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Iran's Secret Nuclear Program and What Comes Next in the Iranian Regime vs. Israel War

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Since Israel launched Operation Rising Lion—a precise and defensive military campaign aimed at preventing the Iranian regime from acquiring nuclear weapons—Iran has responded with a barrage of ballistic missiles and drones, indiscriminately targeting Israeli civilians. Dr. Matthew Levitt, director of the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and a leading expert on Iran’s global terror network, explains what’s at stake—and what could come next.

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Transcript of the Interview:

Israel's shadow war with the Iranian regime, the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, erupted into open conflict last week following a stunning report from the International Atomic Energy Agency that confirmed Iran was much closer to obtaining nuclear weapons than previously known. Since Israel launched a wave of attacks on nuclear sites and facilities, Iran has fired missiles toward Israel's most populated cities. Joining us to discuss what this all means is one of the foremost experts on Iran and its global threats, and a regular guest when trouble arises with Iran. Dr. Matthew Levitt, director of the Reinhard Counterterrorism Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 

Matt, welcome back to People of the Pod.

Matthew Levitt:  

It's a pleasure to be back, but I need to come sometime when the world's okay. 

Manya Brachear Pashman:  

That would be nice. That'd be nice. But what will we talk about?

Matthew Levitt:  

Yeah, just call me one of the Horsemen of the Apocalypse.

Manya Brachear Pashman:  

Well, you are one of the foremost experts on the dangers posed by Iran, especially its terror proxies. And you've written the definitive book on Hezbollah, titled Hezbollah: the Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God. And I say that whole title, I want to get in there, because we are talking about global threats here. 

Can you explain the scale of Iran's global threat and the critical role that its terror proxies, like Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, play in advancing that strategy?

Matthew Levitt:  

So I really appreciate the question, because it's really important to remind listeners that the Israel Iran war did not start Thursday night US time, Friday morning, Israel time. In fact, it's just the latest salvo where the Israelis, after years and years and years of Iranian we call it malign activity, but that's too soft a term. We're talking about Iran sending weapons and funds to proxies like Hamas to carry out October 7, like Hezbollah to fire rockets at Israel almost daily for almost a year. Like the Houthis, who were much more than a thorn in the Saudi backside until the Iranians came and gave them more sophisticated capabilities. 

We're talking about an Iran that a few years ago decided that instead of making sure that every gun that it sent to the West Bank had to go to Hamas or Islamic Jihad. They decided to just flood the West Bank with guns. Who cares who's shooting at the Israelis so long as somebody is. And an Iran that not only carries out human rights abuses of all kinds at home, but that threatens Israel and its neighbors with drones, low altitude cruise missiles, short range ballistic missiles, and medium and long range ballistic missiles. 

And so the totality of this, much like the totality of Hezbollah's striking Israel for almost a year, ultimately led Israel to do what most people thought couldn't be done, and just tear Hezbollah apart, that the Israel war on Hezbollah is the prequel to what we've been seeing over the past few days in Iran. Similarly, for the Israelis, it got to be too much. It wasn't even really that President Trump's 60 days expired and Israel attacked on day 61. It wasn't only that the IAEA came out with a report saying that the Iranians have refused to explain certain activities that can only be explained as nuclear weaponization activities. 

It was that the Israelis had information that two things were happening. One, that Iran was working very, very hard to rebuild its capability to manufacture medium, long range ballistic missiles that can hit Israel. After the Israeli reprisal attack last October took out a key component of that program, the mixers that are important for the solid propellant, without which you can't make ballistic missiles. And Iran is believed to have, at least the beginning of this recent round of the conflict –Thursday, Friday–about 2000 such missiles. Far fewer now, the Israelis say they've taken out about a third of them, plus launchers, plus radars, et cetera. But that Iran had a plan within just a few years to develop as many as 8000 of these. And that simply was not tolerable for the Israelis. 

And the second is that the Israelis say that they compiled evidence that Iran had a secret, secret nuclear weapons program that had been going on predating October 7, but was fast tracked after October 7, that they were planning to maintain this program, even as they were negotiating over the more overt program with the Trump administration. President Trump has even taken issue with his own Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, who testified in March that the US intelligence committee does not assess that Iran is weaponizing. And President says, I don't care what she says, I think they were very close to weaponizing. 

The Israelis say they have shared this information at least recently with their US counterparts and that was not tolerable. So the primary goals that Israel has set out for itself with this campaign is beyond the critically important shattering the glass ceiling. Think where people in particular, in Iran thought this would never happen, was two things, one, addressing and significantly degrading and setting back the Iranian ballistic missile production program, and second, doing the same to the nuclear program. They've already carried out strikes at Isfahan, Natanz, even at the upper parts of Fordow. And there is an expectation that the Israelis are going to do something more. The Israeli national security advisor said on Israeli television today, We are not going to stop without addressing the nuclear activities at Fordow.

Manya Brachear Pashman:  

You know, you called it a prequel, Israel's operations against Hezbollah last year. Did you know that it was a prequel at the time and to what extent did it weaken Iran and leave it more vulnerable in this particular war?

Matthew Levitt:  

I'm going to be the last person in Washington, D.C. who tells you when he doesn't know. And anybody who tells you they did know is lying to you. None of us saw what Israel did to Hezbollah coming. None of us saw that and said, Oh, they did it to a non-state actor right across their border. So they'll definitely be able to do it to Iran, 1000+ kilometers away, big nation state with massive arsenals and a nuclear program and lots of proxies. One plus one does not equal three in this. 

In other words, the fact that Israel developed mind boggling capabilities and incredible intelligence, dominance and then special tools, pagers and walkie talkies, in the case of Hezbollah, did not mean that they were going to be able to do the same vis a vis Iran. And they did. The same type of intelligence dominance, the same type of intelligence, knowing where somebody was at a certain time, that the protocols would be that certain leaders would get in a certain secret bunker once hostilities started, and they'd be able to take them out in that bunker. As they did to a bunch of senior Hezbollah commanders just months ago.

Drone operations from within Iran, Iran being hit with missiles that were fired at Iran from within Iran, all of it. One case did not necessarily translate into the other. It is exponentially impressive. And Israel's enemies have to be saying, you know, that the Israelis are just all capable. Now you're absolutely right. You hit the nail on the head on one critical issue. For a very long time, Israel was at least somewhat deterred, I would say very deterred, from targeting Iran. Because Iran had made very, very clear if Israel or the United States or anybody else targeted Iran or its nuclear program, one of the first things that would happen would be that Hezbollah in Lebanon, Israel, Iran's first, most important proxy would rain hellfire in Israel in the form of 1000s upon 1000s of rockets. Until Israel addressed the problem, Hezbollah is believed to have had 150 to 200,000 different types of projectiles, up to and including precision guided munitions. 

Not only have the overwhelming majority of those been destroyed, Hezbollah still has 1000s of rockets, but Hezbollah leadership has been decimated. There's a new sheriff in town in Lebanon. There's a new government that immediately, when hostility started with Iran's, went to Hezbollah and said, You're not doing this, not dragging Lebanon back into a war that nobody wanted again. We are finally coming out of this economic crisis. And so Iran was faced with a situation where it didn't have Hezbollah to deter Israel. 

Israel, you know, paved the way for a highway in the air to Iran, taking out air defense systems. It was able to fly over and through Syria. The Syrians are not shedding any tears as they see the Quds Force and the IRGC getting beaten down after what Iran did in Syria. And the Israelis have air dominance now. President Trump said, We, using the we term, air dominance now, earlier today. And they're able to slowly and methodically continue to target the ballistic missile program.

Primarily, the medium and long range missiles that target Israel, but sometimes it's the same production lines that produce the short range missiles that Iran uses to target U.S. Forces in the region, and our allies in the Gulf. So Israel is not just protecting itself, it's protecting the region. And then also taking out key military security intelligence personnel, sometimes taking out one person, then a couple days later, taking out the person who succeeded that person, and then also taking out key scientists who had the know-how to potentially rebuild all the things that Israel is now destroying.

Manya Brachear Pashman:  

But Israel is also not hearing from the Houthis, is not hearing from Hamas. It's not hearing from other terror proxies either. Very few attacks from Iran's terror proxies in the aftermath of this wave. Why? Why do you think that is?

Matthew Levitt:  

The crickets are loud. The crickets are loud. Look, we've discussed Hezbollah. Hezbollah understands that if it were to do something, the Israelis will come in even harder and destroy what's left. Hamas is still holding hostages. This is still an open wound, but it doesn't have the capabilities that it once had, and so there have been a couple of short range things that they tried to shoot, but it's not anything that's going to do huge damage, and the Israeli systems can deal with those. 

The Houthis did fire something, and it hurt some Palestinians near Hebron. You know, the Houthis and the Iranians in particular, in this conflict have killed Palestinians, and in one case, Syrians. They're continuing to hurt people that are not Israelis. One of the things that I think people are hopeful for is that as Iran tries to sue for peace, and it already is, it's been reaching out to Cyprus to pass messages, etcetera. The hope is that Iran will recognize that it's in a position whereby A) there has to be zero enrichment and the facilities have to be destroyed, whatever's left of them. And B) there's a hope that Israel and the United States together will be able to use this diplomatic moment to truly end the conflict in Gaza and get the hostages home.

Manya Brachear Pashman:  

Well, that was what I was going to ask. I mean, if Israel achieves its objectives in this war, primarily eliminating Iran's nuclear threat, how significant a setback would that be for Hamas and Iran's other terror proxies, and could it indeed pave the way for an end of the war in Gaza and the return of the hostages?

Matthew Levitt:  

Like everybody else, I'm so scarred, I don't want to get my hopes up, but I do see this as a distinct possibility, and here's why. Not Hezbollah, not the Houthis, not Hamas, none of them, and plenty of other proxies that don't start in the letter H, none of them could have been anywhere as capable as they've proven to be, were it not for Iranian money and weapons. Also some training, some intelligence, but primarily money and weapons. 

And so Hamas is already on its back foot in this regard. It can still get some money in. It's still being able to make money off of humanitarian aid. Iran is still sending money in through money exchange houses and hawaladars, but not weapons. Their ability to manufacture weapons, their military industrial complex within Gaza, this is destroyed. Hezbollah, we've discussed, discussed, and a lot of their capabilities have been destroyed. And those that remain are largely deterred. The Houthis did shoot up some rockets, and the Israelis did carry out one significant retaliatory attack. But I think people are beginning to see the writing on the wall.

The Israelis are kicking the stuffing out of Iran with pinprick attacks that are targeting the worst of the bad guys, including people who have carried out some of the worst human rights transgressions against Iranians. Let's not pretend that this is not affecting the average Iranian. It is. The president says, Everybody get out of Tehran. That's just not possible. People, average Iranians, good people. It must be just an absolute terror. 

But Israel's not bombing, you know, apartment buildings, as Iran is doing in Israel, or as Russia is doing in Ukraine. And so it really is a different type of thing. And when the Houthis, when Hamas, when Hezbollah, look at this, you don't you don't poke the tiger when it's angry. I think they also understand now's the time to get into survival mode. What you want is for the regime in Iran not to be destroyed. This is no longer a moment, as it's been since long before October 7, but certainly since then, of how Iran as proxies, export Iran's revolution. This is now a question of how they maintain and preserve the revolution at home.

And it's extremely important to the proxies that Iran remain, so that even if it's knocked down over time, hopefully, theoretically, from their perspective, it can regain its footing. It will still have, they hope, its oil and gas, etcetera, and they will get back to a point where they can continue to fund and arm the proxies in. Maybe even prioritize them as it takes them longer to rebuild their ballistic missile, drone, and nuclear programs.

Manya Brachear Pashman:  

Which is a scary prospect as well to know that terror proxies could be spread throughout the world and empowered even a little bit more. President Trump left the G7 summit a day early to meet with security advisors, and just a few hours ago, prior to this interview, President Trump called for Iran's, quote, unconditional surrender, saying that the US knows where the Supreme Leader is, and some other threatening language. But I mean, this appears to be a kind of a clear commitment to Israel. So I'm curious how you assess his administration's actions before and during the war thus far, and do you see the United States edging toward direct involvement?

Matthew Levitt:  

All politics is local, and there is a tug of war within the MAGA movement over whether or not the US should be getting involved. Not only in supporting an important ally, but in removing a critical threat. The President is clearly frustrated that Iran was not being more forthcoming in the negotiations. He said many times, we'd offered you a great deal, you should have taken the deal. He's very aware that his deadline ended, and they didn't particularly seem to care. There's also the background that once upon a time, they tried to assassinate him, I think, after the Israelis did what they did, the President appreciates capabilities. He appreciates success. He likes backing the winning horse.

And so the New York Times is reporting that after getting off the phone with Prime Minister Netanyahu, President Trump reportedly turned to some aides and said, maybe we need to help him. Now it's not clear that's what's going to happen, and my understanding is that the Israelis have plans of their own for things like the heavily fortified facility at Fordow, which is the most important and highly fortified, protected of the nuclear installations. The Israeli National Security Advisor spoke today and said, you know, we're not going to be done until we do something with Fordow. 

The United States can do multiple things only the United States has the MOP: the Massive Ordinance Penetrator, and the airplanes to deliver it, and they could end Fordow if they wanted. Short of that, they could do other things to support Israel. There's been defensive support for the State of Israel already, but there's other things they could do, refueling and other things if they wanted to. And at a minimum, I don't see the president restraining Israel at all. Now, I've heard some people say that so far, the President has fired nothing more than some social media postings, some of them even in all caps. 

But the truth is, those do have an effect, and so long as Israel is not restrained. I think the Israelis went into this with a plan. That plan is not necessarily to entirely destroy the entire nuclear program, but if the ballistic missile program and the nuclear program are sufficiently degraded so that it will take them years and a tremendous amount of time and money to rebuild, knowing that Israel has broken the glass ceiling on this idea of targeting Iran, that if the Israelis feel they need to, they will come back. If the Iranians rebuild their air defense systems, the Israelis will address them and create a new highway going if they need to. I think the Israelis are making that clear. Knowing that it's going to be a little bit of a road for Iran, especially when it will have to deal with some domestic issues coming out of this. 

Finally, the Israelis have started signaling there's other things they could do. The Israelis have not yet fully targeted oil and gas fields and facilities. For example, they had one set of attacks where they basically knocked at the front door of some of these facilities without walking in the house. That's signaling, and I think it's one of the reasons you're seeing Iran quietly trying to reach out for some type of a ceasefire. Other signaling, for example, is the Israelis deciding to fly all the way to Mashhad, which is in far eastern Iran, to take out an airplane. That airplane was not particularly important. It was the message. There is nowhere in Iran we can't go. It's not a question of distance, it's not a question of refueling, it's not a question of air defense systems. We can do what we need to do. And I think the Iranians understand that now.

Manya Brachear Pashman:  

So we talked about the commitment to Israel, and how clear, how important it is to clarify that commitment to Israel. How important is it to clarify the United States commitment to Arab partners in the Middle East to help defend them in other words, if this conflict escalates?

Matthew Levitt:  

This is critically important. You know, one of the individuals who was taken out, for example, was the person who was in charge of the drone attack on the Abqaiq oil facility in Saudi Arabia. If you look, for example, at the Saudi statement condemning the Israeli actions, it was issued by the Foreign Ministry without a single name attached to it. Wasn't issued by the Crown Prince, wasn't issued by the foreign minister. So I think you should expect a whole lot of public criticism. I imagine there's a different conversation going on behind closed doors. It's not necessarily, you know, pom-poming. This makes the Gulf states very, very nervous, in part because they understand that one way Iran could try and get out of this is to expand the conflict. 

And that the reason they haven't is because, short of trying to prevent Iranians from taking to the streets and potentially doing something to maybe overthrow the regime, short of that, the number one thing that the Iranian regime is most desperate to avoid is getting the United States involved militarily. And I think the Iranians really understand and the messaging’s been clear. If you target US Forces in the region, if you target our allies in the region, we'll get involved. If you don't, then we might not. 

Now the President now is talking about potentially doing that, and as a lot of maybe this, maybe that, nothing very clear. I think what is clear is that the Israelis are going to continue doing what they need to do for another one to two weeks. Even going so far as doing something, though they haven't made clear what to address the really complicated problem of the fortified facility at Fordow.

Manya Brachear Pashman:  

So how important is it for global security if Israel is successful in eliminating the nuclear threat in Iran?

Matthew Levitt:  

Look, Iran has been the single most destabilizing factor in the region for a long time now. Imagine a region without a destabilizing revolutionary regime in Iran without a regime that is supporting Shia militants in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. 

Imagine the Shia militias in Iraq suddenly without a funder and a patron, enabling the Shia government in Iraq to actually be able to take control of the country and establish a monopoly over the use of force. At a time when the Shia militias, because of Iran's backing, are becoming more dangerous and more powerful in Iraq. 

Imagine the Lebanese government being able to be more forward leaning in their effort to establish a monopoly over the use of force in that country, reclaim bases that Hezbollah has used for all this time, and establish a new Lebanon that is not beholden to Iran and Hezbollah. 

And imagine an Israeli-Palestinian situation where you didn't have Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad as spoilers. Recall that October 7 happened in large part because Hamas and Hezbollah and Iran could not tolerate the prospect of Israeli-Saudi normalization. For most Palestinians, this was great news. The Saudis were demanding real dividends for the Palestinians from the Netanyahu government, which was likely going to do them. This was great for Palestinians, bad for Hamas. 

Imagine Hamas no longer getting that support from Iran. Imagine Iran no longer able to send or being interested in sending millions upon millions of dollars to its proxies, and instead spending what money it has on helping its population, instead of cracking down on it with human rights violations. You could have a very, very different region, let alone imagine Iran no longer carrying out acts of terrorism, kidnapping plots, abduction plots of dissidents and Jews and Israelis and others around the world of the type that we've seen throughout Europe and throughout the Middle East and even in the United States over the past few years.

Manya Brachear Pashman:  

That’s quite an imagination you have. But I take your point. Let me ask you this then. Did you ever imagine that Israel would take this dramatic step? 

Matthew Levitt:  

What the Israelis have achieved, when you are so against the wall and you're forced to come up with solutions, because it's a matter of life or death – you make the impossible possible. And I think that perhaps the Iranians assumed that the Israeli post-October 7 doctrine applied to non-state actors only. And that doctrine is very simple. Israel will no longer allow adversaries who are openly committed to its destruction to build up weapons, arsenals that they can then use at some point to actually try and destroy Israel. They will not allow that to happen. 

They allowed it to happen with Hamas. It was a mistake. They allowed it to happen with Hezbollah. It was a mistake that they corrected. And Iran is the biggest, arguably, really, the only existential threat as huge, as a tasking as that was, clearly they invested in doing it. And the question became, not, why can't it be done? What is it that has to be overcome? And I don't think sitting here with you right now, you know, what is it, 3:30 on Tuesday, the 17th, that we've seen the last of the tricks up Israel’s sleeve. 

Manya Brachear Pashman:  

I only have one last question for you, and that is about the United States. The importance of the United States getting directly involved. I mean, we've talked about previously undisclosed nuclear sites, and who knows how many there could be. We're talking about more than what, 600,000 square miles of Iran. If the goal is a non nuclear Iran, can Israel finish this war without the United States, or does it even matter? I mean, is this just a step to force Iran back to the negotiating table with virtually zero leverage?

Matthew Levitt:  

So look, I don't think the goal here is completely destroying the Iranian nuclear program, or even completely destroying the Iranian ballistic missile program. The goal is to so degrade it that it is set back many, many years, and break that ceiling. People now understand if Israelis need to come back, they're coming back. I think they would like to do as much damage to these destructive programs as possible, of course, and I don't think we've seen the end of it. I think there are more tricks up Israel's sleeve when it comes to some of these complicated problems. 

Judged by this yardstick, by the way, the Israeli operation is a tremendous success, tremendous success, even though there have been some significant casualties back in Israel, and even though this has caused tremendous trauma for innocent Iranians who have no love for the regime. This is a situation that the Iranian regime has brought down on all of us. 

I do think that the Israelis have made very, very clear that this doesn't end until something is done to further disrupt and dismantle Fordow, which is the most important and the most heavily fortified, underground, under a mountain facility. It's not clear what the Israelis have in mind. It seems they have something in mind of their own. It’s clear they would love for the United States to get involved, because the United States could do real damage to that facility and potentially end the Iranian nuclear program. But at the end of the day, if it can't be completely destroyed, I anticipate it's going to be damaged enough to significantly set it back. This phase of the Israel-Iran war, which didn't start last week, is not about pushing them back a week or a month or two months.

Manya Brachear Pashman:  

Well, Matt, thank you so much for your wise counsel and perspective on this matter, and yes, hopefully we can have you back another time to talk about peace and love and things that have nothing to do with war and conflict with Iran or its terror proxies.

Matthew Levitt:  

I would really look forward to prepping for that interview. In the meantime, I want to thank AJC for all the important work it does, and thank you guys for having me on the podcast.

Manya Brachear Pashman:  

If you missed last week’s episodes, be sure to tune in for our crossover episode with Books and Beyond: The Rabbi Sacks Podcast, a podcast of the Rabbi Sacks Legacy, and my conversation with AJC’s Jerusalem Director Avital Liebovich. During a special breaking news episode the day after Israel launched Operation Rising Lion, the latest in Israel’s ongoing war of self-defense against the Iranian regime.

 

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