37: "Why Being Necessary Really Is Not the Same As Being Not Possibly Not", Dana Goswick

Modality (possibility, necessity and related phenomena) is central to philosophy both as a topic of inquiry and as a methodological tool. There are many controversies about the nature of possibility and necessity and about what counts as possible or necessary. But it is generally agreed that possibility and necessity are intimitely related, they are interdefinable: being possible is the same as being not necessarily not. Goswick, however, denies this! Listen to find out why. Click here for the paper. Support the show

Recently, there has been frenzied interest in artificial intelligence and, in particular, in the issue of AI safety; there have been “open letters” signed by some of the biggest names in the tech business urging us to take seriously the existential threat posed by AI, and the UK government has just announced that it will convene the first global AI safety summit this autumn. But what is the threat here, exactly? There are risks associated with any new technology: fire burns, nuclear energy can be harnessed in bombs and social media algorithms threaten democracy. The so-called AI singularity is supposed to be at least on par with the absolute worst of these threats since, according to some, it has the real potential to wipe out all of humanity. Will there be a singularity? How should we negotiate a singularity and will it necessarily be a bad thing resulting in human extinction? Assuming the singularity doesn’t wipe out humanity, how can we integrate into a post-singularity world? Listen to find out!Here is a link to the paper.Support the show

The measurement problem highlights a deeply puzzling feature of quantum mechanics: nature seems to obey one law when not measured and a completely different law when measured. But how does nature "recognise" measurement contexts?! What explains these shifts in how nature operates?  For the Humean about laws, i.e., one who maintains that nature unthinkingly acts and the laws describe, these issues lose their bite. So perhaps there just is no measurement problem for Humeans! But if true, does this count for or against Humeanism? Listen and decide!Here's a link to the paperSee also this paper by Hicks and Schaffer for detail on derivative properties featuring in fundamental laws, an idea that features centrally in Dorst's discussion.  Support the show

This episode is about Sam Cowling's "The Limits of Modality" published in the Philosophical Quarterly in 2011. Are all true propositions either contingent or necessary? Cowling argues that if we want to understand the metaphysics of modality in terms of possible worlds we should maintain that certain true propositions are neither contingent nor necessary but just true simpliciter. Is this conceptually coherent? Have a listen and make up your mind! Here's a link to the paper.Support the show

In the episode, I talk with Francesca Bellazzi about her paper "Biochemical Functions", which is forthcoming in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. We discuss the distinction between functions and mere accidents, the peculiar puzzle posed by biochemical functions, evolutionary explanations, the relationship between science and philosophy and much more! Click here for the paperClick here for more about Francesca Click here for more about the MetaScience project Support the show

In this episode, I ask Donnchadh O'Conaill about themes from his book "Substance" which is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press as part of the Cambridge Elements in Metaphysics series. We cover the roles in metaphysical theorising that substance plays, candidate examples of substance, the methodology of metaphysics and its relationship to science among other things. Click here for more about Donnchadh Click here for the Elements in Metaphysics Support the show

In this episode, I talk to my Bristol MetaScience colleague, Dr Will Morgan, about his recently published paper in which he argues that if we accept the physiological approach to biological individuality, it seems that a foetus never becomes the organism that is present after birth. This then raises the difficult question: what happens to the foetus? We also touch on the relevance of metaphysics to biology and to ethics. You can read the paper hereClick here for more about WillSupport the show

Was Quine really a modal sceptic--someone who thought that modality was unintelligible or paradoxical? Divers thinks he is better cast as a non-sceptical modal anti-realist. Here's a link to the paper: https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/122483/1/how%20Skeptical%3F.pdfSupport the show

The focus of this episode is Ross Cameron's "Modal Conventionalism" published in The Routledge Handbook of Modality in 2021. Here is a link to the paper, but these handbooks are insanely expensive, which I suppose is a good reason to do more episodes based on their chapters! Support the show

The focus of this episode is Thomas Nagel’s “Panpsychism”, published by Cambridge University Press in his “Mortal Questions” anthology. This isn’t a recent paper, it was first published in 1979. But it is a nice, sober, discussion of panpsychism that makes quite clear a relatively sensible motivation for the view as well as what is involved in its denial. This all makes for a nice change to some of the rather heated public debates of the issue nowadays. So, call this a Condensed Matter classic. Maybe I’ll do more of these in future because I definitely think there are plenty of older papers out there that are worth revisiting in this format. Link to the paper: https://philpapers.org/rec/NAGPSupport the show