Zevachim 111 - Shabbat January 3, 14 Tevet

Study Guide What actions are performed on public bamot but not on private bamot? What is considered "outside its gat," as mentioned in connection with the slaughtering and burning of the para aduma (red heifer)? There is a dispute between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan, which is rooted in an earlier disagreement about whether the Flood reached the Land of Israel. Each of them raises three challenges to the other's position.

The Gemara explains that the Mishna follows Rabbi Nechemia's opinion regarding the status of the remainder of the blood. Why did the Mishna compare the case of two cups of blood to a sin offering that was lost and replaced with another? The Gemara explains that this comparison was introduced in order to teach the law regarding a case that can be derived from the Mishna. It clarifies the distinction between an animal designated to replace a lost offering and a situation in which a person designates two animals from the outset so that one will serve as a backup. The Mishna presents numerous cases in which the laws of offering sacrifices outside the Temple do not apply - either because of the type of offering (one that is not brought inside the Temple) or because of the animal itself (a disqualified animal), or because the item is not meant to be offered at all (such as edible portion of a sacrifice). Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the rabbis in three cases where the item will eventually be permitted to be placed on the altar.  The Mishna also provides a historical overview: When were sacrifices permitted to be offered outside the Temple (on bamot), and when were they prohibited? What were the laws governing each period - both when bamot were allowed and when they were forbidden? And during the time when bamot were permitted, which sacrifices could be offered anywhere?  

  The rabbis and Rabbi Elazar disagree about a case involving liability for performing water libations outside the Temple. Three amoraim debate the precise scenario in which they disagree and the underlying basis of their dispute. According to Rav Papa, their disagreement stems from a debate - found in other sources as well - regarding whether libations accompanied sacrifices during the Israelites' time in the desert. This question has practical implications for whether libations were ever offered on private bamot, and whether such libations required sanctified vessels. That, in turn, affects whether one would be liable for performing a libation outside the Temple when it was not placed in a sanctified vessel. Rabbi Nechemia maintains that one is liable for offering the remainder of the blood outside. Rabbi Yochanan explains that this view is rooted in Rabbi Nechemia's position that the pouring of the leftover blood is an essential component of the sacrificial rite. A challenge is raised from a baraita in which Rabbi Nechemia debates Rabbi Akiva on this very issue, but the contradiction is ultimately resolved. The sugya then analyzes liability for offering a bird sacrifice outside the Temple: does liability depend on whether the bird was slaughtered (shechita) or melika was performed inside or outside? All four possible combinations are examined. Rabbi Shimon disputes one of the rabbis' rulings, but it is initially unclear what aspect of their position he rejects. After systematically eliminating all possibilities, the Gemara proposes three explanations - either expanding the Mishna to include another case or revising the formulation of Rabbi Shimon's statement as it appears there.  

Study Guide A third answer is introduced to resolve the contradiction between Rabbi Elazar's ruling in the Mishna concerning the incense and Rav's statement about Rabbi Elazar's position in a braita. The second answer,Abaye's, had been rejected earlier, but Rav Ashi reinstates it by resolving the difficulty raised against it. The Gemara asks: If part of a sacrificial item is missing after it has already been taken out of the Temple courtyard, is one liable for offering the remainder outside? Three sources are brought to address this question, but each is ultimately rejected. If the fatty portions of a peace offering are burned outside together with the meat, one is liable, even though the meat should theoretically constitute a barrier (chatzitza). The Gemara offers three explanations for why it is not considered a chatzitza in this case. If the kometz was never taken from a meal offering, one is not liable for offering the entire mixture outside, since such an act would not fulfill the mitzvah of offering a mincha even inside the Temple. However, if the kometz was taken and then returned to the rest of the mincha, one would be liable for burning the entire mixture outside. The Gemara asks: why is the kometz not nullified in the remainder? A meal offering is brought through the burning of both the kometz and the frankincense. If only one of these is burned outside, the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar again disagree about liability, since the act is only partial. Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha asks whether burning the kometz permits half of the remainder to be eaten by the priest, or whether it merely weakens the prohibition on the remainder. The Gemara first analyzes according to whose view the question is posed, and then leaves the matter unresolved. One who sprinkles part of the blood outside is liable, even according to Rabbi Elazar, consistent with his position regarding the Yom Kippur goat in a case where the blood spills midway through the sprinklings of blood. Rabbi Elazar also rules that one who pours the water libation outside the Temple on Sukkot is liable. Rabbi Yochanan cites Rabbi Menachem Yodafa, who explains that Rabbi Elazar must follow the view of his teacher, Rabbi Akiva, who holds that the water libation on Sukkot is a Torah obligation derived from the laws of wine libations. However, Reish Lakish raises three objections to this explanation.

It is forbidden to offer any sacrificial item outside the Azara. This prohibition applies both to valid offerings and to offerings that became invalid in the kodesh—meaning either after they were brought into the Azara or after they were slaughtered. A braita derives the various valid and invalid items for which one is liable if offered outside the Azara from derashot on the verses in Vayikra 19:8–9. The Mishna rules that if one offers outside the Temple an olive‑bulk composed of a combination of meat and imurim (the fatty portions burned on the altar) of a burnt offering, one is liable. This implies that in the case of a peace offering, the two would not combine, since the meat is designated for consumption while the imurim are designated for burning. Although this inference is supported by Tosefta Meila 1:15, that Tosefta appears to contradict a Mishna in Meila 15b. The Tosefta states that in a burnt offering, the meat and imurim combine for pigul, notar, and impurity, whereas the Mishna states that they combine for pigul and notar in all types of offerings, not only burnt offerings. The Gemara resolves these contradictions by explaining that the terms pigul and notar refer to different cases in each source. The distinction regarding pigul is between (1) eating pigul and (2) having a pigul thought concerning eating or burning the combined olive‑bulk. The distinction regarding notar is between (1) eating leftover meat and imurim after their designated time and (2) a case where parts of an animal (a combined olive‑bulk of meat and imurim) remained from an animal that had been lost before the blood was sprinkled. Since in a peace offering the meat and imurim are destined for different places - human consumption and the altar - they cannot combine in situations where the law depends on their being in the same place (such as pigul thought or leftover parts from before the sprinkling of the blood). However, they can combine in a case involving the eating of disqualified parts. This interpretation of the Tosefta aligns with the view of Rabbi Yehoshua, who discusses a case in which only an olive‑bulk of the animal remains before the sprinkling of the blood. Items that are entirely burned on the altar - such as the kometz, frankincense, the mincha of the priests, and similar offerings - also incur liability if offered outside. However, there is a dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar regarding whether liability applies for offering merely an olive‑bulk or only when the entire item is burned outside. A braita is then cited concerning the requisite amounts for liability when offering a incense outside and for burning incense inside. Initially, a question is raised about the incense and the meaning of the braita. After Rabbi Zeira resolves the question, he raises a further difficulty based on a statement of Rav regarding Rabbi Elazar's opinion about the required amount for liability when offering incense outside the Temple. Rava and Abaye each propose solutions, but both are ultimately rejected.

Study Guide

What is the source for the opinion of the rabbis in the Mishna that one who slaughters outside and then offers it outside is liable? Three possible derivations are presented, and the Gemara raises difficulties with the different possibilities. What is the source for the law in an upcoming Mishna that one who sprinkles the blood outside the Temple is liable? Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael each derive it from different verses. The Gemara then asks: what does each of them learn from the verse that the other used for this prohibition? What is the source for the law in an upcoming Mishna that one who takes a kometz (a handful of a meal offering) or one who accepts the blood outside is not liable? The Gemara demonstrates that there is no basis to assume liability and explicitly rejects a suggestion that there might be reason to think otherwise. The verse forbidding slaughter outside includes three distinct phrases that specify where the prohibition applies and where it does not. What is derived from the use of all three? Ulla and Rava disagree about whether one is liable if they slaughter on the roof of the Heichal, which is dependent on how these phrases are understood. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish dispute whether one is liable nowadays if one slaughters outside the area where the Azara once stood. Their debate hinges on whether the sanctity of the First Temple remains in effect or whether it was nullified with the Temple's destruction.

Since Rabbi Shimon holds that one becomes impure only through direct involvement in the burning of the bulls and goats, the Gemara asks how he interprets the verse "outside the camp" in the context of the Yom Kippur offerings. He applies it to a gezeira shava linking these offerings to the para aduma, establishing that they must be burned outside all three camps and specifically east of Jerusalem. The rabbis, however, reject this comparison and distinguish between the two burning sites: the para aduma was burned to the east, whereas the sin offerings of Yom Kippur were burned to the north of Jerusalem. The Mishna then turns to the laws of slaughtering and offering sacrifices outside the Temple. The tanna kama rules that one who both slaughters and offers outside is liable for each act, while Rabbi Yosei HaGelili exempts a case in which both actions occur outside, since the offering was already invalidated by the improper slaughter and the subsequent offering does not constitute a transgression. The rabbis respond that even an offering slaughtered properly inside becomes invalid once taken outside, yet the prohibition of offering it outside still applies. The Mishna continues with the laws of eating sacrificial meat while impure: an impure person is liable whether he eats pure or impure sacrificial meat, though Rabbi Yosei HaGelili again exempts an impure person who eats impure meat, arguing that he consumed something already disqualified. The rabbis counter that even pure meat becomes impure upon contact with the impure person before it is eaten. The Gemara seeks the scriptural sources for both the punishment and the warning associated with slaughtering and offering outside. The punishment for both acts is explicit, and the warning for offering outsideis derived from Devarim 12:13, "Beware lest you offer your burnt offerings." The warning for slaughtering outside, however, is not clearly stated, and the Gemara explores four possible verses as its source, rejecting the first two and concluding with two possibilities.

Two additional questions are raised regarding the impurity status of those who handle the bull and goat offerings whose bodies are burned outside Jerusalem, but neither question receives a definitive answer. Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about the impurity of the scapegoat (se'ir la'azazel) that is sent off a cliff on Yom Kippur. While both sides agree that the red heifer and the bulls and goats burned outside Jerusalem impart impurity to food and drink, they dispute whether the scapegoat does the same. According to the rabbis, since the scapegoat is a live animal - and live animals generally do not become impure or transmit impurity - it does not impart impurity in this case either, even though the person who sends it off does become impure. Rabbi Meir, however, maintains that the scapegoat does transmit impurity, because anything destined to eventually acquire a severe level of impurity (i.e., the ability to transmit impurity to humans) already imparts impurity to food and drink even before reaching that stage. The rabbis' position is challenged based on a braita from the school of Rabbi Yishmael, who discusses a concept similar to Rabbi Meir's in the context of the carcass of a kosher bird. Since the bird will eventually attain a severe level of impurity (when someone eats it), it already imparts impurity to food and drink beforehand. If the rabbis agree with Rabbi Yishmael, then this principle should apply to the scapegoat as well. But if they do not follow Rabbi Yishmael, then the red heifer and the bulls and goats burned outside the Temple should likewise not impart impurity to food and drink. Rav Dimi resolves this by explaining Rabbi Yishmael's view in a way that allows the rabbis to accept his principle while still excluding the scapegoat. Although items destined to eventually reach a severe level of impurity can already transmit impurity to food and drink, this applies only to items that are generally subject to impurity - namely, dead animals. It does not extend to live animals, such as the scapegoat. Two questions are raised regarding Rabbi Yishmael's principle that an item destined to eventually contract a severe level of impurity can already transmit impurity to food and drink. How do we define the phrase "they will ultimately contract severe impurity"? If an additional action is required before the item reaches that stage, this may prevent it from transmitting impurity, since it is still one step removed from becoming fully impure. The questions, therefore, focus on what qualifies as a "missing action." Would the need to remove the item from the Azara count as such an action? What about the case of a kosher bird's carcass held in one's hand, the size of an olive, that is on the verge of being eaten? Another issue discussed is whether this type of impurity renders food and drink a first-degree impurity or only a second-degree impurity.