Ep. 10 - When Factions are the Cure
TranscriptWelcome to the Self-Evident podcast. It’s been quite a while since my last episode. Life has been crazy, school has been crazy, and, honestly, I just do what I have time to do. Since it’s been so long, I decided to make an episode in connection to the debate triggered recently by an article written by Jonah Golberg about the idea of creating new conservative third parties. I won’t go into too much detail. I and many, many others have delved into this debate and I’d suggest doing some reading of the various articles yourself to get a measure of what it is we’re talking about. As for my two cents on the issue, I wrote a newsletter last week where I submitted a subtle shift from Jonah’s aims, maintaining the same goals but seeking to accomplish what he suggests, not through third parties, but through committees or caucuses that can organize people towards championing values within the existing party structures. Today, in this podcast, I’m going to take this argument a little further and add some philosophical flavoring to what I’m positing. I’m not going to rehash my arguments too much from last week’s newsletter, so before you continue listening, I would suggest taking a moment and giving that newsletter a read. As a Madisonian, one of my key interests throughout my studies of political theory and constitutionalism are the mechanisms or “auxiliary precautions” that can be introduced to a political system and political culture in order to maintain the counterpoise necessary to ensure that no single majority faction gains control of the government and proceeds to assault the rights and liberties of those outside of the majority’s interests. James Madison, for his part, was zealous in assuring that such auxiliary precautions existed within the framework of the US Constitution. While others would have preferred a strong bill of rights within the main body of the proposed constitution, Madison initially scoffed at the effectiveness that “parchment barriers” could have in actually controlling the actions of the government. Pointing to the serious violations of English Constitutionalism at the hands of Parliament that necessitated the struggle against Britain, James Madison was more interested in establishing checks and balances on power than in an enumeration of rights. Madison argued that only through a proper diffusion of interests that forced governance by coalition and consensus could rights and liberties ever truly be secured. In this view, no enumeration or declaration of rights can ever fully secure a nation from arbitrary oppression and tyranny if there was not a proper diffusion of interests to make it impossible for any one faction to be large enough to compose a true majority. It should be pointed out that faction and party are not necessarily synonymous in political theory. More often than not, especially in American political history, a political party is more likely to constitute a coalition of factions rather constitute a single faction in and of itself, seeking absolute dominance of the wheels of government. In our own day, most of Madison’s auxiliary precautions remain intact, though the counterpoise he helped establish has been disrupted by several key developments. The four main disruptions of constitutional counterpoise I’ll discuss today are negative partisanship, national communities, the imperial presidency, and national parties. National Communities By national communities, I refer to associations that allow individuals to assume identities disconnected from their local communities and their states. Social media, for example, has created platforms for political activism that tend to establish core constituencies of citizens united by ideological beliefs that can wield political power despite being spread out across the country. This has tended both to increased instances of groupthink through self-sorting as well as a tendency to view politics as purely national because local and state issues fall to the wayside among groups that have no common interests at that level of government. Developments such as this have frustrated several aspects of counterpoise that had existed within the American system. Firstly, the notion of dual sovereignty shared between state and federal governments has fallen to the wayside as the interests of the people have become far more interested in accomplishing their political goals through the federal government rather than local or state government. As well, officers in local and state government are often more interested in national politics and less interested in wielding political power in their limited spheres. Additionally, Madison had believed that each state would have its own interests and that it would be too difficult to unite various state-based factions into a majority faction. The technology that has brought us closer together has largely washed away the state-to-state differences that used to exist in even similarly philosophically disposed factions. Imperial Presidency The imperial presidency as well has created its own set of difficulties. More than a mere executive authority, the president has come to represent the will of the people as a whole by way of being the only political officer elected by the entire nation. The people and their political representation have developed the tendency to adopt interests based upon whether they support the “nation’s father” or oppose him. This has made it difficult for a proper diffusion of interests to occur as, increasingly, the nation becomes split in two in support or opposition for a president. Both individuals and institutions lay down many of their interests in order to adopt and champion the common interests of a larger faction united by their disposition towards a single man. Not only has this led to the development of larger, overarching factions, but it has disrupted the balance of power in the federal government as well. In the designs of the American system, the various branches of government were meant to check and balance each other through institutional jealousy. The idea was that, even if a member of Congress was politically allied with the President, his institutional loyalty would check the tendency to simply do what the President wants, and vice versa. But, as part of a broader political faction that transcends these countervailing forces, members of Congress now offer undying loyalty or unfailing opposition to the president based upon the pressures of national faction to the detriment of any institutional considerations. National Parties Another concerning development is the popular view of political parties as national parties. I say popular view because, while the supposed leaders of the parties act like they’re leading a national institution, the realities of how American parties organize themselves do not reflect the notion of truly national organization. Each major political party is actually a confederation of mostly independent local organizations with surprisingly high levels of autonomy. What national bodies exist within these parties have very little capability to impose their will upon local organizations. (This is why someone like Joe Manchin is a Democrat in West Virginia but would likely be a Republican in New York. Actual party politics can vary to great extant across different states and counties because there is no institutional gravity that dictates party politics). But, as I said, this is not how the political parties are viewed in the popular imagination. They are made out to be monolithic entities either to be wholly supported or completely opposed. A center-right independent in New York will refuse participation in their local Republican Party because of the actions and words of a far-Right Republican in Georgia. A center-left independent in Utah will refuse participation in their local Democratic Party because of the actions and words of a hard-Left Democrat in Oregon. The natural counterp… Get full access to The Self-Evident Newsletter at selfevidentnewsletter.substack.com/subscribe
