Episode 129: Is Probability Real?

Bruce looks at what makes sense—and doesn’t—about popular theories on knowledge promoted by CritRats (critical rationalists on X). He looks at how much these theories align, and don’t align, with what David Deutsch has actually said about knowledge.⁠Support us on Patreon⁠⁠

A curious Twitter exchange with David Deutsch prompts Bruce to explore what Deutsch and other critical rationalists mean when they assert that randomness doesn’t truly exist.⁠Support us on Patreon⁠⁠

In this episode, Bruce explores his extended conversation with philosopher and inductivist Kieren, focusing on Kieren’s claim that Popper’s Critical Rationalism ultimately depends on induction.Bruce then makes a striking counter-claim: that Kieren’s entire argument amounts to stripping all substantive content from his “theory” of induction and turning it into an unfalsifiable concept—essentially a word game, a kind of argument-by-tautology designed to immunize the theory from criticism. Or put another way, Kieren is turning his theory into a concept because concepts are unfalsifiable.This leads Bruce into a deeper examination of what induction actually is—and what it isn’t. Why is “induction” such a confusing, multidimensional idea? What is the real point of contention between critical rationalists and inductivists? Did Popper truly lack a notion of “support,” as Kieren argues? And what did Popper actually say about justification—did he really reject every form of it?And to make things even more provocative: do CritRats rely on similar linguistic maneuvers to shield their own favored theories from criticism?⁠⁠Support us on Patreon

Here Bruce starts with Popper’s assertion that theories are 100x more valuable than concepts and compares it to Douglas Hofstadter’s ideas on creativity and consciousness. But if concepts matter so little, where do conjectures originate? Popper offers little on this point, yet Hofstadter’s view of the human mind as a system of self-referential feedback loops—able to bridge gaps that formal logic cannot—may provide a useful way to think about it.And while we’re at it, let’s poke at one of the CritRats’ sacred cows: is it actually the case that observations have no role other than helping us pick between rival theories?⁠⁠Support us on Patreon

What is a concept? What is a theory? And was Karl Popper right when he said theories are “100 times more valuable” than concepts? But where do conjectures come from?We go over Popper's own writing about concepts and his explanation for why he feels they are less valuable than theories. Does this prove Bruce wrong from back in episode 112 where he claimed concepts are more valuable than words? What would Popper say?⁠Support us on Patreon⁠

This week we welcome back Micah Redding of the Christian Transhumanist podcast. We had a joyful conversation touching on religion, science fiction, and teleology. We look at the ways science fiction and fantasy triggers our moral intuitions regarding what kind of universe we live in with respect to meaning. Do we live in an inherently meaningful universe (teleology); a meaning neutral universe in line with existentialism, materialism, or naturalism; or an actively-malevolent Lovecraftian universe?⁠⁠Support us on Patreon

Bruce compares Donald Campbell’s evolutionary epistemology and David Deutsch’s ideas on infinite knowledge growth. What is knowledge growth? Is it a rare thing limited to only biological evolution and human ideas, as Deutsch seems to argue? (Does he argue that?) Or is it a ubiquitous process that happens all around us at all levels of nature as Campbell argues?Is knowledge created in human minds an incremental process, as Campbell might emphasize, based on blind variation and selection? Or as Deutsch might emphasize, is this a cosmically significant, open-ended process based on creativity and explanation?Can these two great thinkers ideas be reconciled or are they in contradiction to each other?⁠Support us on Patreon

In this shorter episode Bruce takes a deep dive into logical fallacies. How useful are logical fallacies? Does pointing out a logical fallacy help correct errors? Does doing so make us more rational? Can we become more logical by avoiding ad hominem attacks, not straw-manning or appealing to authority, and avoiding slippery slopes? And is there a difference between a logical fallacy and a rational fallacy? If so, which is more important?⁠Support us on Patreon

In our previous episode covering Strevens' critique of Popper, we briefly touched on why Bruce believes it it a mistake for CritRats to say they don't believe in beliefs. This time Bruce takes a deep dive into beliefs -- and walks back his previous statement a bit. Do humans need beliefs? Are beliefs dangerous? What is the critical rationalist position on beliefs? What did Popper say? And can we even realistically live without beliefs?And along the way, Bruce criticizes "the disobedience criteria" as a way to make his point about the value -- and dangers -- of mythic belief systems and why we need them and why they can confuse us rationally. ⁠Support us on Patreon

This week Bruce puts Popper on trial. Specifically, through the lens of Michael Stevens’s book, The Knowledge Machine, which argues that science works because it follows the “iron law of explanation” where scientists must (at least in public) put aside philosophy, politics, and theology and only follow empirical evidence. Bruce asks, how compatible is this view with the epistemology of Karl Popper?And does Strevens' critique of Popper ring true? Or is it a strawman?