Brussels Sprouts

In a stunning midterm election, Democrats have won back control of the House and Senate. Even with some races still uncalled, Democrats have secured at least 54 Senate seats and a significant majority in the House. Many of their gains came in traditionally Republican states, including Texas, South Carolina, and Ohio, and in districts redrawn at President Trump's urging. The scale of the Democrats' victory has left many scrambling to understand what it means for the final two years of Trump's presidency and for U.S. foreign policy. Democrats will now have greater power to investigate the administration, shape spending, and potentially constrain Trump's actions abroad. But questions remain about how much Congress can really influence foreign policy, where presidents have traditionally enjoyed considerable freedom. Some analysts suggest that with his domestic agenda blocked, Trump could become even more focused on and unpredictable in foreign affairs. In Europe, the results have been greeted with relief, but also uncertainty. European leaders may welcome a Congress more supportive of NATO and Ukraine, but Trump remains in the White House. With a Pentagon review of US force posture in Europe expected next month and the war in Ukraine continuing, Europeans are wondering whether the election will meaningfully change Washington's approach. So, today, to unpack these historic midterm elections and what they mean for Trump's remaining two years in office, we're really happy to have with us on Brussels Sprouts, Susan Glasser and Molly Reynolds. Susan Glasser is a staff writer for The New Yorker. Molly Reynolds is the vice president and director of the Governance Studies program at the Brookings Institution. 

For much of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Europe has demonstrated remarkable unity and resolve. Despite economic pressures, political disagreements, and repeated predictions that its support would falter, European governments have largely held together. But as the war heads into another winter, that unity is facing a growing test. Across Europe, domestic political pressures are mounting. Protests in France, Italy, Albania, and elsewhere have exposed growing public frustration and political instability, potentially making it harder for governments to commit more resources to Ukraine. At the same time, divisions are emerging over how Europe should deal with Moscow. The recent call between Norwegian and Finnish leaders and Russian President Vladimir Putin have sparked disagreements over Europe’s diplomatic approach. All of this comes as Russia is intensifying its attacks on Ukraine heading into winter. Kyiv faces enormous financing needs, and the United States is stepping back from its traditional leadership role while at times appearing to move closer to Moscow. The question now is: Does Europe have the capacity to increase its support to Ukraine? And could perceptions of growing divisions further reinforce Putin’s sense that time is on his side? So, to discuss these questions and more, we’re delighted to welcome Daniela Schwarzer and Steven Erlanger to Brussels Sprouts. Daniela Schwarzer is the incoming president of the Hertie School in Berlin and a professor of European governance and geopolitics. Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times.   

On October 9, U.S. President Donald Trump announced he had reached a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin to produce to purchase Russian diesel ahead of next month’s midterm elections—the first in a series of overtures to Moscow. Trump also waived congressional sanctions on Russia and signaled willingness to meet with Putin and Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping to discuss a peace deal on Ukraine without European involvement. The president’s deal with Putin coincides with striking animosity towards Kyiv. Trump has intensified his criticism of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, claiming last week that Ukraine “needs a new president.” In response, Zelenskyy argued that Trump is attempting to force Ukraine’s surrender, citing lapses in U.S. information sharing and a temporary restriction on Starshield access. U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff met with Zelenskyy in Oslo before flying to St. Petersburg on Wednesday, where he called Putin a humanitarian after his release of an American prisoner. Yet, despite this flurry of diplomacy, there has been little progress toward peace. After Witkoff’s meeting, Russia launched an overnight bombardment of Ukraine. This escalation raises concerns, particularly from European and NATO allies, about how the United States will respond and conduct itself moving forward. To discuss the Trump administration’s approach to Russia and Ukraine, we are delighted to welcome Rebeccah Heinrichs and Peter Rough to Brussels Sprouts. Rebeccah Heinrichs is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and the director of its Keystone Defense Initiative. Peter Rough is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and the director of its Center of Europe and Eurasia. 

More than seven months have passed since the United States launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran. The resulting war has disrupted global energy markets, exacerbated regional instability, and increasingly drawn other countries into the conflict. Europe has been forced to navigate both the direct and indirect consequences of the war. Last month, the EU energy commissioner announced that the bloc had spent an additional $100 billion on energy imports since the conflict began, adding to the economic pressures European governments already face. But the war is also creating new security challenges for Europe. U.S. operations in the Middle East are consuming scarce Patriot missile interceptors, raising concerns about the availability of air defenses for Ukraine and NATO. Iran has also explicitly threatened U.S. military bases in Europe, supporting operations against it. A suspected Iranian plot to attack RAF Fairford in the United Kingdom has raised concerns about hybrid threats and Europe’s ability to protect military installations in its territory. Meanwhile, the growing cooperation between Moscow and Tehran is creating new links between the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. Europe is already paying a price for the war, but could the conflict spread to European territory? And how prepared is NATO to respond? To discuss these risks, we are delighted to welcome Jonathan Panikoff and Matthew Savill to Brussels Sprouts. Jonathan Panikoff is the senior director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. Matthew Savill is the director of military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute.

A fast-approaching winter looms over Ukraine. Russia has intensified a concerted campaign against the infrastructure that keeps Ukraine’s economy running, striking railways, warehouses, steel plants, and energy facilities. The attacks threaten production and exports and further strain Kyiv’s finances just as temperatures begin to drop. Last week, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development downgraded its 2026 growth forecast for Ukraine from 2.2 percent to 1.5 percent. Europe, meanwhile, is signaling an inability—or an unwillingness—to cover the added cost of Ukraine’s war effort. In early September, Ukrainian officials reported a $27 billion deficit in the defense budget. President Zelensky blamed part of the gap on excess spending by dismissed Defense Minister Mykhailo Federov, which Fedorov has denied. European leaders have remained noncommittal, with some proposing renewed discussion over using Russia’s frozen assets—an issue that almost derailed the European Union’s existing $105 billion loan to Ukraine. Ukraine’s shortage of air defense interceptors makes these pressures even more acute. As Russia intensifies its attacks, Ukrainians face rolling blackouts, disrupted heating, lost jobs, and mounting economic pressure through the coldest months of the year. The challenge for Kyiv this winter is not simply keeping the lights on but keeping its economy afloat, sustaining its war effort, and maintaining the resilience of its population. So, to discuss all these issues and how Ukraine can manage these challenges, we are excited to welcome Balázs Jarábik and Kateryna Shynkaruk to Brussels Sprouts. Balázs Jarábik is the founder of Minority Report, a political risk consultancy, and a former Slovak diplomat specializing in Eastern Europe. Kateryna Shynkaruk is a senior lecturer at the Bush School of Government and Public Service in Washington and a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

Europe is facing an escalation in high-profile Russian hybrid attacks. Earlier this month, Germany attributed an attempted drone attack at Leipzig Airport to Moscow, Denmark accused a Russian ship of shooting flares at one of its military helicopters, and NATO jets downed a drone carrying explosives over Lithuania. Just yesterday, more Russian drones crashed in Moldova and Romania, while Poland reported sabotage incidents on defense and logistical infrastructure. In response, European leaders are sounding the alarm. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned last week that Russia plans to test NATO’s Article V by striking European countries with drones or missiles. Finnish President Alexander Stubb carried a similar message, and French President Emmanuel Macron briefed his country’s political leaders in an emergency meeting last Friday. Attendees included national rally leaders Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella, who—despite a history of pro-Kremlin sentiment—criticized Russian “intimidation, threats, destabilization, or psychological warfare.” These recent events underscore that we are moving into a more dangerous phase of the conflict in Ukraine. Russia is growing more accepting of risk in its hybrid attacks designed to get Europe to stop supporting Ukraine. Europe, in turn, is also growing more accepting of risk in both its efforts to signal to Russia that there will be costs and its support and facilitation of Ukrainian long-range strikes inside Russia. To help us assess what's happening in Europe and where this escalatory cycle could go, we're very happy to welcome Ben Hodges and Shashank Joshi back to Brussels Sprouts. Ben Hodges is a retired lieutenant general in the United States Army and the former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe. Shashank Joshi is the Washington bureau chief at The Economist. 

Today we are taking a closer look at Germany as it returns to military power. As the United States pulls back from Europe and threats of Russian aggression are heightened, Germany has begun rearming after many decades of restraint. The country has made a constitutional change to allow debt funding for defense spending, published its first military strategy, and increased its defense budget by far higher rates than the average among other European members of NATO, hitting a 36-year high. Many argue that this is necessary to deter Russia and mitigate the risks of a U.S. retreat from European security. But Germany’s domestic politics complicate the picture. On September 6, the far-right Alternative for Germany party took first place in state elections in eastern Germany, winning 44 percent of the vote. Germany is therefore being asked to assume a much larger role in European security while the political consensus that has underpinned its post-war foreign policy is coming under growing strain. So, what kind of military power is Germany becoming, and can Germany make the transition from decades of military restraint to becoming a country capable of leading and defending Europe? To discuss all of this and her book, which answers all these questions, we’re very happy to welcome Liana Fix back to Brussels Sprouts. Liana Fix is a senior fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations, where she also leads the Securing Ukraine’s Future Initiative. She is the author of Germany Rearmed: The Return of War and the End of Illusions (Hurst, 2026).

Today we are turning to domestic Russian politics, with Russia’s State Duma elections coming up September 18th through the 20th. The elections are taking place in a more uncertain domestic environment than we have seen since the early days of the war. The Russian economy is struggling, with slowing growth, inflation, and high interest rates squeezing businesses and households, and the Kremlin is facing increasingly difficult trade-offs between sustaining the war and maintaining economic stability at home. There is also more public recognition that Russia’s progress on the battlefield is stalling. And as Ukraine steps up attacks deep inside Russia, the war is becoming harder for ordinary Russians to ignore, with strikes on refineries and energy infrastructure contributing to fuel shortages and long petrol lines in parts of the country, including in Moscow. Although it is unclear whether the Kremlin itself is worried about instability, the regime continues its efforts to eliminate even limited sources of political uncertainty. Most recently, the Kremlin barred Yabloko, the only established party campaigning on an anti-war platform, from participating in the elections, and repression and censorship continue to narrow the space for dissent. None of this means President Vladimir Putin is losing control. The Kremlin has spent years constructing a political system designed to prevent precisely that. But the elections come at a moment when pressures on the system are becoming harder to conceal. So today, to examine what these elections can tell us about the state of Russian politics and just how stable the Putin regime really is, we are excited to welcome Mark Galeotti and Sasha Prokopenko to Brussels Sprouts. Mark Galeotti is the director of the consultancy Mayak Intelligence and a non-resident senior fellow at the Institute for International Relations Prague. Alexandra “Sasha” Prokopenko is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.

As the war in Ukraine rages on, Ukraine has struggled this summer with a munitions shortage. With U.S. supplies strained by the war with Iran, European governments are having a hard time filling the gap, both because of concerns about ensuring their own national defense and because of NATO commitments. With northern European governments reaching the limits of what they feel they can safely donate, there is growing pressure elsewhere, including in Poland, Spain, and Greece, who still have stocks of Patriot interceptors. Meanwhile, Ukrainian defense start-up Fire Point is sprinting to develop the Freyja interceptor, but it is not yet ready for use. All of this exposes the need for the European defense industry to adapt. While new output will come too late for Ukraine’s immediate needs, Europe has been racing to step up its production. The European Union has launched initiatives to support drone production and integrate cyber resilience. Poland, whose defense spending has increased fourfold since 2022, is pivoting to domestic and other central European defense companies and prioritizing drones, ammunition, and other frequently used equipment. German defense giant Rheinmetall is expanding into new sectors, including shipbuilding and space. However, questions remain about whether this is enough, especially as the United States is conducting its posture review for forces in Europe and advocating for a “NATO 3.0” in which Europeans play a larger role. What more should Europe be doing? Which firms and/or countries are leading in expansion and innovation? Where should these industries be focusing, and where are they succeeding and failing? To answer these questions and more, we are excited to welcome Christian Mölling and Guntram Wolff to this week’s edition of Brussels Sprouts. Christian Mölling is the director of the think tank European Defence in a New Age (EDINA) and a senior adviser at the European Policy Centre. Guntram Wolff is a senior fellow at Bruegel, professor of economics at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, and a fellow at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe made a highly unusual visit to Moscow this week. Although we don’t know with certainty everything that was discussed, multiple reports now confirm that Ratcliffe went in part to warn Russia against attacking a NATO member or taking steps that could escalate tensions with the alliance. The trip to Moscow comes in the context of increasingly brazen Russian attacks on NATO member states. We've seen arson attacks, assassination attempts, and explosive-laden drones in and around German airports. NATO itself has been on high alert, with a significant increase in surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft operating along the eastern flank. And for the last several months, European intelligence chiefs and senior officials have been sounding the same alarm—namely, that Russia could test NATO even while the war in Ukraine continues. It is against this backdrop of tension between Russia and the West that Hanna Notte’s book, We Shall Outlast Them, arrives. In the book, published this August, Notte argues that the war in Ukraine has become part of a much broader battle of wills, and that Russia has refocused its state machinery around sustaining and ultimately outlasting the West in this confrontation. Drawing on reporting from more than a dozen countries, the book looks at how Russia has adapted to the pressure of war and Western isolation: circumventing sanctions, forging and deepening partnerships, and finding new opportunities for influence across the Global South. Notte examines both the successes and the limits of this newly outward-facing Russian strategy. To talk about her book and what it tells us also about this current moment, we’re very excited to have Hanna Notte with us back on Brussels Sprouts. Hanna Notte is the director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California. She is also a senior associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a fellow with the Kennan Institute.