Zevachim 96 - December 19, 29 Kislev

Rabbi Tarfon and the Rabbis disagree about whether merika and shetifa of metal utensils that were used for cooking sacrificial meat are necessary daily during the holidays, or whether on the holidays one also needs to perform it only after the holiday ends. What is the basis of Rabbi Tarfon's position to be lenient on the holiday? The time for performing merika and shetifa is after the time for eating the sacrifice has passed. From where is this derived? Rebbi and the Rabbis disagree about whether merika and shetifa are both done with cold water, or whether merika is with hot water and shetifa with cold. Even according to Rebbi, who holds that both are with cold water, one would still be required beforehand to boil the pot with hot water to remove the taste of the meat that has now become notar, left beyond the time the sacrifice can be eaten. If mixtures of an offering are cooked together with those of another offering of a different status, or with non-sacred food, the food takes on the status of the more severe offering, as stated in Vayikra 6:20. This law is only applicable if flavor is imparted. The details of this law are analyzed. A question is asked: why does the positive commandment to eat sacrificial meat not override the negative commandment not to eat disqualified meat? Rava answers that this principle does not apply in the Temple. Rav Ashi answers that there is both a negative and a positive commandment not to eat the meat, which is why the positive commandment to eat it does not override. The verse relating to this law is mentioned in the context of the sin offering. From the verse in Vayikra 7:37, which mentions various different offerings, the sages learned that the laws of each type apply to all the other types as well. From the sin offering in that verse, they derive that this law applies to all sacrifices. What is derived from the other words in that verse?   

The Gemara raises two difficulties with the conclusion that earthenware vessels can be koshered by placing fire inside them. First, why does the Torah command that earthenware vessels in which sanctified meat was cooked must be broken, if they could simply be put into a kiln? The answer given is that kilns could not be used in Jerusalem, as they would blacken the walls and mar the beauty of the city. Second, why were the Temple ovens made of metal if earthenware ovens could have been used and koshered? The assumption behind this question is flawed, since the ovens needed to serve as a sanctified vessel in certain cases (such as the two loaves on Shavuot and the showbread), and sanctified vessels cannot be made of earthenware. Rav Yitzchak bar Yehuda left the study hall of Rami bar Hama and joined that of Rav Sheshet. Rami bar Hama was offended, assuming Rav Yitzchak sought greater honor. Rav Yitzchak explained that he had not received satisfactory answers from Rami bar Hama, who relied on logical reasoning rather than tannaitic sources. Rami bar Hama challenged Rav Yitzchak to send him a question, promising to answer with a tannaitic source. Rav Yitzchak asked about merika and shtifa (scouring and rinsing) of a vessel in which only part was used for cooking sacrificial items: does the entire vessel require cleansing, or only the part that was used? Rami bar Hama answered logically that only the part used requires cleansing, as in the case of blood on clothing. Rav Yitzchak rejected this reasoning and cited a braita proving the opposite, thereby refuting Rami bar Hama completely. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the requirement of merika and shtifa applies to both kodshei kodashim and kodashim kalim, or only to kodshei kodashim. From where do they derive this distinction? They both agree that merika and shtifa do not apply to truma. The Gemara raises a challenge to this from a braita, and three answers are offered.

The same issue raised on the previous page regarding laundering vessels removed from the Azara is now applied to breaking earthenware vessels and performing merika (scrubbing) and shetifa (rinsing) of metal vessels. If these vessels are punctured and lose their status as valid utensils, how can the mitzva of breaking or cleaning them be fulfilled? Reish Lakish teaches how to handle a priestly garment that becomes impure, since it cannot be torn. Rav Adda bar Ahava challenges his suggestion, but the Gemara resolves the difficulty. The Gemara raises a difficulty with the obligation of laundering: how can blood be laundered in the Azara if Rav Nachman, quoting Raba bar Avuha, rules that blood of a sin offering and stains from nega'im require cleansing with the seven prescribed detergents, one of which is urine? According to a braita, urine may not be brought into the Temple. The resolution is to bring the urine mixed with saliva (rok tafel). The Mishna teaches that vessels in which sacrificial meat was cooked, or into which boiling liquid was poured, require merika and shetifa, whether from kodashei kodashim or kodashim kalim. Rabbi Shimon disagrees, exempting kodashim kalim from this requirement. A braita explains that the words in the verse in Vayikra 6:21, "that which was cooked in it," extend the law to include pouring boiling liquid into a vessel. Rami bar Chama raises the question of whether meat suspended in the air of the oven counts as cooking for the purposes of requiring breaking the oven. Rava brings a source to answer this question, but it is rejected. A statement of Rav Nachman in the name of Raba bar Avuha is also cited to answer the question, but it too is rejected. A practical case is cited where an oven was plastered with fat, and Raba bar Ahilai forbade eating bread baked in it forever, lest one come to eat it with dairy dip (kutach). This ruling is challenged by a braita that prohibits kneading dough with milk or plastering an oven with fat, but allows use once the oven is reheated (as koshering removes the flavor). Raba bar Ahilai's ruling is therefore rejected. Ravina asks Rav Ashi why, if Raba bar Ahilai was refuted, Rav ruled that pots on Pesach must be broken. Rav Ashi explains that Rav understood the braita to be referring to metal vessels. Alternatively, one can distinguish between earthenware ovens, whose heat is on the inside (so koshering works), and earthenware pots, which are heated from the outside and cannot be properly koshered.

Study Guide The Gemara examines the debate between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether leather garments stained with blood from a sin offering require laundering. A braita cites verses in the Torah as the source for each position, with the disagreement hinging on how to interpret the term "beged." Rabbi Yehuda understands "beged" to include any material potentially capable of receiving impurity, while according to Rabbi Elazar it includes sackcloth and other types of clothing that are actually susceptible to impurity. Abaye and Rava identify three practical differences that emerge from their interpretations. Another braita establishes that only the specific area of a garment where blood lands requires laundering, not the entire garment. The Gemara then derives from the Mishna that hides are subject to laundering, but cites a conflicting source related to Shabbat observance, which rules that rinsing a hide with water is not considered laundering. Abaye resolves the contradiction by attributing one view to the Rabbis and the other to "others," who include hides in laundering. Rava challenges this, citing verses that explicitly mention leather, and concludes that the distinction lies between soft and hard hides. After raising two difficulties with his own explanation, Rava proposes a third approach: differentiating between scrubbing, which constitutes laundering, and merely pouring or soaking with water, which does not. The Gemara then cites a braita deriving from verses that laundering, breaking earthenware vessels, and rinsing copper vessels must all be performed in the Azara. The Mishna rules that laundering is the only stringency unique to the sin offering compared to other offerings, though the Gemara questions this in light of other possible stringencies. The Mishna further teaches that if a garment with blood, an earthenware vessel, or a copper vessel in which meat was cooked leaves the Azara and becomes impure, the impurity must first be removed - by tearing, making a hole, or otherwise invalidating the vessel - and then the item is returned to the Azara to be laundered, broken, or rinsed. Ravina challenges the ruling that an impure garment is torn outside and then laundered inside: if tearing removes its status as a garment, how can the obligation to launder be fulfilled? The Gemara clarifies that the case refers to tearing along the length without splitting it into two pieces, which is sufficient to remove impurity while still leaving it with the status of a garment for laundering.    

Study Guide Rami bar Hama asks Rav Chisda whether blood that splashes onto a garment already impure requires laundering. Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua explains that the question hinges on whether laundering is unnecessary only when impurity and disqualification occur sequentially, or even when they occur simultaneously. Rav Chisda connects the issue to a dispute between Rabbi Elazar and the rabbis regarding the status of mei chatat that became impure, as interpreted by Abaye. To clarify Abaye's understanding, the Gemara presents a broader disagreement among Raba, Abaye, and Rava about the nature of the disagreement between Rabbi Elazar and the rabbis. A braita teaches that only blood fit for sprinkling requires laundering, excluding blood already disqualified. Rabbi Akiva rules that blood which had a moment of fitness and was later disqualified does require laundering, while Rabbi Shimon maintains that disqualified blood never requires it. The Mishna rules that blood splashed from the neck of the animal, or from the altar's corner or base, does not require laundering, nor does blood spilled on the floor and later gathered, since only blood received in a vessel and fit for sprinkling requires laundering. Two braitot are cited to demonstrate how these laws are derived from verses in the Torah. The Gemara further clarifies that the requirement of being "capable of sprinkling" excludes cases where less than the requisite measure was received in each vessel. Rava explains that this principle is rooted in a drasha on the verse in Vayikra 4:6. After presenting several drashot on the different words of that verse, the Gemara analyzes them both in relation to one another - explaining why each was necessary - and in relation to other statements. The Mishna continues with blood splashed on the hide: before flaying it does not require laundering, but after flaying it does. Rabbi Elazar limits laundering to the place of the blood and only where the material is susceptible to impurity. A braita extends laundering obligations to garments, sackcloth, and hides, and specifies that laundering, breaking of earthenware vessels, and rinsing of copper vessels must all be performed in a sacred place. Laundering is a stringency unique to the sin offering compared to other kodshei kodashim.

Shmuel holds that, according to Rabbi Akiva, wine may be brought as a voluntary offering, with the wine sprinkled on the altar. However, a braita records that Rabbi Akiva maintained the wine was poured into cups at the top of the altar, which raises a difficulty for Shmuel's position. The Gemara resolves this by explaining that Shmuel follows Rabbi Shimon, while the braita reflects Rabbi Yehuda's view regarding whether one is liable for an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibition - even when one has no interest in the prohibited outcome (davar sh'aino mitkaven). In this case, pouring wine on the altar partially extinguishes the fire, which is forbidden by Torah law, though the intention is not to extinguish it. A further difficulty is raised: Shmuel himself rules like Rabbi Yehuda in prohibiting extinguishing a wood coal found in the public domain. This is resolved by distinguishing between the two cases. Shmuel aligns with Rabbi Shimon regarding davar she'eino mitkaven (an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibited action), but with Rabbi Yehuda regarding melacha she'eina tzricha l'gufa (performing a forbidden action not for its typical purpose). If the blood of a sin offering is sprinkled on a garment before the blood is presented on the altar, that garment requires laundering in the Azara. This applies both to sin offerings brought on the outer altar and those brought on the inner altar, but not to bird sin offerings. This distinction is derived from a drasha on Vayikra 6:18, which both expands and limits the law. Why are bird offerings excluded while inner sin offerings are included? Three answers are given. Two questions were asked about bird sin offerings. The answer to the second was supplied from a braita related to this topic, but ultimately both questions remain unresolved. Levi asked whether blood that transferred from one garment to another also requires laundering. Rebbi answers that it does and explains the reasoning.  

If one sacrifice is more frequent (tadir), but another is more sanctified, which takes precedence? Three cases are brought from the first Mishna of the chapter (Zevachim 89) to prove that frequency takes precedence, but each is rejected in the same manner. A Mishna relating to the order of blessings in kiddush and a statement of Rabbi Yochanan are also cited to support the principle of frequency, but these too are rejected. Finally, an inference is drawn from the Mishna in Zevachim 90, which implies that if a peace offering and a guilt or sin offering were before the kohen, and both were from that day, the guilt or sin offering would take precedence - even though peace offerings are more common. To reject this proof, Rava distinguishes between "frequent" and "common." Rav Huna challenges Rava's distinction from a source about brit mila and Pesach, where brit mila is considered tadir. His difficulty, however, is resolved in two possible ways. Another question arises: if a less frequent sacrifice is slaughtered first and then they realize their error, should someone mix the blood (to prevent coagulation) while the more frequent sacrifice is offered first, or should they complete the one already begun? Four sources are brought to address this issue (three of which were also cited earlier), but all attempts are rejected. In the Mishna, Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Tarfon disagree about whether oil can be offered in the Temple as a voluntary offering. Shmuel explains that according to Rabbi Tarfon, who permits it, only a kmitza (handful) is burned on the altar, while the remainder is given to the kohanim to eat. Rabbi Zeira supports Shmuel's view from the Mishna, while Abaye presents an alternative opinion: that a voluntary oil offering is burned in its entirety, also citing proof from the Mishna. A Tosefta raises a difficulty for Shmuel, but it is resolved. The Gemara then suggests that this is a tannaitic debate; after an attempt to refute the suggestion, it is upheld. Regarding wine, there is likewise a debate about whether it can be brought as a voluntary offering. Shmuel explains that according to Rabbi Akiva, it may be offered, with the wine sprinkled on the altar. However, this raises the issue of partially extinguishing the altar's fire, which is forbidden by Torah law. Others maintain that the wine is poured into the cups at the top of the altar. The Gemara concludes that this debate parallels the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda (usually in the context of melacha on Shabbat) about whether one is liable for an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibition - even when one has no interest in the prohibited outcome.

Ravina bar Shila holds that the imurim, parts of kodashim kalim designated for burning, that are taken out of the Azara before the sprinkling of the blood are disqualified. The Gemara explores whether this aligns with a tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, but Rav Papa clarifies that their disagreement pertains to a different case. The Gemara examines the order of precedence in the Mishna, which places bird offerings before meal offerings, and sin-related meal offerings before voluntary ones. Although one could argue for reversing the order, the Mishna's reasoning is deemed stronger and thus upheld. A sin offering, even of a bird, takes precedence over any burnt offering, even of an animal. This hierarchy is supported by three verses addressing different scenarios. Although three tannaitic sources appear to challenge this principle, the Gemara resolves these contradictions. Sin offerings also precede guilt offerings, except the guilt offering for a metzora (leper), because it comes to purify the leper. This offering, along with the guilt offering of a nazir, differs from other guilt offerings in two distinct ways. The order of precedence for sacrifices also applies to the consumption of their meat. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir disagree about whether spices of teruma may be added when cooking sacrificial meat. Rabbi Shimon permits it, while Rabbi Meir prohibits it due to the risk of disqualifying the teruma, which would then require burning.  

Study Guide There are two general principles employed by the Mishna to determine the order of precedence among sacrifices: A sacrifice offered more frequently takes priority. A sacrifice of greater sanctity takes priority. The Mishna elaborates on which sacrifices are considered more frequent and which are deemed more sanctified. In its discussion of sanctity, it emphasizes the unique attributes of each type of sacrifice and provides examples illustrating the precedence of one sacrifice over another. However, certain situations are not explicitly addressed, and the Gemara raises questions about the law in those cases, attempting to infer the answers from the Mishna's examples. The Gemara further examines each ruling of precedence in the Mishna, suggesting that the order could, in fact, be reversed. In every instance, the Gemara explains why the Mishna chose its particular order and not the alternative.

The Gemara makes one final attempt to answer the question of whether the airspace of the altar can sanctify disqualified items just as the altar does. The attempt is rejected. The Mishna teaches that liquid sacred vessels sanctify liquids, and vessels used for dry ingredients sanctify dry items. Liquid vessels cannot sanctify dry items, nor vice versa. If sacred vessels are punctured, they only sanctify if they can still perform their original function and remain whole. All sanctification occurs only within the Azara. Shmuel limits the first ruling of the Mishna to measuring utensils, but bowls and similar items can sanctify even dry ingredients. His proof is a verse regarding flour mixed with oil that was placed into a bowl generally used for liquids (Bamidbar 7:13). Rav Acha questions this proof since flour mixed with oil is not exactly a solid, and Shmuel provides two possible answers. Shmuel further rules that sacred vessels sanctify only when they are whole, filled with the entire amount needed for the offering, and can only sanctify items from within. Variants of this teaching differ slightly, as one version reads "from inside the Azara" instead of "from within the vessel" and another includes both. The difference between two of these versions is whether overflow is sanctified. Rabbi Yohanan qualifies the ruling that if there is not a complete amount, the item inside will not be sanctified. He explains that this applies only when there was no intent to reach the full amount, but if one intends to add enough to reach the requisite measure, each portion becomes sanctified as it is placed inside. A braita is brought to support this. Rav or Rav Asi qualifies the Mishna's ruling that dry vessels do not sanctify liquids and vice versa. This applies to sanctification for offering on the altar, but they are sanctified to the extent that the contents can become disqualified. Some say his statement was made regarding a different braita about meal offerings brought from orla and diverse kinds. A braita teaches that damaged sacred vessels cannot be repaired by melting or patching. Similarly, knives with defects cannot be sharpened to remove the blemish, and if a blade slips out, it cannot be reattached. This ruling reflects the principle that there is "no poverty in a place of affluence," referring to the Temple as a place of affluence. Abba Shaul recalls a defective knife in the Temple that was buried so that is would not be used. Another braita, based on the same principle, explains that the clothes of the kohanim must be woven, not stitched, and if they become soiled, they cannot be washed with cleaning agents such as natron or soap. Abaye clarifies that they can be laundered if only mildly dirty, but if cleaning them would require agents, they cannot be cleaned even with water alone. Some say they may never be washed at all. A braita describes the kohen gadol's robe as entirely blue, with hem decorations resembling unopened pomegranates and children's buttons. Bells were attached, either seventy‑two in total or thirty‑six according to differing opinions. Rabbi Anani bar Sasson notes that this dispute parallels disagreements about the number of shades in leprous afflictions. Rabbi Anani bar Sasson explains that the Torah juxtaposes sacrifices with priestly garments to teach that just as sacrifices atone, so too do the garments. Each garment corresponds to atonement for a specific sin: the tunic for murder, the pants for sexual immorality, the turban for arrogance, the belt for improper thoughts, the breastplate for judicial errors, the ephod for idolatry, the robe for lashon hara, and the tzitz for brazenness. The Gemara raises a difficulty from the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who taught that murder and lashon hara have no atonement through sacrifices, only through other means - egla arufa for murder and ketoret, incense, for slander. The difficulty is resolved by distinguishing between situations: when the murderer is known, the tunic atones; when unknown, the egla arufa atones. Regarding lashon hara, they distinguish between public lashon hara, which is atoned by the robe with its bells, and private lashon hara, atoned by the ketoret, which is offered in the sanctuary, a private space.