Menachot 60 - March 12, 23 Adar

Rabbi Shimon derives from the words "et hamincha" that many additional menachot require hagasha (bringing the offering to the altar). However, he uses three other specific exclusions from the verse to exempt certain offerings: The two loaves and showbread: Excluded from the word "m'eleh" (from these), as these are not burned on the altar. The mincha of libations: Excluded from "v'hikriva" (and he shall bring it), as these offerings accompany animal sacrifices. Voluntary offerings of kohanim and the kohen gadol's griddle cakes: Excluded from "v'higisha" (and he shall bring it near), as these are burned entirely and no portion is given to the priests. The Mishna continues by categorizing sacrifices: those that require waving (tenufa) but not hagasha, those that require both, and those that require neither. The Gemara brings the biblical sources for the various sacrifices that require waving. Notably, waving can be performed even on the east side of the Temple courtyard. The Gemara questions why this differs from hagasha, which must be performed specifically at the southwest corner of the altar. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and Rabbi Yehuda each utilize a different verse to derive the source for the waving of the bikkurim. Why was only Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov mentioned in the Mishna? Two answers are suggested. Waving is a collaborative act performed by both the kohen and the owner of the sacrifice. The Gemara identifies the source for this joint action. However, an exception exists: if the owner is a woman, waving is still required, but the woman herself does not perform the act. The Gemara derives the source for this specific exemption. Converts are freed Caananite slaves are obligated in waving, as is derived from "hamakriv," the one who offers the sacrifice.

Which types of meal offerings require hagasha – to be brought to the southwestern corner of the altar? From where do we derive which ones are including in this category? Are they derived by logical arguments or by drashot from the verses?

Study Guide The Mishna discusses the classification of the various meal offerings based on their components, examining which offerings require both oil and frankincense, which require only one of them, and which require neither. To clarify the source of these laws, the Gemara cites a braita that derives the various cases where oil, frankincense, or both are excluded from the verses concerning the Omer offering (the meal offering of the first fruits). During the analysis of the braita, the Gemara analyzes the choice of exclusions and questions why the Midrash focused specifically on the cases mentioned in the braita rather than excluding the law of the Priestly meal offering (minchat kohanim) instead. The Mishna rules that one who adds both oil and frankincense to a sinner's meal offering transgresses two negative prohibitions. However, there is a difference between adding oil and frankincense. If one adds oil, the offering is disqualified as it cannot be removed, but if one adds frankincense, it is not disqualified as it can be removed. Rav bar Rav Huna asks about frankincense that is crushed into small pieces that cannot be removed: is the offering disqualified, as it would be with oil, or is the issue with oil specifically that it is absorbed, whereas this frankincense is not absorbed into the mincha? Three attempts are brought to answer the question. After rejecting the first two, the third leads to the conclusion that it is disqualified.

The verse in Vayikra 2:12 regarding the unique case where one can bring leaven and honey to the Temple on Shavuot uses the phrase "As an offering of the first produce you can offer them." Rabbi Elazar derived that the word "them" is exclusionary. It means that only regarding the two loaves and the bikkurim the ramp of the altar is considered like the altar (as derived from the words following that phrase). Items that came from an item that was burned on the altar are forbidden to be burned on the altar, but can be brought onto the ramp. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with him and forbids even those items to be brought on the ramp. He must have a different drasha on the word "them." To explain his reading of the verse, the Gemara quotes a braita which derives from "them" that even the community cannot bring two loaves as a voluntary sacrifice. The Gemara brings a contradictory braita that seems to say that the two loaves can be brought as a voluntary offering, but this understanding is ultimately rejected. Rami bar Hama asked Rav Chisda whether the words "you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire" (Vayikra 2:11) only excludes items from which part of it was burned on the altar, or does it exclude any item that is considered a korban (offering) but was not meant to be burned on the altar, such as a bird sin offering or the oil of the leper. Rav Chisda responded that this is a tannaitic debate between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva. A drasha on the words "because all leaven and all honey" teaches that one is liable for offering even a small amount and even in a mixture. Rava and Abaye disagree about what is meant by a "small amount." Abaye says it is half an olive-bulk, while Rava holds it is half a handful. Their difference of opinion derives from whether they hold a handful needs to be at least the size of two olives and is it only considered a halakhically significant burning on the altar if the item burned is the size of an olive (Rava), or if the handful can be less than two olives and burning less than one olive is considered halakhically significant (Abaye). If one offered leavened dough and honey together on the altar, how many sets of lashes (if any) would one receive? Rava holds that one would receive four sets - one for leaven, one for honey, one for a mixture with leaven, and one for a mixture with honey. Abaye explains that this is a "lav shebikhlalot" - a negative prohibition including many prohibitions - and one does not receive lashes for this type of negative prohibition. Some explain Abaye to be saying that there would be no sets of lashes for this action, while others explain that one would receive lashes for the leaven and the honey but not for the mixture.

Rabbi Ami rules that one is liable for placing a leavening agent onto a meal offering dough and leaving it to leaven on its own, just as one is liable on Shabbat for an act of cooking in the same manner. The Gemara questions this, noting Rabbi Yochanan's ruling that on Shabbat, one who places meat on coals is generally only liable if they actively turn the meat. Rava explains that Rabbi Ami's comparison means one is liable for the result even without active intervention, provided the leavening reaches a certain minimum level. The Gemara delves into Rabbi Yochanan's statement regarding turning the meat and establishes the case as one where the meat would not cook on both sides to the minimum level of ben Drosai (1/3 cooked) if not turned. Rava adds that if a portion the size of a fig-bulk were cooked fully on one side, in one place, one would be liable. A Mishna regarding building on Shabbat is brought as a difficulty for Rava's statement, but the challenge is ultimately rejected. Some have a version where Rava said that even if not in one place, and the Mishna is brought to support, but the support is rejected. A braita derives from Vayikra 2:11 that the leavening prohibition applies to the entire mincha, not just the kometz burned on the altar. However, it also derives that this applies only to a valid offering, not a disqualified one. This leads to two unresolved inquiries. Rav Papa asks: if one leavened a dough, took it outside the Temple courtyard, and then leavened it further, is there liability for the second stage? Or, is removing it not considered a disqualification since it was already leavened and invalid? Rav Meri asks if one is liable for leavening an offering already on top of the altar, or if the act of "bringing" is considered complete at that point. The Gemara discusses which additional offerings are included in the prohibition. According to a corrected version, Rabbi Yosi haGelili includes the showbread, while Rabbi Akiva includes the mincha libation accompanying sacrifices. This dispute hinges on whether dry-measure vessels possess the inherent sanctity to disqualify an offering if it leavens within them. This is linked to a debate between Rabbi Yoshiya and Rabbi Yonatan regarding the sanctification of liquid versus dry-measure vessels in the Temple. The Torah prohibits offering leaven or honey as a fire-offering, and Vayikra 2:11 further teaches that leftovers of various offerings cannot be offered on the altar if a portion has already been burned. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree on whether one is liable for offering these prohibited substances on the ramp (kevesh) of the altar.

The word "oto" (it) in the verse describing the sin offering of the Nasi, "and he slaughters it in the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered" (Vayikra 4:24), is seemingly redundant. The Gemara offers four possible suggestions for what this word is intended to teach. The first suggestion is that the word excludes a different goat sin offering from the requirement of being slaughtered in the north - specifically, the goat offerings brought by the tribal leaders during the consecration of the Tabernacle. This is rejected because there is no logical reason to assume those goats would have required slaughter in the north, making an exclusionary verse unnecessary. The second suggestion is that the word teaches that while the animal must be in the north during slaughter, the slaughterer does not. However, this is initially rejected because Rabbi Achiya derives this law from a different source. The third suggestion is that only animals require slaughter in the north, excluding bird offerings. This is also rejected because birds do not require a knife for their preparation; since their procedure is entirely different, there is no reason to think they would have been subject to the northern requirement. The final suggestion is that the Pesach offering does not need to be performed in the north. This is rejected because one would not logically derive rules for lower-level sanctity offerings, such as the Pesach, from higher-level sanctity offerings that require the north. In conclusion, the Gemara returns to the second answer and explains Rabbi Achiya's source differently. Regarding leavening, one is obligated if one continues any part of the leavening process of a meal offering, even if the dough had already leavened. An example of this is baking a dough that was already leavened during the kneading stage. Rav Papa adds that a person who bakes such dough is liable for two sets of lashes because the act of baking also serves as the final stage of shaping the dough. Although a difficulty is raised from a braita, the Gemara provides a resolution. For the sake of comparison, a braita is brought regarding a firstborn animal that has a blood-related ailment requiring bloodletting. Since this animal is already considered blemished, the question arises whether it is permitted to inflict a further blemish during the procedure. Rabbi Meir, the rabbis, Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Yehuda each hold different positions on this issue. The Gemara focuses specifically on the first two opinions regarding whether this is legally defined as inflicting a blemish on an already blemished animal. This topic is compared to the obligation for continuing the leavening process through a new action or to the prohibition of castrating an animal that is already castrated. In those instances, there is no debate because the biblical verses indicate liability for each individual action. However, regarding a blemished animal, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis each derive their opinions from different words in the verse, leading them to their respective conclusions.

There is a debate regarding whether apple juice can be used to leaven the dough for the two mincha offerings that are required to be chametz. In Mishna Terumot 10:2, it is explained that apples of teruma that leaven a dough are significant and cannot be nullified; this is because leavening is considered a transformative action that fundamentally alters the dough. While it may initially appear that the Mishna supports the position that apple juice is a valid leavening agent for these offerings, the text can also be reconciled with the opposing view. One can distinguish between different levels of leavening, suggesting that the "leavening" mentioned in the Mishna may be chametz nukshe, which does not satisfy the specific leavening requirements for the mincha offerings. Rabbi Ila and Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi debate whether the mincha of a sinner, which is offered without oil, may contain water. Initially, the Gemara assumes the root of this debate is whether we determine the measurement of an item that has changed form based on its original state or its current state. If we follow the current size, water may be added because the kometz (handful) is measured based on the substance in its present form. However, if it must be measured by its original size, adding water would mean the handful no longer contains the required amount of flour, as the volume has been altered by the liquid. Ultimately, the Gemara rejects this explanation and concludes that both sages agree items are measured by their current state; their actual debate concerns how to interpret the requirement for a sinner's mincha to be "dry"—whether this means it must be completely dry of all liquid, or merely dry of oil. The Gemara continues to delve into whether the halakhic measurements of items that have changed in size are determined by their present state or their original state. A Mishna in Uktzin 2:8 is cited regarding the laws of ritual impurity (tumah) for a piece of meat that has shrunk to less than the size of an egg (kebeitzah)—the minimum volume required to transmit impurity. Two groups of sages disagree over the correct version of this Mishna: one asserting that we assess the item based on its original size, and the other maintaining we assess it by its current size. The Gemara raises a difficulty against the opinion that items are measured by their original size; specifically, in a case where meat expanded to exceed the size of an egg, it is ruled to transmit impurity. This challenge is resolved by explaining that the law in that specific source is Rabbinic in nature, rather than a Torah law. A second difficulty is raised from a braita discussing the opposite case: if meat shrinks below the required volume, it no longer transmits impurity. However, Raba rejects this proof, explaining that all would agree an item cannot transmit impurity if its current state is too small. He clarifies that the sages were only stringent in cases where an item was originally too small but later expanded to the requisite volume. The true point of disagreement, according to Raba, is a case where the item originally met the requirement, shrunk, and then expanded again. The question is whether the item was "rejected" (nidcheh) during its middle stage - thereby losing its ability to transfer impurity permanently - or if it regains its ability to transmit impurity upon re-expanding. A difficulty is then raised against the position that it remains pure even after re-expanding. A challenge from Tosefta Terumot 4:2 is brought against Raba's premise that everyone agrees a shrunken item is measured by its current state. This challenge involves the laws of separating tithes from fresh figs for dried ones; however, the difficulty is ultimately resolved by explaining that the case does not concern standard tithes, but rather terumat ma'aser (the tithe of the tithe). Unlike regular ma'aser, terumat ma'aser does not require an exact measurement, and it is considered preferable to err on the side of generosity by giving more to the Kohen.