Horayot 7 - September 8, 15 Elul

How could Yehoachaz have been anointed with shemen hamishcha if Yoshiyahu hid the shemen hamishcha? What else did Yoshiyahu hide, and for what reason? The king and kohen gadol are anointed in different ways—how is each performed? Kings were anointed near a flowing stream as a good omen, symbolizing that their reign would endure. The Gemara digresses into a broader discussion about various practices people use to seek signs—whether they will survive the year, succeed in business, return safely from a journey, and so on. Some authorities caution against relying on such signs. Abaye, however, says that since we see signs do have meaning, one should eat symbolic foods on Rosh Hashana—such as gourds, chard, dates, and others—because they grow quickly, serving as a good omen for the coming year. Rabbi Meir disagrees with the Mishna, holding that even a kohen gadol who assumed the role by wearing the special garments (rather than being anointed) would still be required to bring a bull offering if he sinned. From where does he derive this ruling? A difficulty arises, as the continuation of the Mishna appears to align with Rabbi Meir’s position. Could it be that the Mishna is split—part following Rabbi Meir and part not? If not, how can the Mishna be reconciled? Three different answers are offered to resolve this question. The Mishna teaches that there are five mitzvot commanded to the kohen gadol that also apply to the mashuach milchama—the kohen who addresses the people before they go out to war. A braita provides the source for this ruling. Rava asked Rav Nachman whether a kohen gadol who becomes leprous is permitted to marry a widow. Rav Nachman did not know the answer. Rav Papa later posed the same question, and Rav Huna son of Rav Nachman responded. The Mishna discusses differences between a kohen gadol and a regular kohen regarding the laws of mourning—specifically, whether they may perform Temple service while in the state of onen (the period between the death of a relative and burial), and how they tear their garments. The kohen gadol tears his garment l’mata and a regular kohen l’maala. Rav and Shmuel disagree about how to translate these terms in this context. The Mishna rules that an action performed regularly (tadir) takes precedence over one that is less frequent. Additionally, if one mitzvah is more sanctified than another, it takes precedence. From where are these principles derived?  

A braita explains that the words “מעם הארץ” — “from one of the land” — mentioned in the section about the individual’s sin offering serve to exclude the king and the kohen gadol. The braita then questions this drasha, noting that the king and kohen gadol are already explicitly excluded by the verses. It concludes that the exemption in the braita for the kohen gadol applies in a case where he committed a forbidden act unwittingly, but without relying on an erroneous ruling. The exemption for the king applies when he sinned before being appointed. However, this interpretation aligns only with Rabbi Shimon’s view, as the rabbis maintain that in such a case, the king must bring an individual sin offering. To reconcile this with the rabbis’ position, Rav Zevid in the name of Rava suggests a scenario in which the king ate half the requisite amount of forbidden fat (cheilev) before becoming king, and then ate the other half afterward. In this case, he would not be obligated to bring an individual sin offering. Rava asked Rav Nachman: if someone ate half the requisite amount before becoming king, then became king, and later ceased being king before eating the second half, would the two halves combine to obligate him to bring an individual sin offering? They attempt to resolve the question by comparing it to a parallel case involving a Jew who ceased practicing religion, a meshumad, but the comparison is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet, according to Rabbi Shimon’s position: if someone ate a piece of fat whose status — permitted or forbidden — was unclear, and only discovered the issue after becoming king, would he bring a provisional guilt offering? The reasoning is that the type of sacrifice does not change with the person’s change in status from a regular individual to a king. The question remains unresolved. A braita presents two different drashot to derive that a meshumad does not bring an individual sin offering. The practical difference between the two derivations is explored. There is a debate regarding which transgressions qualify someone as a meshumad. A braita explains that when the Torah refers to a nasi, it means a king — as no one is above him except God. Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, known as Rebbi, asked Rabbi Chiya whether he would be required to bring the unique offering designated for a nasi. Rabbi Chiya responded that Rebbi had a counterpart in Babylonia, the Exilarch, and therefore did not meet the criteria of someone who has no one above him but God. A difficulty is raised, as both kings of the kingdoms of Judea and Israel would bring the offering, yet it is explained that Rebbi was subservient to the Exilarch. Rav Safra offers a different version of the discussion between Rebbi and Rabbi Chiya. The kohen gadol who brings a unique sacrifice is specifically one who was anointed with the shemen hamishcha, the special oil prepared by Moshe. The Mishna outlines the legal differences between a kohen gadol who was anointed and one who assumed the role by wearing the special garments. It also distinguishes between a kohen gadol currently serving and one who is no longer in the position. A braita records a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding whether the shemen hamishcha was prepared in a miraculous manner. Rabbi Yehuda, who believes it was prepared miraculously, supports his view by citing several miracles associated with the oil, arguing that its miraculous preparation should not be surprising. If a king inherits the throne from his father, he is not anointed, but the kohen gadol is. Only kings from the Davidic dynasty were anointed. Challenges to this theory are raised: Shlomo was anointed despite his father being king, and Yehu, an Israelite king, was also anointed. These are resolved by explaining that Yehu was anointed with balsam oil, not the shemen hamishcha, and that Shlomo’s anointment was due to uncertainty over succession. Yehoachaz, whose father was also king, was anointed because he became king instead of his older brother Yehoyakim, who was two years his senior. Was he really two years his senior? The Gemara delves into the different verses to understand the age order among the brothers. 

There are several differing opinions regarding whether a king and a kohen gadol are obligated to bring a sliding scale offering (korban oleh v’yored) for certain transgressions. Rabbi Yosi HaGelili holds that both are exempt, since they can never become poor—a condition necessary for this type of offering. Rabbi Akiva, however, obligates the king in all cases except for withholding testimony, as a king is not permitted to testify. He exempts the kohen gadol entirely, based on a drasha derived from the unique meal offering of the kohen gadol (minchat chavitin). Ravina raises a question about a king who contracts leprosy and is no longer considered a king: would he then be obligated to bring a sliding scale offering? The Mishna then summarizes which sacrifices are brought by various individuals—the kohen gadol, the king, a regular individual, and the court—for both standard sin offerings and those related to idolatry (avodah zarah). It also outlines who is obligated in provisional guilt offerings (asham talui), standard guilt offerings (asham vadai), and sliding scale offerings. Two additional opinions on sliding scale offerings appear here. Rabbi Shimon states that the king is obligated in all cases except testimony, while the kohen gadol is obligated in all cases except impurity in the Temple. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the king is obligated, but instead of a sliding scale offering, he brings a goat. A braita is cited to expand on Rabbi Shimon’s position. Although it contains an internal contradiction, this is resolved. Chizkia explains Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning for exempting the kohen gadol from bringing a sacrifice for impurity in the Temple: the kohen gadol has a unique Yom Kippur offering and does not receive atonement through the communal sacrifice that covers the rest of the nation. This sets him apart and excludes him from the verse regarding the punishment for entering the Temple in a state of impurity. There is a discussion about Rabbi Eliezer’s view—specifically, whether the king’s obligation to bring a goat applies only to impurity in the Temple or to all transgressions that would normally require a sliding scale offering.

Rebbi and the rabbis disagree about the case in which a kohen gadol becomes obligated to bring a sacrifice for idol worship. According to one view, it involves a situation where he unknowingly worshipped idols. According to the other, it refers to a case where he unknowingly issued an erroneous halakhic ruling and then acted upon it. Despite this disagreement, both Rebbi and the rabbis agree that the sacrifice he brings is the same as that brought by an individual—a female goat. They also concur that the kohen gadol does not bring a provisional guilt offering (asham talui), though each derives this conclusion through a different method. The communal sin offering—whether for general commandments or for idol worship—is only brought for transgressions where intentional violation incurs karet, and unintentional violation requires a sin offering. This same criterion applies to the unique sin offering of the kohen gadol, the king and the individual. Rebbi derives this from a gezera shava based on the word עליה  (“upon her”), which appears both in the verse about the communal offering and in the verse prohibiting a man from sleeping with his wife’s sister. The rabbis, however, interpret the verse about the sister differently for another law, and instead derive the principle from Bamidbar (Numbers) 15:29–30. What does Rebbi derive from that verse? How do we know that the section in Bamidbar 15 refers specifically to the sin of idol worship? Three suggestions are offered, though the third is ultimately rejected. The communal sin offering is not brought for transgressions that are punishable by a sliding scale offering (korban oleh ve’yored). The source for this exclusion is also examined. Does the king bring his unique sin offering for a transgression that is punishable by a sliding scale offering? The Mishnah presents two differing opinions on this matter.

A kohen gadol is obligated to bring a special bull offering only if he issues an erroneous halachic ruling unintentionally and then personally acts upon that ruling. A braita derives this from the verse “לְאַשְׁמַת הָעָם” (“for the guilt of the nation”), which compares the kohen gadol’s actions to those of the community when they bring a communal sin offering. This drasha is necessary because one might have assumed that the kohen gadol’s obligation could be learned directly from the communal offering paradigm, given their similarities. However, since the kohen gadol could also be compared to the nasi (king), who brings a sacrifice without issuing a mistaken ruling, the comparison is not straightforward. The drasha clarifies that the kohen gadol’s case aligns specifically with the communal model. Another drasha teaches that if the kohen gadol issues an erroneous ruling but the people act on it while he himself does not, no special bull offering is brought. The offering is only required when the kohen gadol personally commits the sin. The Mishna rules that if the kohen gadol and the court issue rulings simultaneously but on different matters—where the community follows the court and the kohen gadol follows his own ruling—he must bring an individual sacrifice. However, if he rules with the court on the same issue and acts together with the community, he is atoned through the communal bull offering, not the unique one designated for the kohen gadol. A braita attempts to derive this latter case by comparing the kohen gadol to the nasi, but this is rejected. The nasi is included in the communal Yom Kippur offering, whereas the kohen gadol receives atonement through his own unique Yom Kippur sacrifice. Ultimately, the source is derived from the verse “עַל חַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא” (“for the sin which he sinned,” Vayikra 4:3). Rava and Abaye disagree about whether the earlier case—where the kohen gadol and the court ruled simultaneously—refers to rulings made in the same location or in different places. The Gemara explores various scenarios in which the kohen gadol and the court ruled on different matters. Some cases are obvious, while others remain uncertain. The Mishna further explains that the kohen gadol’s sacrifice resembles the communal sin offering in that both require two conditions: (1) a mistaken ruling that leads to erroneous instruction, and (2) an unwitting action based on that ruling. The same principle applies to idol worship—to be liable, there must be both an erroneous ruling and a subsequent action. A braita derives this from a gezeira shava based on the phrase “מֵעֵינֵי” (“from the eyes”). When the Mishna states that the same applies to idol worship, it does not explicitly say, “And the same is true for the kohen gadol,” as it did earlier. Initially, the Gemara interprets this to mean that the Mishna follows Rebbi, who holds that the kohen gadol brings a sacrifice for idol worship based solely on an unwitting action, even without a mistaken ruling. However, this interpretation is rejected, and the Mishna is re-explained as the sentence “And such is true for the kohen gadol” would apply to both the sentence before and the sentence after, as is the case in the upcoming Mishna.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Tina Lamm’s children in memory of their grandfather, Mike Senders z”l, from Cleveland, Ohio, and later Boca Raton, Florida.  "He dedicated much of his life to growing strong Jewish institutions, and his passion for Judaism, Torah, and Tefilla serves as a constant inspiration for us. May his neshama have an aliya and his memory be for a blessing." A braita is brought to raise a difficulty on Rabbi Meir’s position. The braita mentions two specific sin offerings whose meat is not eaten – the Levites' miluim offering and the offerings brought in the time of Ezra by those who returned to Zion. The latter offering consisted of twelve bulls and twelve goats. The Gemara assumes they were a communal sin offering for idol worship by the people during the time of Zedekiah. This number of sacrifices accords with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion that each tribe brings a bull and goat, and Rabbi Shimon’s opinion that both the tribes and the court bring (in a case where eleven tribes sinned), but it does not accord with Rabbi Meir’s opinion that only the court brings the sacrifice, as there should be only one bull and one goat. This difficulty is resolved by the suggestion that they sinned on twelve separate occasions.  Two other difficulties are raised on the braita. One, if the people of that time were already dead, how could the sin offering be brought, as an animal designated for a sin offering whose owners died is left to die, as the sacrifice can no longer be offered? Rav Papa suggests that the sin offering is left to die only for an individual offering, but not for one brought by the community. Three potential explanations are brought as a source for Rav Papa’s view, but all are rejected, and Rav Papa’s answer is rejected as well. The Gemara then answers that the people were still alive and proves it from a verse in Ezra 3:12. The second question is, didn’t they sin intentionally, in which case a sacrifice would not be able to be offered? They answer that it was a horaat sha’ah, unique circumstances, under which this was permitted. This answer can also resolve the previous difficulties. A braita teaches that if one of the community died, the communal sin offering would still be brought, but if one of the judges who issued the ruling died, the community is exempt from bringing the offering. Which tanna is the author of this braita? Rav Chisda attributes it to Rabbi Meir, while Rav Yosef questions why it cannot be attributed to Rabbi Shimon as well. Abaye disagrees with Rav Yosef’s suggestion, and there is a back-and-forth discussion between them. Ultimately, the Gemara sides with Abaye, based on a different source. In what cases does a kohen gadol bring a bull sin offering?

There are multiple opinions regarding who is responsible for bringing the communal sin offering. Is it the Sanhedrin that offers it? Do individual tribes that sinned each bring their own offering? Could it be both? If only some tribes transgressed, are the others still obligated to bring a bull offering? And is a communal offering required only when the Sanhedrin haGadol issues a mistaken ruling? What are the Torah sources and rabbinic interpretations that support these different views?

This week's learning is dedicated by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z"l, on her 25th yahrzeit. She left a profound legacy for her family and many devoted friends who continue to learn from her to this day. Yehi zichra baruch. Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's mother Ethel Petegorsky Geffen, on her 21st yarhzeit. She was devoted to her family and the Jewish community, volunteering on many synagogue and community committees and projects. Her two sons made aliyah to Israel and her daughter has had a long career in service of the American Jewish community. Today's daf is sponsored by Ayla Ginat in loving memory of Barak ben Lipa and Shlomit. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? While the Msihna brought two opinions, a braita brings four. Rabbi Meir obligates the individual to bring a sin offering, Rabbi Shimon exempts, Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus view it as a case of doubt, but Rabbi Elazar obligates in a provisional guilt offering, while Sumchus does not. Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yossi bar Avin bring examples of other cases of doubt to explain the difference in approach between Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus – to what extent do we expect the individual to be aware that the rabbis corrected their mistake? Rava explains the disagreement in the Mishna between Ben Azai and Rabbi Akiva to be regarding a case where the court realized their mistake on the day that the individual in question was still in the city but preparing to leave. As in the previously mentioned debate, the question is to what extent the individual is expected to be aware of the court’s reversal of their decision while they are busy involved in their upcoming travel plans.  The Mishna taught that the case of a communal sin offering is only in a case where the court’s erroneous ruling was to uproot part of a mitzva, not a complete mitzva. A braita brings one derivation, Chizkiya has another, and Rav Ashi brings a third. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the ruling has to relate to something that the Saducees do not agree with, i.e. something rabbinic in origin and not able to be understood from the simple reading of the verses in the Torah. The reason for this is simple – if it is clear from the Torah and the court rules otherwise, and the people follow, this cannot be understood as unwitting, as it is closer to an intentional violation. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Yehuda from the examples brought in the Mishna, but each one is resolved. Rav Yosef asks: If the court rules there is no prohibition to plow on Shabbat, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? The Gemara tries to answer the question by deriving it from cases in our Mishna, but is not able to. Rabbi Zeira asks if the court rules that there is no Shabbat observance in the Shmita year, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? Ravina brings a source from a false prophet to answer that it is considered a partial mitzva, and they would be obligated to bring a communal sin offering.  There are several cases where there is an issue with judges – either disqualified judges, or the head judge was not there, where there is no communal sin offering, as the case is considered closer to intentional.    

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel that the exemption discussed in the Mishna—for an individual who follows an erroneous ruling of the court—is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion. However, the other rabbis disagree and require the individual to bring a sin offering. In contrast, Rav Nachman, also quoting Shmuel, asserts that the Mishna reflects Rabbi Meir’s view, with the rabbis again dissenting. This dispute between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis appears in a braita, though it is unclear whether the braita is actually addressing this specific issue. Rav Papa offers an alternative interpretation of the braita, followed by three additional suggestions. Rav Asi maintains that the majority required for a communal sin offering refers specifically to the majority of Jews living in Israel, as supported by a verse in Melachim I (8:65). A question arises: if the people sinned while constituting a majority, but by the time the offering is to be brought, they are no longer the majority (e.g., due to death), are they still obligated to bring the offering? The Gemara links this to a debate between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis regarding a king who sinned before ascending the throne and only later realized his error once he had become king. The rabbis hold that he must bring an individual sin offering, since obligation is determined at the time of the sin. Rabbi Shimon, however, argues that both the sin and its realization must occur while the individual is in the same status—thus exempting the king entirely. The Gemara then explores whether this principle can be applied to a case where the people sinned as a minority and later became a majority. It concludes that the comparison is invalid, since Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning hinges on the sin and realization occurring during the same period of obligation, which does not apply in this scenario. A series of unresolved questions is posed regarding whether two distinct teaching errors could combine to obligate the community in a communal sin offering. None of these questions receives definitive answers. Rabbi Yonatan holds that a communal offering is only warranted if the court’s ruling was unanimous. However, after three challenges are raised against his position, the final one leads to its rejection. Ultimately, all judges—and even students present during deliberation—share responsibility for the verdict. As a result, rabbis would often invite others to participate in the judgment process, thereby distributing the responsibility more broadly. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? Rabbi Shimon does not obligate in a sacrifice, but Rabbi Elazar requires an asham talui, a provisional guilt offering. However, their debate only applies in cases where the person was in the city. If they were out of town, all agree that there is an exemption, as they had no way to know about the corrected ruling. A communal sin offering is relevant for erroneous rulings regarding details of a Torah law, but not if they rule to uproot a Torah law completely. Rav explains Rabbi Shimon’s position and the Gemara raises a difficulty to Rav from a braita, but resolves it.