S9 Ep54: Does sacking the manager work?

Your football team keeps losing. The season is slipping away. One thing can be changed by Friday, and the crowd is already singing about it: sack the manager.Jan van Ours (Erasmus School of Economics, CEPR, Feyenoord fan) has looked at seven seasons of the Dutch top flight and 31 managers who were sacrificed mid-season. To work out whether any of them deserved it, he uses bookmaker odds and expected goals to distinguish bad play from bad luck. The new-manager bounce is real: results improve after a new manager walks in. But also, not real: clubs that don't sack the manager have an upturn too. The message for the boardroom, in football and business, is that not doing anything might often be the best course of action.The research behind this episode:van Ours, Jan C. 2026. "Dust in the Wind: Causes and Consequences of Managerial Replacements." CEPR Discussion Paper DP21850, Centre for Economic Policy Research. The paper is gated.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Jan van Ours. 2026. "Does sacking the manager work?" VoxTalks Economics (podcast).About the guestJan van Ours is Emeritus Professor of Applied Economics at Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, and a core member of the Erasmus Centre for Applied Sports Economics. He is also Adjunct Professor at the Center for Health Economics, Monash Business School, and a Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. His research spans unemployment dynamics, labour market policy, health and well-being, and the economics of professional sport, where match data offer a rare chance to watch a labour market in the open.Research cited in this episodeThe Eredivisie sample. Seven seasons of the top league of Dutch professional football, from 2018/19 to 2024/25, covering 4,136 match observations and 126 club-seasons. In that period 31 managers were replaced during a season; about 15% had gone by mid-season and 25% by the end of it.Points surprise. The cumulative gap, from the first match of the season, between the points a club has won and the points the bookmakers implied it should have won. Bookmaker odds are used as the benchmark because they already contain everything the market knows about squad quality, home advantage and the opposition; van Ours confirms this in the data, finding that recent results add nothing to the odds as a predictor of the next match.Performance surprise. The same cumulative gap, but measured with expected points derived from expected goals rather than actual results. Points surprise catches a club that is losing. Performance surprise catches a club that is playing badly. A club can be one without being the other, which is how luck gets separated from ability.Expected goals. The probability that a given shot becomes a goal, estimated from thousands of comparable attempts and conditioned on the distance and angle of the shooter, the body part used, and the type of pass and attack. Van Ours converts expected goals scored and conceded into a distribution of match outcomes, and from that into expected points. His data come from fbref.com; the paper notes that match-level expected goals were discontinued in January 2026 after a dispute between fbref and Opta.The counterfactual replacement. The device that carries the paper. For each actual sacking, van Ours searches the same club in a different season for a moment when the sum of points surprise and performance surprise was almost identical, and the manager survived. Of the 31 replacements, 22 have a counterfactual, 19 of them unique. Clubs that sacked the manager gained 0.21 points per match afterwards. Clubs in the same trouble that did not sack the manager gained 0.38.Scapegoating. William Gamson and Norman Scotch set out the idea in "Scapegoating in baseball" in the American Journal of Sociology in 1964, describing the sacking of a manager as an anxiety-reducing ritual that participants treat as an improvement whether or not anything improves. Van Ours returns to it to explain why a decision with no measurable effect keeps being taken.Managers in regular firms. Stuart Gilson's 1989 study in the Journal of Financial Economics found that replaced executives were not employed by another firm for at least three years. Football managers are frequently back in work within weeks, which is one reason the job pays what it does. Hilger, Mankel and Richter reviewed 91 studies of top executive dismissals published between 1960 and 2010 and concluded that the effects of managerial turnover are not statistically different from zero.Related reading on VoxEU.orgWhat we can learn about economics from professional sport during COVID-19, a VoxEU column on why sport keeps producing clean natural experiments for economists.Racial bias in newspaper ratings of professional football players, a VoxEU column using match ratings to test for discrimination in a labour market where output is measured in public every week.

The new episode of VoxTalks Economics traces the effects of South Americans populism, left and right. Alejandro Werner (Georgetown Americas Institute) is one of the authors of a new paper that traces populist governments across Latin America back to 1970. He argues that they follow a strikingly similar script: they expand spending, weaken the institutions built to restrain them, and ride the wave until inflation catches up with them. But the most recent generation of leaders -- Chávez and Maduro, the Kirchners, Correa, and Morales -- lasted longer than their predecessors. Why?The research behind this episode:Magud, Nicolás E., Antonio Spilimbergo, and Alejandro Werner. 2026. "Lessons from Populism in Latin America." Paper presented at the second Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues Conference, June 2026. Forthcoming in Economic Policy.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Alejandro Werner. 2026. "Lessons from Populism in Latin America." VoxTalks Economics (podcast).About the guestAlejandro Werner is the founding director of the Georgetown Americas Institute and a nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. He spent nine years as director of the International Monetary Fund's Western Hemisphere Department, and earlier held senior posts at Mexico's finance ministry and central bank. His research spans macroeconomic policy, fiscal sustainability, and financial crises across Latin America.Research cited in this episodeThe Global Populism Database, built by political scientist Kirk Hawkins and colleagues, codes the rhetoric of presidents and prime ministers on a scale from zero (not populist) to two (highly populist), reading inauguration and campaign speeches for anti establishment language, appeals to "the people," and simple, direct phrasing. Magud, Spilimbergo, and Werner use this index, rather than a leader's policies, to decide who counts as a populist, which keeps their definition independent of the outcomes they go on to measure.Dornbusch and Edwards' "macroeconomics of populism," from their 1991 edited volume of the same name, was the first systematic account of how Latin American leaders combine expansionary spending with price controls, and how the resulting shortages and capital flight bring the cycle to an end. The new paper tests whether that pattern still holds three decades on.Funke, Schularick and Trebesch (2023), published in the American Economic Review, built an alternative populism index from historical case studies rather than speeches, and found that populist leaders leave a drag on economic activity that can persist for up to fifteen years after they leave office. Werner and his coauthors use this index as a robustness check on their own results.Local projections, a method developed by the economist Oscar Jorda  in 2005, trace how a variable such as inflation or the real exchange rate evolves in the years after a shock, in this case the arrival of a populist government, without imposing the structure of a full macroeconomic model.The commodity terms of trade windfall, a measure developed by Gustavo Adler and Magud, calculates the extra income a country earns when its export prices rise relative to its import prices. The paper uses this measure to show that the populist governments with the largest windfalls, including Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, stayed in power the longest.More VoxTalks Economics episodesFiscal Populism and Monetary Policy, recorded at the same EP conference, in which Magud talks to Tim Phillips about how a government's fiscal stance interacts with the credibility of its central bank.The Dollar Anchor Is Slipping, Tarek Hassan talks to Tim Phillips about what happens when the dollar's role as the world's safe asset comes under strain.Related reading on VoxEU.orgFour decades of terms of trade booms, a VoxEU column by Magud and Adler that introduces the income windfall measure used in this paper, and shows how much larger Latin America's most recent commodity boom was than those of the 1970s.Effects of commodity price windfalls on external debt: the role of political institutions, a VoxEU column by Rabah Arezki showing that commodity windfalls tend to be saved where executive power is constrained, and spent where it is not, a pattern that echoes this paper's account of institutional decay under populist rule.

April 2025: Liberation Day. President Trump announces sweeping new tariffs. And then, the dollar did something a safe haven currency is not supposed to do: it fell.Tarek Hassan (Boston University, CEPR), working with Thomas Mertens, Jingye Wang and Tony Zhang, has been investigating what makes a currency the global anchor. Being the world's biggest economy helps, but what really matters is how far an economy's shocks affect world prices. Tariffs reduce this effect. But are we near a tipping point, when the euro takes over as the global reserve currency? We might be closer than you think and, if a change happens, it might happen more quickly than you think too.This is the third of four episodes drawn from papers commissioned for the second Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues conference, held in Venice on 19 and 20 June 2026 and organised by CEPR, CESifo and Sciences Po.The research behind this episode:Hassan, Tarek A., Thomas M. Mertens, Jingye Wang, and Tony Zhang. 2026. "Openness, Integration, and the International Monetary Order." Conference draft, presented at the 2nd Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues Conference, Venice, 19 to 20 June 2026. Forthcoming in Economic Policy.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Tarek A. Hassan. 2026. "The Dollar Anchor Is Slipping." VoxTalks Economics (podcast).About the guestTarek A. Hassan is Professor of Economics at Boston University, a Research Fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. His research spans international finance, macro-finance, and the political economy of growth, from measuring firm-level political risk with large language models to, in this paper, the size and openness that decide which currency the world treats as safe.Research cited in this episodeLiberation Day and the April 2025 tariffs. On 2 April 2025, the White House announced a sweeping set of import tariffs. Hassan and his co-authors treat the market reaction to that announcement, in which the dollar fell even as US interest rates rose and US stocks underperformed, as the anomaly their model is built to explain; a currency behaving that way in a crisis usually counts as risky, not safe. CEPR has gathered further commentary on the announcement and its aftermath on its Trump and Tariffs page.Exorbitant privilege. A term coined in the 1960s for the advantage the United States gets from issuing the world's reserve currency, since foreign investors will hold dollar assets at a lower return than they would demand elsewhere. Hassan uses it to explain why Americans can borrow more cheaply than almost anyone else, and why losing anchor status would raise the US government's own borrowing costs.Effective size. The paper's central idea. It is not simply how big an economy is, but how much weight its shocks carry in setting world prices, which depends on both actual size and openness to trade and capital flows. Tariffs and capital controls both reduce a country's effective size without touching its GDP, which is how they can knock a currency out of contention as a global anchor.The Budget Lab at Yale's tariff tracker. The paper draws its estimate that the current average tariff on US imports and exports, once retaliation is included, runs at around 12% from The Budget Lab at Yale (2025), Where We Stand: The Fiscal, Economic, and Distributional Effects of All US Tariffs Enacted in 2025 Through April 2, a running assessment of US trade policy maintained by the nonpartisan Budget Lab at Yale.Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff's exchange rate classification. Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff. 2019. "Exchange Arrangements Entering the Twenty-First Century: Which Anchor Will Hold?" Quarterly Journal of Economics 134 (2). This dataset classifies the de facto exchange rate regime of 141 economies. Hassan and his co-authors use it to calibrate their model and to show that the share of countries pegging tightly to the dollar falls with country size almost exactly as their theory predicts.The Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness. Chinn, Menzie D., and Hiro Ito. 2006. "What Matters for Financial Development? Capital Controls, Institutions, and Interactions." Journal of Development Economics 81 (1): 163 to 192. This widely used index scores how open a country's capital account is to cross-border investment. China scores close to the bottom, in the same range as India, Russia, Brazil and Pakistan, while the United States and the eurozone score close to the maximum, which is central to why Hassan treats the renminbi as a non-contender for anchor status while capital controls remain in place.More VoxTalks Economics episodesTariffs, Uncertainty, and the Exchange Rate, the first episode in this series, in which Alfonso Merendino and Tommaso Monacelli offer another explanation of why the dollar fell rather than rose after the 2025 tariffs.How Exchange Rates Responded to Tariffs, in which Giancarlo Corsetti also tells Tim Phillips what happened to the dollar after Liberation Day, and why the textbook response did not show up.Related reading on VoxEU.orgTariffs and US Dollar Depreciations: Not So Surprising After All, a VoxEU column in which Giancarlo Corsetti, Simon Lloyd and Daniel Ostry argue that the dollar's fall after Liberation Day looks less puzzling once expected retaliation and long run risk are taken into account.Tariffs, Global Imbalances, and the Dollar, in which Oleg Itskhoki and Dmitry Mukhin examine whether tariffs aimed at shrinking the US trade deficit can actually work, and what trying would mean for the dollar.

There is a saying in Spanish: get burned by hot milk, and the sight of a cow makes you cry. New research implies that, decades after a populist government leaves office, the central bank it once tried to control is still flinching.Martín Uribe (Columbia) and Nicolás Magud (IMF) have investigated the long-run effect of populist governments that leaned on their central banks to print money and feed inflation. They find that these central banks raise interest rates more aggressively than others when inflation drifts above target, even decades later.This is the second of four episodes drawn from papers commissioned for the second Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues conference, organised by CEPR, CESifo and Sciences Po.The research behind this episode:Jácome, Luis, Nicolás E. Magud, Samuel Pienknagura, and Martín Uribe. 2026. "Fiscal Populism and Monetary Policy Rules." Conference draft, presented at the 2nd Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues Conference, Venice, 19-20 June 2026. Forthcoming in Economic Policy.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, Martín Uribe, and Nicolás E. Magud. 2026. "Fiscal Populism and Monetary Policy." VoxTalks Economics (podcast).About the guestsMartin Uribe is the Robert A. Mundell Professor of Economics at Columbia University and a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. His research spans international macroeconomics and the theory of monetary and fiscal policy, with recent work on tariff shocks, fiscal dominance, and the long-run legacy of high inflation on how central banks set policy. He is editor-in-chief of the Journal of International Economics.Nicolás E. Magud is a Senior Economist in the International Monetary Fund's Western Hemisphere Department. His research spans open-economy macroeconomics, with a focus on fiscal policy, exchange rates, capital flows, and capital controls, much of it drawn from Latin America's long experience of inflation and central bank reform.Research cited in this episodeThe populist leaders database. Funke, Manuel, Moritz Schularick, and Christoph Trebesch. 2023. "Populist Leaders and the Economy." American Economic Review 113 (12): 3249-88. The authors classify a leader as populist if their rhetoric splits society into "the people" against "the elites," then divide populists into left-wing, whose target is economic elites, and right-wing, whose target is foreigners and minorities. Deficit monetisation and "unpleasant monetarist arithmetic." Sargent, Thomas J., and Neil Wallace. 1981. "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic." Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 5 (3). The paper that established the mechanism this episode turns on: when a government's deficit is financed by its own central bank printing money rather than by selling bonds to the public, the result is inflation. It gives the paper's account of populism and central bank credit its theoretical backbone.Local projections difference-in-differences. Dube, Arindrajit, Daniele Girardi, Oscar Jorda , and Alan M. Taylor. 2025. "A Local Projections Approach to Difference-in-Differences." Journal of Applied Econometrics 40 (7): 741-58. The statistical method behind the paper's headline charts. It compares countries that have just installed a populist government against "clean" control countries with no recent populist history, tracking central bank credit year by year after the change of regime.The Central Bank Independence Extended (CBIE) index. Romelli, Davide. 2022. "The Political Economy of Reforms in Central Bank Design: Evidence from a New Dataset." Economic Policy 37 (112): 641-88. A dataset scoring central bank laws on their independence, including limits on lending to government. The paper uses it to show that countries with a populist past, especially a left-wing one, now have stricter legal limits on central bank lending than countries with no such history.Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. The paper's three historical case studies. In Argentina, governments from Perón onward repeatedly rewrote central bank law to permit financing of the treasury, contributing to repeated bouts of high inflation and, eventually, hyperinflation in the 1980s. In Chile, the Allende government printed money to fund an expansion of the state, and inflation reached roughly 600% in 1973 before the government was overthrown. In Mexico, President Echeverría's public investment drive in the 1970s was financed in part by the central bank, feeding an inflation and currency crisis that culminated in the country's 1982 default. Uribe and Magud point to these episodes as the historical template their statistical results describe.Related reading on VoxEUCentral bank independence: An update, a VoxEU column in which Sylvester Eijffinger and Jakob de Haan argue that legal independence alone does not shield a central bank from political pressure to loosen policy.Recent trends in central bank independence, in which Davide Romelli, whose index this paper uses to track legal independence, documents a fresh wave of reforms strengthening central banks worldwide since 2016.

Textbook economics says a tariff should strengthen a country's currency. Since the start of 2025, as US tariffs rose ... and the dollar fell.In the first of four episodes of Voxtalks based on papers presented at the second Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues conference, Alfonso Merendino (Bocconi University) and Tommaso Monacelli (Bocconi University, CEPR) tell Tim Phillips what they found when they looked for reasons. Their conclusion: for tariffs, it's not size, it is how permanent people expect it to be. They call this structural trade policy uncertainty. When that uncertainty is low, a tariff behaves exactly as the textbook says. When it's high, the same tariff can weaken the currency, shrink output and pull down inflation instead.The research behind this episode:Merendino, Alfonso, and Tommaso Monacelli. 2026. "Tariffs, Uncertainty, and the Exchange Rate." Conference draft, presented at the 2nd Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues Conference, Venice, 19-20 June 2026. Forthcoming in Economic Policy.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, Tommaso Monacelli, and Alfonso Merendino. 2026. "Tariffs, Uncertainty, and the Exchange Rate." VoxTalks Economics (podcast).About the guestsTommaso Monacelli is Professor of Economics at Bocconi University and a Research Fellow of IGIER Bocconi and CEPR. His research spans international macroeconomics, monetary policy and the business cycle, with recent work on tariffs and monetary policy, supply chain uncertainty and inflation, and heterogeneous bank models of monetary transmission. He is co-editor of the Journal of International Economics and was managing co-editor of Economic Policy from 2016 to 2021.Alfonso Merendino is a PhD student in Economics at Yale University and a Research Fellow at the Social Economics Lab. He recently completed a research placement in macroeconomic modelling at the European Central Bank, and holds a Bachelor's and Master's degree in Economics from Bocconi University, where this paper was written.Research cited in this episodeStructural trade-policy uncertainty (S-TPU). The paper's central measure, capturing uncertainty not about the size of a tariff but about how persistent the trade-policy regime behind it will be. Merendino and Monacelli split observed US tariff rates from 1990 to 2025 into a persistent component and a short-lived transitory one, using a state-space model with separate volatility for each, and define S-TPU as the volatility of the persistent component.The 2017 US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The authors' example of a pure S-TPU shock. The withdrawal changed no tariff rate on impact, but it reshuffled expectations about the durability of US trade policy, and their index of structural uncertainty spikes at this point."Liberation Day" tariffs, April 2025. The sweeping tariff package announced by the Trump administration on 2 April 2025. The paper treats this, alongside the 2018 Section 301 tariffs on China, as one of two clearly identified tariff shocks used to anchor its statistical model.Aggregate trade-policy uncertainty index. Caldara, Dario, Matteo Iacoviello, Patrick Molligo, Andrea Prestipino, and Andrea Raffo. 2020. "The Economic Effects of Trade Policy Uncertainty." Journal of Monetary Economics 109: 38-59. This newspaper-based index of trade-policy uncertainty mixes announcement noise with genuine regime change; Merendino and Monacelli show that conditioning on it, rather than on their narrower S-TPU measure, erases the state-dependent pattern they document.Narrative-dominance identification. The technique the authors use to isolate tariff shocks in their statistical model, adapted from Juan Antolín-Díaz and Juan F. Rubio-Ramírez. 2018. "Narrative Sign Restrictions for SVARs." American Economic Review 108 (10). Rather than imposing a full statistical model, the method anchors identification to a small number of clearly documented policy events, such as the 2018 and 2025 tariff rounds, and lets everything else, including the sign of the exchange-rate response, be estimated freely from the data.More VoxTalks Economics episodesThe second Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues conference follows the first, held in Paris in December 2025. Three earlier VoxTalks Economics episodes from that Paris conference asked what comes next for Ukraine's economy.What's next for Ukraine: Investment, in which Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Maurice Obstfeld argue that forgiving Ukraine's war debt, rather than treating it as an obstacle, is essential to attracting the $40 billion a year that reconstruction needs.What's next for Ukraine: Reconstruction, in which Edward Glaeser, Martina Kirchberger, and Andrii Parkhomenko argue that postwar Tokyo, not Warsaw or Berlin, is the right model for rebuilding Ukraine's cities.What's next for Ukraine: The labour market, in which Giacomo Anastasia documents the surprising resilience of Ukraine's wartime labour market.Related reading on VoxEUTariffs and US dollar depreciations: Not so surprising after all, a VoxEU column in which Giancarlo Corsetti, Simon Lloyd, and Daniel Ostry argue that the dollar's fall after Liberation Day is explained by foreign retaliation, a different mechanism from the persistence channel that Merendino and Monacelli identify.Tariffs, the dollar, and equities: High-frequency evidence from the Liberation Day announcement, in which Jonathan Hartley and Alessandro Rebucci show that the dollar depreciated on impact on 2 April 2025, against the standard prediction, and trace this to foreign investors rebalancing away from US equities.

Norwegian conscripts arrive at boot camp straight out of school. They are assigned at random to a shared room and they live in it for the next eight weeks. Whatever the culture of that room turns out to be, they are stuck with it.We know that the military everywhere has a poor record on sexual harassment. Johanna Rickne (Stockholm University, CEPR) and her co-authors wanted to reduce its acceptance, and the number of incidents. Compulsory training, standing a in a room a showing a PowerPoint, has a poor record. It can even inspire a backlash. Instead,  they included two pieces of information in a 20-minute enrolment survey. One fact was about how women score on the army's own end-of-service assessments. The other was about what last year's recruits really thought about crude sexual jokes. Eight weeks later, the researchers came back to see what had changed for the 949 recruits.The research behind this episode:Olle Folke, Torbjørn Hanson, Åshild A. Johnsen, Andreas Kotsadam, and Johanna Rickne. 2026. "Targeting Attitudes to Combat Sexual Harassment: A Randomized Intervention in the Norwegian Military." CEPR Discussion Paper 21475. The discussion paper is gated. It is also published in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Johanna Rickne. 2026. "Combatting sexual harassment in the military." VoxTalks Economics (podcast).About the guestJohanna Rickne is Professor of Economics at the Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI) at Stockholm University, and holds part-time chairs at the University of Nottingham and the Stockholm School of Economics. She is affiliated with the Centre for Economic Policy Research. Her research spans labour economics, political economics and gender economics, with sustained work on sexual harassment as a workplace hazard, on who ends up in political office, and on what makes work meaningful. She won the Assar Lindbeck Medal in 2023.Research cited in this episodeThe Sexual Experiences Questionnaire is the behavioural instrument used to measure prevalence here. Rather than asking people whether they were sexually harassed, a term that different people read very differently, it presents a list of specific behaviours and asks whether each one happened. The version used in Norway runs to 14 items and is adapted from the questionnaire developed for the US military.Gender harassment is one of three categories in the standard model of sexual harassment, alongside unwanted sexual attention and sexual coercion. It covers hostile or demeaning conduct based on someone's sex or gender that is not necessarily sexual in nature, including remarks that a person is not suited to the job. In this boot camp it was the most common behaviour reported by women.Backlash from compliance training is the reason the intervention avoids looking like training at all. Mark Roehling, Dongyuan Wu, Mahl Geum Choi and James Dulebohn's 2022 meta-analysis in Personnel Psychology gathers the evidence on what harassment training does and does not shift; other studies find that employees most inclined to harass become more tolerant of the behaviour after being told how to behave. Voluntary sessions have the opposite problem, in that those employees do not turn up.Misperceived social norms supply the mechanism for the second piece of information. Leonardo Bursztyn, Alessandra Gonzalez and David Yanagizawa-Drott's study of Saudi Arabian husbands showed that men privately supported their wives working outside the home while badly underestimating how many other men agreed; correcting the misperception changed what those men did. The boot camp version asks recruits what their predecessors thought about sexualised jokes, then tells them the answer.The Norwegian Armed Forces service statement is the source of the first piece of information. Recruits are assessed at the end of service on leadership, responsibility, collaboration, professional competence and judgement. Average scores show no gender gap; the graph was shown to the treated recruits in this experiment.The vignette holds the harassment event constant across everyone who answers. Recruits read a short scenario set in a room like their own and rate six statements about it, covering whether the conduct counts as harassment, what the woman should do, and what any bystanders owe her. Because the incident is fixed, differences in the answers cannot be explained away by differences in what people happened to experience.Sexual harassment and gender inequality is the wider agenda this episode sits inside. Olle Folke and Johanna Rickne's 2022 paper in the Quarterly Journal of Economics uses Swedish survey and administrative data to show that harassment risk falls hardest on whichever sex is in the minority in a workplace, and that it pushes people out of jobs.More VoxTalks Economics episodesViolence against women in politics. Gianmarco Daniele on why women who win office in Italy are far more likely than men to be attacked, and what that does to who stands for election in the first place.Violence against women at work. Abi Adams-Prassl on Finnish police records linked to employment data, and what happens to the careers of the victim and the perpetrator after one colleague assaults another.Related reading on VoxEU.orgDiscrimination in work conditions: The case of sexual harassment, a VoxEU column by Johanna Rickne and Olle Folke arguing that economists should treat sexual harassment as gender discrimination in working conditions, and showing that both men and women carry the risk when they are the gender minority.

In the oldest Japanese municipalities, close to half the residents are already over 65. As young people move to cities, the retailers close, then the clinics, then the bus that used to reach the next town. Rural Japan is not simply ageing: it is emptying.Elisa Giannone (CREI, CEPR) and her co-authors have analysed Japan's 1,741 municipalities from 1980 onwards. The oldest quarter of them lost around 26% of their population by 2010; the youngest quarter grew by 22%, and the gap between them is still widening. Taxing city dwellers could reverse the trend. But that's a century-long policy, that would also lower national income per head by about 1.3%. There is no version of this without a bill attached, she warns.The research behind this episode:Giannone, Elisa, Yuhei Miyauchi, Nuno Paixão, Xinle Pang, and Yuta Suzuki. 2026. "Living in a Ghost Town: The Geography of Depopulation and Aging." CEPR Discussion Paper 21447 (gated).To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Elisa Giannone. 2026. "What price to save Japan's ghost towns?" VoxTalks Economics (podcast).About the guestElisa Giannone is a researcher at CREI, an Adjunct Professor at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, an Affiliated Professor at the Barcelona School of Economics. She works on internal migration, regional income divergence, the spatial consequences of local shocks and the question of why people move.Research cited in this episodeSocial and natural population change. Demographers separate population movements through migration, known as social change, from births and deaths, known as natural change. Giannone's team runs both counterfactuals separately. Shut down migration and the oldest municipalities still age, but the population loss between 1980 and 2010 falls from nearly 0.3 log points to under 0.1. The framework follows Stanley Smith, Jeff Tayman and David Swanson's standard treatment of state and local population projections.Scale economies in local public services. A 1% increase in local population is associated with a 0.53% fall in municipal government spending per head. Roads, schools, clinics and administration carry a large fixed cost, so the cost of serving each remaining resident rises as a town shrinks. This is the fiscal arithmetic that makes depopulation expensive.Consumption-equivalent flow utility. The paper's measure of quality of life, amenity-adjusted real income. It captures what the residents of a place can actually buy and enjoy rather than what they earn on paper, which matters when the shops and the doctors are leaving.The five oldest prefectures. Kochi, Shimane, Tokushima, Tottori and Yamagata, ranked by elderly share in 2015. They are the target group in every policy simulation, and their combined elderly share reaches nearly 60% by 2215 under the baseline projection.Municipal extinction. Hiroya Masuda's 2014 book Chiho Shometsu warned that unipolar concentration in Tokyo would drive hundreds of rural municipalities out of existence. It set the terms of Japan's regional revitalisation debate, and the paper's projections give that warning a number.United Nations World Population Prospects. Giannone's figures for the global picture, including the count of countries that have already passed peak population and those projected to do so by the mid 2050s, come from the UN projections rather than from the paper itself.More VoxTalks Economics episodesEconomic decline and the rise of populism. Andrés Rodríguez-Pose explains what happens politically in the places this episode watches emptying, and why long term regional decline shows up at the ballot box.Related reading on VoxEU.orgLiving in a ghost town: The geography of depopulation and ageing. The authors' own column, with the charts behind this episode.Japan's age wave: Challenges and solutions, a column by Andrew Stawasz, Paige Kirby, JP Sevilla and David Bloom on the national scale of the problem this episode breaks down by region.Mobile seniors and local economic development. Marco Badilla-Maroto, Benjamin Faber, Antoine Levy and Mathilde Munoz find that retirees moving into poorer French regions bring economic gains with them, a useful counterweight to the Japanese story.Population shrinking and the future of European municipalities, in which Friedrich Heinemann, Alexander Kalb and Benny Geys set out the scale economies problem for Europe's own shrinking towns.

Travel broadens the mind. So the Voxtalks visits a conference, we find the most interesting research from economists just starting out, and hand three of them a microphone. Ad that is today's episode, recorded at the CEPR Paris School of Economics Policy Forum 2026.Listen to hear three findings that undercut conventional wisdom. Guido Lamarmora (University of Nottingham) argues that the usual policy prescription for developing economies that want to industrialise of raising agricultural productivity can deepen their reliance on farming rather than break it. Costanza Tomaselli (Imperial College London) studies what an energy price shock in Mexico does to employment: she finds that firms without access to credit hire rather than fire. Mushegh Tovmasyan (University of Paris-Saclay) follows Armenia after Russia was sanctioned in 2022, where trade doubled but the gains went to incumbents and their workers, not to new firms.The research behind this episode:Lamarmora, Guido. 2026. "The Food Problem in an Open Economy." Tomaselli, Costanza, and Armando Rangel Colina. 2026. "Energy Shocks, Employment Response, and Heterogeneous Credit Access." Tovmasyan, Mushegh. 2026. "Trade and Firm-Level Adjustments to Geopolitical Shifts: Evidence from Armenia." To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, Guido Lamarmora, Costanza Tomaselli, and Mushegh Tovmasyan. 2026. "The Next Generation: PSE 2026." VoxTalks Economics (podcast).About the guestsGuido Lamarmora is completing his PhD at the University of Nottingham, with research on international trade, macro development, and structural transformation. Soon you will find him at Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz as a postdoc.Costanza Tomaselli is a PhD candidate at Imperial College Business School, with research spanning financial economics, industrial organisation, and energy economics.Mushegh Tovmasyan is a PhD candidate at University Paris-Saclay, RITM, with research spanning international trade, sanctions, and firm and worker outcomes, built on newly accessible Armenian administrative microdata.Research cited in this episodeThe food problem. The long-standing account of why poor countries keep so many workers in agriculture; households spend most of their income on food, and low farm productivity means many workers are needed just to feed the population. Lamarmora's point is that the standard fix, raising farm productivity or opening to trade, need not hold once you model the economy as open and put land into the picture.Land as a fixed factor. Agriculture uses land, which is fixed, as well as labour. Ignore it and a country with many workers per hectare looks unproductive when it is not. Once land is accounted for, low-income countries turn out to have relatively high agricultural productivity, which flips the conventional diagnosis.Input-output linkages. Industry is wired into the rest of the economy through supply chains, so a rise in industrial productivity or cheaper industrial imports lowers costs everywhere, including on the farm. In Lamarmora's estimates the gains from industry run roughly twice those from raising agricultural productivity.Storm Uri. The February 2021 winter storm that damaged the natural gas pipeline supplying Mexico's electricity, producing a sharp and spatially uneven jump in power prices. Tomaselli uses distance to gas-fired capacity as the source of variation to isolate the labour-market effect of an energy shock.Credit access as a shock absorber. Mexico gave firms no fiscal support after the shock, which let Tomaselli see what finance alone can do. Firms with credit did not change production or employment; they borrowed to smooth the shock. The suggestive model implication is that easing credit frictions could do the work of a blanket energy subsidy at lower cost to the public purse.Sanctions and the neutral economy. Sanctions destroy trade between the sanctioning and target countries but open opportunities for neutrals. Armenia, a landlocked transition economy with trade near 100% of GDP and Russia as its largest partner, saw trade double to triple after 2022. Tovmasyan uses Armenian customs and matched employer-employee microdata to ask whether this is new production, rerouting, or just higher prices.Incumbent-led intermediation. The trade boom was driven by existing large firms scaling up relationships and adding sanctioned goods such as electronics and machinery, not by broad new entry. Employment barely moved; gains showed up as more hours and higher wages for existing workers, which Tovmasyan reads as intermediation rents shared with labour.More VoxTalks Economics episodesPrevious next generations:Paris 25: Ali Bakhtawar, Lucie Giorgi, and Alishuba Philip discuss Lawfare, single sex schooling, and slum clearance.PSE 25: Pelin Ozgul, Deepakshi Singh, and Nathan Vieira on AI in call centres, female employment in India, and short-time work in Europe.Paris 24: Laura Arnemann, Gustavo Julio García Bernal, and Matyas Molnar tall Tim about performance-related pay, intergenerational wealth, and international exhibitions. PSE 24: Alice Chiocchetti, Yuan Hu, and Christoph Semken describe their research on profit-shifting, green tech, and the effect of changing to a greener lifestyle.Follow VoxTalks to discover more of yesterday’s stars of tomorrow. 

Recorded at the PSE-CEPR Policy Forum 2026.A country wants a stable exchange rate, it wants money to move freely across its borders, and it wants to set its own interest rates. It's a well-known trilemma. Central bankers must pick any two, because you cannot have all three. History, it turns out, did not read that memo.Eric Monnet has spent years reading the balance sheets that central bankers kept on each other. Since 1891 the Bank of France paid teams of multilingual economists to copy out the weekly and monthly accounts of every other central bank in the world. Those ledgers, now digitised, show that central banks have been far more than interest-rate setters. For more than a century they have quietly expanded their balance sheets to cushion their economies against shocks arriving from abroad. In this week's VoxTalk, Monnet argues we have seriously underestimated how much room to manoeuvre they have used since the 19th century.The research behind this episode:Bazot, Guillaume, Eric Monnet, and Matthias Morys. 2024. "Central Banks and the Absorption of International Shocks (1891-2019)." CEPR Discussion Paper No. 19646. (Gated.)To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Eric Monnet. 2026. "Absorbing shocks since 1891." VoxTalks Economics (podcast).About the guestEric Monnet is Professor at the Paris School of Economics and EHESS, and a Research Fellow at CEPR. An economic historian, his work spans central banking, the international monetary system, and the history of European financial systems across the 19th and 20th centuries. He previously worked as an economist at the Bank of France, and his book Controlling Credit examines monetary policy in postwar France.Research cited in this episodeThe Mundell trilemma. Formulated by Robert Mundell in the 1960s, the trilemma holds that an open economy cannot simultaneously maintain a fixed exchange rate, free capital movement, and an independent monetary policy; it can have any two. Mundell received the Nobel Prize in part for the idea. The global financial cycle and the dilemma. Helene Rey argues that even a floating exchange rate does not buy full monetary autonomy, because a common global financial cycle, driven by the risk appetite of large financial institutions, moves interest rates and exchange rates across countries at once. A shock in one emerging market prompts investors to demand higher compensation across others they treat as similar. The trilemma, in this view, is really a dilemma.The Bank of France archive. The research department of the Bank of France was founded to track the financial operations of foreign central banks, collecting their weekly and monthly balance sheets from 1891 onward. The dataset assembled from these records covers 23 countries, essentially every central bank in existence by the late 1930s, and combines balance-sheet data with monthly figures on industrial production, consumer prices, and stock markets.Discount loans, open market operations, and foreign exchange interventions. The specific tools have changed completely; the behaviour has not. In the 19th century central banks intervened by discounting commercial bills and holding gold or foreign deposits; today they conduct open market operations in government bonds and hold US Treasury bills. Across all these forms, the response to an external shock, expanding domestic assets to supply liquidity, has been consistent.Taming the Global Financial Cycle. The predecessor study by the same authors: Bazot, Monnet, and Morys, "Taming the Global Financial Cycle: Central Banks as Shock Absorbers in the First Era of Globalization," Journal of Economic History 82(3), 2022, which established the pattern for the classical gold standard period.More VoxTalks Economics episodesThe Bank of England's Capital Mistake. Former Bank insiders David Aikman and John Vickers argue that cutting equity capital requirements for UK banks could raise the odds of a financial crisis, a companion piece on what central bank balance sheets are for.Related reading on VoxEU.orgCentral banks and the absorption of international shocks, the authors' own VoxEU column setting out the dataset and the two main findings in brief.

If you run a business that exports to the United States, how big is the tariff you have to pay? In 2025 that question was hard to answer. Between February and December, 53 separate announcements introduced, delayed, reinstated or changed US tariffs, with different countries and products pulled in or exempted each time.Kalina Manova (UCL, CEPR) and her colleagues built a database of every one of those announcements, but they also measured  the confusion that those announcements created. She tells Tim Phillips about how tariff confusion has become a second tax on trade, as confusion puts off exporters: but it's one that raises no revenue. On average, uncertainty about the actual tariff doubled the damage done to trade by the tariff hikes themselves. For some countries it tripled it. Does this result mean that, if the US cleared up the confusion by not changing its tariffs regularly, it could double tariff income for the same impact on trade?The research behind this episode:Manova, Kalina, Dennis Novy, Thomas Sampson, and Aaron Tang. 2026. "Tariff Confusion." CEPR Discussion Paper DP21688 (gated).To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Kalina Manova. 2026. "Tariff Confusion." VoxTalks Economics (podcast).About the guestKalina Manova is Professor of Economics at University College London and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research. Her work spans global production networks and multinational activity, firm productivity and management, trade policy, and the financial frictions that shape international trade and investment. She holds an AB, AM and PhD from Harvard, and has previously held posts at Stanford, Princeton and Oxford.Research cited in this episodeUS Tariff Announcement Database (USTAD). The dataset Manova and her co-authors assembled by hand from US presidential executive orders and proclamations, recording all 53 tariff announcements of 2025 and tracing, for roughly 230 origin countries and more than 18,000 ten-digit product categories, the statutory tariff in place each month.The four confusion measures. With no direct way to measure confusion, the paper proxies it four ways: the cumulative number of relevant announcements a firm had to track; the number of possible tariff calculations those announcements could produce (labelled tariff mess, defined as two to the power of the number of announcements); the highest tariff a firm might infer if it heard only the bad news (tariff max); and how far that worst case sits above the true statutory rate (tariff miss).The firm survey. A survey of roughly 4,500 firms in the US and Canada in March and April 2025 found that around 45% believed tariffs on Chinese goods were below 20%, when the true average was about 42%; at the same time, 87% underestimated how many announcements had postponed or rolled back tariffs. Firms were wrong in both directions at once.Trade policy uncertainty. A prior literature on uncertainty about future tariffs, which tends to find that firms delay forming trade relationships when the future is unclear. The paper’s contribution is to separate confusion about current tariffs from uncertainty about future ones, and to show the former bites on its own.Relationship-specific investment and trust. Trade in goods that require buyers and suppliers to customise to one another, or that sit in stickier supply relationships, proved more resilient to confusion; so did trade with countries whose populations report higher trust in foreigners. Informal trust, rather than formal contract enforcement, did the work of cushioning the shock.The IEEPA ruling. In February 2026 the US Supreme Court ruled that the tariffs imposed in 2025 under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act were unlawful. The paper's data stops before the ruling, which generated fresh policy change and, presumably, fresh confusion.More VoxTalks Economics episodesWorld War Trade. Richard Baldwin on how the April 2025 tariffs settled into a trade Cold War, and why the rest of the world kept trading without the US.Europe in the Middle. Pol Antrà s and Beata Javorcik on where redirected Chinese exports go when they can no longer sell in the US, and what that means for European firms and consumers.How exchange rates responded to tariffs. Giancarlo Corsetti on why the dollar fell after Liberation Day when tariffs should, in theory, have pushed it the other way.Related reading on VoxEU.orgTrump and Tariffs, a VoxEU debate page collecting research on how the 2025 tariffs are reshaping supply chains, trade relationships and market stability.