Ukraine Invades Russia

This week we talk about Kursk, asymmetric warfare, and Russian politics.

We also discuss HIMARS, supply lines, and Kyiv.

Recommended Book: The Disappearance of Rituals by Byung-Chul Han

Transcript

About two and a half years ago, on February 24, 2022, Russia invaded neighboring Ukraine.

This invasion had been forecasted for a while, as Russian forces had at times surreptitiously, at times more overtly supported separatist factions in the eastern and southeastern portion of Ukraine for about a decade, eventually invading and them annexing the Crimean Peninsula back in March of 2014 using what became known as the "little green men" strategy because the invading soldiers had their flags, patches, and other insignia removed, which gave the Russian government deniability, saying basically some patriotic members of their military might be inclined to help their fellow travelers in parts of Ukraine that are being repressed for their Russian heritage, and who crave freedom from an oppressive central government; how these patriotic soldiers acting on their own behalf, without support from the Russian government, supposedly, were able to bring so much heavy artillery and tanks with them was never formally addressed.

So Russia had been chipping away at Ukraine for a long while leading up to this more conventional attack in 2022, grabbing an important port when they took Crimea and leaving the Ukrainian government, which had been tilting toward Europe and away from Russia's sphere of influence—which is part of what triggered that pseudo-invasion of Crimea—and all of this left Ukraine fighting those separatist groups on their eastern flank pretty much continuously for the decade leading up to that bigger invasion a few years ago.

When that invasion was launched, Russia was expected by pretty much everyone to basically waltz right into Kyiv with little opposition, as it was this huge, powerful country with nukes and a massive conventional military apparatus, so it stood to reason it should easily defeat its weaker, former supplicant neighbor.

But that's not how things played out.

Ukraine managed to hold off an initial, ill-planned but large invasion force, and for the past two and a half years they've continued to hold those lines, despite huge drafts of soldiers and new investments in wartime materials, including drones and missiles that have been near-continuously lobbed at Ukrainian cities and towns, by the Russian government.

For the past year or so, following some back-and-forth pushes by Russian and Ukrainian forces in mostly the eastern part of Ukraine, at least following that initial unsuccessful incursion toward the capitol, Ukraine's efforts to reclaim its captured territory have been fraught.

It launched a successful counterattack a little while back, retaking some earlier captured territory, but after plowing through Russian forces and arriving in the eastern portion of the country, it's next-stage offensives basically collapsed as soon as they were launched.

The Ukrainian government is still making fresh attempts in this regard, as any stagnation and seeming lack of progress could serve as justification by its allies to stop sending money and weapons to bolster their war effort, but these have been relatively small and haven't accomplished much—not for the last year, at least.

The same was generally true for Russia up until recently, it's troops on the ground exhausted and undersupplied, their pushes deeper into Ukrainian met with stern-enough resistance that they've had to pull back, or they've persisted in shouldering their way through a meat-grinder defense, capturing little tiny bits of territory, but with huge costs in terms of lives and military hardware.

This past year they've seen some decent gains, though, as freshly drafted and trained troops have subbed-in for exhausted and wounded ones, and as Ukraine's forces have suffered the consequences of delayed support from the US in particular, and as their own forces have been unable to tap-out, rest, and recover, because of the difference in the size of the two countries' populations, but also because of the nature of the conflict, Ukraine being invaded, while Russia has remained a safe-haven for the most part.

As of the day I'm recording this in late-August 2024, Russia's military controls about 20% of Ukraine's total territory—and that includes Crimea and other chunks that were taken in 2014—around 8.2 million of Ukraine's 41 million population before the invasion had already fled the country by mid-2023, some having returned in the year or so since, but millions of people are still scattered throughout Europe and the rest of the world, making this the continent's largest refugee crisis since WWII.

About 8 million Ukrainians are now considered to be internally displaced, which means they're homeless within their own country, often because their cities or towns have been captured or destroyed.

Estimates on casualties and fatalities in this conflict vary widely, as official numbers are often incomplete and filtered for public consumption and propaganda purposes, but some fairly strict and consequently probably low estimates from outside groups suggest a few hundred thousand people may have died in this conflict, so far, with hundreds of thousands more having been wounded, in some cases grievously, with some more biased figures—like those provided by Ukraine's Ministry of Defense—suggesting that well over half a million people may have been wounded on Russia's side, alone, since the 2022 invasion began.

Again, this war has been uneven but surprising from the get go, Russia taking a lot of territory, but Ukraine holding its own and performing well beyond most expectations.

But over the last year, since battle lines in the east were more firmly drawn and both sides had the opportunity to carve out defenses, lay mines, things like that, this has been a story of slow attritional conflict, which has tended to mean an advantage for Russia: they've ever-so-slowly been claimed more of Ukraine—grabbing just over 400 square miles of territory over the course of the past twelve months, including a few dozens cities and towns along those well-entrenched emplacements.

What I'd like to talk about today is a recent move by Ukraine that has seemingly surprised just about everyone, and which, depending on who you ask, is the desperate act of a flailing military, or an inspired bit of asymmetrical warfare that could help turn the tides in their favor.

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Part of why many well-informed analysts assumed Russia's invasion of Ukraine would be a quick thing, several days-long, maybe a week or two at most, is that Russia's military is big and backed by the largest arsenal of nukes in the world. Russia's economy is also decently large, even if it is significantly dependent on fossil fuel and mineral wealth.

So Russia's military should be capable of stomping in to a smaller country's territory, especially a neighboring country, and then killing and threatening everyone into submission, and menacing them with nukes if they do anything threatening in return.

That's the ostensible promise of a nuclear arsenal: you have the whammy on everyone else if they do anything that really scares you or threatens you, no matter what you do to them, first.

That expectation didn't pan out, but the threat of nukes has hovered over this conflict from day one, and Russia's government has happily reinforced the sense that if Ukraine does anything to threaten them in return, even as they invade and gobble up Ukraine's territory, killing and kidnapping their people, Russia might use nukes, because why wouldn't they?

And they've often signaled this by saying, basically, that if the Fatherland is threatened, if anyone menaces Russia in return, that could serve as a spark that turns this invasion into a nuclear conflict.

This threat has ensured Russia's invasion of Ukraine, thus far, has been a fairly one-sided undertaking in which Russia can do basically anything they want, stomping all around Ukraine and launching endless drones and missiles at their densely populated cities, but Ukraine is not allowed to do anything like that to Russia in return.

And this nuclear threat has been taken seriously enough by Ukraine's allies that they've said, from the get-go, we'll give you money and weapons, but you have to promise not to use them on targets within Russia, because we don't want to kick off a nuclear war, or even a broader conflict between nuclear-armed nations, if Russia were to consider attacks by Ukrainians wielding American weapons against Russian civilian targets to be an attack by the US—which was always a theoretical possibility that, again, Russia was happy to reinforce.

As a result, some of the weapons provided to Ukraine by its allies were artificially limited, including the 20 HIMARS long-range rocket systems the US supplied back in late-2022, which were altered before being sent so they couldn't be used against targets within Russia territory.

The US and other allies have also been incredibly hesitant to provide Ukraine weapons with greater range, like ATMS, Army Tactical Missile System rockets, that can strike targets up to 186 miles away, and fighter jets that could be used to take out targets deep within Russian territory, if used correctly.

From the beginning, though, Ukrainian forces figured out ways to hit targets within Russia, generally using asymmetrical methods, like covert infiltrations and loose alliances with anti-government entities operating within Russia, rather than launching aerial or artillery strikes from within their own borders.

In 2022, they struck dozens of air bases, fuel depots, and similar targets across the border, though they almost always denied involvement, officially, due to fears that overtly launching such attacks could lead to significant reprisals, and could cause their allies to step back from supporting Ukraine over fears of an expanding conflict.

Several bits of manufacturing and shipping infrastructure in Russia were damaged or destroyed by Ukrainian missiles and drones in 2023, which were again, often denied, though a bit more overt than their earlier efforts, and military and civilian buildings in Russian towns along their shared borders were damaged by drones and saboteurs from the beginning of the invasion.

Artillery shelling has also incidentally or accidentally hit civilian targets across these borders, though almost all of these attacks, up until 2024, caused little damage and few deaths and injuries; they were more symbolically than practically important.

Beginning in early 2024, though, mostly drone attacks on Russia energy infrastructure seemed to impact Russia's economy, several important oil and gas terminals damaged to the point that they required a lot of time and investment to get them operational again, not to mention the further investment that would be required to protect these small, numerous, and important weak-points that Ukraine had shown a willingness to attack.

There were also a few drone attacks on major cities, like St. Petersburg, but these seemed to be mostly symbolic strikes, and were generally not claimed by Ukraine—they could have been false flag attacks, or launched by Ukraine's anti-Russian-government allies operating within Russia's borders, or attacks by ISIS or similar terrorist organizations—but whoever launched them, they seem to have caused more fear and consternation than actual, physical damage.

Causing fear, though, is still important in this conflict, because, as far as many Russian civilians have understood for years now, the war has been going fine, or fine enough, and they haven't felt they've had much to worry about, because although a lot of their people have been drafted and sent to the frontlines, the conflict itself hasn't really impacted them beyond some brands having disappeared from shelves due to international sanctions, and a general sense that the government has clamped down on several freedoms they previously enjoyed, using the invasion—which has been pitched internally as an effort to liberate Ukrainians from a tyrannical, Nazi government—as justification.

That's part of what makes a recent move by Ukraine's military so interesting.

On August 6, 2024, the Ukrainian military launched an attack across their border with Russia into the Kursk oblast, which is an administrative district of about a million people located in western Russia.

This assault included at least 1,000 troops, alongside armored personnel carriers and tanks, and they plowed more than 6 miles into Russian territory within two days, apparently wiping out local defensive positions without too much trouble.

They reportedly drove right past many defensive emplacements and came at the relatively few defenders from unexpected angles, behind rather than in front of them, and that allowed them to rapidly capture territory and prisoners.

As a result of this blitz into Kursk, more than 100,000 Russian citizens, closer to 200,000 by some estimates, have had to flee their homes, a state of emergency has been triggered in this and surrounding regions, and the Ukrainian military has captured just under 400 square miles, or around 1,000 square km of Russian territory—which is about what Russian forces have managed to capture of Ukraine over the whole of the past year. Within that held territory, they also hold 82 towns and villages, and they've captured an estimated 2,000 or so prisoners.

This rapid assault into Russian territory was unexpected, catching even Ukraine's allies by surprise, reportedly, and it struck an area that was apparently under-defended, which is part of why they were able to break through so easily, hundreds of Russian soldiers surrendering almost immediately, none of them having expected anything like this so far from what has become the front lines of the conflict all the way on the other side of the country.

In the weeks since this assault was launched, Ukrainian forces have taken out a couple of important bridges, which serves the double-purpose of making a counterattack by Russian forces more difficult, while also hobbling some of their supply lines that are fueling the Russian invasion of Ukraine further south and east.

The Ukrainian force that invaded Russia is relatively small, but because of the nature of this sort of thing, it's estimated that Russia will need something like 3 to 5-times as many soldiers as Ukraine has if they want to successfully dislodge them, which will likely mean having to pull troops and military hardware from the frontlines, or other spots along their border, which would leave those other spots less defended, in order to muster that kind of counterattack.

This spot is also reportedly somewhat protected from existing Russian artillery installations, and any attacks they launch against the occupying Ukrainian forces will be attacks against their own cities and towns—something that is arguably inevitable when you're invaded and trying to boot the invaders, but also not something that's super politically popular, because, again, as many as a few hundred thousand people have fled their homes, and if their own government bombs their homes and other infrastructure into smithereens in order to recapture it, that probably won't make all those people too happy, in addition to making them an additional burden in a way, suddenly needing more government support just to keep them fed, housed, and so on.

This is also tricky for Russia because, as I just mentioned, pulling troops from elsewhere will require weakening either some other border area, or their front lines in eastern Ukraine, meaning they either open themselves up to another incursion, or they slow the progress they're making with their own invasion, and that component of the conflict is currently going pretty well for them, so it's a tough sell, the idea of slowing that momentum in order to take back territory they didn't think was under any real threat, up till just now.

Of course, this assault also makes clear that other parts of Russia's extensive shared border with Ukraine might be under threat if they leave any gaps or weak spots, which will likely mean having to shuffle things around a bit, either way. Attacking and capturing this part of Kursk, then, would seem to be a means of forcing Russia into a two-front conflict, while also demonstrating parts of their territory they thought were well-fortified-enough possibly aren't, which could further distract their leaders and spread their forces out over a wider area.

The political aspect of this might prove to be important, too, as while Russia's economy has been doing pretty well, considering all the sanctions, because the government has been flooding the economy with war-time investment and dropping all kinds of regulations to keep businesses afloat and flourishing, authoritarian regimes are often bulwarked by certainty and the projection of strength, and anything that seems to weaken that supposed inevitability and invulnerability can lead to cracks in the facade that ultimately lead to the people up top no longer being up top.

That doesn't seem to be a major threat here at the moment, but if we're looking at the long-term, this could be one more dent in what's meant to be an impervious, pristine visage of power, which could over time lead to something more substantial, in terms of who's in charge in Russia.

All that said, most analysts seem to think this invasion of Kursk won't be terribly maintainable because it stretches Ukraine's supply lines in such a way that those who did the invading can be relatively easily cut off from the rest of their military, and because it forces Ukraine into a two-front conflict, as well, and while Russia can muddle through something like that, even if it would prefer not to, Ukraine will struggle to do the same because of the nature of their population and infrastructure at the moment.

Ukrainian forces are also already struggling on their eastern front, losing territory in small bits, but continuously, to Russian forces, and the grinding nature of the invasion has really taken a toll on those who have been fighting without a break for in some cases years at this point.

This successful and surprising move does seem to have served as a morale boost for Ukrainian troops, though, as this is the first time a rival military has taken and held Russian territory since WWII, marking a huge symbolic victory, and one that may keep Ukraine's allies optimistic as well, which is important, as many politicians in those allied countries have shown themselves to be more than willing to stop the ready flow of money and weapons into Ukraine any time it seems like the conflict might not be going their way, even momentarily.

Some reports have suggested that this assault might be part of a larger effort by Ukraine's leadership to prepare itself for what seems to be, to some at least, inevitable near-future peace talks, as holding this chunk of Russian land and all these prisoners would give Ukraine more leverage to get some of their land and prisoners back in such negotiations.

Others have suggested that the key purpose might have been to humiliate Russian President Putin, while also making everyday Russians feel the war the way everyday Ukrainians have, as that can help tip public opinion enough to, eventually, sway governmental action, even within authoritarian states like Russia.

If that's the case, Ukraine may well achieve the opposite, as while Putin has seemingly been slow to respond, focusing his public statements on the Russian military's continuing success in eastern Ukraine, he's reportedly, behind the scenes, plotting revenge, and telling his people to step back from back-room negotiations that have been focused on agreements related to not targeting energy infrastructure on either side; this is pretty speculative and there are a lot of anonymous sources on this narrative, so take it with a grain of salt, but there's a chance that Putin is playing down how bad this is for him and his forces in public, but is planning some kind of significant and devastating counterattack for sometime in the near-future, to deter future attacks on Russian soil.

Russian officials have described this attack as an escalation, which is exactly the language you would use if you were preparing your own escalation, so we maybe have that to watch out for in the coming weeks.

Simultaneous to all this, though, Russia is on the brink of capturing all of Donesk in eastern Ukraine, which it illegally annexed a little while back, but which Ukraine has partially held all this time—so we may see some kind of change to the conflict once that capture is completed, as it could prove to be a suitable moment, strategically, for Russia to walk back to the peace talks table, happy to take the land it says it owns, before stepping back from active conflict and arming itself for some later, potentially less-direct effort to claim the rest; another little green men attack, perhaps.

There's a chance that this attack will force Putin to make politically expedient, but militarily non-ideal decisions over the next few months, though.

It would arguably be smartest for the Russian military to keep at it in the east, claim what they need to claim and reinforce their holdings, there, before then going and addressing the Ukrainians in Kursk, but he may feel pressured to send forces to Kursk sooner rather than later, because of embarrassment if nothing else, but also possibly pressure from other Russian leaders, which would spread out his forces and the military's attention, while also slowing their advances in the east, which could in turn give Ukraine a chance to shore up some of their positions, and possibly even launch more small attacks into Russian territory, further complexifying the state of play and the number of emergencies the Russian military needs to address simultaneously.

Each of these attacks could be small and strategic, causing outsized damage and requiring an outsized response force: a bit like how irregular militaries, like Hamas and Hezbollah, use cheap rockets that they know will almost always be knocked out of the sky with countermeasures, but those rockets cost maybe ten thousands dollars, while the countermeasures cost ten or twenty times that.

Over time, you can deplete the enemy's reserves of money, hardware, and people by forcing them to commit a lot more than you do to a given area or attack; in this way, the outgunned and out-populated Ukrainian military could tie-up a lot of Russia's forces by making them worry about maintaining the bare-bones status quo back home.

There's also a chance, though, that Russia will play the long game, ignore opinion polls and protests by people who are forced to flee their homes, and wait to address these asymmetric incursions until later, at which point they'd be in a much stronger position within Ukraine, and that leaves them in a good spot to keep pushing forward, militarily, or to have peace talks that heavily favor them, even more than such talks would, today.

Show Notes

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3762042-us-secretly-modified-himars-for-ukraine-to-prevent-kyiv-from-shooting-long-range-missiles-into-russia/

https://www.wsj.com/world/behind-ukraines-russia-invasion-secrecy-speed-and-electronic-jamming-188fcc22

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-russia-looked-wrong-way-ukraine-invaded-2024-08-17/

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-lukashenko-says-nearly-third-army-sent-ukraine-border-belta-reports-2024-08-18/

https://www.news24.com/news24/world/news/most-likely-used-north-korean-ballistic-missiles-russia-strikes-with-for-the-third-time-ukraine-20240818

https://ca.news.yahoo.com/now-even-north-korea-weighed-103312164.html

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kursk-incursion-bridge-invasion-43d6579c82c24ffc5cfabd99d07c66db

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/17/world/europe/ukraine-russia-bridge.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/17/world/europe/ukraines-incursion-russian-conscripts.html

https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraines-raid-kursk-russia-shift-tactical-narrative/

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4829506-how-ukraines-surprise-offensive-into-russia-has-changed-the-war/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_2024_Kursk_Oblast_incursion

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/19/world/europe/ukraine-russia-zelensky-putin-ceasefire.html

https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/17/safety-at-ukraines-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-deteriorating-iaea-warns

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/18/vladimir-putin-kursk-crisis-reponse/

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-08-17/ukraine-military-incursion-into-russia-maps-satellite-images/104233912

https://www.barrons.com/news/russia-says-captured-another-village-near-ukraine-s-pokrovsk-6dc20994

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/18/world/europe/kursk-russia-ukraine-incursion.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/16/world/europe/russia-ukraine-pokrovsk-kursk.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_2024_Kursk_Oblast_incursion

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy0ngzg9754o

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/10/ukraine-braces-for-reprisals-as-russia-to-send-more-troops-to-kursk

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attacks_in_Russia_during_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2024

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-incursion-kursk-afa42b9613323901bef07800ac2cae9e

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_Crimea_by_the_Russian_Federation