May One Listen to a Torah Class Before Reciting Birkot Ha’Torah in the Morning?

After waking in the morning, a person is not permitted to learn Torah before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah. As we saw in earlier installments, however, this applies only to learning verbally. Merely thinking Torah in one's mind, without speaking, is allowed before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning. (We saw, though, that reading a Torah book, even silently, might require the recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah.) Intuitively, we might assume that silently listening to a Torah lecture should be no different than silently thinking about Torah. Seemingly, then, if a person attends a Torah class in the synagogue early in the morning, he does not need to first recite Birkot Ha'Torah. However, the Halachot Ketanot (Rav Yisrael Yaakob Hagiz, 1680-1757) rules that listening to a Torah class differs from thinking about Torah in this regard. He applies to this situation the famous Halachic principle of "Shome'a Ke'oneh" – that listening to the recitation of a text is akin to reciting it oneself. Thus, for example, every Shabbat, one person recites Kiddush, and everyone else at the table fulfills his obligation by listening to the recitation. Accordingly, people who listen to a Torah class are considered to be saying the words spoken by the teacher. Hence, listening to a Torah class is akin to verbally speaking words of Torah, and requires the recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah. Hacham Ovadia Yosef brought proof to this theory from the Gemara's inference of the Birkot Ha'Torah obligation from a verse in the Book of Debarim (32:3). The Gemara in Masechet Berachot (21a) cites as the Biblical source of this requirement the verse, "Ki Shem Hashem Ekra, Habu Godel L'Elokenu" – "When I call the Name of G-d, give praise to G-d." Moshe here was announcing that when he teaches Torah, the people should recite a blessing. Thus, the very source of Birkot Ha'Torah is a situation where people recite a Beracha before listening to words of Torah, clearly implying that even silently listening to a Torah lecture requires the recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah. This is the ruling also of the Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909). Although several Poskim (including the Lebush and Hida) disagree, Halacha follows the opinion of the Halachot Ketanot. Therefore, those who attend a Torah class early in the morning must ensure to first recite Birkot Ha'Torah. Some addressed the question of how to reconcile the Halachot Ketanot's reasoning with the ruling of the Rosh (Rabbenu Asher Ben Yehiel, 1250-1327) that the person who receives an Aliya to the Torah must read along with the Ba'al Koreh (reader). Fundamentally, the obligation to read is upon the Oleh (person who was called to the Torah); the Ba'al Koreh reads the Torah on his behalf. Seemingly, the rule of "Shome'a Ke'oneh" should allow the Oleh to silently listen to the reader and thereby discharge his obligation. Indeed, the Peri Hadash (Rav Hizkiya Da Silva, 1659-1698) disputed the Rosh's ruling, and maintained that the Oleh does not need to read together with the reader. Halacha, however, follows the Rosh's ruling. If, as the Halachot Ketanot writes, listening to words of Torah is akin to reciting them, then why must the Oleh read along with the Ba'al Koreh? Several explanations were given for why the congregational Torah reading might be different, and is not subject to the rule of "Shome'a Ke'oneh." One theory is that "Shome'a Ke'oneh" applies only when there is a general obligation to recite a certain text. The congregational Torah reading is an obligation upon the congregation as a whole, and not on any particular individual, and it therefore is not included in the rule of "Shome'a Ke'oneh." Others explain that since the original format of Torah reading was that the Oleh reads the text, and the concept of a Ba'al Koreh was introduced later, the Oleh is required to read along, to preserve the initial arrangement. Yet another answer is that the rule of "Shome'a Ke'oneh" does not allow for one person to recite the Beracha over a Misva and another person to perform the Misva. On Purim, for example, the one who reads the Megilla for the congregation also recites the Beracha. Never does someone from the congregation recite the Beracha, and then the Ba'al Koreh reads the Megilla. Therefore, the Oleh cannot recite the Beracha and then fulfill his obligation by listening to the Ba'al Koreh's reading. Interestingly, Rav Shlomo Kluger (1785-1869) asserted that this Halacha regarding Birkot Ha'Torah before listening a Torah class hinges on a debate among the Rishonim regarding a different issue. It often happens that somebody is still in the middle of the Amida prayer when the Hazzan begins the repetition, and reaches Nakdishach. Common practice follows the view of Rashi, that the person in this situation should stop and listen silently to Nakdishach in order to fulfill this Misva. Rabbenu Tam (France, 1100-1171), however, disagreed with this ruling, arguing that in light of the principle of "Shome'a Ke'oneh," listening to Nakdishach in the middle of the Amida would constitute a Hefsek (forbidden interruption) in the Amida. This is no different than reciting Nakdishach in the middle of the Amida, which is of course not allowed. Seemingly, Rav Kluger writes, the ruling of the Halachot Ketanot, that listening to Torah is akin to speaking Torah, follows the view of Rabbenu Tam, that "Shome'a Ke'oneh" actually equates listening to speaking. According to Rashi, listening is not precisely the same as speaking, which is why he permits listening to Nakdishach during the Amida. By the same token, it would seem that Rashi would not require reciting Birkot Ha'Torah before listening to a Torah lecture. The question, then, becomes why we follow Rashi's opinion regarding listening to Nakdishach during the Amida, but we accept the Halachot Ketanot's ruling regarding Birkot Ha'Torah. These two rulings seem to contradict one another – as the first presumes that listening is not precisely like speaking, whereas the second presumes that listening is equivalent to speaking. Hacham Ovadia answers that when a person is reciting the Amida as the congregation reaches Nakdishach, he wants to fulfill the Misva of reciting Nakdishach, but he also does not wish to interrupt his Amida. Halacha therefore allows him to listen to Nakdishach – such that he will be credited with this Misva – without being considered in violation of disrupting the Amida. Since the person seeks to perform the Misva, an exception is made to allow him to do so. Even Rashi agrees that listening is equivalent to speaking, but in the specific instance where a person recites the Amida and hears Nakdishach, special permission is given to listen to Nakdishach. Hacham Ovadia cites in this context the Gemara's teaching (Kiddushin 39b) that a person's intention to transgress a sin is disregarded if he ends up being unable to commit the forbidden act. A person's thoughts are discounted as far as Halachic violations are concerned, and thus one cannot be considered guilty of disrupting his Amida by silently listening to Nakdishach. Another question that was asked regarding the Halachot Ketanot's ruling is whether the speaker and audience must have specific intention for "Shome'a Ke'oneh" to take effect. During Kiddush, the person reciting Kiddush must have in mind that his recitation will be effective in satisfying the listeners' obligation, and they must likewise intend to fulfill their obligation by hearing his recitation. Seemingly, then, if listening to a Torah class is akin to speaking words of Torah due to the principle of "Shome'a Ke'oneh," this should depend on whether or not the speaker and audience have this specific intention. However, Hacham Ovadia Yosef, in his Yabia Omer (vol. 4, addendum to #8), writes that this specific intention is not necessary, and he draws proof to the fact that Torah study marks an exception to the general rule. The Gemara in Masechet Sukka (38) infers the principle of "Shome'a Ke'oneh" from the story of King Yoshiyahu, before whom a man named Shafan read the Torah, and Yoshiyahu was considered to have read it himself. There is no mention of either Yoshiyahu or Shafan having specific intention that Yoshiyahu should be considered to have read the text – indicating that such intention is not necessary. Although in general "Shome'a Ke'oneh" requires the intention of both the speaker and listener, Torah study marks an exception, where such intention is not needed for "Shome'a Ke'oneh" to take effect. Rav Yisrael Bitan offers two possible explanations for this distinction, for why the mechanism of "Shome'a Ke'oneh" does not require Kavana (intent) in the context of Torah study, but it does in the context of all other Misvot. First, the primary method of Torah learning is through a teacher and listeners; this is the most common way that Torah is studied. Therefore, the listeners fulfill their obligation by listening without having to create a connection to the speaker through Kavana. Alternatively, one could say that in the case of Torah learning, the intent is present by default. When a Rabbi or teacher stands up before a room to teach Torah, everyone's intention is clearly to fulfill the Misva of Torah learning, and there is no need to consciously think this. The fundamental difference between these two explanations is that according to the first, Kavana is not necessary for "Shome'a Ke'oneh" to take effect when teaching Torah, whereas according to the second, Kavana is necessary, but it is presumed even without consciously having it in mind. These different perspectives will affect the fascinating question of whether a distinction exists between attending a Torah class and listening to a recording. According to the first explanation, listening to Torah is equivalent to speaking Torah even without Kavana, and this would be true even when listening to a recording of a Torah class. According to the second approach, however, Kavana is necessary for the listener to be considered to be speaking, and the speaker and listener are presumed to have this intent – and thus this would not apply in the case of a recording. When listening to a recording, there is no speaker to supply the Kavana, and thus the listener is not considered to be speaking the words. It would then follow that one would not be required to recite Birkot Ha'Torah before listening to a recorded Torah class in the morning. For example, if a person wishes to listen to a Torah class as he makes his way to the synagogue in the morning, he would not – according to this second explanation – be required to first recite Birkot Ha'Torah. In practice, however, as this matter cannot be conclusively determined one way or another, we must be stringent and recite Birkot Ha'Torah even before listening to a recorded Torah class. Therefore, one who wishes to hear a Torah class in the morning – either in person or a recording – must first recite Birkot Ha'Torah and the verses of Birkat Kohanim beforehand. Summary: One who wishes to hear a Torah class in the morning – either in person or a recording – must first recite Birkot Ha'Torah and the verses of Birkat Kohanim beforehand.