Bekhorot 10 - September 28, 17 Tishrei

The Mishna lists animals that cannot be used for redemption, including a calf, an undomesticated animal, a slaughtered or treifa animal, a hybrid (kilayim), or a koy (a creature of doubtful status between a domesticated and undomesticated animal). Rabbi Eliezer permits redemption using a hybrid because it is nevertheless a lamb (born to two animals in the sheep family), but forbids a koy. The Gemara explains that the Mishna follows Ben Bag Bag, who derives from a textual comparison (gezeira shava) of the word seh from the Paschal sacrifice that only a standard, kosher lamb or goat fulfills the obligation. Four questions are asked regarding animals that may or may not be used to redeem a firstborn donkey. The first question: may a fetus that was in the womb of its mother when she was slaughtered (ben pekua) be used? At first, the Gemara assesses that the question is according to the Sages' position regarding a ben pekua, and not Rabbi Meir's. Mar Zutra holds it is invalid because it does not require ritual slaughter, and therefore it is considered equivalent to a slaughtered animal. Rav Ashi permits it because the Torah repeats the word tifdeh (redeem) to include all kosher sheep. The second question: can an animal that does not resemble its mother (nidmeh) be used for redemption? At first, the Gemara assesses that the question is according to the Sages' position and not Rabbi Eliezer's, since it is clear he would permit it, given that even kilayim is permitted for use. Two sources are brought to answer the question, but in the end, each source is inconclusive. The third question: may consecrated animals that became blemished (pesulei hamukdashin) be used to redeem a firstborn donkey? Rav Mari son of Rav Kahana proves from the verse comparing them to a gazelle and a deer (k'tzvi v'ka'ayal) that just as a gazelle or deer cannot be used to redeem a firstborn donkey, blemished consecrated animals likewise cannot be used. The final question: may one use an animal that possesses Sabbatical year sanctity for redemption? One clearly cannot use it to redeem a definite firstborn donkey, as the Torah specifies that Sabbatical produce is designated "for eating" (l'okhla) and not for commerce (l'skhora). To answer the question, a statement of Rav Chisda is brought showing that one may use a Sabbatical year animal to redeem a doubtful firstborn donkey, according to Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Chisda ruled on other issues regarding animals with the sanctity of the Sabbatical year—that they are exempt from firstborn status and obligated in priestly gifts. A difficulty is raised from a braita regarding halla, but it is resolved. If an Israelite gives an unredeemed firstborn donkey to a kohen, the kohen is not permitted to keep it until a lamb is designated in its place immediately, as kohanim were suspected of taking firstborn donkeys without properly redeeming them. If one designates a lamb for redemption and the lamb dies, Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages dispute who bears responsibility. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the owner remains responsible to provide another lamb (comparing it to redemption of a firstborn son, pidyon haben), whereas the Sages hold that the owner is free of responsibility (comparing it to the redemption of second tithe, ma'aser sheni). Testimony from Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Tzadok confirms the Sages' view that the kohen receives nothing if the designated redemption dies before reaching him. Rav Yosef and Rava subsequently explain the source for Rabbi Eliezer's position.

How much must one give to redeem a firstborn donkey? Rabbi Yosi bar Yehuda requires at least one shekel, whereas the Sages hold that any minimal amount is valid for redemption. Rav Yosef explained that the value of "any minimal amount" can even be a lamb worth a sixth of a zuz. However, in the story involving Rabbi Yehuda Nesia, Rabbi Tarfon presents three options—a generous eye, a stingy eye, and an average eye—ranging between two to four zuzim. To resolve this contradiction, it is explained that Rabbi Tarfon's ruling applies when one comes to consult, but if one acts on their own, a sixth of a zuz is sufficient. Reish Lakish rules that if the owner does not have a lamb to redeem it with, he may redeem it with its financial equivalent, as the Torah did not specify "a lamb" to be stringent upon him, but rather to be lenient. Initially, it was thought that he ruled in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, but because it is unreasonable to say he ruled like him (for two distinct reasons), his ruling is ultimately explained according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. If a person redeems someone else's firstborn donkey, the redemption is valid. However, the Gemara asks: to whom does the donkey belong after redemption—is it similar to consecrated property (hekdesh) and thus belongs to the redeemer, or not? This question is answered from the law stating that a thief who steals someone else's firstborn donkey pays double damages to the owner, showing that it is not treated as hekdesh. An Israelite who has ten doubtful firstborn donkeys in his house designates ten lambs for them, tithes them as animal tithe (ma'aser behema), and retains them for himself, since due to the doubt he is not obligated to give them to a kohen. The same applies to an Israelite who inherited ten definite firstborn donkeys from his maternal grandfather who was a kohen, who had inherited them from his maternal grandfather who was an Israelite, or untithed produce under similar circumstances, he sets aside the tithes for them and they remain his. One who purchases untithed, smoothed produce from a non-Jew in the Land of Israel is obligated to tithe it, because a non-Jew's ownership in the Land of Israel does not exempt produce from tithes. Nevertheless, the tithes belong to him and he does not give them to a kohen, since he can say to the kohen: "My rights to this produce comes from the rights of a person with whom you have no legal claim." A contradictory source is brought, but it is resolved by differentiating between teruma gedola and teruma of maaser (that the Levite gives to a kohen). In explaining the words of the Mishna, the Gemara clarifies that from the moment the owner redeems the donkey for a lamb, it becomes the property of the kohen and stands in his domain, so that even if it dies in the house of the owner, the kohen can still derive benefit from the lamb.

Even though Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagree regarding whether a firstborn donkey (peter chamor) is forbidden for benefit, Rabba maintains that Rabbi Shimon, who permits benefit prior to redemption, agrees that if the donkey was not redeemed and its neck was broken, it becomes forbidden for benefit. Rabba derives this law via a gezeira shava comparing the term "breaking the neck" (arifah) used here to that of an egla arufa, which is forbidden for benefit once its neck is broken. Rabba attempts to prove his assertion from a braita concerning a dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Shimon over several items regarding susceptibility to food impurity, including a firstborn donkey. In that braita, Rabbi Shimon holds it is not susceptible to food impurity, which Rabba infers as evidence that it is forbidden for benefit after its neck is broken. However, Rabba's proof is rejected after two alternative explanations for the core debate in the braita are proposed, though ultimately both alternative interpretations are refuted as well. A further challenge is raised against Rabba from another braita, but this difficulty is successfully resolved. Rav Huna supported Rabba's ruling and cited two braitot to demonstrate that Rabbi Shimon considers the firstborn donkey forbidden for benefit after its neck is broken, yet both proofs are shown to be inconclusive. The Gemara then introduces a different version regarding how Rav Nachman's opinion was framed, connecting it directly to a Mishna that discusses betrothing a woman with a firstborn donkey. An alternative version of the sugya pertaining to that Mishna is presented as well. The opinion of Rabbi Yochanan (and some say Rabbi Elazar) is brought: he disagrees with Rabba and Rav Huna, holding that according to Rabbi Shimon, the donkey remains permitted for benefit even after its neck has been broken. Resh Lakish, however, agrees with the position of Rabba and Rav Huna.

Does Rabbi Shimon require an offspring to resemble its mother in its head and most of its body (ראשו ורובו) to be permitted for consumption, or does his requirement of its head and most of its body apply exclusively to firstborn (bekhorah) status? Three braitot are brought to answer this question, but all are deemed inconclusive. Is donkey urine permitted or forbidden? While horse and camel urine are thin and clearly just excreted water, donkey urine is thick and resembles milk. Is it absorbed and derived from the animal's body (and thus forbidden as an excretion of a non-kosher animal), or is it merely ingested water that became cloudy from body heat? Rav Sheshet proves from our Mishna ("that which emerges from the non-kosher is non-kosher") that donkey urine is forbidden because it derives from a non-kosher species. There are two versions of Rav Sheshet's proof and how it is derived from the Mishna, with potential halakhic ramifications between the two versions. A difficulty is raised against Rav Sheshet's opinion from a braita permitting honey—even though it is produced in the body of a non-kosher creature—as it comes from something outside the body. To resolve this, it is explained that Rav Sheshet follows a different tanna who permits honey because it is derived from a drasha in the Torah and is an exception to the rule, not the rule. Fallow deer secretions (chalei d'yachmurta) and the skin/placenta covering a donkey foal's face (or haba k'neged panav) are permitted as mere waste matter (pirsha). If a non-kosher fish swallows a kosher fish, the swallowed kosher fish is permitted for consumption. However, if a kosher fish swallows a non-kosher fish, the non-kosher fish remains forbidden because it is not the product of the kosher fish's growth. If one did not witness the swallowing, one might assume a non-kosher fish found inside a kosher fish was actually birthed by it (as non-kosher fish give birth to live young, while kosher fish lay eggs). This last point raises a difficulty, which four answers are brought to resolve.

Following the dispute between the tanna of our Mishna and Rabbi Yosi HaGelili, where each derived from a different verse the exemption from firstborn status for an animal that gave birth to an offspring resembling a different species, the Gemara clarifies what Rabbi Yosi HaGelili derives from the proof-verses of our tanna ("peter hamor" twice). Rabbi Yosi HaGelili derives from there the source for exempting horses and camels from firstborn status. Rav Achai raises a difficulty against his derivation, but the Gemara answers his objection. Our tanna derives this rule (exempting the firstborn of horses and camels) from a general rule and a detail (klal u'phrat): "All your livestock you shall designate as male" is a general rule, "ox and sheep and donkey" is a detail, and a general rule includes only that which is in the detail; therefore, firstborn laws apply only to a donkey and not to other non-kosher animals. The Gemara discusses a series of uncertainties regarding an animal that gave birth to a different species that possesses some of the mother's features: regarding a cow that gave birth to a donkey-like offspring, do we judge it like a goat that gave birth to a sheep-like offspring that looks somewhat like its mother, which is subject to firstborn status because both are subject to firstborn status, or perhaps here the laws are different because one is sanctified with intrinsic holiness (kedushat haguf) and the other with monetary value (kedushat damim), and one is kosher while the other is not? Subsequently, the Gemara inquires about a donkey that gave birth to a horse-like offspring and a cow that gave birth to a horse-like offspring. From the braitot, the Gemara proves that the obligation when there are partial features was stated regarding a cow that gave birth to a donkey-like offspring, but it remains unclear regarding the other questions. Regarding eating, the Mishna clarifies the principle that what emerges from the non-kosher is non-kosher, and it is not judged according to the offspring's appearance but rather according to its mother - this rule was intended to remember the law. The source showing that a kosher animal born from a non-kosher mother is forbidden to be eaten is from the verse "These you shall not eat," whereas a non-kosher offspring born from a kosher mother is permitted, as it is said, "the camel... it is non-kosher" - it is non-kosher, but a non-kosher born from a kosher mother is kosher. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and forbids a non-kosher animal born from a kosher mother based on the repetition of the word "camel" in Leviticus and Deuteronomy, and he derives the prohibition of milk from a non-kosher animal from the phrase "et ha-gamal" (the camel), whereas the Sages forbid milk from "camel" "camel" and do not derive laws from the word "et." To show that there are those who derive laws from the word, et, the Gemara brings the position  of Shimon HaAmsoni, who derives laws from that word, but changed his position when he reached "You shall fear the Lord (et Hashem) your God," until Rabbi Akiva came and taught that it serves to include Torah scholars. The Gemara clarifies why a special verse was needed to forbid the milk of a non-kosher animal and presents two possible explanations. Afterwards, it discusses the source for permitting the milk of a kosher animal and presents six proofs, of which three are rejected. The Gemara cites a braita stating that a sheep that gave birth to a goat-like offspring or a goat that gave birth to a sheep-like offspring is exempt from firstborn status unless it possesses some of the mother's features, and Rabbi Shimon disagrees, maintaining that it is not obligated until its head and most of its body resemble its mother. The Gemara concludes with the question: Does Rabbi Shimon require its head and most of its body to resemble its mother regarding the prohibition of eating as well?

The Gemara continues analyzing the dispute regarding whether firstborns were sanctified in the desert. According to Reish Lakish, they were not sanctified until entering the Land, whereas Rabbi Yochanan holds they were already sanctified in the wilderness. Rabbi Eleazar explains that Rabbi Yochanan derived his position from the verse "לי יהיו" ("they shall be Mine") – b'havayatan yehu, meaning that their holiness remains intact and does not lapse. Rabbi Yochanan explains the verse "והיה כי יביאך... והעברת" in accordance with the exposition of the Academy of Rabbi Yishmael: perform this mitzva so that you will inherit and enter the Land. Rav Mordechai notes to Rav Ashi that in his academy the dispute was taught with reversed attributions - Rabbi Yochanan said they were not sanctified (meaning they did not need to be sanctified anew), while Reish Lakish said they were sanctified. Rav Ashi clarifies that the underlying explanatory principle is the exact same, but a person is obligated to speak in the language of his teacher. Two questions are asked by the officer Quntroqos to Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai. First, regarding the discrepancy between the detailed count of Levites (22,300) and their total sum (22,000), Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai explains that those additional 300 Levites were firstborns themselves, and a firstborn cannot discharge the firstborn obligation of another, as Abaye adds that it suffices for a firstborn to discharge his own personal holiness. Second, regarding the discrepancy between the silver collected (half a shekel for 601,550 men, equaling 201 kikar and 11 maneh) and the silver gathered and accounted for (100 kikar and 1,775 shekels, which equals 101 kikar and 11 maneh), Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai responds that Moses our teacher was a trustworthy treasurer and skilled calculator, and that the sanctuary maneh was doubled. After two failed attempts, Rav Chisda proves from a verse in Ezekiel that the sanctuary maneh was indeed doubled, and the Gemara establishes three principles regarding measures: additions may be made to measurements, additions cannot exceed a sixth, and this sixth is calculated from the outside. Rabbi Chanina relates three questions he asked Rabbi Eliezer in the Great Academy. Regarding why firstborn donkeys were singled out for redemption over horses or camels, Rabbi Eliezer explains that it is a divine decree (gezeirat hakatav), and also because donkeys assisted Israel during the Exodus, as every Israelite brought out ninety loaded Libyan donkeys with the silver and gold of Egypt. Regarding the place names Rephidim and Shittim, Rabbi Eliezer holds that they are literal place names, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua interprets them homiletically as allusions to behavior: Rephidim signifies that they loosened their grasp on Torah study, and Shittim signifies that they engaged in acts of folly. The Mishna rules that a cow giving birth to an offspring resembling a donkey, or a donkey giving birth to an offspring resembling a horse, is exempt from bekhora, as the repetition of the words "peter chamor" teaches that both the mother and offspring must be donkeys. Regarding consumption, an offspring born of a kosher animal that resembles an non-kosher animal is permitted to be eaten, while an offspring born of a non-kosher animal that resembles a kosher animal is forbidden, based on the principle that whatever emerges from the non-kosher is not kosher, and whatever emerges from the kosher is kosher. The Gemara compares our Mishna to a Mishna dealing with a ewe that gave birth to an offspring resembling a goat. Rav Yehuda derives from the verse "אך בכור שור..." that both parent and offspring must be of the same species, instead of using the verse in our Mishna. The Gemara explains the dispute between the tanna of our Mishna and Rabbi Yose HaGelili (upon whose view Rav Yehuda relied) regarding whether the textual derivations apply to monetary consecration (kedushat damim) and from there we learn to inherent sanctity (kedushat haguf) or the reverse. What does each do with the verse of the other?

The Mishna rules that Kohanim and Levites are exempt from bekhora (firstborn male donkeys) based on a kal v'chomer: if they exempted the firstborns of Israelites in the desert, logic dictates that they exempt their own. The Gemara challenges the Mishna's premise as the Levites themselves did not exempt the donkeys of the Israelites – they themselves exempted the Israelite firstborn males, and their animals exempted the Israelite firstborn donkeys. Two answers are offered to resolve this question, by both Abaye and Rava. Abaye answers that the Mishna means the livestock of the Levites exempted their own livestock. Rava rejects Abaye's interpretation on two grounds: first, the Mishna uses the verb "they exempted", referring to the Levites themselves; second, if Abaye were correct, Levites' kosher firstborn animals should be exempt from bekhora also, yet a Mishna explicitly teaches that Kohanim and Levites are obligated in the firstborn of kosher animals and exempt only from redeeming their sons (pidyon haben) and firstborn donkey (peter chamor). Rava provides his own answer, explaining that the Levites exempted themselves (their human firstborns) via kal v'chomer from what transpired in the desert where the Levites exempted the Israelite firstborns. To derive their exemption from the firstborn donkey (peter chamor), the Gemara cites a verse equating human firstborns with impure animal firstborns ("האדם ואת בכור הבהמה הטמאה תפדה"), establishing that whoever is exempt from human firstborn is exempt from the redemption of the donkeys. Rav Safra raises four difficulties against both Abaye and Rava: if the exemption depends on the Levites' exchange in the desert, what about those who were not involved in the exemption, such as a Levite who did not own animals or was under a month old, or a female Levite, or Aharon? All difficulties are resolved. Three other questions are asked and answered, namely, the source for kohanim being included in this exemption, that this exemption applies for future generations, and that the redemption of a firstborn donkey in the desert was performed specifically with a lamb (seh) just as it is for future generations. Rav Chanina states that a single lamb belonging to a Levite exempted multiple firstborn donkeys of Israelites in the desert. Abaye attempts to prove this from the fact that Scripture notes how many excess human firstborns there were compared to Levites, but did not mention any excess firstborn animals. After rejecting Abaye's proof, the Gemara proves this from the precise phrasing "ואת בהמת הלוים תחת בהמתם" – "an animal (single) of the Levites in place of their (Israelites) animals (plural)", and Rava notes that this aligns with a Mishna ruling that one may redeem with a lamb multiple times, and the Gemara explains that Rabbi Chanina's statement was meant to give the reason for that Mishna. Rabbi Yochanan challenges Reish Lakish from two tannaitic sources, but both difficulties against Reish Lakish are resolved. An alternative version suggests that the second difficulty was brought by Reish Lakish to challenge Rabbi Yochanan's position. A third source is brought by the Gemara to prove Rabbi Yochanan's position, but Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak provides an alternative explanation of that source to reconcile it with Reish Lakish. Following a difficulty on this explanation, raised by Rav Papa, the Gemara is forced to slightly adjust Reish Lakish's view: it is clear that at the beginning of their stay in the desert, firstborns were sanctified; according to Reish Lakish, it was only after that specific event (the exchange of the firstborns for the Levites) that they ceased to sanctify them until entering the Land of Israel.