
The Great private Capital Reset is upon us. Markets are volatile and driving new economic imperatives.
Are VC funds still VC funds, even if they raise billions per fund? What happened to the rest of the market? What is driving VC investments?
What do Limited Partners think? What is on their minds?
This and more, in episode 76 of Tech Deciphered.
Navigation:
- Intro
- The State of the Reset: The Hangover from the Party?
- LP Fatigue and VC Differentiation
- What Really Matters: Performance.. Returns
- The Mega Fund Question
- The Case for Smaller… Rightsized Funds
- What Comes Next?
- Conclusion
Our co-hosts:
- Bertrand Schmitt, Entrepreneur in Residence at Red River West, co-founder of App Annie / Data.ai, business angel, advisor to startups and VC funds, @bschmitt
- Nuno Goncalves Pedro, Investor, Managing Partner, Founder at Chamaeleon, @ngpedro
Our show: Tech DECIPHERED brings you the Entrepreneur and Investor views on Big Tech, VC and Start-up news, opinion pieces and research. We decipher their meaning, and add inside knowledge and context. Being nerds, we also discuss the latest gadgets and pop culture news
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Bertrand
Introduction
Welcome to episode 76 of Tech Deciphered. This episode will be about the great private capital reset. As you know, or you have probably heard, there is significant structural transformation in the world of venture capital, and we are probably witnessing a fundamental reset of the private capital stack. We got a huge bubble in 2020, 2021. Fueled by near-zero interest rates. We got inflated fund size, compressed due diligence, and now a generation of zombie funds and zombie startups. Now that rates have normalized, exits have not been as much as expected. LP patience is a warning sign, and I guess the industry is being forced to confront an uncomfortable truth: most VC funds raised since 2017 might not return what their LPs expected. You know, how do we start?
Nuno
This is going to be a relatively nuanced episode. Obviously, there is going to be a lot of haves and have-nots, both in terms of VC funds, also in terms of startups. And so I want to start with that. This is going to be more nuanced than all transformational and disruptive.
Bertrand
It’s not the end. It’s not the end.
Nuno
State of the Reset: The Hangover from the Party?
It’s not the end. There’s still huge mega funds that are raising more and more. It’s clear that the music has stopped, right? So if we’re playing the game of chairs, the music has stopped. Around ’22, ’23, we started seeing the first signals that funds had raised way too much money. Firms collectively raised around $669 billion globally in 2021 alone. If we fast forward now to last year, 2025, depending on the sources, we did some internal analysis at Chameleon. We came up with $75.6 billion was raised last year by 493 funds, right? So That’s a significant drop, right, in terms of fundraising. Other sources would say a little bit more. There’s a little bit of a discussion around how much did the top 30 funds capture. If you believe some of the stats out there, they would say that actually top 30 funds captured 75% of all capital raised last year. We did again some internal analysis at Chameleon, and the conclusion we came to, it was closer to 50 to 55%. So not as dramatic as some of the sources out there, but still pretty dramatic. There’s a lot of capital concentration on the top funds.
Again, the top 30 funds would’ve raised 50 to 55% of capital or up to 75% according to other sources. So definitely a tremendous amount of concentration. There was a lot more fragmentation in terms of capital raised if we’re looking at the years from 2010, 2011, all the way through 2021. So 2021 would’ve been sort of the peak of non-concentration if you look at that. And that again, now we are getting more and more concentration. There’s more and more of this arbitrage around, I’ll give money to the top funds, I will not give money to the smaller funds, or I’ll give less money to the smaller funds. There’s a little bit of a movement around concentration. We’ll talk about it later and what that means. Are mega funds really better? Are the small funds still the way to go? We’ll talk a lot about that later in today’s episode. There seems to be a little bit of a bifurcation. We could say it’s either bifurcation around top-tier VCs or larger VC funds versus smaller VC funds. My perspective is the bifurcation that we’re seeing right now is more of a bifurcation between funds that are no longer just stepped into the VC space, but they’re actually becoming more and more private equity firms with full asset management range from early stage all the way to late stage.
Think of it almost like a private equity hedge fund, quasi, versus classic VC funds. And I think what we’re seeing is the Andreessen Horowitzes, the a16zs of the world, the NEAs, the Sequoia Capitals, just to name a few, becoming more and more broad asset class managers across private equity, whereas you have more classic VC happening in earlier stages. And so that’s the real bifurcation that I think is actually happening.
Bertrand
And maybe not really hedge fund, because they are always still long-only funds. So there is no hedging happening, at least as far as I know.
Nuno
Well, some of these guys have become RIAs, like A16z has become an RIA, so they can do secondaries.
Bertrand
That’s true. Yeah.
Nuno
And they can also sell stuff, etc. So I don’t know how aggressive they’re going to be in terms of secondaries and selling and actually doing other kinds of services you can do if you’re an RIA. But it’s not, I think, out of the realm of possibility that they would sort of acquire and sell stock more rapidly. In that way, to your point, Bertrand, maybe they actually become beyond just long guys, right?
Bertrand
Yes. Another trend I have seen is some of the larger VC funds seems to have no problem investing in multiple competitors. This was not possible before. I mean, if you’re a VC fund, you had some sort of duty not to invest in the competitors, but now some invest OpenAI, Anthropic at the same time. Do you see that as part of this evolution?
Nuno
For sure. And I think there’s a lot of people like the ostrich putting their heads below the ground and it’s like, “Eh, no, no, nothing to see here.” But that does constitute a conflict of interest. And if I’m a startup raising, this assumption that you will not invest in one of my competitors is no longer there, certainly for the mega funds, because of that notion of deployment of capital. Now, some funds will still hide under the notion, actually formally from a fund perspective, we’re not investing in competitors. It just happens that different types of our funds are investing in competitors. Like maybe my growth fund is investing in a competitor to my early stage fund, right? But our funds are relatively independent. So I think there’s a little bit of hide and seek that will go on if you talk to some of the fund managers. Well, they say, well, we’re not investing out of the same fund into these competitors. But between you and I, as we know, a lot of these partnerships actually do a lot of stuff together at the general partnership level. So are there really actual Chinese walls between the funds?
Well, it really depends on the partnership. And to be honest, most of the partnerships don’t have very significant Chinese walls between the funds, right? The managing general partners sometimes actually occupy investment committee roles across different funds. So I think the conflict of interest is there. So that’s why I say there’s a little bit of ostrich behavior. Put your head behind the ground or below the ground and just pretend nothing is happening. Just sharing maybe a couple of interesting stats. Global fund closings for 2025, according to our numbers at Chameleon, 1,098 closed. In 2025. Closed is when you start deploying capital, right? Whereas— so it’s not closed down, it’s closed like we start deploying capital. And that number, 1,098, is dramatically down from 1,600 in 2024. And it’s actually the lowest number of closings that we saw since 2014. So again, this is bad, right? It means there’s less funds doing fund closings and deploying capital in the market than since 2014 and dramatically below the 2024 numbers, right? Where we already saw some market readjustments. The number of active VC firms in the US that did 2+ deals, which is not a huge bar, has dropped 38% back to numbers in 2023.
So we don’t have numbers that are a little bit more up to date, but basically in 2023, those numbers are already dramatically dropped. So there’s less and less active funds. So there’s funds that might be in the market, but they’re not actually deploying that much capital, not doing that many investment. They’re sort of either zombie funds or relatively passive funds that have passed their investment period. For those listening to us, the investment period for a VC fund is normally between the first 3 to 5 years of the fund, which is when you build your portfolio, when you can invest in new companies. After that time period, everything that you do up to normally what would be year 10 is follow-ons. You put more money into the companies that you’re already invested in, that you already constructed portfolio with during those 3 to 5 years.
Bertrand
Yeah, that’s a pretty scary change. And obviously, I guess we’ll come to it, but the time it takes to fully liquidate investments is getting longer and longer. In the old days, we used to talk about VC funds having a 10-year life, maybe a +1/+1 in terms of extension of the fund life. But it looks like it’s taking 16 to 18 years actually to get full liquidity from a fund investment.
Nuno
LP Fatigue and VC Differentiation
And I think that’s the scariest piece. I mean, just to share some numbers, we in venture capital talk about vintages, right? Which year did your fund start in? Normally when you did your first close onto the fund, as we were saying before, close is when you get all your investors at that moment in time to come in and you do your first close so the next fund starts running. 2018 vintage funds, right? This is now almost 7 years ago. So you should start having— actually 8 years ago almost at this point in time. You should start already getting distributions or you start getting cash back if you’re a limited partner and investor in those funds, you should start getting cash back. Half of all 2018 vintage funds have returned $0 to their LPs. So they’ve had no distributions to their LPs. 2020 vintage, which was a very hot vintage, only 42% have begun any distribution. So 58% have distributed $0, right? 2021, only 25% have done any distributions. Now, I happen to have a 2018 vintage fund and a 2021 fund. My 2018 fund has already distributed over 3x net of fees in distributions, and my 2021 fund’s already over 10% distributed back in distribution.
So we’re very proud of that. But in general, the numbers are awful. There’s no liquidity back to LPs. And to your point, that’s kind of a big deal because some of these funds have been going on for 7, 8 years, and where’s the liquidity going to come from? On the other hand, if you look at TVPI, so DPI is distributions to paid-ins cash on cash. But if you look at TVPI, which is total value to paid-in, which also includes the book value or the value that you’re marking it on your books, basically the paper value as we call it for the company, even on that, the median 2017 fund, so 2017 vintage fund has a TVPI, total value to paid-in, of only around 1.76x, which is well below what should be, which is sort of the 2 to 3x benchmark of a really good performing fund. So the median funds are doing very, very poorly overall. So if you add that to the fact of what’s happening and distributions are taking a long time, back to your point, Bertrand, it’s taking like— this should be a 10-year asset class, maybe 11, 12 years, and now it’s looking a little bit like a 15, to 18-year asset class, which is not what most limited partners sign up for.
Part of this dynamic, I think, is that we’ve had tremendously overvalued private companies over the last few years, right? Secondly, these companies have just stayed private longer. And I was having a discussion recently with a friend of mine, it’s like, hey, what’s this thing about companies are staying private much longer? Is there some dynamic around secondaries? And the reality is there is a dynamic around secondaries, right? Because if I’m a very large fund and I can get away with doing secondaries on my portfolio, I will get liquidity at some point, right? But someone else is stuck with private stock, which hopefully will IPO, but who knows, right? And so there’s this funny dynamic right now of because of secondaries, because of a couple of other things that are happening in the market, actually a lot of these startups are staying private for tremendous amounts of times, and some of them will IPO and they’ll be huge deals. Some of them might not and might not warrant the latest private valuations that they’ve exercised. And so there’s this tremendous noise that we’re seeing in the mid to late funnel of privately held companies where some are just waiting to be public.
Some of them might not be able to go public at anything that is an up round versus private valuations that they’ve had in previous moments and in previous rounds.
Bertrand
And obviously the 2 to 3x returns that funds are targeting, and obviously more 3x than 2x, I mean, that was good and nice if it’s a 10-year fund, but if it’s the same 3x for 15 to 18 years, it’s not at all the same rate of return annualized. So it’s a really, really, really big issue if you keep the return the same, but you extend the duration of the fund. Concerning going IPO, there is a lot of complexity going public, the IPO process itself, but also after that when you’re a public company. It changed how you can run the business. Some would argue that we have had an issue with more companies delisting than companies listing on the public market. So I think there might be also separate issues about the efficiency of the public market and maybe a need for change. We went very strongly in one direction for the public market, have post and run, but was it really ultimately the right thing to do? I’m actually not so sure.
Nuno
Yeah, I mean, just to be clear, this is anecdotal, but when we tell prospective LPs at Chameleon about our returns, the last few funds, 2018, 2021, the first reaction is, “You must be lying, right? Surely you can’t have distributions already for 2021,” et cetera, et cetera. So clearly there’s almost a state of disbelief right now from limited partners. And liquidity does matter. So clearly you have to move forward. So how did we get to this point where we had this bubble 2021 all around that time space and now things don’t look so good. Well, the macro conditions have changed dramatically. I mean, rates when they were near zero, safer assets yield nothing or yield nothing. So basically you had to push capital into longer duration risk assets like venture capital. And so you had to push it. So the opportunity cost of capital also has fundamentally shifted. Obviously a 3x VC return in 15 years over 10 actually competes very poorly against 5% annual credit returns over several years. So there’s been a readjustment of stuff. And then the public equities in particular, the tech public equities have had a lot of volatility, but some of them have done extremely well, right?
Chipsets, things like NVIDIA, the Amazons of the world, Alphabets, et cetera, et cetera. They’ve done very, very well. So why would I invest in a long-term illiquid asset that takes now longer to give me money back, and in some case doesn’t give me back, if I can invest just in public equities, and a variety of other things. The venture debt costs have increased dramatically. The burn rates that were sustainable back in the day with sort of the addition of venture debt, private credit, et cetera, now are overblown at this moment in time. At the end of the day, there’s been a lot of movements also overall in the pipeline in terms of valuations, et cetera, et cetera. Now, I would put a grain of salt into all the numbers I just told you. There still is a little bit of the haves and have-nots in startup land. Certainly in early stage where if you’re a hot AI company, you can get away with raising a Series C or $480 million. This is actually a true story. Series C, right? Not Series C, a $480 million at $4 billion pre-money valuation. Whereas if you are maybe in a space that’s less hot, you’ll have more difficulty in raising money at this point in time, might not be able to even raise a Series C, right?
So there’s a little bit of the haves and have-nots happening on the VC side in early stage that has been really amplified by the macro regime and where we’re at, which is actively zero-rate era is done and now the new regime is quite different. And so I can get better returns by doing something else.
Bertrand
Kind of makes sense. I mean, if you have some ways the SaaSpocalypse in the public market because there is that fear that AI is going to completely change the game for especially for the more typical software companies. Good luck raising private money to quote unquote just build traditional software companies. You cannot expect a warm embrace from the private market if the public markets are completely destroying that category. I’m not saying that this is there forever, uh, things might change over time, but for sure what’s happening on the public markets always have a very strong impact on the private market.
Nuno
Indeed. So what’s happening in this relationship between limited partners and VCs, the general partners? Again, limited partners are the people that give venture capital firms and venture capital funds their capital to actually deploy. And they are a variety of different players, right? Could be endowments, like university endowments, pension funds, family offices, very high net worth individuals, fund of funds, et cetera, et cetera. I mean, in particular, if you look at the institutional investors, the endowments, the pension funds, the fund of funds, they have allocations that they do to different asset classes typically. And the feedback that we’ve received from the market is they are increasingly frustrated with what’s happening in terms of distributions. They’re not getting capital back. It’s like, I gave you capital 8 years ago, 9 years ago, 2017, 2018 vintages, and I’m not getting any capital back. So what the hell’s happening? On paper, it looks maybe the fund’s doing okay or it’s doing great in some cases, but where’s my money? And so that creates a little bit of wait-and-see kind of game on portfolio allocation. As we’re thinking through their re-ups, putting more capital into funds that they’re already actually put capital or putting in capital into new slots, into new fund managers that they want to put money into.
They’re like, well, let’s wait and see. I want to get my money back or get some money back first before I redeploy it. Again, this is a little bit the haves and have-nots because we’ve seen, for example, a couple of top-end LPs in terms of returns that have a little bit the opposite problem, right? Because they are into funds that are performing extremely well. They actually are over that period and they want to actually redeploy. But to be honest, the average in the industry right now is a wait-and-see game. It’s like, I want to wait and see, which leads to what can only be characterized— I was hearing someone the other day, one of the top advisors in the LP community, saying this is the worst fundraising environment ever for venture capital. Not the last 20 years, 30 years, like ever, right? Since this became an asset class more institutionally in the late ’60s, early ’70s, Pulse Robo 2 as it was created, this is the worst fundraising environment ever. Oh, wow.
Bertrand
And concerning TVPI, let’s not forget that typically it’s not mark-to-market. So the metrics in terms of TVPI, correct me if I’m wrong, you know, but the metrics in TVPI are based on typically the last fundraise. So if the valuation went down but there was no additional fundraise, we wouldn’t know by looking at the TVPI metrics. It will only be updated if there is a new Financing, equity financing, or an exit.
Nuno
Yeah, normally most funds act like that. Some funds are a little bit more aggressive and do do mark-to-market, but normally funds would be conservative and say, hey, I’m being conservative, it’s whatever is the last known valuation of the company. And if there wasn’t a priced round, it’s a little bit more obscure than that, right, Bertrand? Because it might actually be the company has raised money on a note, or either convertible note or a SAFE note, and that wouldn’t count as a priced round. So I would say actually, even if it was a cap that’s below with a significant discount, I won’t recognize the assets as a down round. I won’t recognize the asset with a lower valuation because formally it wasn’t a price round. So it’s on the one hand conservative, on the other hand, it’s only relating to price rounds or exits to your point. So it’s sort of, you can be like, hmm, well, we opt to do that because we think it’s actually the most conservative route. Mark-to-market is extremely difficult to do. And who would do the mark-to-market for you, right? It’s like it’s some valuation firm, et cetera.
Bertrand
I’m not saying a mark-to-market is easy, but I’m not sure I would call using the last valuation something conservative in the context that most startups will fail. So it’s not clear.
Nuno
Well, in some cases it is, some cases it’s not, right? Depends on the startup situation, to be honest. Yeah, yeah.
Bertrand
But yeah, at least that’s how it’s done. So for instance, to evaluate the impact of the SaaS apocalypse, it’s tough to know. We will have on the private market. I mean, we will see that in a few quarters. Because if companies still exist in that environment, if they still do additional truly price rounds after that, that’s when I will start to know.
Nuno
I mean, just to share a little bit more data, like VC fund close time stretched to 15 months. Basically, it’s just taking a long time to raise money. It’s taking a long time to do your first close, get your fund running. When entrepreneurs complain to me that their fundraising is difficult, I always say, you have no clue how difficult it is compared to ours. First-time funds have collapsed. We had some numbers that only 77 first-time funds actually closed. I assume this is in 2025 versus 215 in 2023. So that’s a huge number. We did some internal analysis on our side and we did some analysis that emerging fund managers, emerging fund managers are normally people that are in their first one or two funds. Basically emerging fund managers gained some ground until 2017. Reaching by then a slice that was 63.7% of all capital raised in 2017. But since then, the capital deployed to emerging managers has been largely reduced to actually 24.2%, right? So it’s gone from 63.7% in 2017 to 24.2%. So this has been a culling of sorts on emerging managers and almost like a slaughterhouse of emerging managers. Compared to previous situations, which is obviously incredibly concerning if you’re an emerging manager starting your VC firm, et cetera, et cetera.
So really tremendously problematic for those. We think capital’s not leaving VC. I think we see a lot of the institutionals saying— there’s some numbers as high as 33% of institutional investors plan to invest more in venture in the next 12 months. So I don’t think capital’s leaving VC. I think it’s really concentrating. We’ll come back to the concentration issue later in the episode. And part of that concentration comes from a topic that has been widely spoken in venture capital recently, which is differentiation. How do you differentiate in venture capital if you’re talking to a limited partner, right? How does my firm differentiate versus the firm next to mine? And that’s incredibly, incredibly challenging. Bertrand, what are your thoughts on that?
Bertrand
Differentiation is always a question. I mean, if you’re an entrepreneur, Typically, you think fully about the best possible partner for your stage and for your type of business model. You want a VC who understands fully your business model, because if they don’t, then it’s going to be troubled down the line. But that’s true that another piece of the puzzle is that the best VCs help you get more visibility in terms of achieving potential customer deals, in terms of attracting the best talent. And that’s where VCs’ brand names can help. If you can say you have backing by some of the top, most visible names in the industry, and usually these are the mega funds because others have trouble to be as visible, then they have some sort of unfair advantage compared to others. So I can see that there is some level of concentration happening naturally, especially in the later stage from Series B onwards.
Nuno
What Really Matters: Performance… Returns
Yeah, I mean, we did some analysis internally about What are the top funds that invested in the top performing companies in early stage, Series C, Series A? And we looked at it by size of fund and the top performing normally are funds below $100 million, but in some cases very closely followed by funds between $100 and $500 million. And actually funds above $500 million, so $500 million to $1 billion and then $1 billion and above are actually tremendously underperforming. So this notion of the industry that says, well, the mega funds still see The top investments early on, because they still deploy in Series C and Series A opportunistically, in some cases even spray and pray if they have their own incubation and acceleration programs, is not true. Actually, we verified that over the last 12 to 13 years. It is not 12 to 13 years in vintage, right? So up to a 2021 vintage fund. So we went basically 12, 13 years back from there. And it’s not true. Actually, the most performing are 0 to 100 and then 100 to 500. And as I said, there’s 100 to 500 in a couple of years actually are a little bit better.
Than the $0 to $100 million ones. So that’s the first thing that’s a conclusion. And actually, that’s not shocking. If we remember back in the day, Kleiner Perkins used to raise funds up to $600 million, Benchmark raised their $425 million funds. It seems like the sweet spot for a VC fund would be around $500 million at the top end, like maximum. And now somehow people are saying, well, I’m raising a $3 billion VC fund. It’s like, well, it can’t be a VC fund. The return profile is totally different, right? You can’t deploy that capital just based on early stage investing. And by the way, you’re not seeing the guys at early stage, all that you’re seeing, you’re going to make your returns in mid to late stage, right? Back to what we said at the beginning of the episode. So there’s a little bit of the haves and have-nots there. The big guys are raising more and more money, but they’re no longer venture capital. And I think limited partners that are a little bit more evolved, that are a little bit more conscious of this, that have been in the market longer, are realizing that shift.
So it’s like if they want to have the alpha of venture capital, they need to deploy to the sub-$100 million funds or the sub-$500 million funds, right? That’s where they need to actually focus their VC capital. They can still deploy to mega funds, but they’re deploying to a different asset class. They’re deploying to a private equity, mid to late stage asset class, which looks maybe a little bit more like a growth fund or something like that. The second part of differentiation is the honest truth is most VC funds are like, I have proprietary network access, right? I’m ex-Stripe or I’m ex-Google or I’m ex-Facebook or whatever, and I have access to that. I mean, we know proprietary networks from that standpoint are no longer true. The whole thing that created Silicon Valley back in the ’70s of what I used to call the country club deals where there were a few people coming out of the big companies, the Fairchilds of the world, later on the Intels of the world, et cetera, et cetera, that made some money along the way that sort of bootstrapped their next companies, were well-known quantity to the existing VCs and raised money relatively easy on ideas, that doesn’t work anymore.
Someone was telling me the other day one interesting thing that I wasn’t quite aware of, a lot of it had to do with the NDAs. I don’t know if you knew this, Bertrand, but like the fact that in California, it was sort of the Silicon Valley community sort of imposed this, we don’t sign NDAs thing and Boston continued signing it. And this whole NDA enforcement issue and non-compete, actually not the NDA thing, but more strongly that California did not enforce non-competes. I could leave Fairchild and start a company that magically was doing something that could be considered competitive to Fairchild. And that was sort of part of the acceleration actually of venture capital in California versus, for example, Boston, which was sort of hand in hand at the beginning.
Bertrand
Yeah, I mean, I’m a big, big believer in California success coming from not enforcing or banning non-compete agreements. I think it’s a key part of the game. If you lock people into not doing something similar in the next 6 months to 24 months. And the industry has always been moving fast. So this is a significant time where you are blocked to do something very similar. I think it was really an issue. So I think it’s a key part of the game and it has been there. I don’t know how it started, but I think that non-enforcement of non-compete has been a key part of the success of California. I’m actually pleased to say that Washington State is going in the same direction. They are just signing a non-compete ban. And you might remember that at the federal level, I think in 2024, there was also a ban that was put in place to ban non-compete, but this has been reversed by the courts. So this is not there anymore. So that’s why we see a state like Washington State putting their own ban, and we might see more state by state moving in that direction.
I think it was not helping at all, this non-compete. I mean, there is obviously stuff that needs to be done, like you cannot steal secrets, you cannot steal IP.
Nuno
Yeah.
Bertrand
Even stealing employees, there should be some restraints. We need to find the right balance, but you have to be careful there. That was key for the success of California, and I’m glad to see that this is a trend that’s going to go beyond California. And I hope most states will have a ban on non-compete.
Nuno
Maybe just to close on the differentiation process, two things. One, I think there’s this notion When you talk to some LPs, that seems to be a little bit ingrained, some LPs that prefer specialized funds. We’ve also done some significant analysis internally and have talked to a couple of datasets other than our own, or people that own datasets other than our own, and the feedback has actually been not so fast. Actually, generalist funds over time cannot perform specialist funds. There seems to be a little bit of a sweet spot around generalist funds. We like to call ourselves multi-specialized at Chameleon, but ultimately from the perspective of specialized versus Generalist funds, the picture’s not as clear as specialized funds outperform generalists or generalists outperform specialized. We’ve seen there are pockets where actually generalists outperform specialized, in other pockets where specialized of a certain size can outperform generalists. So that’s one topic on differentiation that is a little bit broader. And then the final topic on differentiation, it’s really an industry that hasn’t innovated dramatically on where it creates the most value, which is really the picking stage, right? So it’s having great deal flow, very optimal, productive, efficient due diligence with very few resources and the ability to then get into those deals.
That’s where most of the value is created. And then hopefully liquidating the asset if there’s an opportunity to do so at the right time, either through secondary trade sales or an IPO or something else. And what we’ve seen is the industry has innovated very little. I mean, the only thing I could point out in terms of core innovation at the top of the funnel has been the creation of the mega funds, the well-known funds, right? Like a16z, Union Square Ventures, et cetera, et cetera. But there needs to be more innovation on that cycle. And that’s why we certainly at Chameleon believe that the future is to have quant and AI-native VC firms that develop their own tooling, their own platforms. We have Mantis in our case that allow you to have this unfair advantage in how you source deals and how you do due diligence, how you get into the deals, et cetera, and how you take it to the next level. And we think that’s the beginning of the next stage is that the industry becomes more tech-enabled, shockingly enough, an industry that has made all its returns on tech or almost all of its returns on tech.
That we need to be more tech-enabled ourselves. But I think the writing is on the wall there, and that will be a source of differentiation certainly over the next 3 to 5 years.
Bertrand
One thing the industry has innovated somewhat and maybe could innovate even more is providing liquidity beyond trade sale and an IPO, because it’s clear that if VCs want more liquidity without waiting 18 years, you need that liquidity at different stage, not just when it’s time to do an exit, a full exit for the business. And for employees as well. I mean, it’s one thing to stay for a company for 4 years, which is your typical vesting. Maybe you extend that to 6 years, to 8 years, you have a great time at the company. But to think that maybe you have to stick around for 15 to 20 years in order to get liquidity on your stock options. I mean, that’s too much to ask for most people. I mean, people have a life, they have other things to do, other plans, they might want to move, they come at a different stage of life. So you need to provide them liquidity. The new game is we are not going to exit until 15 to 20 years, else it’s truly unfair. It’s not just unfair, but people will say, you know what, I’m going to go across the street, go work for Amazon or Google.
I will have RSUs at best regularly that are liquid, and why bother? I mean, we need to find pathways to liquidity for both investors but also employees. There has been a change in that direction, but I think we need more of this change, and maybe not just reserved for the absolute biggest, most successful companies like OpenAI or SpaceX, but also us as well. Hopefully we can find a way.
Nuno
Well, now we have these AI companies that actually grow so fast that they will IPO in one year. Now, isn’t that what’s going to happen? They raise They raised $500 million in Series C or $1.4 billion in Series C, and they’re going to IPO in 2 years. No? Is that not the new reality? I’m being facetious.
Bertrand
At the same time, I mean, there are rumors that some of them are going to IPO this year. I mean, we talk about OpenAI, about Anthropic. I mean, OpenAI is quite old, but Anthropic is a relatively new business, quote unquote. So I think it’s a good time.
Nuno
The Mega Fund Question
So maybe it will be true after all. Moving to the next section, are mega funds still venture capital, Bertrand? Are they still venture capital funds?
Bertrand
Yeah, I guess venture capital is a term that can encompass from small to very big funds. I truly don’t know. I mean, once you reach a growth stage, are you truly a VC fund? I don’t know. I think some of these definitions are kind of arbitrary from my perspective. What is clear is that you as a business need different providers of capital. And as we just discussed, you as a business, probably need to keep going and stay private for longer. One reason being, again, there is a tremendous cost to being a public company. There are some true strategic disadvantages. And at the same time, just practically, I mean, you need to get bigger and bigger in order to have a chance of a successful IPO. So you cannot just go IPO at a $500 million valuation. I mean, that’s like committing suicide, at least in the US market on NASDAQ. So my point is, you truly have no choice. You need to extend and If you need to extend, then you need to have capital providers that are there at later stage and therefore have more money. Is it still true venture capital? Is it true venture?
I don’t know. At some point, it makes sense that from the startups to the capital providers, everyone adjusts to a reality where the life cycle is getting longer.
Nuno
We don’t think it is. We don’t think mega funds are venture capital. We have actually some data that shows that they’re not in terms of actual returns. The alphas you can generate, the IRR that you can generate is actually not comparable. We did some analysis again with some of our datasets and from 2012 to 2022, so that’s the datasets that we used so that we had actual distributions and stuff we could take into account and so on and so forth. And looking at IRR, just to share some numbers in terms of IRR over those 10 years on sub-$100 million funds versus above $1 billion funds, the differences are incredibly stark. And this is true for global and US IRR, right? So just to quote some numbers in terms of average, sub-$100 million funds, global IRR of 22.9%, US IRR of 21.6% versus above $1 billion, 9.1% and 9.0%. Median IRR, if we just looked at median, 7.3% and 16.6% for sub-$100 million funds, 7.5% and 8.1% above $1 billion. Top quartile IRR, sub-$100 million, 31% versus 30.4% US IRR. And then above $1 billion funds, 14.7%, 15.5%. So it’s very clear if you sort of cut this in different ways, averages, medians, top quartiles, et cetera, over all these years that sub-$100 million funds are in a very different asset class than above $1 billion funds.
They’re in different alpha that you can generate and so on and so forth. Now to the point you made, Bertrand, I don’t fully disagree with the point you made of the bigger funds should become bigger. I just think they’re becoming different things. Now, again, some of these funds will hide under the facts like, well, wait a second, we have all these assets under management, but they’re over different funds. Sequoia, we’re still raising small early-stage funds, $500, $600 million funds. And then we have larger funds for growth, et cetera, et cetera. Andreessen Horowitz, a little bit less clear what they’re actually doing. We heard that they’ve raised $15 billion across funds. I’m not sure if that’s the exact number at the end of the day. But the point is, if I’m a multi-asset class manager, like early growth, et cetera, et cetera, then it still applies what Nunu is saying. I’m still going after the $500 million, $600 million early-stage funds. Well, not so fast, right? Because you still have all this capital with managing general partners that are maybe across funds for which their incentives in particular, both carry and management fees are coming from the larger funds.
Et cetera, et cetera. So there’s necessarily conflicts of interest. In many cases, the funds are just straight up big, right? And so they are above a billion. And so I don’t think a lot of these guys are in early-stage investing anymore, right? It may appear that they are, but I don’t think that’s where the returns necessarily are going to come from. And so if you are a limited partner, if you’re looking at your asset class allocation, again, you’re absolutely free to put money into mega funds because that’s the kind of asset class you want to play in. In terms of a blended private equity asset class that has a little bit of growth, a little bit of whatever, or actually a lot of growth, a lot of late stage, and maybe a little bit of early stage. And I want something that’s a little bit more blended, right? But if I still want the alpha venture capital, I need to deploy to funds that are early stage, right? And that’s like up to $100 million, up to $500 million. I think that’s my two cents on that topic. We see crossover things coming around, like guys who do both public and private markets.
Again, that starts feeling a bit like a hedge fund. A lot of these funds have also become RAs, as we discussed earlier. So I feel the writing’s on the wall. The mega funds are going more and more after either some mechanism of edging or a mechanism that’s a little bit more blended in terms of private equity than classic venture capital.
Bertrand
Yes, I think a few things. One, if you’re an LP, I can imagine that dealing with multiple $100 million funds might be more difficult. You, you need to know the partners, you need to have some background, uh, visibility. You need potentially to change regularly of VC investments. So I can see some level of simplicity if you just focus on the bigger ones, especially if you have a lot of assets you have to put to work. Another piece of the puzzle, I would guess that the bigger funds are able to return money faster because they are at later stage of the cycle. So instead of that 15 to 18 years, maybe they are more in a 5 to 10 year range, while the smaller funds being there more early might be the one who are taking longer to deliver. So I can see that Yes, there is an IRR picture, but there is also time to liquidity that is not the same. So that can probably also influence. And in terms of crossover PE hybrid model, I mean, for sure we have seen some of the public equity investors doing crossover, meaning going into private equity firms like Coatue, like Tiger Global and others.
And for companies that are preparing for IPO, there is a lot of value to work with these firms because they have very good visibility and understanding of the public markets. And their presence in the cap table is also a sign of quality, typically for public market investors. So there is a lot of value and logic for them to be there on both sides of the puzzle. But again, the fact that firms keep delaying IPOs, that the market is not so much startup-friendly, makes this model a bit more difficult. But personally, I think there is value there.
Nuno
Yeah, I think on the mega fund, just so that I’m not boo-booing everything, I mean, but there’s definitely angles in terms of the asset class that make a lot of sense. And there’s the scalability of the model. The ability to go after Series B, Series C, as well as mid-stage, as well as late-stage, even secondaries over time, to your point, in some cases even public equities. And that level of skill I think matters. We’ve also seen, as we’ve known, we won’t mention any brands, but people will know who they are, that late-stage hedge funds and investors, even if they’ve done okay-ish in growth in private equity, don’t necessarily do well in venture. So it’s clearly a very different asset class, right? So once you start getting venture teams together, The returns are not quite the same. Actually, sometimes they’re not even quite the same as the growth investments. So clearly they’re very good at the growth side, but not so good in early stage. But definitely there is a case for it.
The Case for Smaller…Rightsized Funds
But if we switch gears maybe to the small, or I would call right-sized funds, maybe just to quote a couple of numbers and then open up the discussion.
Small funds do seem to outperform larger funds. There’s a lot of data in the market that shows some of that dynamic outperformance frequency. All the Very historical numbers from Cambridge Associates from 1981 to 2010. 19 out of 30 vintages were won by sub-$150 million funds. We did our own analysis as I was sharing before. Funds between $0 and $100 won most years between around 2010 and 2021. And the years that they didn’t outperform in terms of investing in the top-performing companies in early-stage Series C, Series A, they were outperformed by the $100 to $500 million funds. The $500 to $1 billion funds and $1 billion or above were never even in the same league in terms of performance, of having identified those top performers in terms of quantity over those early-stage investments. Top 10 funds by vintage, 2004 to 2006, 2016 numbers. Top 10 funds, 73% were sub-$100 million. 2004 to 2016, top 10 funds by vintage, 73% of those were sub-$100 million. So there seems to be a little bit of a case that actually smaller funds, sub-$100 million, sub-$500 million in some cases, are outperforming the larger funds over time. Now, these funds are complex in and of itself.
The positive of it is small fund GPs like myself, we are deeply invested in our own funds. We’re not there to just make management fee monies. I mean, we’re not making $1 million, $2 million a year in management fees of salary ourselves, like some of the larger funds. So we are there to really get the carry and be less focused on management fees. And so I think there’s a little bit of alignment around that and really taking that kind of perspective on portfolio construction and liquidation, being also more aggressive on the individual time that we spend with our startups. On the negative side, obviously a lot of these smaller funds, not the case of Chameleon, but others out there are single GPs, very little teams or very small teams. And so it’s sometimes difficult to actually do a lot for portfolio companies as well. And this is where the mega funds, for example, a16z notably would say, hey, we have 600+ people that can support you, right? On market development, business development, communications, talent recruiting, all this stuff. Question mark whether that’s the right way to do it in terms of operating model, if technology is not a better way of supplying that value back to your portfolio companies, or if there’s no better way of doing it.
But still, that’s one of the appeals of actually dealing with a larger mega fund if you’re a startup, right? That they will have the resources, also the financial resources to put more capital in you. But also, again, if there’s entrepreneurs listening to this right now, and hopefully there are, it’s a two-edged sword, right? Because if you have Andreessen Horowitz putting money in you, or NEA, or General Catalyst, or whatever, putting money in you on a Series C and then not doubling down on the Series A or the Series B, there will be questions, right? Because like they have the capital, they have other funds, so why the hell are they not putting more money in? Um, so, so it’s a little bit of a two-edged sword.
Bertrand
Yeah, I think that one is a pretty big one. And on top of it, as we discussed, some of these big firms have multiple funds managed technically by different teams. So you might have convinced the early-stage teams, they have investors, they’re happy, but you don’t convince the growth-stage firm. As you say, it might raise questions because people might think that there is some communication between the early-stage team and the growth-stage team. So why the heck are they not deciding to invest? And as we also discussed, even worse possible situation, what happens if the growth-stage team has invested in your competitor? It’s even more trouble. So I think trying to understand how firms behave, what’s the reputation of the firm, what’s the reputation of the partner you are working with, I mean, can have tremendous importance and impact. When it’s time for you to work with a firm.
Nuno
Indeed. I mean, at the end of the day, we still believe that the smaller fund— we at Chameleon discuss the notion that our limit should be $500 million per fund, right? And that’s the logic of it. We think that model is the model that works well in venture capital. We do recognize, as I said before, why mega funds keep raising more and more money, right? It becomes a harm’s race at that end of the market. As I said, probably a slightly different asset class, or if not a significantly different asset class as well. So seeing a little bit both sides of the market, I mean, we often compete with the mega funds, but honestly, a lot of the mega funds are kind to us and they let us in. And this whole notion of elbows out, we haven’t felt it that much in the market. And people see our value at the table. And in many cases, I, I do see the larger funds more and more seeing the value of smaller funds coming in on the same rounds and even in some cases co-leading early stage rounds like Series C. So it’s not like elbows are out everywhere across the board.
So I don’t mean to say this is like an all-out war between small funds and big funds and the small funds need to win or the big funds need to win. I think actually there’s a lot of potential for coexistence. My point is more that the asset classes and the returns are quite different over time, and that’s how I would think through it. And if you’re an entrepreneur, you should think about that as well, right? What are the implications of taking money from certain funds versus others in terms of the expected returns, expected time allocated to you? For example, if you’re not doing very well as a as a company, right? Will the big funds spend the same amount of energy on you if you’re not doing great and all of that? So it’s a little bit sort of a beware, open your eyes, both for limited partners and for startups. What do you actually want, right? What do you want from your VC firm if you’re a startup? And what do you want from your VC firm if you’re an LP?
Bertrand
I must say, as an entrepreneur, uh, a board member, I have seen some situations where the bigger funds are actually trying sometimes to elbow out the existing investors. Like, uh, we have that much money to put to work, we cannot do less. And you’re like, yeah, but I don’t need that much money. And then they’re like, okay, just don’t let your existing investors do their pro rata. I don’t think it’s great because an entrepreneur, if your investors, your VCs, trusted you earlier stage when it’s more risky, and when it’s becoming less risky, you don’t give them the right to their pro rata because you have to let this big guy come in. That’s not great. Or even if there is not this pro rata issue, when an investor tries to put more money to work than it’s really necessary, it’s also not a good idea as an entrepreneur to take more capital than you could use. It will dilute you more, it will set higher expectations in terms of valuation, it will push you to use that capital faster than maybe would be reasonable. So I think that’s something you want to be careful with the bigger funds.
So don’t talk to funds that are in some ways beyond your stage and try to make it work in that context. Or don’t accept to have your strategy change dramatically for no good reason by funds that just want to put too much money to work in your business. And that for me is surprising because it should also be in their best interest not to invest in businesses that are not ready to accept that much capital. But as we have seen, there were in the past some funds that believe that capital is a moat. Was a good idea. So hopefully, I guess we’re a bit behind that. But yeah, I would say entrepreneurs, be careful, find partners that are the right partners for you at your current stage. Sometimes some big names look great, but at the same time, if it comes with a lot of issues, from too much capital to also taking the risk that these partners don’t understand the stage of the business you are in or your industry, Just be careful. There is a lot of value to have firms that are very focused on your stage, on your industry, are finely attuned to that situation.
Nuno
What Comes Next?
Maybe to end in terms of sections, what comes next? And maybe we can come up with some predictions that are a little bit provocative on what’s going to happen to the market. You, if you’re listening to us, feel free to interact with us on LinkedIn, on X. If you have our email address, shoot us an email as well. We’d love to hear from you if you think these are the right predictions or if we’re totally off. Maybe I’ll throw in the first one, Bertrand, and we’ll go one by one. So we’ll each put one at the table and see where we head. My first one is that we’ll have a huge culling of VC investors. We had this rapid expansion of the VC asset class with arguably at least tens of thousands of firms globally, maybe even over 10,000 in the US. I think we’ll have a culling and the culling will continue and we’ll have several firms sort of getting eliminated over the next couple of years that will have either because they’re having tremendous difficulty doing their first close in their next fund, or the returns are not there, or it’s a firm that has done 3, 4 funds, but for some reason the returns have just gone out of whack in the last few years during the bull years.
And so therefore, actually they can’t justify to raise more funds out there. So I predict there will be a significant elimination of active firms in the next at least 2 to 3 years. So maybe by 2028, and we’ll be below, I don’t know, 30% of number of active firms that we are today. The other side of it is I do think if we look beyond that, 2029, 2030, and so on, we’ll have the reemergence of not micro funds, but nano funds where people will start deploying capital very, very early and writing small angel checks, but doing it in a way that it’s sort of not this cottage industry that we’ve had of angel investors. So I think angel investment will be disrupted by people that will use more and more of the AI toolification out there to actually manage their portfolios of 10, 15, 5K investments in a way that is a lot more professional, creating sort of an advent of nano funds.
Bertrand
Yeah, makes sense. On my side, in terms of prediction, I think there is a possibility that the mega fund model keeps expanding and looks more similar over time to some PE models. So do we have the top 10 VC firms that look more like a Blackstone than a Kleiner Perkins or Sequoia used to be? That for me will be an interesting question and development. I think that there is some possibility that it keeps going in that direction. A lot of incentives are pushing things that way.
Nuno
My next prediction is that DPI, distributions to paid-in cash on cash, just cash back, will become essential for limited partners. I think TVPI, total value to paid-in, that also has in there, as we just said, paper valuations. There’s a lot of disbelief now around the TVPI metric if there isn’t distributions going alongside it. For those who, again, don’t know what TVPI is, it’s total value paid in, but it also includes DPI. So it’s cash on cash component plus a remaining valuation to paid in, an RVPI. And the problem is the RVPI really, in reality, it’s that kind of on-paper valuation that never gets attributed. I think LPs, they’ve seen the writing on the wall and they’re like, dude, just show me your DPI numbers. I don’t care about TVPI. Some LPs will still ask about TVPI just to make sure that the rest is sort of looking in order. Like, show me the money, show me the cash. Actually, it’s not money, show me the cash, right? I want money back.
Bertrand
But that’s an issue. I mean, if you’re supposed to raise financing every 3 or 4 years, good luck getting DPI to show for that. So you need to be at least on your third fund in order to be able to show DPI, I guess.
Nuno
I mean, my corollary to that, Bertrand, is if you allow me just to have a corollary kind of prediction, is that we’ll see certainly for funds like $50 million and above, $100 million, $200 million, et cetera, even increased concentration, right? I really need to have anchors that believe in me over time. And we might start having, again, the advent— we had it some decades ago, the advent of cap table kind of VCs, right? Like Sutter Hill Ventures, right? Where they’re not really raising funds anymore. And so we might have the advent of that, that we’ll have structures that are created that have more permanent capital allocated to them, or at the very least more concentrated capital by very few players.
Bertrand
Interesting. Me on my side, as I shared before, I believe secondaries are, are important and here to stay. Um, in the past, some could argue, is it a distress signal or something? I, I don’t think it’s true anymore. In a world where your average startup might take 15 to 18 years to exit through M&A or IPO, we need to have other options. For funds, for employees, they cannot be expected to stick around for so long and have no liquidity. I mean, it’s just pure madness. It’s just bad alignment at some point to do that. So I think secondaries are becoming the third liquidity pathway for VCs, for employees, and it should be more and more a key part of the game, a key infrastructure in the VC/startups tech industry.
Nuno
I mean, on specialized versus generalist funds, I believe we’ll continue seeing the coexistence of those two models where the specialized funds will in many pockets actually outperform generalist funds, but where we’ll continue seeing that the large franchises, the tier one franchises will likely be generalist funds. I mean, we just saw it in the cycle. The AI cycle went upon us. We had a 2021 fund. We could easily adapt and go into AI and figure out that AI was growing very fast. I mean, if you have an ultra-specialized fund and that’s your remit and that’s the only thing you can invest on, very difficult to change even during our investment period. I will put a caveat on that. We don’t call, for example, ourselves at Chameleon generalist. We call ourselves multi-specialized because our scoring models for the verticals that we track are specialized within Mantis. Because the partnership is specialized, we all focus on different areas. And because we have the Kin network that allows us to tap into that level of expertise, Again, I think the world will be specialized coexistence. Some pockets specialized will do very well, certainly on the smaller fund size, but the big franchises will likely look a little bit more generalist.
And as I said, multi-specialized from our perspective is the future. We’ll start seeing more and more funds that are multi-specialized like ourselves. Do you want to talk about AI and how it’ll distort the metrics? No.
Bertrand
Yes. I think AI is an exciting moment in the tech industry. It feels in some ways that the same way we had a big distortion coming with COVID and work from home in 2020, 2021. 2021, where suddenly everyone and their mother will build a SaaS company or invest in a SaaS company. AI feels a bit of the same. I mean, to be clear, I truly believe it’s deserved. I mean, we are facing a dramatic shift in how computing is being done in terms of value you can get from software. So at the same time, AI will probably distort this matrix for a long time. We clearly see a split where investments are going, in what startups are being created. So I think, yeah, we will see some distortion. And we know that maybe 50% of all deal value is going to AI in 2025. We have seen single rounds reaching 40 billion, like to OpenAI. We have seen, as you discussed, some seed stage investment of 400 million. So AI investing and AI startups are definitely a beast on their own. And will distort VC metrics for a long time. And we might need two sets of metrics in parallel, you know, AI versus everything else.
So that would be an interesting bifurcation in the industry in some ways. I would say it’s fair to separate AI versus non-AI. We reach a point where it’s two different beasts.
Nuno
Conclusion
So in conclusion, AI has changed the world and it’s changing VC as well, as we discussed earlier in the episode. We have a tremendous momentous occasion for the asset class where venture capital is really bifurcating into very large funds, which no longer are in venture capital or seemingly may be distributed between different asset classes, and the smaller funds, sub-$500 million and sub-$100 million, that keep having the better returns, but also with much smaller scale. We’re seeing a culling of the industry where the industry is definitely getting smaller and smaller and more concentrated at both ends, number of VC firms, as well as a number of limited partners per fund and the interest that some of these limited partners have of being more and more concentrated in their own portfolio allocations. And last but not the least, the discussion around specialized versus generalist, where it seems like there’s some clear winners on some asset classes, on some sizes, in some industries, but on others, there’s other kinds of winners. And so maybe the future is multi-specialized, as I framed at the end. Thank you so much for listening. If you want to check us out and if you want to comment, feel free to send us messages on X, LinkedIn, to both myself and Bertrand, as well as send us an email.
Thank you so much, Bertrand.
Bertrand
Thank you, Nuno.
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