitza? The Gemara explains that he requires two separate derivations - one for the act of kemitza itself and another for placing the kometz into a sanctified vessel. This theory is again questioned in light of Rabbi Shimon's view that the kometz does not require a vessel at all. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes the gezeira shava (for Rabbi Shimon) is necessary for the sinner's meal offering; otherwise, one might have thought it could be performed with the left hand, as, according to Rabbi Shimon himself, this specific offering is not intended to be mehudar (ornate or distinguished).

Earlier, Rabbi Yochanan employed the principle that something that takes place in the Temple courtyard can obviously also be performed in the Sanctuary (such as slaughtering the peace offering), as the Sanctuary is more sanctified. However, in a different situation, a verse is needed to derive that items permitted to be eaten in the courtyard can also be eaten in the Sanctuary (in unique circumstances). Why was a verse needed if the principle of Rabbi Yochanan could have been used? The Gemara answers by distinguishing between a ritual (slaughtering) and eating. There are three debates between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding mincha (meal) offerings. First, if they are mixed outside the Temple courtyard, are they disqualified? Second, if the mincha batter is missing some part before the kemitza (handful) is taken, can it be refilled? Third, if the remainder is missing a part after the kometz is taken, can the kemitza be burned? In each debate, the Gemara explains the reasoning behind each approach. In all three instances, a support is brought for Rabbi Yochanan or a difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's position which remains unanswered. In the third debate, a difficulty is also raised against Rabbi Yochanan's position but is resolved. The Mishna ruled that if the kohen performs the kemitza with his left hand, it is disqualified. The source for this is that when explaining the process of the leper's purification, the text specifically says "left hand." Since the text regarding the mincha offering simply says "hand" without the word "left," we can assume that if an action can be done with the left, the Torah will specifically say "left"; conversely, if it appears without specifying a hand, it must refer to the right hand. The Gemara questions this drasha, suggesting that perhaps the verse is not intended to teach about other mentions of the word "hand." However, after pointing out that the phrase "left hand" appears four times in the section on the leper's purification, it becomes clear that the repetition comes to teach that in other cases where the word "hand" is mentioned, it refers exclusively to the right hand.  

Rabbi Eliezer holds that when the Kohen accepts the blood from a sacrifice into a sanctified vessel, there must be enough collected in that single bowl to be used for placing the blood on the altar. If one collects some blood in one bowl and some in another, and later mixes them together before performing the placements, the blood is not sanctified. The Gemara suggests that Rabbi Eliezer contradicts himself, as regarding the Kohen Gadol's griddle-cake offering (minchat chavitin), he holds that it is sanctified even if placed in two separate bowls. To resolve this, the Gemara first suggests that perhaps Rabbi Eliezer does not derive one law from another—specifically, a mincha offering from blood. However, this is rejected because Rabbi Eliezer does derive laws for a mincha from the bowls of frankincense of the Showbread. In conclusion, the Gemara distinguishes between learning a mincha offering from another mincha-style offering and learning a mincha offering from an animal sacrifice (blood). Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Elazar regarding the minchat chavitin and rules that it is not sanctified if placed in the vessel in parts. Rabbi Acha brings the source in the Torah for his prohibition, and the Gemara brings two braitot that support his opinion and contradict Rabbi Elazar's position. Rabbi Yochanan's position regarding the Kohen Gadol's griddle-cake offering (minchat chavitin) is questioned in light of a position he holds against Rav in a case of a regular mincha offering that is sanctified even before the person completely filled the vessel with the fine flour. Why does he differentiate between the cases? The Gemara then asks about Rav, who disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan and requires the vessel to be filled: would he hold like Rabbi Yochanan or Rabbi Elazar regarding the minchat chavitin offering? They conclude that since he derives one item from another (on a different mincha-related issue), he would derive from the minchat chavitin to here, and therefore he must hold like Rabbi Yochanan by the minchat chavitin and requires it to be complete to sanctify. Since the Gemara mentions a different mincha-related issue where Rav derives one thing from another, they quote that source in its entirety and delve into his debate with Rabbi Chanina about mincha offerings where not all the parts were added yet to the bowl – are they sanctified without everything being there? At the beginning of the daf, Rabbi Elazar had made a comparison of taking the kometz from a mincha in the Sanctuary, which is permitted as it is derived from the bowls of frankincense from the Showbread. Rabbi Yirmia raises a difficulty against this from a braita, but the drasha in that braita is reinterpreted to fit with Rabbi Elazar's ruling.

According to Yosi ben Yasiyan and Rabbi Yehuda the Baker, ben Beteira permits returning a kometz taken in a disqualified manner to the original dough, provided it has not yet been placed in a sanctified vessel. Rav Nachman challenges this ruling: if taking the kometz is a significant ritual, the act should be irreversible; if it is not, placing it in a sanctified vessel should be meaningless. Rav Nachman resolves this by explaining that while taking the kometz is indeed a ritual act, it is not complete until the kometz is placed in the vessel. If so, the Gemara objects, returning the kometz to the original dough - which is also held in a sanctified vessel - should complete the act and permanently disqualify it. This difficulty is answered in two ways. Rabbi Yochanan answers that one can derive a principle from here: sanctified vessels only sanctify items if they are placed inside with intent to sanctify. The Gemara questions this assumption, noting that it implies one could intentionally sanctify disqualified items; yet, Rabbi Yochanan previously answered Reish Lakish that disqualified items cannot be sanctified for the altar by being placed in a sanctified vessel. This contradiction is resolved by distinguishing between sanctifying an item to permit it to be offered on the altar (which is not effective) and sanctifying an item merely to disqualify it (which is effective). Rav Amram answers the original question by qualifying the case to when the kometz is returned to a heaping bowl. As a sanctified vessel only sanctifies what is within the walls of the vessel, the kometz is not sanctified to be disqualified when placed back in the original vessel. After raising a difficulty regarding the reality of this case, his answer is partially modified to a level bowl, not heaping. Rabbi Yirmia tells Rabbi Zeira that he derives from the fact that they did not suggest returning it to the vessel when it was on the ground, that the actions of kemitza do not need to be performed while a kohen is holding the vessel in his hands. Rabbi Zeira points out that this was an issue raised by Rav Nachman to Avimi, who explained that the kohen indeed needs to be holding the vessel. Rav Sheshet disagrees, holding that the Kohen does not need to be holding the vessel for all the actions of kemitza. He derives this from the laws of the Showbread, as he understands from a Mishna that the kohanim did not hold up the Table when the Showbread and bowls of frankincense was switched at the end of each week. Rav brings a third position: The first two actions - placing the dough in the bowl and taking the kemitza - do not require the kohen to be holding the vessel, but the kometz must be placed in a vessel held by a kohen, as it is parallel to accepting the blood of a sacrifice.

Rav Sheisha brings a fifth explanation of an ambiguous line in the braita brought on Menachot 5b, "If you had raised a difficulty on the logical argument." As in all the previous explanations, also this one is rejected. Rav Ashi suggests that one could knock out the logical argument from the beginning as perhaps one could not even bring a kal v'chomer from blemished animals as they have a stringency. This suggestion of Rav Ashi is modified a few times and ultimately his explanation is that if one were to make a kal v'chomer with both blemished animals and ones born not through natural childbirth, one could reject that kal v'chomer as they both have a stringency that is not in a treifa as they have noticeable issues, whereas a treifa is not necessarily noticeable. The braita concluded that the source for a treifa not being able to be offered on the altar is derived from "from the cattle." However, two other verses also are used to exclude a treifa. Why are all three verses necessary? The Mishna rules that any meal offering that the kemitza is done by a non-kohen, onen, impure person, etc. (i.e. not in the proper manner), is disqualified. Ben Beteira disagrees and explains that if it was done with the left hand, one returns the kometz to the pile and redoes it with the right hand. If a kohen took the kemitza but there was something else in there like a pebble or frankincense, it is invalid as the kemitza must be a precise handful, no more and no less. The Gemara first questions the language of the Mishna – why does it list the mincha offering brought for a sin together separately from the others. The answer is that the Mishna is highlighting that even according to Rabbi Shimon who holds that a sinner's offering should not be glorious, it still needs to be done properly. Even though in Zevachim, the parallel Mishna relating to sacrifices does not single out the sin offering, the Gemara explains why there was no need there to explain it according to Rabbi Shimon, but there was a need here. Rav explains that any disqualification can be fixed by redoing it. At first, they question Rav's ruling in light of the rabbis' position in the Mishna, but then they explain that Rav holds like ben Beteira and is coming to explain that even though ben Beteira only mentioned the disqualification of the left hand in the Mishna, his ruling applies for all disqualifications. The Gemara raises a difficulty on this from tannaitic sources that show that this was clear even before Rav made his statement. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different explanation – that Rav was pointing out that ben Beteira permits it to be redone even if the kometz was placed in a sanctified vessel, which disagrees with a tannaitic opinion that it can be fixed only if it wasn't yet placed in a sanctified vessel. According to others, Rav is coming to teach the exact opposite and to show that he agrees with the tannaitic opinion that it can only be fixed if it was not yet placed in the vessel.