
Lecture 23: Bargaining with Incomplete Information
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MIT 14.12 Economic Applications of Game Theory, Fall 2025 Instructor: Ian Ball View the complete course: https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/14-12-economic-applications-of-game-theory-fall-2025/YouTube Playlist: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUl4u3cNGP63quuKvMHCt3cmTmt0O2qpvUploaded 18-05-26In this lecture, Ian Ball explains bargaining with incomplete information, which is a scenario where at least one party lacks full knowledge of the other's private information. Plea bargains are an example of this. License: Creative Commons BY-NC-SAMore information at https://ocw.mit.edu/termsMore courses at https://ocw.mit.eduSupport OCW at http://ow.ly/a1If50zVRlQWe encourage constructive comments and discussion on OCW’s YouTube and other social media channels. Personal attacks, hate speech, trolling, and inappropriate comments are not allowed and may be removed. More details at https://ocw.mit.edu/comments. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
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