[25-406] FCC v. AT&T

Bondi v. Lau Justia · Docket · oyez.org Petitioner: Pamela Bondi, Attorney General.Respondent: Muk Choi Lau. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Muk Choi Lau, a native and citizen of China, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on September 7, 2007, after several years of traveling to the country as a nonimmigrant. On May 7, 2012, Lau was charged in New Jersey with third-degree trademark counterfeiting. While awaiting trial, he left the United States for a brief period. Upon returning on June 15, 2012, he presented himself at John F. Kennedy International Airport as a returning lawful permanent resident. However, because of his pending charge, immigration authorities declined to admit him outright and instead paroled him into the country pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Over a year later, in June 2013, Lau pleaded guilty to the counterfeiting charge and was sentenced to two years’ probation. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Lau in March 2014, charging him with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Lau argued that he should not have been treated as an arriving alien at the time of reentry and that he was eligible for a discretionary waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The immigration judge rejected both claims, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Lau petitioned for review, arguing primarily that DHS lacked clear and convincing evidence to treat him as an applicant for admission on reentry merely due to a then-pending charge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, holding that DHS erred in treating Lau as inadmissible based solely on unproven allegations at the time of reentry and granted his petition. The immigration judge ordered removal in 2018, and the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld that decision in 2021. The Second Circuit vacated the removal order in 2025 and remanded the case to terminate proceedings under the inadmissibility ground, reserving the possibility of future removal under a deportability provision. Question To remove a lawful permanent resident who committed an offense listed in Section 1182(a)(2) and was subsequently paroled into the United States, must the government prove that it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the offense at the time of the lawful permanent resident’s last reentry into the United States?

Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Petitioner: Federal Communications Commission, et al.Respondent: AT&T, Inc. . Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Between 2014 and 2019, AT&T operated a location-based services program in which it collected and shared its customers’ mobile location data with third-party service providers such as Life Alert and AAA. To provide this data, AT&T contracted with “location aggregators,” who in turn resold the data to service providers. AT&T required those providers to obtain customer consent for each location request and reviewed their procedures, but it did not directly verify customer consent before transferring data. In 2018, news reports began revealing that some service providers misused or failed to adequately protect customers’ location data. In response, AT&T halted access for those providers, and by March 2019, shuttered the entire location-data program. Prompted by these reports, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) initiated an investigation and in 2020 issued a Notice of Apparent Liability (NAL), proposing a $57 million fine for AT&T’s purported violations of Section 222 of the Communications Act of 1934 and corresponding FCC regulations. AT&T challenged the classification of location data as “customer proprietary network information” (CPNI), asserted it had acted reasonably, and raised constitutional objections. After reviewing AT&T’s written response, the FCC rejected its defenses and issued a forfeiture order. Significantly, the FCC imposed the fine without a hearing or trial; AT&T’s only opportunity to respond occurred through written submissions to the agency. AT&T paid the fine and petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review. The Fifth Circuit vacated the forfeiture order, holding that the FCC’s in-house enforcement process violated AT&T’s rights under Article III and the Seventh Amendment. Question Are provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 that govern the Federal Communications Commission’s assessment and enforcement of monetary forfeitures consistent with the Seventh Amendment and Article III?

T. M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation Justia · Docket · oyez.org Petitioner: T. M.Respondent: University of Maryland Medical System Corporation. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In March 2023, T.M., a woman with a rare medical condition that triggers psychosis upon consuming gluten, was involuntarily committed to Baltimore Washington Medical Center after an episode. Her treating psychiatrist sought and received state approval to forcibly administer antipsychotic medication; T.M. contested this but was unsuccessful in administrative proceedings. Independent psychiatrists later stated that T.M. no longer required inpatient care. To secure her release, T.M. and the hospital negotiated an oral agreement, which was formalized as a state court consent order. The order allowed her to leave the hospital on the condition that she comply with ongoing psychiatric treatment and medications, switch providers, and drop pending lawsuits. Her parents, J.M. and A.M., were also bound to notify authorities if she failed to comply. Ten days later, represented by new counsel, T.M. and her parents filed the present federal lawsuit claiming that the consent order was unconstitutional and entered under duress. They challenged the order as violating T.M.’s due process rights and sought declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating its enforcement. They did not request damages or challenge the initial commitment decisions. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the lawsuit. It held that T.M.’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents parties who lose in state courts from challenging injuries caused by state-court judgments, because they amounted to a request for federal review of a state court judgment. It also dismissed the parents’ claims for failure to state a constitutional violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that T.M. was a “state-court loser” seeking to undo a state judgment still reviewable in Maryland courts. Nonetheless, it remanded for the district court to modify T.M.’s dismissal to be without prejudice, due to lack of jurisdiction. Question Can the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents parties who lose in state courts from challenging injuries caused by state-court judgments, be triggered by a state-court decision that remains subject to further review in state court?

Sripetch v. SEC Justia · Docket · oyez.org Petitioner: Ongkaruck Sripetch.Respondent: Securities and Exchange Commission. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) From at least 2013 to 2019, Ongkaruck Sripetch participated in a series of fraudulent securities schemes involving at least 20 microcap, or “penny,” stock companies. Working alongside various associates and through multiple entities, Sripetch acquired discounted shares of small-cap companies and then secretly funded promotional campaigns to inflate their stock prices before selling his own holdings into the artificially heightened market—a practice known as stock scalping. He also engaged in unregistered sales of securities, most notably through control of a company called Abby Inc., and manipulated trading in another company, VMS Rehab Systems, through matched trades and wash trades designed to create the illusion of market activity. Later, he organized pump-and-dump schemes for Argus Worldwide stock, using matched trading to build trading volume before dumping shares after promotions without disclosing his intent to sell. In 2020, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a civil enforcement action against Sripetch and others. In 2023, Sripetch consented to a bifurcated judgment, agreeing to the SEC’s allegations for the purposes of remedies. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California found him liable for $2.25 million in disgorgement and over $1 million in interest. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the SEC may obtain disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing that investors suffered pecuniary harm, joining a circuit split on this question.   Question May the SEC seek equitable disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing investors suffered pecuniary harm?

Trump v. Barbara Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 1, 2026. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States.Respondent: Barbara. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Petitioners) Cecillia D. Wang (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On January 20, 2025, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order No. 14,160, titled “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship,” which declared that individuals born in the United States are not U.S. citizens at birth if their parents lack sufficient legal status. Specifically, the order directs federal agencies not to recognize citizenship claims for children born after February 20, 2025, if: (1) the mother was unlawfully present in the U.S. and the father was neither a U.S. citizen nor a lawful permanent resident (LPR), or (2) the mother’s presence in the U.S. was lawful but temporary and the father was not a U.S. citizen or LPR. The order was issued on the alleged basis that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause does not confer birthright citizenship on such children because they are not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States in the constitutional sense. Three families challenged the order on behalf of themselves and similarly situated individuals. One class representative is Barbara, a Honduran asylum applicant whose child is due in October 2025. Another is Susan, a Taiwanese citizen in the country on a student visa whose daughter was born in April 2025; her child’s passport application was in progress at the time of the suit. The third is Mark, a Brazilian applicant for permanent residence whose son was born in March 2025 and initially received a U.S. passport. These families filed suit under pseudonyms, alleging that the Executive Order unlawfully strips their children of citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a). They seek to preserve access to citizenship-related benefits including Social Security, SNAP, and Medicaid. The U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire issued a preliminary injunction and provisionally certified a nationwide class of children affected by the order. The court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional and statutory claims. That decision was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and before a ruling from that court, the Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment. Question Is a presidential executive order that denies U.S. birthright citizenship to children born in the United States because their parents are unlawfully present or in the country on temporary visas consistent with the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)?

Pitchford v. Cain Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 31, 2026. Petitioner: Terry Pitchford.Respondent: Burl Cain, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections. Advocates: Joseph J. Perkovich (for the Petitioner) Scott G. Stewart (for the Respondents) Emily M. Ferguson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Terry Pitchford was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for his involvement in the 2004 armed robbery and killing of Reuben Britt, a store owner in Grenada County, Mississippi. At the time of the crime, Pitchford was 18 years old. He confessed to participating in the robbery, although the fatal shot was fired by his accomplice. At Pitchford’s 2006 trial in the Grenada County Circuit Court, the jury was selected from a pool that included 36 white and five Black potential jurors. The prosecution used peremptory strikes to remove four of the five Black prospective jurors. Pitchford’s counsel raised a Batson objection, alleging that the strikes were racially discriminatory. The trial court found Pitchford had made a prima facie showing of discrimination and required the prosecution to provide race-neutral reasons for each strike. The prosecutor cited explanations such as the venirepersons’ criminal histories, perceived mental health issues, or similarities to the defendant. The trial judge accepted those explanations and allowed the strikes, ultimately empaneling a jury that included only one Black juror. Pitchford’s counsel sought to preserve Batson-related objections during a bench conference, emphasizing the racial composition of the jury and the county, but did not conduct a further comparative analysis or expressly argue that the prosecution’s stated reasons were pretextual. Pitchford’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Mississippi Supreme Court, which held that any pretext arguments had been waived for failure to raise them clearly at trial. A federal district court later granted habeas relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, ruling the Mississippi Supreme Court had reasonably applied Batson and its waiver rule. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited to the question of whether the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably determined, under AEDPA, that Pitchford waived his right to rebut the prosecution’s race-neutral justifications for the challenged juror strikes. Question Did the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably decide—under the standards set by federal habeas law—that Terry Pitchford gave up his right to argue that the prosecutor’s explanations for striking four Black jurors were false or racially biased?

Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 30, 2026. Petitioner: Adrian Jules.Respondent: Andre Balazs Properties. Advocates: Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioner) Daniel L. Geyser (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Adrian Jules worked at the Chateau Marmont hotel in Los Angeles until he was fired in March 2020. In December 2020, he sued multiple individuals and affiliated corporate entities in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging discrimination and other claims under both federal and state law. He invoked federal-question jurisdiction under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as diversity jurisdiction. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement Jules signed with Chateau Marmont, which was not initially named as a party. The district court stayed the litigation pending arbitration but did not formally compel arbitration, as the agreement required arbitration to occur in California, outside that court’s district. Jules proceeded to arbitrate his claims against Chateau alone. The arbitrator ultimately ruled against him on all claims and sanctioned him and his attorney for misconduct during the arbitration. After the award, Jules returned to the district court, seeking to vacate it, while Chateau and other defendants sought to confirm it—even though some of them were not parties to the arbitration proceeding. Jules argued that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Badgerow v. Walters, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm the award because the post-arbitration petitions, on their face, did not establish federal jurisdiction. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed the award, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that because the court had jurisdiction over the original, stayed lawsuit, it retained jurisdiction over subsequent applications to confirm or vacate the arbitration award. That ruling deepened a split among the courts of appeals, prompting the U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari. Question Does a federal court that initially exercises jurisdiction and stays a case pending arbitration maintain jurisdiction over a post-arbitration Section 9 or 10 application where jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking?

Abouammo v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 30, 2026. Petitioner: Ahmad Abouammo.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Tobias S. Loss-Eaton (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2013, Twitter hired Ahmad Abouammo, a U.S. citizen, as a Media Partnerships Manager responsible for high-profile users in the Middle East and North Africa. Through this role, he became involved with Bader Binasaker, a close aide to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Beginning in 2014, Abouammo used his access to Twitter’s proprietary tools to gather nonpublic information—including email addresses, phone numbers, and IP data—about Saudi dissident Twitter users, particularly accounts critical of the Saudi royal family. He transmitted this information to Binasaker—circumstantially inferred through encrypted messaging services—and was rewarded with lavish gifts, including a luxury Hublot watch, and over $300,000 in wire transfers to a Lebanese bank account held in his father’s name. Communication between the two included expressions of intent to “delete evil,” suggesting the sensitive nature of their collaboration. After leaving Twitter in 2015, Abouammo continued to facilitate communication between Saudi representatives and Twitter, allegedly under the guise of social media consulting. In October 2018, FBI agents approached him as part of an investigation into unauthorized access of Twitter accounts connected to Saudi espionage. During the interview at his Seattle home, Abouammo denied wrongdoing and claimed he was paid for legitimate consulting. While the agents waited in his home, Abouammo fabricated an invoice to substantiate this claim and emailed it to them. The actions connected to the allegedly falsified document—including the questioning, fabrication, and transmission—all took place in Seattle. The agents who received the document, though physically present in Seattle at the time, worked out of the FBI field office in San Francisco. A grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California indicted Abouammo for falsifying a record with intent to obstruct a federal investigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, among other charges. Abouammo moved to dismiss the falsification count for improper venue, arguing that all relevant conduct occurred in Seattle. The district court denied the motion, holding venue proper in the Northern District because the statute required an intent to obstruct an investigation based there. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that venue is proper in a district where the obstructed investigation occurred, even if none of the defendant’s physical conduct took place there. Question Is venue proper in a district where no offense conduct took place, so long as the statute’s intent element “contemplates” effects that could occur there?

Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2026. Petitioner: Flower Foods, Inc., et al.Respondent: Angelo Brock. Advocates: Traci L. Lovitt (for the Petitioners) Jennifer D. Bennett (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioners—the defendants, collectively known as “Flowers”—produce and sell packaged baked goods throughout the United States. Flowers utilizes a “direct-store-delivery” system, contracting with individuals it classifies as independent distributors who purchase the rights to distribute its products within specific geographic territories. In 2016, Angelo Brock, operating as Brock, Inc., signed a “Distributor Agreement” with Flowers Baking Co. of Denver, LLC (“Flowers Denver”) to distribute products in parts of Colorado. This agreement, along with a “Personal Guaranty” Brock signed, included a mandatory Arbitration Agreement stipulating that disputes must be resolved under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Under this arrangement, Brock, Inc. placed orders for products, most of which were produced by Flowers bakeries located out of state, specifically to fill those orders. Flowers shipped the goods to a warehouse in Denver. Brock picked up the products at the warehouse, loaded them onto his own vehicle, and delivered them to his customers—various retail stores located only within Colorado. Brock himself did not cross state lines while making these deliveries. The business relationship soured, and Brock filed a lawsuit alleging Flowers misclassified its distributors as independent contractors to systematically underpay them, asserting violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Colorado labor law. Brock filed his putative class and collective action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. Flowers moved to compel arbitration based on the parties’ agreement, but the district court denied the motion, concluding that Brock falls within the FAA’s § 1 exemption for transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed that decision. Question Are workers who deliver locally goods that travel in interstate commerce—but who do not transport the goods across borders nor interact with vehicles that cross borders—“transportation workers” “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” for purposes of the exemption in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act?

Noem v. Al Otro Lado Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 24, 2026. Petitioner: Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security.Respondent: Al Otro Lado, a California Corporation. Advocates: Vivek Suri (for the Petitioners) Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Beginning in 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented a “metering” policy at ports of entry along the United States-Mexico border to manage asserted capacity constraints. CBP officers stationed at the physical boundary line turned away asylum seekers lacking valid travel documents, preventing them from stepping onto U.S. soil to undergo mandatory inspection and processing. These officials instructed migrants to return to Mexico and wait for future processing opportunities, often without providing specific appointment times, forcing numerous asylum seekers to endure prolonged delays in Mexican border towns where they faced significant safety risks. While these asylum seekers waited, the federal government promulgated the “Asylum Transit Rule” in 2019, which generally rendered noncitizens ineligible for asylum if they traveled through a third country without first seeking protection there. This regulatory change prejudiced individuals previously turned away under the metering policy because, had CBP processed them upon their initial arrival, the Transit Rule would not have applied to their claims. Al Otro Lado, a legal aid organization, joined thirteen individual asylum seekers to file a class-action lawsuit challenging the metering policy and seeking to prevent the government from applying the Transit Rule to those who attempted to enter before its enactment. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California declared the metering policy unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act and permanently enjoined the government from applying the Asylum Transit Rule to class members . The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the policy unlawfully withheld mandatory agency action, but narrowed the injunction to prevent the district court from forcing the government to unilaterally reopen past asylum denials. Question Does a noncitizen who is stopped on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border “arrive[] in the United States” within the meaning of Immigration and Nationality Act?