Sanhedrin 77 - March 4, 4 Adar

Today's daf is sponsored by the Tannenbaum family in loving memory of Miriam's father Yaakov Yitzchak ben Moshe Nachum haLevi on his 21st yahrzeit "He raised his family with the positive ethos of אבא, כתיב בתורה כך. Yehi zichro baruch!" If one sees one's father doing something wrong, what is the proper language one should use to correct one's father?  If one is supposed to get two death penalties for two separate actions or for one action involving two prohibitions, the ruling goes by the harsher death penalty. Rabbi Yosi disagrees in the latter case and holds that it goes by the one that was first prohibited to the person. What is the source for the former?  The Mishna explains that if one sins and gets lashes and then sins again, the third time they are put into a kipa, a small cell, and fed barley until their innards explode and they die. The Gemara limits this to a case of a sin punishable by karet, death in the hands of God, and explains that since the person is actually considered like a dead person since they have a death penalty hanging over them, which allows for the law of kipa to go into effect. Is the Mishna like Rebbi only who holds that one creates a chazaka after two times, or can it be explained according to Rashbag as well? Ravina explains it according to Rashbag, as the chazaka is created by the sins, not the lashes, which are repeated three times. A difficulty is raised against Ravina's explanation, but is resolved. What is the source in Tanach for the law of kipa?  A murderer who can't be convicted also is put in a kipa. The sages offer various possibilities of a murderer for whom this would be relevant.  There are certain transgressions that do not need to be ruled in court, but a zealous person who is on the scene is permitted to take the law into his/her own hands and kill the person. In what situations?   

Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Schwartz in loving memory of her father Chaskel Tydor, R. Yechezkel Shraga ben R. Yehuda Leib Halevi and Esther on his 32nd yahrzeit. "A Torah scholar who survived Auschwitz and Buchenwald, founded "Kibbutz Buchenwald" after the war, and merited living in Eretz Yisrael. He would have been amazed and happy to know that his youngest daughter and two granddaughters learn Daf Yomi with Hadran." Today's daf is sponsored by Adam Plunka in loving memory of Moshe ben Amram, "Moshe Rabbenu". Rava challenges the two previous interpretations of the Mishna, citing a contradictory braita. He offers a third explanation with supporting evidence. According to Rava, the two opinions in the Mishna address different scenarios: the tanna kama discusses a case where an arrow was shot from between two people, making it impossible to identify who shot it. Both individuals are exempt from punishment, even if one is known to be righteous. Rabbi Yehuda, however, refers to a case of a bull that killed someone and then was mixed up with other bulls. Since all these bulls are now forbidden for use, they are all placed in a kipa (small enclosure) until they die. A braita is presented that supports Rava's interpretation of the Mishna. The first section discusses a pregnant cow that kills a person and is sentenced to stoning. The status of its unborn calf depends on whether the verdict was issued before or after birth. This appears to be independent of when the cow became pregnant, which doesn't make sense in light of Rava's statement that if the cow was pregnant at the time of killing, the offspring shares responsibility since it is considered part of the cow. The Gemara initially suggests the pregnancy occurred after the verdict, but rejects this solution. The conclusion is that the pregnancy happened after the killing but before the verdict was issued. Does a warning to a potential transgressor need to specify the exact type of death penalty they would face? Rav Yehuda amends his father's version of the Mishna regarding people sentenced to stoning who were mixed up with those sentenced to burning, explaining that without this correction, Rabbi Shimon's language in the Mishna would be implausible. Had the original version been correct, Rabbi Shimon would likely have offered a different explanation altogether.  

Study Guide Sanhedrin 79 Today's daf is sponsored by Amy Goldstein in loving memory of her grandfather, Ben Goldstein on his yahrzeit. What type of intent is needed in order for one to receive the death penalty for murder? Rabbi Shimon has a unique approach, that one only gets capital punishment if one intends to kill that particular person. The rabbis disagree but also have their own set of criteria. Rabbi Shimon derives his opinion from the verse in Devraim 19:11, "and he ambushes him and stands up against him and kills him." The rabbis derive a different law from that verse - that if one throws a rock into a group of people and kills one of them, the murderer is not held liable. The Gemara tries to establish the exact case that the rabbis derive and conclude that it must be a case where there were nine Jews in the group and one gentile. The law is lenient here as even though the majority are Jews, if they are fixed, then the doubt is considered 50/50 and we are lenient in cases of capital punishment.  After questioning Rabbi Shimon from a case in Shmot 21:22 when a pregnant woman is accidentally killed and the murderer is killed, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Shimon must hold like Rebbi, that the murderer there is not actually killed, but needs to pay money. A third opinion is brought, of Chizkia, who rules that the murderer is not even obligated to pay, as the laws that we hold by the more severe punishment, and exempt from a less severe punishment apply even in cases where the death penalty could have potentially been there, but is not.  If a murderer gets mixed up with a group of people and there is no way to identify who the murderer is, what can be done? The Mishna brings a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda.  Three different interpretations are brought to explain the case that they are debating.

This week's learning is sponsored by Anne Rubin. "I would like to thank two people that have had the greatest influence on my Jewish life and learning in the most recent years. Michelle Farber who has become my study partner through her podcast since I started Daf Yomi in January 2020. I have not missed a day of reading or listening. And to Rabbi Elliot Cosgrove who has inspired me in more ways than I can say in reconnecting with my Jewish soul."  Today's daf is sponsored by Judith Weil in memory of Rabbi Eliahu Chaim Greenberg, z"l on his 50th yahrzeit, this past Monday. "My grandfather was an ilui who grew up in difficult circumstances. He didn’t know how to tell you he loved you in words, so he’d tell you by sitting you down to learn a daf of Gemara together. Yehi zichro baruch." Today's daf is sponsored by Rhona Fink in loving memory of her brother-in-law Michael Desroches who passed away February 26th. "Michael was a self-described Christian Zionist, devoted to Israel and the future of the Jewish people." If a group of people beat up one person to death, none of them receive the death penalty. But if they beat them one after another, there is a debate whether no one receives the death penalty, or the last one does,  as the last person brought the death upon them sooner. How does each interpret the verse in Vayikra 24:17 differently? What are the laws regarding a person who is a treifa - one who is assessed to die within twelve months - what if a person like that is killed, kills, or testifies against another?  If one puts a snake up to another's body to bite, is the person killed or is the snake killed? The rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda disagree? On what basis? If one hits another and is assessed to die but then recovers somewhat and then subsequently dies, can the one who hit be killed as punishment for the death or not? Rabbi Nechamia and the rabbis disagree. How does each interpret the verse in Shmot 21: 19 differently?

The rabbis discuss various cases of indirect murder and establish in which situations one is liable for indirectly murdering another and in which cases one is exempt.

Presentation If we compare a man's relatives to his wife's relatives, as was stated in the braita quoted earlier, then just as his daughter-in-law is forbidden, why isn't his wife's daughter-in-law forbidden to him? Abaye and Rava each explain differently why the comparison would not work for this case.  What is the source for deriving that a man's daughter from rape or out of wedlock would be forbidden by penalty of burning? Where is the negative commandment for this in the Torah? Three different answers are brought. The last opinion derived the negative prohibition from Vayikra 19:29 "Do not disgrace your daughter to zenut." That verse also teaches that a father can't sell his daughter to be a prostitute. How are two things derived from the same verse? Rava and Abaye, who do not derive the original law (forbidding a father to his daughter from rape) from here, derive another law from here, that a father cannot marry of his daughter to an old man, as that may lead her to commit adultery. Other statements are brought to prevent a father from marrying or not marrying off his daughter out of self-interest.  Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael disagree about how to interpret the verse regarding the death penalty for a man who engages in sexual relations with his wife and mother-in-law. It says in the verse that he dies and they die. To who is "they" referring? Rava and Abaye explain their debate in two different manners.   Who gets punished by decapitation by the sword? A murderer and members of an idolatrous city (ir hanidachat). If one prevents another from getting out of the water and they drown, the murderer is liable, but if one pushes another into the water and the person can get out, but instead they die, the one who pushed the person in, is exempt. 

The Gemara tells of a man who was dangerously ill due to his unfulfilled sexual desires with a particular woman. The doctors determined he would die unless these desires were satisfied. When consulted, the rabbis ruled that even allowing the man to merely be in the presence of the woman he desired was forbidden. The Gemara discusses whether this woman was married or single, and examines why the rabbis took such a strict position in this life-threatening situation. The Gemara then discusses which relatives are liable to the punishment of death by burning. It examines which of these forbidden relationships are explicitly stated in the Torah and which are derived through interpretation. A debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael centers on whether the prohibition against relations with one's grandmother-in-law (punishable by burning) is explicitly stated in the Torah or derived through rabbinic interpretation. A braita is presented that lists three categories of forbidden relationships, all derived from the case of relations with a mother-in-law. Due to the braita's complex language, the Gemara carefully analyzes each section, clarifying its meaning and specifying which forbidden relationships fall under each category. The Gemara raises a logical challenge based on the second category of the braita: if relations with one's grandmother-in-law are forbidden, shouldn't relations with one's own grandmother be forbidden as well? However, it is established that relations with one's grandmother are not prohibited. Both Abaye and Rava offer explanations for why this logical extension does not apply and why one cannot derive a prohibition against relations with one's grandmother from this case.

Two more answers (altogether five) are brought to reconcile the contradiction between the braita and the Mishna in Ketubot 29a. From where does Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul learn that if one can neutralize the pursuer, one is not allowed to kill him? When one is pursuing another and either the pursuer, the pursued or the one trying to stop the pursuer causes damage - who is exempt from payment and who is liable to pay? Why?  What is the basis for the opinions of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his son Rabbi Eliezer who add more cases to the list where one can kill one who is about to commit a certain transgression? Rabbi Yochanan quotes Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak saying that the rabbis sat in an attic in Lod and ruled that if one is threatened by death unless they transgress one of the commandments, they should transgress the commandment and not be killed, as the commandments were given to "live by them." However, there are three exceptions to the rule - idol worship, inappropriate sexual relations and murder (yehareg v'al yaavor). What is the source for the three exceptions? There are also certain circumstances in which one must give oneself over to be killed rather than transgress any commandment - if it is in public and if it is a time of religious persecution. What is the definition of public? How was Esther permitted to engage in relations with Achashverosh if it was public? Rava and Abaye each provide an answer.  Are Bnei Noach also commanded to give themselves over to be killed if asked to transgress one of the Noahide laws in public? 

The Mishna discusses the laws of a rodef (pursuer), addressing when it is permissible to kill someone pursuing another person – either to kill or to rape. A fundamental question emerges: Is this permission based on preventing the pursuer from committing a grave offense, or is it specifically aimed at protecting the potential victim? The Mishna rules that one is not about to pursue one who is going to commit idolatry, violate Shabbat or engage in bestiality. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his son Rabbi Elazar extended this rule to include some of these cases.  The Gemara examines several potential scriptural sources for the law permitting the killing of a rodef who intends to murder someone. After rejecting two initial suggestions, the law is ultimately derived through a hekeish (textual comparison) involving the rape of a betrothed young woman. The Gemara then explores which verses establish the obligation to save someone facing mortal danger, whether from drowning, wild animal attacks, or armed assailants. A braita expands upon the Mishna's teachings, and the Gemara provides derivations for the various categories where the law of rodef applies. Two additional cases from the braita are analyzed in detail: First, the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding a woman who, facing imminent rape, fears that intervention could lead to her death and therefore tells potential rescuers not to intervene. Second, the Gemara addresses an apparent contradiction between this braita and a Mishna in Ketubot 29a, offering several resolutions to reconcile the texts.

This week's learning is sponsored by Nira Feldman in loving memory of her mother Faye Darack z"l. "A devoted Hadran learner, she approached each day with a renewed curiosity to learn and grow, she continues to inspire us each day."  Today's daf is sponsored by Phyllis & Yossie Hecht in loving memory of Phyllis’s father’s, HaRav Yerachmiel Binyanim ben Zalman Tzvi Witkin on his 16th yahrzeit, “Jerry Witkin, the יושר לב, חבר לכל רואך וכל כך שמח בחלקו. We can only imagine the pride Dad must feel peeking down on his impactful legacy of 6 children, 28 grandchildren and continuous growth of great-grandchildren living lives of Am Yisrael b'Eretz Yisrael im Torat Yisrael! Dad, you are so missed and we have been so blessed. Yehi Zichro Baruch.” Today’s daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in loving memory of Carol’s mother, Irma Robinson, Hudda Bat Moshe on her 8th yahrzeit. “Irma built a rich life in the Chicago area. She loved to have the family over for special events. Sadly, four years after she was widowed, Irma developed Alzheimer’s. Carol and her sister Debbie were blessed that though her illness progressed, she never forgot who they were.” She and Carol are together in a different world, and this dedication will always remain the same.  Today's daf is sponsored by Naomi Cohen. "Mazal Tov to Jack, Rivka, Itzik and Yoni on the birth of a daughter and sister, Elisheva bat Yaakov v'Rivka, Ella - with love from Mum and Dad/Savta and Sabba." Assumptions are made about a rebellious child regarding the course his future will take and therefore he is killed to prevent him from sinning further. Similar assumptions are also made regarding a robber - the assumption is that a robber will come to kill if the owner of the house stands up against the robber, and therefore it is permitted to kill a robber. The Gemara discusses the circumstances in which one can assume the robber is coming to kill. Additionally, if at the time of the robbery the robber is viewed as a pursuer, there is a "death penalty" on the robber. Therefore, the robber is exempt from damages caused to property because of the law that if one incurs two punishments simultaneously, one is exempt from the more lenient one. Rav takes this even further to say a robber who can be killed is exempt from returning the stolen items.  Rava disagrees and only exempts the robber if the item is broken or gone. Our Mishna is brought to support Rava's interpretation. Another source is brought to raise a difficulty against Rava's position. The difficulty is resolved. Other drashot are brought on the verses regarding robbery, including laws that one can even kill a robber on Shabbat, in any way they want, and anyone can kill the robber, not only the one being robbed. Two different drashot highlight why the verse specifically brought the example of a robber in a machteret, i.e. breaking in, even though the law would also apply to one who climbs up to the roof or enters the courtyard (easily). One explains that it is the typical manner of robbers, while the other learns from here that one who breaks in is already considered forewarned and no warning is necessary before killing the robber. Rav Huna rules that a minor pursuer can be killed as well, as there is no need for a warning. Rav Chisda raised a difficulty from a Mishna in Ohalot 7:6 that if the mother's life is endangered during childbirth, if the head has emerged, one cannot kill the baby to save the mother, even if the baby is acting like a pursuer. The resolution is that the baby is not intending to kill the mother, as it is an act of God. In the earlier part of that Mishna it is explained that before the head has emerged, one can abort the fetus if it is causing risk to the mother, as the life of the mother takes precedence to an unborn fetus. A braita is brought to support Rav Huna's position and another is brought to contradict. However, both are rejected as inconclusive.