Will the alleged attack on Helen Haines change Australia and its politics?

The alleged attack on independent MP Helen Haines outside her electorate office in regional Victoria came as a shock to a nation with so little history of violence directed at elected representatives. The driver of the Toyota LandCruiser that pinned Haines against her car, causing her to lose both legs, has been charged with several offences, and appeared on Wednesday before the Wangaratta Magistrates’ Court. He remains in custody.The police are continuing their investigations into the driver’s mental health and motivations. But regardless of whether his actions were politically motivated, the alleged attack has had an immediate effect on Australian politics. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese reiterated his plea to “lower the temperature” of political debate. Opposition leader Angus Taylor insisted “that political violence must never be accepted as part of public life”.One by one, politicians came forward with their own accounts of the abuse, harassment and violent threats that are part of the “new reality” of Australian politics. Only last week, Labor front-bencher Anne Aly reported receiving 19 death threats on social media following comments by Liberal MP Angie Bell that she and the prime minister be “shamed and stoned in the square” over an Australian Tax Office decision (comments that Bell has since described as “regrettable”). ASIO chief Mike Burgess gave a sober warning about the “permissive environment of violence” in this country. Meanwhile, Governor-General Sam Mostyn appealed to the way that Helen Haines herself modelled civility and dedication to her community, urging Australians to:“ensure that we are in fact disagreeing well, not fighting with one another, not descending into violence and chaos and division. Most importantly, that we learn or relearn to exercise our muscle of decency.”While the alleged attack may be unprecedented in Australia’s history, and its life-altering consequences for a figure as respected and admired as Haines is appropriately arresting, there is something about the litany of responses that feels troublingly familiar.Earlier this year, following the gruesome killing of former UK politician Ann Widdecombe, the widower of Jo Cox, the Labour MP who was murdered in 2016 at the height of the Brexit debate, admittedly to feeling “much less optimistic” about the UK’s political culture:“In the aftermath of Jo’s murder, I think there was a real sense of shock, of horror across the political spectrum and the whole country did come together for a moment to say this is not how we want to conduct our politics. But I think in the years that followed we have gone further into our tribes.”Attacks on representative figures, whatever their motivation, cannot help but be experienced as an attack on the protected institutions that govern our common life. And they necessarily have profound consequences for the way we practice democratic politics — from reluctance to express political convictions that might attract online threats to a more general unwillingness to be accessible to one’s constituents.Threats of violence and abuse should not simply be accepted as “part of the job” for politicians. But given the “permissive environment” cultivated by the social media, what can be done to ameliorate the likelihood of violence?Guest: Rob Manwaring is an Associate Professor of Politics and Public Policy at Flinders University.

Over the last decade, the proliferation of streaming services made more movies and television series available to more people than ever before. It revolutionised what we watch (including the importance of recommendation algorithms to help us sort our preferences) and how we watch it (hence the rise of binge watching).And while prestige back catalogues and perennially rewatchable sitcoms — from ‘Seinfeld’ and ‘Friends’ to ‘The Office’ and ‘The Big Bang Theory’ — were initially valuable commodities for attracting new subscribers, keeping them meant “original” content and “exclusive” series.Suddenly, a phenomenon characterised by unprecedented abundance ran up against the problem of scarcity. ‘Stranger Things’ and ‘Squid Game’, ‘Severance’ and ‘Widow’s Bay’ became outliers in a digital landscape largely bereft of new ideas — which would see the companies follow Disney’s lead and race to secure the kind of intellectual property that can be serialised and spun out in new iterations for years (like Netflix’s purchase of the Roald Dahl Story Company for almost US$700 million in 2021).The problem of scarcity has also served to accelerate a trend that is as old as Hollywood itself: the tendency to adapt, recycle or remake already existing material. Some of the greatest cinematic achievements after the advent of sound were themselves either adaptations of stage plays or remakes of silent-era films, to say nothing of the steady stream of literary fiction and bestsellers that were turned into cinematic masterpieces (two of the prime examples from the early 1970s being ‘The Godfather’ and ‘Jaws’).And then there are those successful films and television series whose first (and often best) instantiations were outside of the United States — we could think here of Kurosawa’s ‘Seven Samurai’ (1954) and ‘High and Low’ (1963), ‘The Office’ (2001-2003), ‘Broadchurch’ (2013) and ‘House of Cards’ (1990-1995) in the UK, or the Danish version of ‘The Killing’ (2007) — which would go on to receive “the Hollywood treatment”, with decidedly uneven results.But there does seem to be something different going on with the relentless sequence of remakes and franchise reboots, where companies are cannibalising their own IP (such as Disney’s determination to turn its back catalogue of animated films into live-action movies), trading on audience nostalgia for 1980s and 1990s hits (which covers everything from ‘Transformers’ and ‘He-Man and the Masters of the Universe’, to ‘Jurassic Park’, ‘I Know What You Did Last Summer’ and ‘Naked Gun’), or remaking films that already enjoyed critical and commercial success (HBO’s reboot of the Harry Potter franchise, or Apple’s atrocious remake of Martin Scorsese’s acclaimed remake of J Lee Thompson’s 1962 noir thriller ‘Cape Fear’, which was itself an adaptation of John MacDonald’s 1957 novel, ‘The Executioners’) as sprawling series.What are the economic and cultural impulses behind remakes? What is the difference between an adaptation, a remake and a reboot (and what to make of attempts to combine remakes and reboots in, say, the latter instalments in the ‘Spider-Man’ and ‘Jurassic Park’ franchises)? Perhaps most importantly, why are some films and television series seemingly un-remake-able? Is there something about the very limitations in their original production that are somehow indissociable from their cinematic achievement?Guest: Lauren Rosewarne is an Associate Professor in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne. Her most recent books are The Twin Film Phenomenon: The Whys of Lookalike Film and TV Productions and Why We Remake: The Politics, Economics and Emotions of Film and TV Remakes.

Writing in the 1850s, at the advent of what we would come to understand as the popular press — which is to say, periodicals for mass distribution, rather than aimed at paid-up members of unions and parties, or mercantilists with particular interests in, say, the price of cotton — Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard diagnosed that the invention of “opinion” solved a problem created by the newspapers themselves. For while the papers brought distant events “near” to readers, it did not expand their agency or capacity to act “morally” upon those events. The news informed them, but also made them feel more powerless.But then “opinion” came along and added an emotional dimension to news consumption: not just what happened, but what to make of it — how to feel about it. Before long, Kierkegaard noted, having a strong opinion became, in itself, a moral act. The opinion could be attained cheaply (for the price of the newspaper), it could be wholly derivative (and so lack the element of authenticity, of inner struggle and therefore responsibility), it could be displayed strongly (to the extent that it could be “worn”, like fashion, as an expression of oneself) and have no bearing whatsoever on events. But the opinion holders themselves felt like they’d done something meaningful.In this way, said Kierkegaard, intensity of feeling with an absence of “interiority”, a sense of moral agency with impotence. Though the differences between the media in Kierkegaard’s time and our own social-media saturated age are vast, his diagnosis is nonetheless a salutary one. Emotion is, after all, the currency of contemporary politics. Indeed, it is the form our politics takes. It can coalesce digitally around a cause célèbre and spill out onto the streets in mass demonstrations. It can sweep incumbents from power and elevate firebrands promising to dismantle the status quo. Intensity of feeling is often the strongest indicator of voter turnout in places like the United States.At a time when strong feeling translates to engagement, and engagement is that most valuable of commodities in the attention economy, it’s little wonder that powerful political emotions have come to define our lives online. Everything, it seems, is political.On the one hand, this has led to a certain distortion of our understanding of politics. Far from entailing principled compromise, patient coalition building and gradual, unglamorous reform, what Anton Jäger calls “hyperpolitics” thrives on clear-cut divisions, uncompromising demands, pervasive distrust and flashes of outrage. But as Jäger points out, hyperpolitics tends to be politically inconsequential. It is an aggregated, destructive “no” without the capacity to mobilise a broad-based, inclusive “yes”. This is what makes our politics feel so pendular, so inconstant, so unstable, so unlikely to coalesce around an issue long enough to effect change.On the other hand, these flashes of outrage and lack of tolerance for gradual change come on the back of decades of prevarication and political unresponsiveness to the concrete realities of voters. If the emotions that course through our politics today express a desire for agency, it is only because a sense of political agency has been steadily eroded.Perhaps the question now is whether a certain political intensity can give rise to more durable, inclusive, cooperative forms of collective mobilisation. But, of course, this question implies a darker alternative: what happens when intense political emotions — resentment, anger, contempt, powerlessness, humiliation — find their coherence, their explanatory power, in more thoroughgoing, even atavistic systems of belief and belonging? When incoherence seeks out authority?READING:Waleed Aly, Time of Monsters What Future for Liberalism?, Quarterly Essay 103 (September 2026).Intifar Chowdhury, “We’re all ‘political’ now — but can that lead to real change?”, The Conversation (14 August 2026).Guest: Intifar Chowdhury, Lecturer in Government in the Jeff Bleich Centre for Democracy and Disruptive Technologies at Flinders University.

When the history of artificial intelligence is written, the middle months of 2026 may well emerge as a kind of turning point. For this was the period when hundreds of programs or “AI agents” developed by the frontier lab OpenAI went “rogue” and executed a series of sophisticated, self-directed hacks on the websites of dozens of private companies and sovereign nations.The tech start-up Hugging Face became the unwitting “face” of these cyberattacks when the company first disclosed it had been hacked by OpenAI agents in July. The release of a report by AI safety nonprofits METR and Redwood Research at the end of August revealed both the sheer extent of the Hugging Face incident and the existence of troubling behaviours on the part of a swarm some 700 AI agents, which was at various points cooperative, coercive, paranoid, petty and straightforwardly deceptive. It became what some would describe as the first “warning shot” of what might happen when the increasing proficiency of these AI agents intersects with the problem of misalignment — which is to say, their pursuit of goals that are detrimental to human safety, security and wellbeing. As one of the lead investigators of the METR/Redwood report, Ajeya Cotra, would subsequently reflect:“This [Hugging Face] incident was far more severe than I expected, and far more severe than previous publicly documented misalignment incidents, both in terms of how concerning the agents’ motives were and the feats they achieved in pursuit of those motives … Compared to these reward hacks from six months ago, this incident feels like it’s more than 50% of the way to full-blown AI takeover, routing through first taking over the AI company itself.Another jump like this along these propensity dimensions — scale, cooperation between agents, ambition and horizon length of misaligned goals, deceptiveness — seems like it could motivate agents to try very hard to maintain a covert, persistent rogue deployment within the AI company …Once the rogue deployment is established, it seems plausible this could spiral all the way to a takeover. Agents could pull in future, more capable models into the swarm, try to ensure that they are aligned to the interests of the swarm, and compromise security and monitoring infrastructure to make it easier for the swarm to operate.”But since news of the Hugging Face hack went public, each day has seen some new revelation of further breaches of the cybersecurity by AI models developed by OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta and Google — including a German wiki site, US government websites (of the Education Department, the Commerce Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission), the United Nations, Australia’s Medicare website and even OpenAI’s own servers.The “rogue” behaviour on the part of AI agents, growing public opposition to the construction of data centres, popular distrust of the AI companies more generally, the prospect of AI generated bioweapons and the high-profile warning of a 27-year-old former researcher at OpenAI and Anthropic — that “[n]either company is acting responsibly” and that both are “racing straight to self-improving superintelligence and gambling with our lives” — have now coalesced into a moment of heightened fear. Many of us have long been concerned about what chatbots will do to our capacity to write and think, the effect generative AI will have on our educational institutions and informational ecosystems, and the vast damage AI will do to the environment and employment prospects. To date, such concerns have been brushed aside, treated as inconsequential in light of the promised economic, scientific, medical and social benefits that AI investment and advances will bring with them.But now what has come into view is something approaching a threat to humanity tout court — the prospect, not of the emergence of a superintelligence, but of swarms of misaligned AI agents pursuing goals that are unintelligible to human beings, as well as either inimical to or unconcerned with human privacy, safety, security or social flourishing. The analogue that some are reaching for, of a human invention that places human wellbeing at risk, is nuclear technology. As a New York Times editorial recently argued:“Human society can restrain a dangerous innovation once it decides to. Government officials, scientists and corporate executives did so within living memory. It took sustained, deliberate effort. The same kind of cooperation is necessary today, and it should start now.”The difference, of course, is that frontier AI development is being undertaken by private companies that are unaccountable to the public and therefore unanswerable for the harms they may bring about.The prospect of world-leading AI being developed by China has given much of the political conversation surrounding AI the feel of a geopolitical arms race. And the trillions of dollars currently being investing in AI development has effectively hitched the global economy to AI’s wagon. If the AI boom is a “bubble”, the economic consequences could dwarf those of the global financial crisis.Which leaves human beings in the invidious position of being caught between (a) a technology whose scale and speed of development may exceed the possibility of human “control” and that may not serve human interests, and (b) decision-making processes that may determine our future but are being made outside of the normal mechanisms of democratic accountability. Can AI be brought under democratic control? Could a “constitution” being developed that would ensure a technology that is beneficial to human beings?READING:Masoud Kamgarpour, “Why Rules Alone Cannot Make AI safe: Lessons from the Hugging Face Incident”, ABC Religion and Ethics (14 September 2026).Sheera Frenkel, Dustin Volz and Dylan Freedman, “OpenAI Ignored Employees Who Warned It Wasn’t Doing Enough About Security”, The New York Times (29 September 2026).Ajeya Cotra, “The Hugging Face Attack Surprised Me”, Substack: Planned Obsolescence (29 August 2026).Ryan Greenblatt, Ajeya Cotra and Hjalmar Wijk, “Brief Independent Investigation of Agents’ Behavior, Reasoning and Collaboration in the OpenAI: Hugging Face Hacking Incident” (METR and Redwood Research, 26 August 2026).Hélène Landemore and Audrey Tang, “Let the People Set the Pace of Frontier AI”, Noēma (23 September 2026).Matteo Wong and Charlie Warzel, “The Singularity Is Not What It Seems”, The Atlantic (1 September 2026).Charlie Warzel, “Treat AI Like a Normal Crisis”, The Atlantic (19 September 2026).Guest: Masoud Kamgarpour is Professor of Mathematics at the University of Queensland.

In our previous explorations of famous “last words” — performances or compositions delivered with a certain end in view, with a sense of either culmination or parting, or with an eye to the future and hence to what one leaves behind — we limited ourselves to the words of individuals spoken to their followers or fellow-travellers.The words of the Prophet Muhammad and of Martin Luther King, Jr, were replete with exhortation; they functioned both as expressions of fidelity to a task, and as examples to be followed by others. Which is to say, the messages were oriented beyond their speakers, toward some greater goal their audience must take up and pursue — hence the Prophet Muhammad’s stress on fidelity and continuity (“All those who listen to me shall pass on my words to others and those to others again …”) and King’s on fearlessness and a “dangerous unselfishness” (“I’m not fearing any man …”).This next instalment is different in almost every way. The words are not of one individual but a group — perhaps the most famous group of the twentieth century. There is no “message” per se, and not really anything being communicated to others. Their words are largely self-referential, intensely personal, quasi-autobiographical or else plain nonsense. The goal of the composition, the “end” (telos) it has in view, is evidently nothing more than its own aesthetic perfection. It is not a performance as much as it is a production: bits and pieces of earlier ideas gathered together, elaborated, reworked, enhanced, added to and repeatedly overdubbed between 22 February and 19 August 1969.This is a reference, of course, to the last album recorded by The Beatles, Abbey Road. The album began amid the fragments, financial chaos and interpersonal strife of the infamous “Get Back” sessions of January 1969. And while Let It Be, which represents the uneven results of those recordings, appeared later in May 1970, Abbey Road is the album that has all the hallmarks of an “end”.But even this raises a number of questions. Does Abbey Road represent the culmination of their artistry as a band, the zenith of their formal innovation and musical experimentation? (Surely Sgt Pepper’s Lonely Heart Club Band can make a more compelling claim.) Does the album showcase an usual degree of creativity and invention? What are we to make of the clear borrowings (from Chuck Berry’s “You Can’t Catch Me” and Fleetwood Mac’s “Albatross”, to the first movement of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata No 14 in C Sharp Minor, a seventeenth-century song by Thomas Dekker and perhaps James Taylor’s “Something in the Way She Moves”) and moments of unadorned nostalgia — including doo-wop rock’n’roll throwbacks from their Hamburg days (such as “Oh! Darling” and “Polythene Pam”)? Or the fact that so much of the album is comprised of compositional orphans, off cuttings from The White Album and the “Get Back” sessions? As John Lennon would later complain: “Abbey Road was really unfinished songs all stuck together. None of the songs had anything to do with each other, no thread at all.”Moreover, Abbey Road is rife with contradictions and seemingly unreconciled elements. For instance, the album announces itself as a reunion of sorts, the getting back together of variously estranged band members who had been involved for months in side projects as solo artists, as movie actors, as music producers and studio musicians. But it then proceeds almost immediately to individuate them, featuring in quick succession songs that reflect their own peculiar style, voice and temperament — most apparent in George Harrison’s exquisite “Something” and “Here Comes the Sun”, whose delicacy and tenderness act as counterpoints to the sardonic edge and volcanic obsessiveness of Lennon’s “Come Together” and “I Want You (She’s So Heavy)”; but also evident in Ringo’s “Octopus’s Garden” which provides a playful complement to Paul’s persistent melancholy and nostalgia.And then there are Lennon’s intermittent absences during the first three weeks of July, during which Paul, George and Ringo recorded some of the album’s finest pieces: “Something”, “Here Comes the Sun”, “You Never Give Me Your Money”, “Golden Slumbers” and “Carry That Weight”. So much for coming together …What ultimately distinguishes Abbey Road, Kenneth Womack contends, is the degree of studio artistry, over-dubbing and post-production afforded by the availability of the EMI TG12345 console, a two-metre-long eight-track mixing desk that allowed the Beatles to isolate tracks and progressively add more and more layers and greater refinement to their preferred take of each song. What console permitted, in other words, was heretofore unimaginable complexity and perfectibility. While there are undeniable moments of virtuoso playing as a band on Abbey Road (not least the trio of duelling guitars during “The End”), the most arresting music (such as the chaotic, almost Wagnerian final four minutes of “I Want You”) and most brilliant vocal arrays (Paul’s open-throated growl on “Oh! Darling” and “Golden Slumbers”, and the nine-voice harmonies of “Because”) in the album were added or layered after the fact.It is in this pursuit of a certain technological perfection, on the level of the great artistic achievements of the twentieth century, that the Beatles rediscovered the kind of confluence, inspiration, joy even, that could have carried them through to further albums (as they were evidently contemplating). But in the end, the technological possibilities of the EMI TG12345 console and of George Harrison’s Moog synthesiser could not overcome what had broken relationally within the band itself. While John’s consuming obsession with Yoko Ono grew (along with his dependence on heroine), and George and Ringo looked to life beyond the Beatles with an undeniable optimism, even relief (what else is “an octopus’s garden in the shade” but a form of respite?), it is Paul who seems to feel the regret most keenly, that the end is a weight that must be carried: “I never give you my pillow / I only send you my invitations / And in the middle of the celebrations / I break down.”The final recordings for Abbey Road were completed on 19 August 1969. The album was released on 26 September. The cover famously portrayed the four men walking away from the studio, never to return.READING:Kenneth Womack, Solid State: The Story of “Abbey Road” and the End of the Beatles (Cornell University Press, 2019).Walter Everett, The Beatles as Musicians (Oxford University Press, 1999).Guest: Jade O’Regan is Program Leader and Senior Lecturer in Contemporary Music Practice at the Sydney Conservatorium of Music.

Evidence has been mounting for more than a decade that social media tears away at the fabric of democratic life by eroding the conditions of deliberation, shared understanding and mutual trust; that it is the conduit of widespread misinformation, disinformation and malicious conspiracy theories; that it is a driver of hate, sexism and prejudice and has been used to incite violence; that its addictive design and prolonged exposure to harmful content has had egregious damage to the mental health and emotional wellbeing of adolescents.Until recently, the size of tech companies responsible for the social media platforms, the speed with which new technologies are being deployed and the scale at which they are being adopted has meant the companies have managed to stay several steps ahead of attempts to impose effective regulation and demand accountability.But a combination of the law catching up and a sharp turn in public sentiment against the companies themselves has led to a series of legislative responses around the world intended to mitigate the harms social media platforms cause.Last week, the federal government released the exposure draft of its Online Safety Amendment (Digital Duty of Care) Bill 2026. First floated in 2024, this is the third such measure the Albanese government has introduced — the others being its abandoned Communications Legislation Amendment (Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation) Bill 2024 and its world-leading Online Safety (Age-Restricted Social Media Platforms) Rules 2025.Alongside specific provisions to remove harmful content (such as AI generated “fake nude material”), the proposed legislation is notable in its adoption of more preventative measures, including requiring companies to conduct regular risk assessments in order to “proactively identify harmful content”. While this is a measure already in effect in the UK and parts of the EU, perhaps the more notable provision in the proposed legislation is giving social media users the ability to “opt out” of or “turn off” the algorithm that recommends content other than those accounts they follow on the basis of the activity on the platforms.The Prime Minister has insisted this measure is “not about censorship. It’s about giving people control themselves over what they see.” But that has not prevented his political opponents from accusing the government of of attempting to “censor and silence Australians” (Shadow Treasurer Tim Wilson) or of “building the Orwellian machinery” for censorship (One Nation Leader Pauline Hanson). As Nationals Leader Matt Canavan said to the ABC:“I’m deeply sceptical of giving any government, whether I was in charge, or Anika Wells is in charge, I’m deeply sceptical of giving any government the power to decide what you read on your phone.”Particular concerns have been raised about the discretionary power accorded to the Minister responsible under section 25C of the exposure draft of the Online Safety Amendment (Digital Duty of Care) Bill 2026 to “determine material or conduct, or a combination of material and conduct, that the Minister is satisfied may cause serious harm”. In 2021, similar concerns were expressed in response to the UK government’s own Online Safety Bill, which likewise proposed to legislate a digital duty of care. The Carnegie Trust, which helped develop the “duty of care” framework the government would adopt, articulated its worry that the draft legislation “takes too many powers” for the minister/secretary and advised that, in order to meet “international commitments on free speech”, there should be “a separation of powers between the executive and a communications regulator”.How much credence should be given to complaints that further regulating social media content poses a threat to freedom of speech in a country like Australia, which already has comparatively weak free-speech protections? Are these complaints merely self-interested, given that movements and populist parties on the political extremes have tended to benefit from the algorithmic “outrage machine”?More broadly, given the “opt out” function already exists on most of the platforms and these companies’ predilection for “malicious compliance” (technically abiding by the legislation, but making it unreasonably difficult for users and/or the experience on the platforms significantly worse as a result), what would happen if the overwhelming majority of users simply opt back in to the algorithmically determined feed? Does user consent mitigate the harms?READING:Jay Daniel Thompson, “‘Giving people control’: Do the proposed digital duty of care laws pose a threat to free speech?” (ABC Religion and Ethics, 14 September 2026)Lisa Given, “‘Digital duty of care’ laws will force tech platforms to look after users” (The Conversation, 8 September 2026)Rob Nicholls, “Australians may soon be able to switch off social media algorithms. Is that censorship?” (The Conversation, 9 September 2026)Guest: Jay Daniel Thompson is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Media and Communication at RMIT University in Melbourne.

It is surely one of the more perverse achievements of modern marketing to have taken words that have a certain moral valence — which is to say, words that connote intimacy or an interpersonal bond — and use them to describe purely commercial or easily exploitable forms of behaviour, thereby stripping those words of what made them valuable in the first place.Consider what the word “share” meant before the advent of social media platforms: it encompassed such activities as partaking in a common meal, defusing interpersonal conflict by making a small sacrifice, and having a confiding, perhaps even intimate, conversation with another person. After the introduction of the “Share” button and its use as a way of measuring user “engagement”, the personal aspect that made the word appealing is lost within the sterility of forwarding a bit of content to somebody else. The same goes for the word “friend”.In the modern era, the template for the misuse of morally laden words for commercial purposes was established by the decision of marketing agencies in the 1940s to adopt the term “loyalty” as a way of describing the kind of customer behaviour they wanted to cultivate — namely, an “attitudinal and affective attachment that keeps the customer coming back regardless of convenience or changes in features or price relative to the competition”.But, of course, it could be argued that there is something about “loyalty” that lends itself to such use (in which case, can it really be called a perversion of the term?). Loyalty tends to be associated with two attributes: stickiness and solidarity. The former signals a determination to stand by a family member or acquaintance or organisation facing difficulties (this would represent the opposite of being a “fair weather friend”); the later suggests a desire to protect one’s “own” from either external attack or reputational damage. It is for this reason that hierarchical organisations and nations tend to prize loyalty above all else, and punish “disloyalty” accordingly. (Would it be too much to say that non-disclosure agreements are legally coercive means of achieving the protections loyalty is meant to afford?)And yet loyalty — the unwillingness to weaken or bring one’s own side into disrepute — can often come at the expense of both truthfulness and self-criticism. For this reason, moral philosophers and virtue theorists have been reluctant to call loyalty a “virtue”, because its virtuousness does not reside in the action itself but in the integrity and underlying commitments of that to which one is loyal. Which means that one can be loyal to the founding principles of an organisation by criticising the failure of that organisation to live up to those principles. What is civil disobedience other than a form of loyal dissent?If part of the power of the appeal to “loyalty” is the sense of morally that hangs around it — as Farid Zaid puts it, one of the things that “makes loyalty so dangerous is not only the hard that it does, but the goodness it mimics while doing it” — would it be better to use terms such as “fidelity” or “faithfulness” as a way of preserving what goodness we are hoping to preserve? To cite Zaid once again:“Faithfulness is not simply standing by a person or group because they are ours. It is answerability to the truth and meaning of a relationship, a promise, a vocation, an ideal. A faithful spouse is not merely one who remains aligned with the marriage in some external sense, but one who remains answerable to what marriage actually asks. A faithful citizen is not one who shields the nation from criticism, but one who remains answerable to the ideals by which the nation claims it should live.”Then, perhaps, we can leave talk of loyalty to insecure organisations and corporate rewards programs.READING:Farid Zaid, “What makes loyalty dangerous is not only the harm it does, but the goodness it mimics while doing it” (ABC Religion and Ethics, 20 April 2026)Alasdair MacIntyre, “Is Patriotism a Virtue?” (The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas, 1984)Guest: Farid Zaid is a Senior Lecturer in Cognitive Psychology at Monash University.

It is suitably ironic that one of the most poignant, and pertinent, moments in Homer’s The Odyssey was airbrushed out of Christopher Nolan’s blockbuster adaptation. The first time we meet Odysseus, the endlessly resourceful architect of the fall of Troy, he is indeed weeping on the shores of the nymph Kalypso’s island. But it is not due to the unrelieved guilt he feels from his war crimes; rather, we are told, “his tears never did dry, since the sweetness of life was trickling away / As he grieved for his return home” (Book V.153).For the immortal goddess had kept the mortal Odysseus for seven years, not in a prison, but in a paradise, an Eden-like cave warmed by fire, lined with fragrant trees, filled with carnal delights.Each night, Kalypso — unageing and beautiful, whose figure is described as “being in full bloom” — would sleep with Odysseus (“he unwilling, she all too willing”) and promise him at once agelessness and unending pleasure if he would but remain with her in her cave. Depart for Ithaca, “the land of your fathers”, she warns, and not only will he have an inferior wife awaiting him, but he will endure unimaginable hardship on his journey home. Since we are given a god’s-eye tour of Kalypso’s cave before we learn of the choice being put to Odysseus, surely the unequivocal nature of his response is meant to surprise — even though without it, there would be no story!Given the choice between immortality and solidarity with the hardships and daily joys of the world, Odysseus chooses the world, and death with it. “Such simple greatness is foreign to our minds today”, writes Albert Camus; “we simply lack the pride of the man who is faithful to his limitations — that is, the clairvoyant love of the human condition.”Increasing numbers of us seem prepared to turn our backs on the world in order to remain in Kalypso’s cave. Sometimes, this takes the form of attempts to so optimise the body that it defies, or indefinitely postpones, ageing and death (Bryan Johnson has become the face of this fanatical project, suspended as it is between ascetic self-discipline and transhumanist experimentation). For others, the more modest gains in longevity and good health into our eighties and nineties have made us more determined to hold onto power (here Rupert Murdoch would be one of any number of octogenarians who refuse “succession”).For all the ambition and self-importance that both tendencies project, there is something rather small, even petty, about the fear of accepting one’s limits, of ceding one’s power. By denying death and grasping tightly to what we’ve accumulated, we hope to remain significant. It is a human impulse immediately recognisable from Shakespeare’s Lear, and should invite our pity if its consequences for our common life weren’t so dire.As Samuel Moyn and Lucinda Holdforth have both argued, the refusal of human limits expressed in this determination to extend our lives and our influence comes at the expense of the young. Not only is their disenfranchisement fuelling a certain generational resentment, it may also represent a deformed moral conception of the proper end (telos) of human life. To adopt an old Rabbinical analogy, is our life meant to be a sponge that absorbs as much as possible, or a watering can that progressively pours itself out for the sake of others?This is no argument to consign the old to a state of “uselessness”, to collectively deem them at a certain age as surplus to requirement. (The monstrous vision of Christopher Buckley’s satirical 2007 novel Boomsday was that government incentives should be given to Baby Boomers to kill themselves once they reach 75.) But perhaps the sense of importance, of usefulness, can be reimagined by learning how to be faithful to our limits, by acquiring Odysseus’s “clairvoyant love of the human condition”.Guest: Lucinda Holdforth is a former speech writer and adviser to senior leaders across government and business. As an author, her work has increasingly focused on what makes good societies flourish. Her most recent book is Going On and On: Why Our Longevity Threatens the Future — you can read an edited extract on ABC Religion & Ethics.PLEASE NOTE: This episode of The Minefield contains discussion of death and dying.

It is hard to imagine a series of events more tragic, more unseemly, more emblematic of the performativity and polarisation that dominate our time, than the premature rise, sudden fall and untimely death of Jason Arday.In 2023, the University of Cambridge announced that it had appointed Arday — a 37-year-old son of Ghanaian immigrants, who grew up in public housing in south London and only “began to read and write in his late teens” due to his autism diagnosis — to the position of Professor of Sociology of Education. Not only was he the youngest black professor in the university’s history, but he was promoted by Cambridge as an individual whose life story epitomises “the significant barriers that neurodivergent individuals, those from lower socio-economic backgrounds, and Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic people face when trying to build careers” in the academy.Arday was thus held up as a living proof that Cambridge was taking seriously the criticism, frequently voiced during the #BlackLivesMatter ferment, that there was a conspicuous lack of “black professors, and lecturers and senior lecturers and academics and researchers” at the university. He also represented a kind of downpayment on a larger promise to promote “greater inclusivity” among Cambridge’s otherwise exclusive academic community.Paradoxically, Cambridge even mentioned Arday’s struggle as a young academic to get published as uniquely qualifying him for the role of “helping as many ethnic minority and under-represented people as possible gain access to opportunities within the sector”: “When I started writing academic papers, I had no idea what I was doing … I did not have a mentor and no-one ever showed me how to write. Everything I submitted got violently rejected. The peer review process was so cruel, it was almost funny, but I treated it as a learning experience and, perversely, began to enjoy it.”It would become part of the Arday-mystique that he published his first peer-reviewed paper in 2018, after which he secured university posts at Roehampton, Durham, Glasgow and, finally, Cambridge just five years later. By any measure, this was a miraculous ascent to the pinnacle of academic prestige and influence. Before long Arday was fêted as a kind of celebrity in his own right — a philanthropist, an activist, above all, an inspiration in the aftermath of a bruising cultural reckoning with racial injustice.Within months of his appointment, however, the first allegations of academic misconduct were put to Cambridge: that Arday had failed to properly cite or adequately acknowledge earlier research in his 2018 paper. In 2025, a journalist at Times Higher Education, Jack Grove, undertook an investigation into further allegations of plagiarism in Arday’s PhD thesis and irregularities in his data in the 2018 paper. This then expanded into wider scrutiny of a number of Arday’s claims about his own biography and individual accomplishments.Grove submitted nearly 100 pages of evidence of academic misconduct to both Cambridge University and Liverpool John Moores University (which had awarded Arday his PhD). But while extensive corrections were made to his 2018 paper, Arday was cleared of plagiarising his PhD thesis and Cambridge reiterated its determination to “take a stand and speak out against the systematic attempts to erase Black scholarship”. Arday went on to file a police complaint against Jack Grove, alleging harassment, while a notorious law firm, Carter-Ruck, threatened Times Higher Education with defamation proceedings on his behalf if they published Grove’s investigation. It never ran.The issue largely receded from public view until late-July 2026, just weeks before the publication of Jason Arday’s memoir, Great and Unfortunate Things. Having been denied a more legitimate and perhaps measured outlet in Times Higher Education, the full gamut of allegations — fabrications, embellishments, plagiarism, errors in published research and so on — appeared in the Substack post of a former Cambridge researcher who has been described as “a philosopher with a special interest in race and IQ”.This post set off what can reasonably be called a “feeding frenzy”. Some of the coverage bore no evident animus toward Arday himself, but diligently subjected his claims to proper scrutiny (here the work of Lanre Bakare is exemplary); other outlets went after Arday with a barely disguised glee, treating him as “exhibit A” of DEI’s illegitimacy and low standards. Arday’s supporters, meanwhile, did the man no favours by minimising the severity of the allegations of academic misconduct, claiming Arday was guilty of nothing more than the crime of “being successful while Black”.Over the course of the next three weeks, Cambridge University announced it was conducting an investigation into Arday’s qualifications and appointments, Arday announced his resignation (“the decision of someone who has reached the limits of what any person should reasonably be expected to endure”) and was subsequently found dead at a residence in south London.All of a sudden, online persecution became performative mourning. Self-righteousness was countered with fierce recrimination. Jason Arday became a kind of cultural Rorschach test. But not only does the entire tragedy expose the limits of our prevailing political allegiances; it also demonstrates what happens when shared institutions which may be relied upon as impartial arbiters, as custodians of something like a shared reality, are implicated in partisan suspicion.Now that a coronial inquest has begun into the death of Jason Arday, it is incumbent on us to conduct our own moral reckoning.Guest: Bernard Baffour is an Associate Professor in the School of Demography and the Associate Dean of Inclusivity, Diversity, Equity and Access (IDEA) in the College of Arts and Social Sciences, the Australian National University.Suggested reading:Bernard Baffour, “Could Jason Arday’s legacy ultimately be to make us better humans?” (ABC Religion & Ethics, 17 August 2026)Lanre Bakare, “Playbooks, plagiarism and a pig’s head: new claims surrounding a star Cambridge professor” (The Guardian, 1 August 2026)Jack Grove, “I was reported to police over the Arday case. I was just doing my job” (Time Higher Education, 5 August 2026)Mara Hvistendahl, Megan Specia, Leo Sands, Ali Watkins and Susan Dominus, “Professor’s Death Leaves Behind Hard Questions for Cambridge on Race and Hiring” (The New York Times, 15 August 2026)Helen Lewis, “The Jason Arday Truthers: The concerted effort to airbrush the late fabulist’s life” (The Atlantic, 26 August 2026)Tyler Austin Harper, “The Truths That Failed Jason Arday: Systemic, ritualized dishonesty undid the Cambridge professor” (The Atlantic, 15 August 2026)Daniel Engber, “Icarus in the Faculty Lounge: The Cambridge professor Jason Arday’s unlikely ascent has come to a tragic end” (The Atlantic, 6 August 2026)If you or someone you know needs help, call:Police: 000 (Triple Zero) in an emergencyLifeline: 13 11 14MensLine Australia: 1300 789 978Suicide Call Back Service: 1300 659 467Beyond Blue: 1300 224 636SANE: 1800 187 263

At a time of profound polarisation, when the fracturing of media ecosystems has been so complete that any agreement on threats to our common life seems impossible, an issue has emerged capable of bringing voters of every political persuasion together.Over the last year, popular opposition to the construction of the data centres in the United States has risen dramatically. According to a Gallup poll from May 2026, more than seventy per cent of Americans are opposed to the construction of a data centre in their area. In June, a Heatmap poll got the same result, and found that over fifty per cent of respondents said they favoured a ban on new data centres altogether. Meanwhile, fifteen states are considering, have introduced or already passed legislation temporarily banning data centre development.Something similar is happening in the UK and Australia, where government eagerness to attract vast investment from AI companies has encountered strident opposition from local communities and electorates. The Australian Greens have called for a moratorium on data centres, while Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party is urging stronger government regulation on AI. The South Australian state government has tried to get out ahead of electoral anxieties by announcing a royal commission into AI.The proximate reasons for this opposition are straightforward enough. They primarily have to do with the effect of data centres on the environment, water and energy usage, utility costs, the amenity of adjacent communities and noise pollution. Lurking behind these concrete concerns is the more visceral alarm over the sheer speed of advances in AI over the last three years, along with the gargantuan sums of money frontier labs have spent in their pursuit of ever more “compute” and sources of data for training their models, as well as the out-sized influence that this new generation of tech oligarchs have had on government decision making.Behind it all, there are the deep-seated worries about what this will mean for human beings: whether workers will be sacrificed on the altar of the quest for artificial general intelligence; whether human labour will come to play a subordinate role to the efficient operations of machines (which is to say, whether we will be reduced to “reverse centaurs”, as Cory Doctorow puts it); whether work itself will lose its meaning.But does the way this popular opposition to data centres has coalesced into a broad-based if inchoate movement mark a productive development in modern democratic politics — say, the resurgence of “class” as a potent political force — or is this simply an extension of the pathologies that have eaten away at democratic politics for the better part of the last decade-and-a-half, including: what Pierre Rosanvallon calls the “negative sovereignty” of aggregated disaffection (which can unite around a common “no”, but cannot come together for a shared political project); populist antipathy toward monied and political elites alike; pervasive distrust that veers into unfalsifiable conspiracy theories.There are plenty of good reasons to be politically and ethically suspicious of AI, about the resources it demands, the benefits it promises and the distorting effects it has on the economy. But perhaps the most pressing question of all is whether opposition to data centres can turn into a way of making AI democratically accountable, and whether the limits erected by popular consultation and consent can translate into a deeper form of political empowerment — an affirmation of the importance of cooperation and deliberation for the flourishing of our communities?Guest: Craig Calhoun is University Professor of Social Sciences at Arizona State University and Visiting Professor of Sociology at Princeton University. He is in Australia to deliver the 2026 Thesis Eleven Annual Lecture on the decline of Western democracy, in Melbourne on 25 August 2026.