Zevachim 26 - October 10, 18 Tishrei

Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite. A difficulty is raised against each one. The one against Rabbi Yochanan is resolved, but the one against Ilfa is left unresolved. A debate in Masechet Temurah 25b between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi regarding a similar situation is brought as a comparison. Abaye and Rava disagree about their understanding of the debate and whether it is similar to the debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis in our Mishna. There is a discussion about the language in the Mishna – is it referring to a case of a thought about “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” or “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk.” What are the ramifications of the different versions? Which is established as the correct version, and how?

Rava explains the Torah source for cases of improper intent (machshava) that disqualify sacrifices - specifically, when one intends to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial parts, or eat the meat “outside its time” or “outside its location.” The intent of outside its time renders the sacrifice pigul and incurs the punishment of karet for one who eats the meat, whereas outside its location does not carry that penalty. Rava explains that all these laws are derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:18, which also serves as the basis for additional halakhot related to pigul. An alternative interpretation is cited in a braita, which understands that verse as referring to someone who actually ate the meat beyond its designated time (on the third day), rather than to a disqualifying thought during the sacrificial process. Various drashot are brought on the wording of that verse and related verses, such as Vayikra 19:7, to further clarify the scope and implications of pigul. If one has a disqualifying thought of outside its time, but the sacrifice is also performed incorrectly in another way, such as outside its location, the punishment of karet does not apply. However, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and rules that if the outside its time thought occurred first, the sacrifice is considered pigul and punishable by karet. Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite.  

  Study Guide In discussing various cases of improper intent that render a sacrifice pigul, the Mishna presents a scenario in which one intends to eat the skin under the tail either outside the azara or beyond the designated time. Since the skin of the tail of the sheep is generally not eaten, but burned on the altar, this case is difficult to interpret. Shmuel, Rav Huna, and Rav Chisda each offer distinct explanations. Rabba, Abaye, and Rava explore the Torah sources for the prohibition against improper intent that invalidates sacrifices - specifically, when one intends to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial parts, or eat the meat “outside its time” or “outside its location.” An intent of “outside its time” renders the offering pigul and subjects one who eats it to the punishment of karet, whereas “outside its location” does not carry that penalty. These laws are derived from Chapters 7 and 19 of Vayikra, though there is disagreement over the precise derivation. Challenges are raised against the interpretations of Rabba and Abaye, and their views are ultimately rejected.  

Study Guide Three distinct explanations—by Shmuel, Reish Lakish, and Rabbi Yochanan—are presented to clarify the Mishna that disqualifies a sacrifice if its blood was sprinkled either in the wrong location on the altar or on the wrong altar entirely. Each interpretation is examined in depth, with challenges and questions raised based on other sources and halakhic principles.

Study Guide If one leg of the animal was outside the azara at the time of slaughter or blood collection, does that disqualify the animal and on what does the ruling depend? If the meat of an animal with a lower level of sanctity leaves the azara before the blood is sprinkled, is the sacrifice disqualified? Shmuel’s father poses several questions to Shmuel about whether the animal, the slaughterer, or the kohen who received blood that was suspended in the air would invalidate the sacrifice. When the blood was placed in the wrong location on the altar or on the wrong altar, the Mishna rules that it is disqualified. Shmuel reads this to mean the blood is accepted and the owner receives atonement, while the meat itself is disqualified. A Mishna in Zevachim 32 is cited to raise an apparent contradiction with Shmuel, which is subsequently resolved.

In the Torah verse regarding the purification of the leper (Vayikra 14:17), the word “right” appears three times - once in reference to the hand, once to the foot, and once to the ear. Rava explains that each mention teaches the requirement to use the right hand in a different ritual: one for kemitza (taking a handful of flour) in meal offerings, one for chalitza (the release ceremony of levirate marriage), and one for piercing the ear of a Jewish slave. According to Rabba bar bar Hanna, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, wherever the Torah uses the term “kohen,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Based on this, Rava’s drasha regarding kemitza teaches that not only the taking of the kometz (handful) must be done with the right hand, but also its placement into the kli sharet (sanctified vessel). Rabbi Shimon, who either does not require this part of the process or does not require it to be done with the right hand, agrees that the kemitza itself must be performed with the right hand, as derived from Vayikra 6:10, which compares the meal offering to the sin offering. Therefore, Rava’s interpretation applies specifically to the meal offering of a sinner, brought as part of a sliding scale offering. The Mishna rules that if the blood spills directly onto the floor from the animal, without first being collected in a sanctified vessel, the blood is disqualified. A braita teaches that the blood to be collected must be the spurting blood from the act of slaughter - not blood from a cut, nor residual blood that flows after most of the blood has exited the animal. The blood must flow directly from the animal into the kli sharet, from which it will be sprinkled on the altar. These laws are derived from Vayikra 4:5, in the context of the sin offering of the Kohen Gadol. Rav rules that all of the blood must be collected, based on Vayikra 4:7. According to Shmuel, the knife must be lifted immediately after slaughter to prevent blood from dripping off the knife into the vessel, since the blood must come directly from the animal. Rav Chisda and Rabbi Yochanan explain that the animal’s throat must be held directly over the vessel to ensure the blood flows straight into it. Rabbi Asi posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding the airspace above a vessel. The Gemara brings three versions of the question and Rabbi Yochanan’s response: If the bottom of the vessel broke before the blood reached it, but the blood had already entered the vessel’s airspace, does this count as if the blood had reached the vessel? If so, the blood could be collected from the floor and used on the altar. To answer the question, Rabbi Yochanan cited a braita regarding a barrel into which fresh water streamed into its airspace, disqualifying it for use in the red heifer purification waters, as it is considered as though the water entered the vessel. However, this comparison is problematic, since the red heifer case does not involve a broken vessel. To justify the citation, the Gemara reframes the question as a two-pronged inquiry. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was drawn from the aforementioned braita. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was derived from the laws of sacrificial blood, which must reach the vessel directly. Since the blood passes through the airspace first, this implies that the airspace is treated as part of the vessel. If the animal becomes blemished after slaughter but before the blood is collected, brought to the altar, or poured, the blood is disqualified. A source is cited from the laws of the sin offering to support this. The Gemara attempts to extend this ruling to offerings of lesser sanctity, such as the Paschal sacrifice, but the proof is ultimately rejected.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Elana Kermaier in loving memory of her father, Moishe Fox, Moshe Yehuda ben Harav Binyamin and Chaya Tzipora, on his seventh yahrzeit. "I miss his smile, his chuckle, his humor, and his warmth more and more as the years go by." If the kohen does not stand directly on the floor but rather on an object placed upon the floor while performing one of the central sacrificial rites, this is considered a chatzitza—an interposition—and disqualifies the sacrifice. From where is this derived? The Mishna presents three examples of such interpositions between the kohen and the floor. Each example is necessary to illustrate different types of chatzitzot. A braita is cited with Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling: if a kohen has one foot on the ground and the other on an object, and the object is removed such that he can stand solely on the grounded foot, the sacrifice remains valid. Rabbi Ami raises a question regarding a kohen standing on a loose stone. One version of his inquiry concerns whether the looseness of the stone constitutes a chatzitza. An alternative version explores whether, if the stone were removed and the kohen stood directly on the ground beneath, the rite would be valid. The Mishna also discusses a debate between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon regarding whether accepting the blood with the left hand renders the sacrifice invalid. Their disagreement centers on the interpretation of the verse in Vayikra 4:25. Three explanations are offered by Rav Yehuda, Rava, and Abaye to clarify the root of the dispute. Abaye further notes a third interpretation by Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that while the blood must be accepted with the right hand, the sprinkling may be performed with the left. Rabba bar bar Channa quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who teaches that if the Torah mentions both “kohen” and “finger,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Rava clarifies that Rabbi Yochanan meant that even if either term appears independently, the right hand is required. Abaye limits this principle to essential sacrificial rites. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Shimon requires the right hand if either “finger” appears alone or “kohen” together with “finger”. According to Rabbi Yochanan’s rule that the mention of “kohen” implies the use of the right hand, why did Rava derive a gezera shava—a textual analogy—from the three mentions of “right” in the leper purification ritual (right hand, right foot, right ear), applying one of them to kemitza (the flour offering), when the verse already includes the word “kohen”? This is there to teach an additional halakha that requires the right hand.

Several difficulties are raised against the conclusion that the elders of the South must hold that the Paschal sacrifice may be brought on behalf of someone who is impure from contact with the dead. After presenting a challenge based on a question posed by Rami bar Hama, the Gemara concludes that Rami bar Hama clearly disagrees with the elders of the South. He maintains that the Paschal sacrifice cannot be brought for someone who is impure, and if it is, the offering is disqualified. A baraita is cited as a challenge to Rami bar Hama’s position, but the difficulty is ultimately resolved. Notably, there are two different versions of this challenge. Additionally, the Gemara discusses the case of a kohen who sits while performing the sacrificial rites. In such a case, the sacrifice is disqualified. The source for this ruling is examined, and two textual proofs are brought to support it.

Even though the basin in the Temple must be large enough for four people to simultaneously wash their hands and feet from it, a kohen may also perform this washing using a smaller utensil - provided the water originates from the basin and the utensil is sanctified (a kli sharet). Reish Lakish ruled that a liquid suitable for completing the required volume of a mikveh may also be used to complete the volume of water in the Temple basin. However, such a liquid is not valid for the quarter-log amount required for netilat yadayim (ritual handwashing). The Gemara explores what types of liquids are excluded from use in netilat yadayim. Initially, it suggests excluding liquefied clay or aquatic organisms like red gnats, which are considered water-like. Both suggestions are ultimately rejected. Instead, the Gemara concludes that the exclusion applies to a case where one adds a se’ah of liquid to a mikveh that contains exactly forty se’ah, then removes a se’ah, repeating this process until half the mikveh consists of the added liquid. This method is acceptable for a mikveh and the Temple basin, but not for the quarter-log required for handwashing. Rav Papa introduces a unique case where such a liquid would be valid for tevilah (immersion) of very small items. Rabbi Yirmia, quoting Reish Lakish, stated that water from a mikveh may be used in the Temple basin. This raises a question: perhaps the basin requires flowing water rather than stagnant water. Although a tannaitic source seems to support this requirement, the Gemara resolves the issue by showing that it is a matter of dispute among the tannaim. The Mishna teaches that if an uncircumcised kohen performs sacrificial service in the Temple, the sacrifices are disqualified. This ruling is derived from Yechezkel 44:7,9. Similarly, a kohen who is impure disqualifies the sacrifices he offers. The elders of the South limit this disqualification to impurity from a sheretz (creeping creature), but not to impurity from contact with the dead, which is permitted when the majority of the community is impure. The Gemara challenges this view, noting that impurity from the dead is more severe as it lasts seven days and requires purification through the ashes of the red heifer. However, the elders argue that since communal sacrifices are accepted when the majority are impure from the dead but not from a sheretz, the same distinction applies to kohanim: a kohen’s sacrifice is not disqualified if he is impure from the dead. To better understand the elders’ position, the Gemara concludes that they must hold that someone impure from a sheretz on the 14th of Nissan may have the Paschal sacrifice offered on their behalf and eat it on the night of the 15th in a state of purity. Ulla explained that Reish Lakish strongly disagreed with the elders of the South. He argued that the laws governing the community are more lenient than those governing the kohanim. While the people may have their Paschal offering brought on their behalf when impure, a kohen’s offering is disqualified if he is impure from a sheretz. Therefore, if the Paschal offering cannot be brought on behalf of someone impure from the dead, then certainly a kohen who is impure from the dead should disqualify the sacrifice he offers. To resolve Reish Lakish’s difficulty, the Gemara suggests that the elders of the South may have held that even the Paschal offering could be brought on behalf of someone impure from the dead. This raises a question: how does this view align with the laws of Pesach Sheni?  

Study Guide Today's daf is sponsored by Joanna Rom in loving memory of her mother, Rose Rom, Sura Razel, on her seventeenth yahrzeit. "She is still with me every day, my inner teacher." If one becomes impure, must one repeat the washing of hands and feet? A source is brought from Mishna Para 3:7 regarding the para aduma (red heifer) to suggest that re-washing is not required. However, this proof is rejected, as the laws concerning the para aduma are considered more lenient. Can a kohen immerse his hands and feet directly in the water of the basin, or must the water be poured over them? Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak cites a source to support the permissibility of immersion, but the inference is ultimately rejected. Regarding the timing for sinking the water into its pit to prevent disqualification for the following day, three opinions are presented: Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef distinguishes between rites performed during the day and those at night. For daytime rites, the water must be sunk at sunset; for nighttime rites, at dawn. Rav Chisda maintains that for all rites, the water must be sunk at dawn. Rabbi Yochanan holds that once the water is sunk at the beginning of the night, it may not be raised again until morning. Rabbi Yochanan’s position is examined in light of other statements he made that appear contradictory. The analysis also ensures his view is clearly differentiated from those of Rav Chisda and Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef, with whom he disagrees. A challenge is raised against Rav Chisda’s opinion, but it is resolved.