Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-28 – Colin D. Robinson – “Why the Afghan and Iraqi Armies Collapsed: An Allied Perspective”

In this episode, Colin D. Robinson discusses American and Western liberal ideas (ideological views) and politics in relation to the obstacles faced in rebuilding the Afghan and Iraqi armies. This podcast reviews the differences between Western liberal democracies and partner states, the politics of counterinsurgency, and army accounts.  E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Podcast record date: September 26, 2024 Keywords: liberal peace, Afghan National Army, Iraqi Army, security sector reform, security force assistance Episode transcript Stephanie Crider (Host)You're listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Joining me virtually today is Colin D. Robinson, author of “Why the Afghan and Iraqi Armies Collapsed: An Allied Perspective,” which you can find in the Autumn 2024 issue of Parameters. Robinson lectures on defense leadership and management at Cranfield Defense and Security at Cranfield University, Shrivenham, United Kingdom. He began his tracking of Operation Enduring Freedom while at the Center for Defense Information in Washington, DC, in 2002. Welcome to Decisive Point, Colin. Colin D. RobinsonThank you so much. HostIn your view, what were the most critical structural weaknesses that led to the collapse of the Afghan and Iraqi armies? How could these have been addressed more effectively by their respective governments or allied forces? RobinsonThe structural weakness was politics. Iraq was split between Sunni, Shia, and Kurd. And, the parties interested in the Afghan army were split between the Tajiks and the Uzbeks and less-than minorities and networks of political party affiliation in the armed forces, which led to different political parties having the loyalty and patronage and financial links to different sets of generals within what was the Afghan National Army. One of the other critical points was the disbandment of the Iraqi army under Coalition Provisional Authority [CPA] Order No. 2, which has historically now been seen as an enormous, enormous mistake. There were plans in place to use the existing remnants of the Iraqi army that still existed by the time Baghdad had fallen, and US Army senior leaders were liaising with their generals. The most recent research I have seen attributes the origins of CPA Order 2, potentially, to Ahmed Chalabi, clearly through Ambassador Paul D. Bremer. The question is, did the United States try to set up a mirror-image state army along the lines of Western armies or try to build forces that took more account of the political realities? In thinking about this, one has to remember that the Kurdish forces, now, in what is the Kurdish zone of Iraq, are still split down the middle between two separate factions. HostSome have attributed the failure of these armies to issues of leadership, issues of corruption.How much responsibility do you think should be placed on these internal factors compared to the external military pressures? RobinsonGeneral Colin Powell, later Secretary of State, had something he called a “Pottery Barn rule.” You break it, you own it. So, at least equal responsibility can be divided between the United States and its allies, including the United Kingdom, and on the other side, Iraqi and Afghan actors because the United States firstly created the whole Iraqi mess in 2002 and 2003 for no real justifiable reason, as we now know, in my view. And secondly, as [State Department representative Carter] Malkasian and [David] Kilcullen and Mills have noted, the United States and its allies did not bring one of the most important actors, the Taliban, to the key Bonn Afghan peace conference of 2002. If the Taliban had been at that conference, the result might have been very, very different. Now, that’s the external military factors or external political factors. In terms of internal factors, leadership and corruption issues had been endemic in Afghanistan and Iraq since they were established. They were very much patrimonial states. They work along the lines of a father ruling his family with, to some degree, an iron hand. They’re low-trust societies. Less than 10 years of very bloody US-led presence in Iraq, or 20 years in Afghanistan, had very little hope of changing that. To sum up again, basically, at least equal responsibility between the interveners, the United States and its allies, and Iraq and [Afghanistan], different feuding political actors.HostTaking into consideration the lessons from the collapse of the Afghan and Iraqi armies, what changes in strategy should be implemented in current—or future—US military interventions to avoid similar outcomes?RobinsonSince about the 1960s, large-scale Western democratic states have tried to do counterinsurgency in several states after they gained independence. After independence in places like South Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, it does not seem to work. There are too many political compromises. The selected local leader, client leader, does not want to do what the United States wants. It does not seem to be successful. Perhaps the most recent clearest example of this is Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan.The thing is, this was not well understood or potentially well understood because during the colonial period, this is something that Richard Holbrook pointed out, it could and sometimes did work. The usual standard example of the British in Malaya, the British in Kenya, to some extent, the suppression and eventual resolution of the [Hukbalahap] insurgency in the Philippines immediately after the Second World War, assisted by the United States. So, what changed in strategy? Firstly, do not try large-scale expeditionary Western counterinsurgency in client states, in partner states. It just doesn’t seem to work. For smaller-scale efforts, the State Department should be much more in the political driver’s seat. They should be building the political roads, supervising the political activities for overseeing things for the competent commands and involving, yes, the Department of Defense and the implementation, more the State Department overseeing, and potentially, even the Agency for International Development, which did wonders in Yugoslavia after the Second World War, supporting Yugoslavs when the US was allied with them. The Bosnia train and equip program is a good working example of how the State Department implemented the program properly. I have to say with some sorrow that the Department of the Army is really not particularly well placed to plan and run assistance programs. [It has] too much focus on technical specifications and not enough on politics, which made and broke the Afghan and Iraqi armies. The temptation to put together a program plan and then push it together, push it through, virtually at all costs, should be resisted firmly. HostSo where do we go from here? How do the failures of these armies reflect the broader challenges of nation building in conflict zones? Is there a way for external forces like the United States to foster sustainable military institutions in these kinds of environments?RobinsonState building, what you could call fixing failed states, unquote, has proven very, very difficult in these very, very deeply split conflict zones. Literally, the book called Fixing Failed States: [A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World] was cowritten by Ashraf Ghani, who became president of Afghanistan and then lost to the Taliban. Analysts are moving beyond this kind of, “liberal peace,” paradigm. There needs to be a little bit more of an ability and a willingness to accept and work with other actors, non-state actors, the political forces that don’t necessarily fit in the state or Western Europe or North America’s view of the state.To try and generate some kind of peace and prosperity, but potentially, case by case, to leave state structures out of it. So, no. External forces like the United States cannot necessarily at all foster sustainable military institutions in countries ripped apart by decades of war and oppression. Afghanistan and Iraq are a good example. Another potentially similar example is the decades of effort by France to support former colonies in Africa, which has just had somewhat of a similar backlash in the three countries in Niger and Burkina Faso [and] Mali, where their efforts have just led to yet another military coup. We have a whole lot more stable countries, [where it is] much easier to help because we have much more to work with, but if we’re wanting to work in places like Somalia, which appear to be strategically critical, be prepared to work with non-state actors or militia.HostUnfortunately, we’re out of time here. I do have time for one more question, though, if you have any concluding thoughts you’d like to share with us.RobinsonI said before, do less interventions. Often, do not go. Focus on more stable countries where there are strong forces to work with. The United States actually doesn’t have to run the entire world. Climate change will create more problems and pressure for deployments. So, aspirations, as far as I can tell, will have to be scaled back over time as climate disasters increase in number and forces are needed more closer to home. HostThank you for making time to speak with me today, Colin. RobinsonThank you so much for listening. HostListeners, you can read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 54, issue 3. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

In this episode of Decisive Point, authors Michael T. Hackett and John A. Nagl delve into insights from the article “A Long, Hard Year: Russia-Ukraine War Lessons Learned 2023.” They analyze the evolution of warfare tactics between the first and second year of the Russia-Ukraine War, highlighting the shift from rapid maneuvers to trench warfare characterized by saturation and attrition. The discussion emphasizes the significance of adaptability for military strategists in the United States and NATO, particularly in response to Russia’s strategic use of mercenaries like the Wagner Group. Hackett and Nagl explore the implications of a transparent battlefield shaped by modern technologies and the contrasting command structures of Ukraine and Russia, showcasing the effectiveness of decentralized command. Additionally, the critical role of airpower and the future of Ukraine in the context of Western support are key themes, underscoring the vital lessons for contemporary military strategists.E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.Podcast record date: September 5, 2024Keywords: culture, human domain, cross-cultural competence, military education You’re listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m in the studio with Dr. John A. Nagl today and joining us virtually is Michael T. Hackett. Nagl and Hackett are the authors of “A Long, Hard Year, Russia-Ukraine War Lessons Learned 2023,” which was published in the Autumn 2024 issue of Parameters. Nagl, the director of the Russia-Ukraine War integrated research project, is a retired Army officer and a professor of war-fighting studies at the US Army War College. Hackett is a foreign service officer at the US Department of State and served as the chief of staff for the integrated research project that studied the second year of the Russia-Ukraine War. He is a distinguished graduate of the US Army War College class of 2024. Welcome to Decisive Point, John and Mike.Dr. John A. NaglThank you, Stephanie. It’s good to be with you.Michael T. HackettGreat to be here.HostLet’s just jump right in and get started here. How has the approach to war and its tactics changed from the first-year study of the war to the second-year study?NaglI’ll take that if I can. I was asked by General [Paul E.] Funk and the Training and Doctrine Command during the first summer of the Russo-Ukrainian War [Russia-Ukraine War] to try to examine that war for lessons learned for the Training and Doctrine Command of the US Army, which General Funk then led, and started the academic year that graduated in 2023 by looking then at the first year of the Russo-Ukrainian War [Russia-Ukraine War] over the course of 2022.And, Mike and I have now authored a study that is a capstone to a broader study of the second year of the war. And, I think I’d characterize the first year of the war as a war of maneuver. It was the year that Russia invaded and then that Ukraine counterattacked, broadly speaking, erasing the majority of Russia’s gains from the first month of the war. And so, the first year studied a war of movement. The second year of the war, the year 2023, covered in the article that Mike and I have published, was much more a static war. It was a war of trenches. It was a war of a failed Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer of 2023. And so, the lessons we learned from the first year of the war were very different than a lot of the lessons—not all, but a lot of the lessons—we learned during the second year of the war. And ironically, we are now in academic year 2025, studying the war as it happens in 2024. And, with the Kursk incursion by Ukraine, we’re again seeing a war of movement. And so, the war keeps changing, the Russians and the Ukrainians keep learning and adapting, and our hope is that the American Army and the US military [will] learn and adapt as well from these changing lessons of a changing war.HostThanks, John. Mike, how has Russia’s approach to utilizing mercenaries impacted its broader military strategy in the conflict? And what lessons can be drawn from this for future conflicts involving state and non-state actors?Michael T. HackettOne of the most significant aspects of the second year of the war was Russia’s increased use of mercenaries—of private military companies, or PMC—particularly the Wagner Group, culminating in the failed mutiny last June by [Wagner founder Yevgeny] Prigozhin and his death two months later. So, our Norwegian international fellow on the team focused exclusively on this topic and looked not only at the history of Wagner, but also the tactics and the degree to which their approach has altered Russian force structure in the long term. In his review, he looked at two components of the Wagner PMC, zeki, which is short for zaklyuchënnyi, or prisoners, and osvovy, which are the foundational elements of that unit. And, the zeki’s are prisoners who were brought in through a service agreement, and the osvovy were trained professional fighters with experience in Syria and Africa. Now, on the battlefield, this meant that Wagner used the zeki as assault units, the so-called “Storm Z” units, which are sheer mass of numbers just to throw at the enemy, while the osvovy, the trained soldiers, were left to consolidate the gains. And, in doing so, despite the heavy casualties among the zeki, Wagner was able to maintain his long-term capabilities, leaving command elements and experienced soldiers protected and able to continue to fight.So, the Russians used this approach to counter an increasingly transparent battlefield—one with drones and space and electronic warfare—made massing and concentrating attacks very difficult. Wagner used these assault tactics with bursts of massive expendable forces followed by a consolidation of gains with trained soldiers to successfully grind down the Ukrainians in that second year in battles like the one in Bakhmut and Avdiivka. And, even with the death of Prigozhin and the folding in of Wagner into regular Russian units, we’re seeing the Russian army adopt this approach into the tactics of its regular armed forces and even using it to alter the military’s force structure. So obviously, in TRADOC, Training and Doctrine and Command, we need to look carefully at ways to approach an adversary that’s willing to take these heavy losses with these assault tactics and one that may not feel encumbered by [the] law of armed conflict. Both are really a significant shift and one that we need to be ready for.HostThe article highlights the impact of persistent surveillance on the battlefield. How has this transparency affected traditional combat doctrines, and what innovations are necessary to counteract these changes?NaglSo, Mike talked a little bit about the transparent battlefield, and this is the idea that there’s an unblinking eye—largely drones, but also satellites and various electromagnetic systems that produce an unblinking eye—that make it essentially impossible to mask the forces that are necessary to conduct breakthrough-level attacks. And, the idea of that chapter was that a lot of the work we did during the second year of the war’s study was [documenting] that this technology changed the character of war. That was one of the reasons we attributed to the failures of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer of ’23 [2023], and that was one of the conclusions we drew. And then, just as we published the article, the Kursk invasion happens and, all of a sudden, Ukraine has found ways to adapt, to conceal movement, to use surprise, to somehow manage to mass the forces that allowed a breakthrough of Russian lines in a place where, admittedly, Russian lines were weak and seize a fairly extraordinary amount of Russian territory in fairly short order. And, we’re still trying to figure out—this is one of the things we’re going to examine in this year’s study—why and how it was that Ukraine was able to succeed. One of the early explanations appears to be that although Russia saw the massing of forces, they couldn’t understand why Ukraine would attack in that direction. There were no immediately apparent strategic goals in the direction of Kursk. They couldn’t imagine Ukraine, which was under enormous pressure defensively further south, would use its forces in an offensive manner.This is one of the questions I’m most interested in. It’s one of the questions that I’m looking forward to digging into this year, but it’s another example, to me, of the way that armies learn and adapt at a very rapid pace on the battlefield. They make mistakes, but under the pressure of combat, and, for Ukraine, under the pressure of national survival. And arguably for Russia, at least for Putin, this is also a war of survival at this point. We saw the Wagner mutiny spooking Putin. Both armies are working hard to gain an advantage over their adversary, and I’m reminded, really, of some of the innovations during World War I that led to, for instance, ultimately, the invention of the tank, the harnessing of the internal combustion engine to machine guns or to cannons and to armor that restored mobility to the battlefield. And, one of the interesting things for me is that the tank has been declared dead a number of times in the Ukraine war [Russia-Ukraine War], and, what the Kursk incursion clearly shows is that its demise has been sadly over-reported to date.HostThe article suggests the need to foster a culture of mission command. How can military organizations effectively cultivate this culture, especially in a high-intensity conflict like Ukraine?HackettTo John’s point, talking about the Kursk incursion, certainly innovation adaptation has been important to the Ukrainian success on that front. Mission command has also been very important. The degree to which the Ukrainians have been able to delegate authority onto subordinate units, [and] frankly, the Russian failure to do so, this is something that we saw very much in the first year of the war, where subordinate Russian forces were unable to respond to changing factors on the ground without direct command from higher echelons. Communication did not only cause a time delay in responding on the ground, but also created a real vulnerability that the Ukrainians effectively exploited to strike at command centers. I suspect that something similar to that probably happened in Kursk as well. In the second year of the war, when we were looking at mission command, we looked at Russia’s enforced conscription, opening its prisons to recruit new soldiers for the front line. And, those new soldiers were given very little training. This, in turn, led to very little agency given to those units, as there was really no opportunity to build the trust needed to allow for high command to feel comfortable to delegate decision-making autonomy. This wasn’t the case on the Ukrainian side, which benefited from extensive training and a [significantly] different culture, allowing subordinate units more autonomy. While we have an entire section, an entire chapter dedicated to mission command, I think this idea of distributed operations is a common thread that was woven into almost every chapter that we looked at in the second year. Whether it’s the decentralization of fire’s direction or creating a culture of innovation and adaptation or even in the information space, our information expert discussed how Ukraine was brilliant in its ability to delegate authority and autonomy to its government officials and military spokespeople to speak directly to the public audience—not only in Ukraine, but to the Western partners as well—in a way that is deeply authentic and convincing. It’s been crucial to building shared resolve, both in the US and with our NATO partners. And, I think we could learn from that. We could look for ways ourselves to build in this advocacy into our military and broader US government messaging.HostGiven the assertion that air superiority is a prerequisite for successful ground offensive, what challenges have emerged in achieving this in the Russia-Ukraine War? And, how might these lessons influence future air-ground integration strategies?NaglWe had two different Air Force officers examine the role of airpower during the second year of the Ukrainian war, and the American pilot, call sign “Boss,” unsurprisingly, I think, said that airpower is the key to victory, as airpower has been the key to victory since airpower was invented roughly a century ago. The non-American airpower advocate made a somewhat different argument. He said that Ukraine’s use of air defense systems, of air denial, was enabling, if not victory, at least Ukrainian survival, and he wondered whether there’s a less expensive way to negate the use of airpower on the battlefield. My own sense, in particular, for the American audience to whom we’re mostly writing, is that the former argument is more correct, that in order to gain ground, in order to seize ground on the battlefield, air superiority remains immensely valuable. Although again, during the Kursk incursion, Ukraine didn’t yet have its F-16s up in the air, but nonetheless managed to seize ground using elements of surprise [and] using artillery systems in some ways to achieve some of the effects of airpower. And so, while the American military certainly hopes that it will always have air superiority, that we’ll be able to use multiple domains interacting together to place the adversary in as uncomfortable and difficult a position as possible, the Ukraine [Russia-Ukraine] War  continues to be a case that has different lessons, depending on where you look and what part of the war you examine. I’m reminded of the blind men feeling the elephant and thinking it’s a fan and a tree trunk and a rope. And the Ukraine [Russia-Ukraine] War is all of those different things all at once. I do think that America should continue to try to achieve air superiority whenever possible, but when it can’t, it should study the lessons of what Ukraine has been able to do in air denial and achieve great things with limited resources, which is a challenge the United States military hasn’t had to struggle with for many years, but it’s a great reminder that ingenuity and national will, national resilience, which was another thing we studied in the second year of the war, have enormous and lasting benefits for an army, for a defense department, and for a nation.HostUnfortunately, we have to wrap it up. I’d love to hear—did we leave anything out? Do you have any concluding thoughts you’d like to share?HackettThe biggest question left unanswered here is what comes next? Not only in year three with Russia’s slow advance into eastern Ukraine and Ukraine’s incursion into the Kursk and Belgorod regions, but what are the prospects for war termination? What is the future for Ukraine post-conflict? And, I think a lot of that really depends upon maintaining resolve in Ukraine, as well as its Western partners. And fixing Ukraine as a partner in transatlantic institutions like the European Union and NATO, and supporting and strengthening Ukraine as a liberal democracy, strengthening its institutions, helping to build a vibrant economy, a robust civil society. And, I think that the team assembling at the [US Army] War College right now to look at year three will have their hands full grappling with those very questions. But overall, I’m very proud of what our team was able to accomplish over the past year. And, I’m so honored and humbled to have been part of the project. It’s really rare for us at the State Department to see how all the pieces of our military support puzzle come together. And, the incredible team that we brought together at the [US] Army War College pulled expertise from across the Joint Force, as John mentioned, from active duty, reserve, National Guard, and crucially included international fellows from Ukraine and from our NATO partners who really are on the front line of this conflict. I really think and hope that the insights that this team of professionals has shared will help not only Ukraine but, really, our own Joint Force and unified command more broadly in the fight of the future. And I’ve really been grateful to have been a part of it.HostWhat a great note to end on. Listeners, you can download the article at https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/. Look for volume 54, issue 3.For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace. John, Mike, it was a pleasure. Thank you for making time for this today. NaglIt was fun, Stephanie. Thank you.HackettThank you so much.

In this episode, Colonel Daniel W. Henk (US Army, retired), PhD, and Dr. Allison Abbe discuss cultural education in the US military. They emphasize the importance of cultural capability across the competition and conflict continuum and address how the Department of Defense can build on service culture centers’ efforts to address the LREC skills military personnel need to work effectively across cultural boundaries, whether during conflict against an adversary or in interoperability with allies and partners.E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.Podcast record date: August 27, 2024Keywords: culture, human domain, cross-cultural competence, military educationEpisode transcriptStephanie Crider (host)You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.I'm talking remotely with Colonel Daniel W. Henk and Dr. Allison Abbe, authors of “Restoring Priority on Cultural Skill Sets for Modern Military Professionals,” which you can find in the Autumn 2024 issue of Parameters.Henk, US Army retired, holds a PhD in social anthropology. His research interests include peace operations, human and environmental security, and civil-military relations. He was the founding director of the Air Force Culture and Language Center.Abbe is a professor of organizational studies and the Matthew B. Ridgway Chair of Leadership Studies at the US Army War College. Her research focuses on [the] development of leadership and intercultural skills in national security leaders.Welcome to Decisive Point, Dan and Allison.COL Dan Henk (US Army, retired)Thank you.Dr. Allison AbbeThanks for hosting.HostWhy are human relations skills important to US military operations or partnerships in today’s culturally complex environments? And, if you could, briefly cite a couple of specific examples to illustrate your answer.HenkA compelling argument could really be made that in conflict in the early twenty-first century, managing human relations has risen to a level of importance that we’ve never seen before. And for the military professional, doing the nation’s business really now means an ability to understand and to work very well with very diverse communities under the constant scrutiny and instant reporting of the information age and, often, unfortunately, with malign actors waiting and watching for our missteps. Poor command of human relations skills could very easily lead to mission failure at any level of responsibility and across the entire spectrum of military involvements.If you don’t mind, let me just offer a couple of examples.In 2004, not long after our latest intervention in Iraq, a very perceptive young Marine documented American military deficiencies in working across cultural boundaries at the tactical level in Iraq. His article appeared in Small Wars Journal and was titled “Marines Are from Mars, Iraqis Are from Venus.” He made the point, based on his observation, that it is very difficult to work with people when you are clueless about their take on reality, about their norms, about their values, about their expectations, and about their grievances and their insecurities.But, you know, the same thing is true at a higher level, as well. In my role as an attaché and a researcher, I frequently overheard comments by host nation officials describing US military connections. Some were complimentary, to be sure. Many were not. In fact, American military personnel were really often characterized as impatient, insensitive to local dynamics, and much more inclined to operate on transmit than on receive. Now, the fact of the matter is a grounding in the more advanced skills of cross-cultural competence could have been a considerable help—both in avoiding offense and in discerning the true nature of the relationships.We have had senior officials that have displayed really commendable cross-cultural skills at very high levels of responsibility. Particularly noteworthy were [Special Presidential Envoy] Robert Oakley and Director of Operations Marine General Anthony Zinni in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in ’92 and ’93. These two men were true cross-cultural adepts. They were able to reconcile and work with extraordinarily diverse and difficult actors in one of the world’s most problematic conflict environments. They reached out, they communicated well, they reconciled hostile factions, and they achieved a remarkable cooperation. Sadly, their UN [United Nations] successors had no such motivation or capability, and their American peers generally lacked their cross-cultural proficiency.The point here, again, is that the military profession in the twenty-first century will succeed or fail based on its ability to understand opponents, appeal to the uncommitted, and work effectively with partners and allies. And, cross-cultural competence is key to these capabilities.AbbeLooking forward, the National Defense Strategy does really rely on allies and partners in this strategy. And so, developing those relationships at all levels, from the tactical to strategic, is really important for success, especially in our relationships in the Pacific, where we might not have had the same level of experience, where military personnel serving now all have experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and, now, we are looking to the Pacific, where they may not have as much cultural awareness or cultural knowledge. So, we need to rebuild that in personnel for another theater. And, more broadly, just for the strategy and facing all of our potential adversaries and competitors, it would be important to incorporate these cultural skills that we talk about in the article.HostThe Department of Defense has identified language, regional expertise, and culture—the LREC rubric—as a body of related essential skills. Yet, you’ve chosen to focus on culture and, even more specifically, on cross-cultural competence. How do these skill sets relate, and why does your discussion single out culture?HenkWell, there has been, since the early twenty-first century, a new DoD focus on this new paradigm of LREC—language, regional expertise, and culture. Behind this formula is actually the explicit assumption that these are mutually reinforcing skills. We fully agree with that. Absolutely. But, imagine the best of all worlds—a military professional deploys to a contingency environment fluent in the local language, having a detailed knowledge of the region, [and] steeped in cross-cultural expertise. Of course, if these skills could be combined and harnessed in one person, he or she would have an unmatched ability to impact the social environment.But, you know, that combination is an absolutely optimum scenario. It is conceivable but is very far from likely—simply because of the limitations of time and resources and human capacity. It is much more probable that real fluency in foreign languages and pockets of deep regional expertise will continue in our system to reside largely in specialized communities accessed as needed.That being the case, here are a couple of observations.Our need for foreign language speakers is so obvious that it hardly requires comment, and language-enabled service personnel are worth every penny we spend on them. And, we could do more—and should. But, no matter what inducements we use, we will never fully satisfy the language demand, particularly the requirements for sudden, newly needed languages. We all know that military professionals are not all able to learn languages or to learn them well, and very few of us will learn enough different languages to cover all likely contingency environments to which we may be sent.Now, the same holds true for regional knowledge, actually. It is valuable stuff. We should produce more of it. But, when it’s held by one person, it’s simply not going to stretch far enough and deep enough to cover even the predictable, let alone the unforeseen, in the worldwide responsibilities of the general-purpose forces. The fact is we are devoting substantial resources to both language and regional expertise, but these two skill sets, despite their value, have significant limitations. That’s why, for us, the long pole in the human-relations tent has to be cross-cultural competence. Sure, that competence would be immensely enhanced if supported by language fluency and regional expertise in the right place and time—and again, if these were available. But of the three, cross-cultural competence is the only generalized set of skills that could be used anywhere. It’s the only set that could be instantly available. That’s why cross-cultural competence is an astute investment. If we can produce it, you can be absolutely assured we will use it everywhere all the time.AbbeI just want to emphasize that point about how difficult it is to scale language proficiency very rapidly—even getting personnel to limited proficiency for operations takes [a] substantial amount of time. And so, being able to scale that, as we found in previous conflicts, there’s just so many limitations on it. So, we’re not arguing against language skills per se but arguing for a more scalable skill set in helping personnel understand cultures and how to make sense of other cultures wherever it is that they find themselves in deployments.Henk Well, most Western military establishments, certainly including our own, could offer at least occasional examples of senior leaders with remarkable cross-cultural skills. Anthony Zinni, we’ve already mentioned is a case in point.We have had these examples of people who could do this stuff very, very well, but they did it as an art. Their background [and] maybe their experience all contributed to their personal ability to do this. We want to make this a replicable science that we can spread much more widely than the isolated artists that have practiced it well in the past.HostWhat institutional approaches would you recommend to embed and sustain US military cross-cultural skills?HenkAs an organizational culture, we do, at times, exhibit a notorious fickleness, [a] tendency to chase butterflies, and a tendency to abandon promising initiatives that do not produce instant results. Now, these characteristics have worked against the culture initiatives in the past, but there are some significant differences now, and there is room for optimism here. The military need for culture skills is more evident today than it’s ever been. Any lack of these skills is much more quickly and graphically visible to a worldwide attended public than any time in the past. There’s lots of incentive for acquiring this skill set. Also, while the culture initiatives in the past two decades seem to have stalled, they did make some progress that appears to be, at least, somewhat durable. These initiatives did result in the recruitment of more culture educators than we have ever had in the past. They’re now at least thinly seated in military education.These initiatives also produce more culture content in that education, even if it remains at a very foundational level. So, there is a nucleus of a constituency and a body of culture education that simply did not exist before. But probably much more significantly, the LREC development as a whole, including culture skill, is now embedded in Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD] and Joint Staff mandates and is visible in OSD oversight infrastructure. If it’s given sufficient priority, resources, and teeth, these mandates could be powerful instruments to push the program along.That said, as we argued in the article, we believe that the development of a cross-culturally competent force requires at least four additional essential initiatives to achieve a lasting status and impact. These, we argue, are a senior advocate in OSD—like the senior language authority but charged specifically with overseeing culture skills development. We think it’s necessary to have a strategic plan for culture development similar to the Language Transformation Roadmap of 2005, which provided, actually, a real strategy—ends, ways, and means. We think it’s important that we renew the emphasis of recruitment of culture subject matter experts, those with terminal degrees, into both military education and into the policy infrastructure. Most importantly of all, we think that a defense culture center similar in shape to the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute is necessary to push the science, connect the research to practice, and infuse it into the skills development that’s needed at all levels. It’s our firm conviction that these measures would finally embed cross-cultural competence in the collective American military mind as a critically important set of conceptual tools.AbbeI think that the Marine Corps’ Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, which is now no longer in existence, is a good example of an organization that was able to translate the social science into something actionable for Marines to use. So, that might serve as a model for how to reestablish some of these connections. The Department of Defense is funding social science through the Minerva program [Minerva Research Initiative] that may be relevant to this kind of professional development that Dan talks about, but there’s a missing link there to make that more accessible in military professional education or training programs. Some of the recommendations that we’ve made in the article would help bridge that gap between the research and the practitioners so that they can be better prepared to interact in those cultures when they find themselves in exercises or deployments.HostYour article also alludes to a long-term educational process to develop cross-cultural skills within the force. What would that process look like?HenkHow would we acquire a cross-cultural competent military? It would not be quick. It would not be easy. But, culture skills could reach a much broader community of practitioners than the deep-language skills or the regional expertise. Now, building that competence is an educational process, but it’s an educational process that involves conceptual molding over a long period of time. [The] earlier it starts in life, the better.Ideally, for at least military personnel, the start time should at least be pre-accession education, and the molding would continue through the whole professional lifetime. For this kind of education to be effective, it simply has to be empirically based, continuous, persistent, consistent, experiential—let me emphasize that. Experiential—and measurable. We will not get there if we try to base it on boutique seminars, culture hustler contractors, idiosyncratic educators, or unconnected learning episodes. The building blocks have to correlate with each other. They have to relate to the foundation.If we expect the recipients of this learning to take it seriously and not dismiss it as superficial, subjective, and speculative, we are going to be obliged to prove that the skills are real, they are progressive, and they do impart a significant capability. Military cross-culture competence today might be a lot like military aviation in the 1920s. We see its potential, but we know we have a long way to go to realize it.AbbeI would just add that the professional development also has to be sustainable from the institution’s perspective. The Army adopted a culture and foreign language strategy in 2009 with some of these, outlining what some of the professional development would look like at different career stages. But, ultimately, that plan was not really sustainable from a resourcing perspective, and so, I think part of the job of culture scientists and a potential DoD culture center would be to look at what are most efficient ways to develop some of these skills so that it’s sustainable from a resourcing perspective over time.HostListeners, you can download the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 54, issue 3. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.Thank you so much.AbbeYour time. Thank you, Stephanie. Appreciate you, too.HenkThank you.

In this episode, Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff, interim director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College, discusses his work on managing escalation during the Israel-Hamas War. The conversation covers the complexities of Israel’s deterrence strategies, the proposed ceasefire, and the implications of Hamas’ potential power dynamics akin to Hezbollah. Pfaff highlights the delicate balance required in deterring Iranian support for Hamas and the importance of diplomatic efforts in establishing sustainable ceasefire conditions and examines how Israel’s strategies can inform global conflict resolution, offering insights into the intricate dynamics of military and diplomatic engagement in international relations.E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.Podcast record date: September 5, 2024Keywords: Israel, Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, Israeli Defense Forces, violent extremist organizationsDownload the full transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Nov/06/2003579418/-1/-1/0/DP5-25-PFAFF-TRANSCRIPT.PDF

In this episode, Steven Metz discusses his article, “The Challenges of Next-Gen Insurgency,” which was published in the Autumn 2024 issue of Parameters. We discuss how generational conflict may drive future insurgencies, particularly tensions between youth and older generations fueled by frustration and radical ideologies. Metz emphasizes the importance of narrative control in modern cybersecurity and information warfare, suggesting that this shift will redefine counterinsurgency strategies. He also explores how insurgents increasingly focus on undermining state authority, presenting challenges for state responses. This conversation urges a reevaluation of traditional counterinsurgency methods to better address evolving threats, with Metz’s insights set to be further detailed in his forthcoming book.E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.Record date: 22 August 2024Keywords: insurgency, Cold War, people’s war, Mao Zedong, social media, al-QaedaDownload the full transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Nov/05/2003578522/-1/-1/0/DP5-24-Metz-Transcript.PDF

In this episode, Dr. Jeff McManus discusses his article, “Operating Successfully Within the Bureaucracy Domain of Warfare: Part Two.” He addresses seven key fundamentals for navigating bureaucracy, emphasizing the importance of principles, perspective, and prediction in policy making. McManus highlights effective persuasion strategies, the role of privacy in building trust, and how programming and budgeting influence policy formulation, as well as the significance of objectivity and social media’s impact on credibility, providing valuable insights for professionals navigating complex bureaucratic environments.Read part one of the series here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss2/11/Listen to the podcast about part one of this series here: https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/3900805/operating-successfully-within-the-bureaucracy-domain-of-warfare-part-one/E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.Podcast record date: July 15, 2024Keywords: bureaucracy, fundamentals, policy, politics, strategyDownload the transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Oct/29/2003572891/-1/-1/0/DP5-23-MCMANUS-TRANSCRIPT.PDF

With the 2024 US presidential election fast approaching, Dr. Carrie A. Lee takes on the topic of retired flag officer endorsements and political campaigns and how public servant endorsements influence public trust in the military. Is there a way for active duty and retired military servicemembers to navigate their roles in political discourse without undermining democratic principles? How risky is it for retired military leaders to endorse political candidates considering the perception of military impartiality?  E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.  Keywords: political endorsements, retired general officers, non-partisanship, norm-based approach, civil-military trustDownload the transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Oct/23/2003569803/-1/-1/0/DP5-22_LEE-TRANSCRIPT.PDF

In this episode, Patricia M. Shields, a Regents Professor at Texas State University, discusses the evolving dynamics between military institutions and civilian society over the last 50 years. She explores key themes such as recruitment strategies, veteran welfare, and the impacts of pivotal events like the Vietnam War and 9/11 on civil-military relations. Shields highlights the shift to an all-volunteer force, the influence of the women’s rights movement, and the challenges faced by servicemembers today, as well as the balance of civil-military relations and the implications for national defense. E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: Afghanistan War, Armed Forces & Society, Cold War, COVID, veteransDownload the transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Oct/07/2003559918/-1/-1/0/DP-5-21-SHIELDS-TRANSCRIPT.PDF

The United States is experiencing an era characterized by civil-military tension and conflict. From the increasing politicization of the military, to declining public trust in the military and the recruiting crisis, to the erosion of norms meant to protect civilian control to a perceived lack of accountability within the profession, healthy civil-military relations in America today are under assault. In response, the US Army War College established the Civil-Military Relations Center (CMRC) in summer 2022 to “sponsor and promote the development of a healthy, sustainable relationship between the American military, society, and political leaders through education, research, and outreach.Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss2/13/E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.Keywords: civil-military relations, General Charles Q. Brown Jr., General Randy A. George, Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth, National Security Strategy

In this episode, Majors Brennan Devereaux and Cliff R. Parsons discuss the influence of professional military writing on strategy and decision making. Devereaux previews his article on military discourse, while Parsons discusses his recent work on deterring Russian nuclear threats. They touch on collaborative writing and the significance of writing during the current interwar period, emphasizing initiatives to encourage writing among military personnel. Both majors share their personal journeys and mentorship and the development of essential communication skills.E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.Keywords: General Randy A. George, Michael R. Weimer, Harding Project, professional discourseDownload the transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/24/2003552946/-1/-1/0/DP-5-19-PARSONS-DEVERAUX-TRANSCRIPT.PDF