Zevachim 2 - September 16, 23 Elul

Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. "He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life." Today’s daf is sponsored by Judi Felber in loving memory of her mother, Yocheved bat Zvi and Sara, on her 4th yahrzeit. If one takes an animal that was designated for a specific sacrificial purpose and slaughters it with the intention that it be used for a different type of offering (shelo lishma), the sacrifice is not invalidated. It must still be offered according to its original designation. However, it does not fulfill the obligation of the person who brought the sacrifice. There are exceptions to this rule - cases in which slaughtering with the wrong intent completely disqualifies the offering. The Mishna records four differing opinions regarding these exceptions: Tana Kamma holds that a sin offering (chatat) and a Passover offering (korban Pesach) - when brought at the proper time (the afternoon of the 14th of Nissan, or possibly even the morning) - are disqualified if slaughtered with incorrect intent. Rabbi Eliezer adds the guilt offering (asham) to the list, arguing that it is similar in nature to the sin offering. Yosi ben Honi expands the rule further, stating that any sacrifice slaughtered with the mistaken intent that it be offered as a sin offering or a Passover offering on the 14th of Nissan is disqualified. Shimon, brother of Azaria, maintains that if a sacrifice is slaughtered with the intent that it be offered as a higher-level offering than originally designated, it remains valid. However, if the intent is to downgrade it to a lower-level offering, the sacrifice is disqualified. The Mishna provides examples of what constitutes higher and lower offerings. The Gemara raises a question: Why does the Mishna use the word "ela" ("but") instead of "ve" ("and") in the phrase “but [a sacrifice slaughtered with the wrong intent] does not fulfill the owner’s obligation”? The answer given is that although the sacrifice does not fulfill the owner's obligation, its original sanctity and designation remain intact. Therefore, the remaining sacrificial rites must be performed in accordance with its original purpose. This explanation aligns with a statement made by Rava, and two reasons are offered to support this ruling—one derived from a biblical verse, and the other based on logical reasoning. A further question arises: If a sacrifice is slaughtered without any specific intent, is that considered “no intent” or does it count as “intent”? Rava infers from the Mishna that such a case is treated as if it were done with intent. However, he notes a contradiction with the laws of lishma regarding a get (divorce document), which must be written specifically for the woman being divorced. Why, then, is the law different in each case? After addressing this question, the Gemara investigates the sources that underpin Rava’s apparent contradiction: first, that a sacrifice brought without specific intent is still valid; and second, that a get lacking explicit intent is invalid.  

Introduction to Masechet Zevachim

Siyum Masechet Horayot and Seder Nezikin is sponsored by the Tannenbaum family in loving memory of their beloved mother/grandmother Ruth Zemsky z"l, Raizel bat Chaya Kayla, on her 9th yahrzeit on 23rd of Elul. "Marking the completion of Nezikin, a seder that is focused on bein adam l’chavero- both in the building and healing of society, aptly reflects the life she lead. She was a paragon of sensitivity and taking care of "the other", often those unseen, in community, work and home. Her example continues to inspire us all. Yehi zichra baruch." A braita outlines the protocols for showing respect to the Nasi, the Av Beit Din, and the Chacham—each accorded honor in a distinct manner. This differentiation was instituted by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (the Nasi) on a day when Rabbi Natan (Av Beit Din) and Rabbi Meir (the Chacham) were absent from the Beit Midrash. Feeling slighted, they conspired to remove Rabban Shimon from his position. However, their plan was overheard by Rabbi Yaakov ben Karshi and ultimately thwarted. Upon discovering their plot, Rabban Shimon expelled them from the Beit Midrash. In response, they began submitting challenging questions into the study hall. When the students inside couldn’t answer, they would send in the correct answers. Rabbi Yosi eventually intervened, arguing that it was absurd for Torah to remain outside while the students sat within. Rabban Shimon agreed to reinstate them—but imposed a penalty: the Torah they taught would no longer be attributed to them by name. Thus, Rabbi Meir’s teachings were transmitted as “acherim” (“others”), and Rabbi Natan’s as “yesh omrim” (“some say”). Later, they both dreamt that they should seek reconciliation with Rabban Shimon. Only Rabbi Natan acted on the dream. But Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was not exactly willing to reconcile. A generation later, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was teaching his son, Rabbi Shimon, a teaching of Rabbi Meir, referring to it as “acherim omrim.” When his son asked why he didn’t cite Rabbi Meir directly, Rabbi Yehuda explained that these sages had once tried to undermine their family’s honor. Rabbi Shimon replied that they were long deceased and had failed in their attempt. Rabbi Yehuda relented and agreed to cite Rabbi Meir—though still indirectly, saying “They say in the name of Rabbi Meir.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and other sages also debated a broader question: is it better to be a sinai - one with vast Torah knowledge, or an oker Harim - one with powerful analytical skills who can “uproot mountains”? Rav Yosef was a sinai, while Raba was an oker Harim. Although the scholars in Israel recommended Rav Yosef for leadership, he humbly deferred to Raba. Raba led the yeshiva for 22 years, and only after his passing did Rav Yosef assume the role. During Raba’s tenure, Rav Yosef refrained from receiving honor out of respect. In another case, Abaye, Rava, Rabbi Zeira, and Raba bar Matna were studying together and needed a leader. Abaye was chosen, as his teachings remained unrefuted, unlike the others. The Gemara concludes with a question: who was greater—Rabbi Zeira or Raba bar Rav Matna? Each had unique strengths, and the matter is left unresolved with the classic Talmudic closure: teiku.

Today's daf is sponsored by Tova and David Kestenbaum in loving memory of Tova's father, Rabbi Dr. Israel Rivkin z”l, on the occasion of his first yahrzeit. "My father was a pillar of strength and love for our family, a passionate learner of Torah, and a man whose chessed for his community and Klal Yisrael knew no bounds. He was deeply grateful to be living in Israel, together with my mother, surrounded by generations of descendants — a dream he cherished and fulfilled with joy and pride. יהי זכרו ברוך" Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Shapiro in memory of her mother Deera Tychman, Tzvia Bracha bat Mordechai v'Chaya Tova, on her 12th yahrzeit. "My mother was a lover of Israel and the Hebrew language. May her memory be a blessing." Today’s daf is dedicated to my brother Jonathan Cohen on his 50th birthday! He has been learning daf yomi with me since Masechet Nidda of the last cycle. The bull offering of the kohen gadol precedes the bull offering of the community. This is derived both from a verse in the Torah and a logical argument. The bull offering of the community (sin offering) precedes the bull offering of the community in a case of idol worship (burnt offering), as a sin offering precedes a burnt offering, as is derived from a verse regarding the sliding scale offering when two birds are offered - one as a sin offering and one as burnt offering. The Gemara brings several other rulings regarding which sacrifice precedes another and the source for it in the Torah. Only in one case is there a tannaitic debate.  If there are two lives to save or two people to feed or two people taken hostage, on what basis do we decide who to save, feed, or redeem first? The Mishnayot list who comes first, and a braita explands on this list.  Lineage plays a key role in determining precedence, but a Torah scholar overrides this and comes before even a mamzer, as is derived from a verse in Mishlei 3:15. What things cause one to forget one’s Torah, and what can one do to restore forgotten Torah? What are ten things that are detrimental to Torah study? A braita delineates the rules for showing respect for the Nasi, Av Beit Din and Chacham – each in a different manner. This differentiation was instituted by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (the nasi) on a day that Rabbi Natan, the Av Beit Din, and Rabbi Meir, the Chacham were not in the Beit Midrash.

How could Yehoachaz have been anointed with shemen hamishcha if Yoshiyahu hid the shemen hamishcha? What else did Yoshiyahu hide, and for what reason? The king and kohen gadol are anointed in different ways—how is each performed? Kings were anointed near a flowing stream as a good omen, symbolizing that their reign would endure. The Gemara digresses into a broader discussion about various practices people use to seek signs—whether they will survive the year, succeed in business, return safely from a journey, and so on. Some authorities caution against relying on such signs. Abaye, however, says that since we see signs do have meaning, one should eat symbolic foods on Rosh Hashana—such as gourds, chard, dates, and others—because they grow quickly, serving as a good omen for the coming year. Rabbi Meir disagrees with the Mishna, holding that even a kohen gadol who assumed the role by wearing the special garments (rather than being anointed) would still be required to bring a bull offering if he sinned. From where does he derive this ruling? A difficulty arises, as the continuation of the Mishna appears to align with Rabbi Meir’s position. Could it be that the Mishna is split—part following Rabbi Meir and part not? If not, how can the Mishna be reconciled? Three different answers are offered to resolve this question. The Mishna teaches that there are five mitzvot commanded to the kohen gadol that also apply to the mashuach milchama—the kohen who addresses the people before they go out to war. A braita provides the source for this ruling. Rava asked Rav Nachman whether a kohen gadol who becomes leprous is permitted to marry a widow. Rav Nachman did not know the answer. Rav Papa later posed the same question, and Rav Huna son of Rav Nachman responded. The Mishna discusses differences between a kohen gadol and a regular kohen regarding the laws of mourning—specifically, whether they may perform Temple service while in the state of onen (the period between the death of a relative and burial), and how they tear their garments. The kohen gadol tears his garment l’mata and a regular kohen l’maala. Rav and Shmuel disagree about how to translate these terms in this context. The Mishna rules that an action performed regularly (tadir) takes precedence over one that is less frequent. Additionally, if one mitzvah is more sanctified than another, it takes precedence. From where are these principles derived?  

A braita explains that the words “מעם הארץ” — “from one of the land” — mentioned in the section about the individual’s sin offering serve to exclude the king and the kohen gadol. The braita then questions this drasha, noting that the king and kohen gadol are already explicitly excluded by the verses. It concludes that the exemption in the braita for the kohen gadol applies in a case where he committed a forbidden act unwittingly, but without relying on an erroneous ruling. The exemption for the king applies when he sinned before being appointed. However, this interpretation aligns only with Rabbi Shimon’s view, as the rabbis maintain that in such a case, the king must bring an individual sin offering. To reconcile this with the rabbis’ position, Rav Zevid in the name of Rava suggests a scenario in which the king ate half the requisite amount of forbidden fat (cheilev) before becoming king, and then ate the other half afterward. In this case, he would not be obligated to bring an individual sin offering. Rava asked Rav Nachman: if someone ate half the requisite amount before becoming king, then became king, and later ceased being king before eating the second half, would the two halves combine to obligate him to bring an individual sin offering? They attempt to resolve the question by comparing it to a parallel case involving a Jew who ceased practicing religion, a meshumad, but the comparison is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet, according to Rabbi Shimon’s position: if someone ate a piece of fat whose status — permitted or forbidden — was unclear, and only discovered the issue after becoming king, would he bring a provisional guilt offering? The reasoning is that the type of sacrifice does not change with the person’s change in status from a regular individual to a king. The question remains unresolved. A braita presents two different drashot to derive that a meshumad does not bring an individual sin offering. The practical difference between the two derivations is explored. There is a debate regarding which transgressions qualify someone as a meshumad. A braita explains that when the Torah refers to a nasi, it means a king — as no one is above him except God. Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, known as Rebbi, asked Rabbi Chiya whether he would be required to bring the unique offering designated for a nasi. Rabbi Chiya responded that Rebbi had a counterpart in Babylonia, the Exilarch, and therefore did not meet the criteria of someone who has no one above him but God. A difficulty is raised, as both kings of the kingdoms of Judea and Israel would bring the offering, yet it is explained that Rebbi was subservient to the Exilarch. Rav Safra offers a different version of the discussion between Rebbi and Rabbi Chiya. The kohen gadol who brings a unique sacrifice is specifically one who was anointed with the shemen hamishcha, the special oil prepared by Moshe. The Mishna outlines the legal differences between a kohen gadol who was anointed and one who assumed the role by wearing the special garments. It also distinguishes between a kohen gadol currently serving and one who is no longer in the position. A braita records a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding whether the shemen hamishcha was prepared in a miraculous manner. Rabbi Yehuda, who believes it was prepared miraculously, supports his view by citing several miracles associated with the oil, arguing that its miraculous preparation should not be surprising. If a king inherits the throne from his father, he is not anointed, but the kohen gadol is. Only kings from the Davidic dynasty were anointed. Challenges to this theory are raised: Shlomo was anointed despite his father being king, and Yehu, an Israelite king, was also anointed. These are resolved by explaining that Yehu was anointed with balsam oil, not the shemen hamishcha, and that Shlomo’s anointment was due to uncertainty over succession. Yehoachaz, whose father was also king, was anointed because he became king instead of his older brother Yehoyakim, who was two years his senior. Was he really two years his senior? The Gemara delves into the different verses to understand the age order among the brothers. 

There are several differing opinions regarding whether a king and a kohen gadol are obligated to bring a sliding scale offering (korban oleh v’yored) for certain transgressions. Rabbi Yosi HaGelili holds that both are exempt, since they can never become poor—a condition necessary for this type of offering. Rabbi Akiva, however, obligates the king in all cases except for withholding testimony, as a king is not permitted to testify. He exempts the kohen gadol entirely, based on a drasha derived from the unique meal offering of the kohen gadol (minchat chavitin). Ravina raises a question about a king who contracts leprosy and is no longer considered a king: would he then be obligated to bring a sliding scale offering? The Mishna then summarizes which sacrifices are brought by various individuals—the kohen gadol, the king, a regular individual, and the court—for both standard sin offerings and those related to idolatry (avodah zarah). It also outlines who is obligated in provisional guilt offerings (asham talui), standard guilt offerings (asham vadai), and sliding scale offerings. Two additional opinions on sliding scale offerings appear here. Rabbi Shimon states that the king is obligated in all cases except testimony, while the kohen gadol is obligated in all cases except impurity in the Temple. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the king is obligated, but instead of a sliding scale offering, he brings a goat. A braita is cited to expand on Rabbi Shimon’s position. Although it contains an internal contradiction, this is resolved. Chizkia explains Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning for exempting the kohen gadol from bringing a sacrifice for impurity in the Temple: the kohen gadol has a unique Yom Kippur offering and does not receive atonement through the communal sacrifice that covers the rest of the nation. This sets him apart and excludes him from the verse regarding the punishment for entering the Temple in a state of impurity. There is a discussion about Rabbi Eliezer’s view—specifically, whether the king’s obligation to bring a goat applies only to impurity in the Temple or to all transgressions that would normally require a sliding scale offering.

Rebbi and the rabbis disagree about the case in which a kohen gadol becomes obligated to bring a sacrifice for idol worship. According to one view, it involves a situation where he unknowingly worshipped idols. According to the other, it refers to a case where he unknowingly issued an erroneous halakhic ruling and then acted upon it. Despite this disagreement, both Rebbi and the rabbis agree that the sacrifice he brings is the same as that brought by an individual—a female goat. They also concur that the kohen gadol does not bring a provisional guilt offering (asham talui), though each derives this conclusion through a different method. The communal sin offering—whether for general commandments or for idol worship—is only brought for transgressions where intentional violation incurs karet, and unintentional violation requires a sin offering. This same criterion applies to the unique sin offering of the kohen gadol, the king and the individual. Rebbi derives this from a gezera shava based on the word עליה  (“upon her”), which appears both in the verse about the communal offering and in the verse prohibiting a man from sleeping with his wife’s sister. The rabbis, however, interpret the verse about the sister differently for another law, and instead derive the principle from Bamidbar (Numbers) 15:29–30. What does Rebbi derive from that verse? How do we know that the section in Bamidbar 15 refers specifically to the sin of idol worship? Three suggestions are offered, though the third is ultimately rejected. The communal sin offering is not brought for transgressions that are punishable by a sliding scale offering (korban oleh ve’yored). The source for this exclusion is also examined. Does the king bring his unique sin offering for a transgression that is punishable by a sliding scale offering? The Mishnah presents two differing opinions on this matter.

A kohen gadol is obligated to bring a special bull offering only if he issues an erroneous halachic ruling unintentionally and then personally acts upon that ruling. A braita derives this from the verse “לְאַשְׁמַת הָעָם” (“for the guilt of the nation”), which compares the kohen gadol’s actions to those of the community when they bring a communal sin offering. This drasha is necessary because one might have assumed that the kohen gadol’s obligation could be learned directly from the communal offering paradigm, given their similarities. However, since the kohen gadol could also be compared to the nasi (king), who brings a sacrifice without issuing a mistaken ruling, the comparison is not straightforward. The drasha clarifies that the kohen gadol’s case aligns specifically with the communal model. Another drasha teaches that if the kohen gadol issues an erroneous ruling but the people act on it while he himself does not, no special bull offering is brought. The offering is only required when the kohen gadol personally commits the sin. The Mishna rules that if the kohen gadol and the court issue rulings simultaneously but on different matters—where the community follows the court and the kohen gadol follows his own ruling—he must bring an individual sacrifice. However, if he rules with the court on the same issue and acts together with the community, he is atoned through the communal bull offering, not the unique one designated for the kohen gadol. A braita attempts to derive this latter case by comparing the kohen gadol to the nasi, but this is rejected. The nasi is included in the communal Yom Kippur offering, whereas the kohen gadol receives atonement through his own unique Yom Kippur sacrifice. Ultimately, the source is derived from the verse “עַל חַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא” (“for the sin which he sinned,” Vayikra 4:3). Rava and Abaye disagree about whether the earlier case—where the kohen gadol and the court ruled simultaneously—refers to rulings made in the same location or in different places. The Gemara explores various scenarios in which the kohen gadol and the court ruled on different matters. Some cases are obvious, while others remain uncertain. The Mishna further explains that the kohen gadol’s sacrifice resembles the communal sin offering in that both require two conditions: (1) a mistaken ruling that leads to erroneous instruction, and (2) an unwitting action based on that ruling. The same principle applies to idol worship—to be liable, there must be both an erroneous ruling and a subsequent action. A braita derives this from a gezeira shava based on the phrase “מֵעֵינֵי” (“from the eyes”). When the Mishna states that the same applies to idol worship, it does not explicitly say, “And the same is true for the kohen gadol,” as it did earlier. Initially, the Gemara interprets this to mean that the Mishna follows Rebbi, who holds that the kohen gadol brings a sacrifice for idol worship based solely on an unwitting action, even without a mistaken ruling. However, this interpretation is rejected, and the Mishna is re-explained as the sentence “And such is true for the kohen gadol” would apply to both the sentence before and the sentence after, as is the case in the upcoming Mishna.