Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 7-7 – Allison Abbe – “Perceiving a Competitor: Culture and Cognitive Biases of the Strong Enemy and the Pacing Threat”

The United States and China show distinct patterns of cultural cognition that shape their perceptions of the security environment and of each other. In this podcast episode, Dr. Allison Abbe discusses theories from cross-cultural psychology to national security, highlighting sources of misperception in competition. Recommendations covering education, recruiting and retention, perspective taking in practice, and long-term workforce development will help defense institutions achieve US cognitive advantage in the Indo-Pacific. Keywords: culture, cognitive bias, mirror imaging, cultural cognition, strategic empathy, perspective taking, cognitive flexibility  Stephanie Crider (Host)Welcome to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Dr. Allison Abbe is in the studio with me today. She is professor of organizational studies and the Matthew B. Ridgway Chair of Leadership Studies at the US Army War College. Her research focuses on development of leadership and intercultural skills in national security leaders. She speaks and teaches about strategic leadership, cross-cultural competence, and organizational climate. Thank you for joining me today, Dr. Abbe.  Allison Abbe             Thanks so much for having me. It’s good to talk with you again.  HostWhat inspired you to write this monograph?  Abbe              So, there were two sources of inspiration for this monograph. One came out of conversations with students in our China integrated course, which we’ve been teaching since academic year 2024. We focus heavily on strategic culture and history about China, as well as some war gaming. In conversations with students, it was clear that they were really searching for simple narratives and simple explanations about the behavior of China as an actor. Some of that was evident in mirror imaging and making some assumptions about adversary motives and behavior that I thought needed a little bit more understanding. The second source has come from conversations that I’ve had after I published an article in Parameters a few years ago, and that article looked at strategic empathy and perspective taking in conceptual terms. And, conversations with intelligence organizations and other organizations after that article indicated that there was more need to understand the “so what” of those concepts. So, what does it look like when we apply strategic empathy and perspective taking in the context of trying to understand our competitors and adversaries? So, those were two intersecting sources of inspiration for this monograph.  HostHow will this monograph benefit US war fighters?  Abbe              There are benefits at two levels—that individual level and the enterprise level. So, at an enterprise level, I really hope that the monograph will prompt some reconsideration of programs and approaches that used to be in place but have been defunded or are just missing now that some reorganizations have happened. For example, there are some courses that used to be available in red teaming and things like that. So, I’m hoping that at an enterprise level, we could relook at some of those capabilities and programs. At the individual war fighter level, there’s always a need to better understand our adversary, our competitors, just to understand the strategic environment a little better. There’s some suggestions in the monograph about how we can go about slowing down cognition and recognizing when we might have some blind spots about our adversaries.  HostYou mentioned a moment ago mirror imaging. What is mirror imaging, and what role does it play in the US-China relationship?  Abbe              Mirror imaging is the tendency for each side in a competition or conflict to characterize their counterparts in very negative and often very similar terms. So, we always assume our own side is acting benevolently, rationally, and is fair, and we assume the other side is irrational, escalatory, and expansionist, and both the US and China have used almost exactly those terms to describe each other’s behavior. And, often that kind of language is appealing to domestic audiences, but then it limits us in seeing where there might be opportunities to de-escalate or even cooperate on some issues.  HostYou also talked about perspective taking. I’d like to revisit that as well. From my understanding, military practitioners are taught to think like the enemy through perspective taking. You describe a perspective paradox, where trying to see the other side’s view can backfire when threat perceptions are already high. Why does this happen, and is there an alternative or something we can do differently?  Abbe              It’s a great question. So, the perspective paradox is (you described it completely accurately) when we have the most motivation to really understand our adversary clearly, the conditions of competition and the stress of competition in conflict often push us back toward our cognitive biases and our work in exact contradiction to the kinds of cognition that we need to better understand the relationship and the adversary. So, things like sleep deprivation, stress, [and] security threat, all those things are likely to push us back toward our automatic default cognition when we really need to be slowing down and thinking through what are we missing? What are we getting wrong? And, the conditions of conflict just don’t really lend themselves to that. So, one solution is, during the competition phase, [to] try to build those habits of thinking and habits of planning and decision making that account for these differences in perspective, so that when you find yourself in more stressful, time-pressured situations, you’ve already built those into your decision-making processes so that you can account for adversary behavior much more accurately.  HostYour research highlights a contrast between Western analytical thinking and East Asian holistic thinking. Can you expand on the comparison and explain it for us?  AbbeSure. So, when we talk about Western—so, there, I’m obviously referring to the United States, but also similar cultures, English-speaking cultures, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia.  HostOkay.  Abbe A lot of this research has happened in those cultures, as well. The cultures in East Asia are obviously very distinct, but they do have some similar patterns of holistic thinking that contrast with more Western analytic ways of thinking. Whereas in the US, we tend to think in rather linear, mechanistic, and reductionist terms, in East Asian cultures, holistic thinking patterns and more readily viewing situations and circumstances as able to change [are the norm]. So, whereas US observers would be looking for continuity in the environment, East Asian and Chinese observers would be expecting that change would occur [and] that those are complementary. Change is just as likely as continuity. It’s not that they would dismiss continuity altogether. And, in perspective taking, US observers tend to engage in a lot of projection of their own point of view, and East Asian observers are a little quicker to accommodate the other person’s perspective in a more [alterocentric] way. So, they also will show egocentric bias, but not to the same degree that US observers do. Those differences in thinking just make it harder to understand the other’s point of view and how they’re viewing the strategic environment. There have been a series of experimental studies that show that US observers and East Asian observers, when they look at an image, they actually are seeing very different things and paying attention to different things. And, they can show that through eye-tracker data. So, [the data show] what people are actually literally looking at when they see these images and then their descriptions of those images. And, in the case of US observers, they’re often focused on an individual actor or individual object that seems to be the center or the most prominent in a photograph or an image or video. Whereas, when you ask East Asian observers to look at the same image or video and describe it, they describe the relationships. They describe how different actors are interacting with each other (or could be) and look over time at what that relationship is. So, they’re quite literally seeing different things in the same exact setting or image, and that comes from the way that people are socialized from childhood. So, US kids are asked to categorize in that kind of reductionist mode that I mentioned earlier, and East Asian children are socialized to look and talk about the relationships between actors in the environment. And so, that really influences your starting point, if you’re trying to engage in systems thinking. US observers will start with the actors rather than the context and the relationships, and East Asian observers would be starting from the opposite perspective, [by] starting to consider the relationships and context, and focusing to a lesser extent on the individual actors or components in isolation. So, that’s a more integrated way of looking at the strategic environment ...

In this episode, Thomas Bruscino argues that American military professionals must focus on war fighting in publishing about military history to bring their unique military perspectives to the study of war. Bruscino uses the historical example of American professional military writing and teaching from the American Civil War to World War II about General Ulysses S. Grant to demonstrate the value of analyses focusing on war fighting, especially relative to popular and academic histories of Grant’s military leadership. Keywords: military publishing, professional military education, Ulysses S. Grant, military leadership, military strategy  Stephanie Crider (Host)Welcome to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Joining me today is Dr. Thomas Bruscino, a historian and professor in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College and author of “War Fighting: The Case of Ulysses Grant,” which you can find in the Autumn 2025 issue of Parameters. Welcome to Decisive Point.  Dr. Thomas BruscinoThank you. Glad to be here.  HostSo, today we’re looking through the lens of your research to discuss how military leaders can lead the revitalization of professional military writing and institutional memory. You note that after World War II, professional military writing largely lost its influence outside the US Army, and schoolhouses then turned toward broader policy issues.Today, for a senior officer who sits at the intersection of policy and execution, how can they use professional publishing to project unique military perspectives back into broader academic and popular strategic discourse?  BruscinoWhat I was noticing, doing research on World War I and World War II, areas that I do a lot of work on (and I’m a big fan of Ulysses S. Grant—particularly the 1864 campaigns and the strategy for the last year of the [Civil] War) is that the folks writing before studying in the military schoolhouses prior to World War I, and in the interwar period prior to World War II, did a really good job of understanding Grant [and] the way that he approached the campaigns. And, the reason I think they were good at doing that is because they were able to put themselves into the positions. They didn’t think so much in terms of levels of war the way we do now, where we talk about strategy and operational art and tactics, and they focused more on what it would mean to be a field army commander or a theater commander. And in doing that, in focusing on positions, as opposed to saying, “I’m a strategic leader, I’m a field army commander, or in a field army staff,” or “I’m on a” what we now call a “Joint Task Force or a theater command.” And, since they did that, they were able to put themselves into the shoes of Grant. And in doing that, they were able to really bring that unique perspective that only military officers and military professionals really have because they’re putting themselves in that position. So, when they write from that perspective, they bring something unique and valuable to the wider discussions that are academic, popular, [and] that are out there because we have a tendency to boil it down in popular (and even a lot of academic writing) just to big arrows on maps, sort of hand-wave versions of this. But, by putting themselves in those positions, they really empathized with the subject because they have that view that they’re going to be that person someday and that they needed to understand it that way. And, I think in doing that, they bring this perspective that is missing in a lot of the stuff out there. And so, this has been a longtime thing of teaching military professionals and thinking about these issues. I’m always in this [mode] and preparing, trying to prepare, [and] help them prepare themselves for those positions. That’s always this gap when I’m looking for writings that are useful for soon-to-be senior officers or current senior officers. And, I really do think it funnels through them, that [as] these ideas funnel through them, that’ll make a huge difference in what they’re doing.  HostSo, when we’re looking at leaders who are thinking about strategic-level issues, how can they write candidly without violating operational security?  BruscinoIf they lead with the lessons learned, it will usually manifest in the form of some kind of principles, these are not to say laws. We’re good Clausewitzians here [at the US Army War college] so we don’t think of warfare as being dictated by laws but by principles, principles that, generally, when applied, are effective in helping commanders and staff sort through these types of problems at their appropriate level. If you’re leading with principles, and you’re writing to understand and to describe principles, the ones that are the most important that you found to be—senior leaders have found to be—the most important in their roles as, like I said, field army commanders, Joint Task Force commanders and staffs, theater-levels commanders and staff—then you’re pretty safe. When it comes to the specifics, like how those are applied, I think that probably the best way is to stick with—I’m a historian, so I’ll have my bias here, but I think it’s useful—the historical examples, if it’s for an open audience. In a TS, in a top-secret environment, maybe you can get into the specifics of how they apply. But, we’re talking about wider writing right now. In that case, I think you can go back and say, “Hey, this is a lot like what Grant had to deal with. It’s a lot like what (General Douglas) MacArthur had to deal with, or (Fleet Admiral Chester W.) Nimitz or (General Creighton W.) Abrams or (General H. Norman) Schwarzkopf, (David H.) Petraeus.” It doesn’t matter, any of those people. And, you can say, “Here are these principles playing out in this historical example,” and then let your audience make the connections to their current issues.  HostYou highlighted that Grant and General George G. Meade didn’t just maneuver armies. They orchestrated the physical arrangement of a joint supply system and established successive waterborne bases like City Point, Virginia. So, given today’s contested logistics environments in theaters like the Indo-Pacific, how can senior leaders use these kinds of historical insights to build real physical resiliency into modern theater sustainment plans?  BruscinoSo, the theory that they studied in the past, the principles that they were talking about, the original military theory that a lot of these folks studied, some of this is (Henri, baron de) Jomini some of its (Carl von) Clausewitz, and then there’s a whole range of other people—that’s another discussion/article to work on to help explain that stuff— really tended to break up strategies. The concept of strategy tended to be focused on large units—so, those things that we’re talking about, theaters, field army to army groups, that sort of idea of it—or what we now call Joint Task Forces, which is very similar in the past to now. So, that would be the kind of focus of strategy. They had another category, and I don’t know that this was exactly right, but they also would separate out logistics and would say that warfare really consisted of strategy, tactics, logistics, engineering (they’d often put into there, too). I don’t know that that’s necessarily the best way to look at it as we move forward, but the focus on and the linking of logistics to strategy was sort of how they thought, and logistics was kept as a thing, and it was very well-understood by those guys that that’s commander’s business. Logistics is commander’s business. So, we have a tendency, now, to talk in terms of sustainment as a function, and even logistics as a function. And, that is owned by either a G-4 or a J-4, the assistant or deputy chief of staff for logistics, or it’s part of a sustainment function, which is supposed to be everyone’s business in the way that we talk about it but then tends to just get pushed to the fore. It gets pushed to the main sustainment officer. I think that when somebody like Grant, who was a quartermaster in his background (so he had a very good understanding of what was necessary for that), he had a long experience with moving large bodies of troops, with the Navy, with boats in the Western theaters of the Civil War. For him, it was all the same thing. You had to always account for your logistics. That was a massive portion of what you did, and that was his business. So, he’s the one who was doing the arranging of that with the support of quartermasters, what we now call G-4s or J-4s, that would be doing that for him. So, it really is that sort of commander’s focus on logistics. That is commander’s business.  HostIn Grant’s time, jointness meant the Army and Navy securing supply ports. What does that historical joint baseline teach us about the friction we face today in multidomain command and control?  BruscinoWhen it comes to command and control, we have the ability to communicate very broadly and almost instantaneously about all kinds of matters. So, when I say they should be focused on logistics, that doesn’t mean that they should be doing some sort of version of over control, putting themselves into the execution of this, the exec...

Education is often only examined within a single domain before, during, and after armed conflicts, limiting the use and effectiveness of civil-affairs operations. In this episode, Jason Jabbari discusses a framework of the primary mechanisms across unique domains by which education can serve as a key area of resiliency or vulnerability and addresses the costs, benefits, and potential roles military civil affairs can play in a post-conflict scenario. Keywords: education, armed conflict, human rights, civil affairs, vulnerabilities and resiliencies  Stephanie Crider (Host)Welcome to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.  Jason Jabbari is joining me today. Jabbari is an assistant professor at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri, and serves as a public education officer at the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, US Army Reserve. He holds a PhD in education from Washington University and a master of education degree in school leadership from Harvard University. Jabbari is the founding director of the Center for Education Research, Practice, and Policy Partnership at Washington University and the faculty director of community engagement at the Clark-Fox Policy Institute.  Welcome to Decisive Point, Dr. Jabbari.  Jason JabbariThanks for having me.  HostWhy should military planners look beyond human capital or economic growth when evaluating a conflict zone’s educational system?  JabbariYeah, that’s a great question. So, we know from research that human capital isn’t enough. We know that educated societies can fall to extreme ideologies. Economic growth doesn’t guarantee [and] democracy doesn’t guarantee stability. We have some examples—especially in our recent past. We could think about the suicide bombers during 9/11, [and] elite institutions, you know, in Nazi Germany. And so, we know that just post-secondary education, years of schooling, and human capital really doesn’t lead to democracy or stability. So, I think we need to adopt a much wider lens to understand how education functions pretty broadly in a society.  HostYou also document how Russia has imposed its curriculum and national identity in occupied territories. How can local civil affairs operations actively counter this specific type of political weaponization of schools?  JabbariWe have some recent evidence linking education in Ukraine to how Russia is using schools and using students to try to “Russify” different parts of Ukraine. We can think about imposed curriculum, using propaganda to kind of attempt to erase Ukrainian identity, [and] forcing students over 18 as draftees. We can view this as a weaponization of the political domain, right?  School [are] being [used as] an attempt to flip places where democratic socialization can occur into tools of extremism. And, I think that the goal here is to think about how this can be countered. How can democratic education [effect change]? Schools for democracy, youth for democracy, these are programs in Ukraine that have really adapted to wartime with online delivery. And, I think here, you know, for civil affairs, we’re thinking about commanders downrange. And, I think data like this can be used to pinpoint [the fact] that schools may be used for indoctrination or child-soldier recruitment, which might have implications for military engagements.  And so, here, it’s important to note that civil affairs is not just about post-conflict rebuilding. It’s about providing information that battlefield commanders can use, again, or not use. The point here is to provide a broad set of information, and I think the Ukraine example is a good one because it does demonstrate how education is being used, or attempted to be used, by Russia in the current war.  HostLet’s talk about how Ukraine recently guaranteed free access to preschool education, despite the ongoing war. What makes universal preschool such a powerful tool for rebuilding long-term academic and social resilience in a war-torn country?  JabbariWe know that preschool drives long-term economic gains, especially for low-income students. It’s a very strong return-on-investment mechanism, right? So, we have some evidence from [an] economist named Jim (James J.) Heckman that essentially shows that the earlier [adults] intervene, the broader and the longer and the stronger the gains are going to be. So here, we can think about early childhood education as investments that can accumulate over time. This is especially important during wars, as parents are often preoccupied.  You can imagine, you know, fathers are fighting in the war. Sometimes mothers are serving as nurses. Places for kids to learn, I think, is going to be really important. Here, quality is key. There’s a universality policy that is really important. We want to make sure that kids have a place to go and learn, which is especially important during wars. We want to make sure that that place to learn has high-quality [education and services]. And so, that was something that the Ukrainian government, you know, really tried to shore up to make sure that early childhood [education] was not only free, but [also] high quality.  Here, it can build intellectual, social-emotional, [and] psychological foundations at once. If you think about this in the long term, this could allow Ukraine to build back better. Investing early builds long-term capacity. It aligns with a strategy for building back better after a conflict.  HostYou mention that broad nation-building efforts are not synonymous with civil affairs engagements. What’s the distinct role of US Army civil affairs in restoring essential services like education?  JabbariWe kind of think of this in a few different layers and aspects. And so, we have transitional governance. We have civil knowledge integration, network development, and civil-military integration. And so, we can think about civil knowledge integration as collecting and analyzing civil data for operational relevance. You can imagine in Ukraine right now, [civil affairs experts are] thinking about some of the data that helps us understand how that country is going to function, you know, both during the war and after.  For civil network development, you know, this is really trying to engage a broad array of stakeholders. Using the Ukraine example, [civil affairs leaders are] thinking about educators, employers, [and] vocational/educational training institutes, both for the current demands of Ukraine as well as what happens after. Civil-military integration is coordinating military and civilian actors towards unified action. Again, this could involve working with NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and governments to shore up schools. And then, [there is] transitional governance. This is a period of advising civil administrations and institutions on key policies post-conflict.  Together, I think these [concepts] are really distinct. They’re targeted goals for civil affairs, which is different than broad nation-building efforts. And here, I would just say that education is really viewed as an essential service. It feeds civil security. It helps establish and maintain rule of law. It can improve cultural relations and economic growth at the same time. And so, we view this as an essential service.  HostYou also talk about how the rentier effect and foreign aid centralization hampered long-term education goals in Afghanistan. How can Ukraine and NATO avoid these same structural failures during post-conflict reconstruction?  JabbariFrom the lessons over the past 20 years, I feel that self-determination is a key lesson to take away. When we looked at some of the things that Ukraine [is] doing currently in their education system—some of their policies, some of their programs, some of their broader efforts—we see a lot of self-determination here, and I think that is going to be key. It both allows the local citizens to trust the leaders that are making these choices and these policies, and it allows them to have a say in how these things unfold over time.  And so, again, I think there’s this balance of self-determination. Also, if they’re able to get advisement, these are things that can be really helpful for a country in the rebuilding phase. But, I think it’s important that self-determination, that lesson we learned over the past 20 years, is carried forward. And so, [when] we think about what Ukraine is doing currently, I think there’s a lot of promise in being able to move that forward in a post-conflict setting.  HostYou are clearly passionate about education and education policy. What inspired you to write this article?  JabbariI have spent most of my life in education. So, I was a teacher, I was a school leader. I joined the Army Reserves because they opened up some specialty places. One of those was in education—as part of civil affairs—in their 38-Golf (38G) program. And, I think what inspired me was this idea to really think about education in a much broader way.  You know, I’m a researcher by training, especially over the past 10 years. So, I went from practice now to research. And so, I’m able to step back, look at things, and try to paint a bigger picture. What is ...

In this podcast episode, Lucas Ziller contends that the current US deterrence-by-denial strategy is insufficient to deter China from attempting forcible unification with Taiwan, due to its neglect of ideological and psychological drivers in the Chinese Communist Party’s decision-making calculus. He introduces a hybrid deterrence framework that integrates denial and punishment across domains, coordinated by a Joint Interagency Organization. Keywords: deterrence, interagency, China, Taiwan, operational-level planning  Stephanie Crider (Host)Welcome to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Joining me today is Major Lucas Ziller, author of “A Hybrid Deterrence Model for Countering China,” which you can find in the Winter 2025–26 issue of Parameters.  Ziller is an Infantry officer serving as a battalion operations officer in the 82nd Airborne Division. He has served in units within US Central Command, US Special Operations Command, and US Army Forces Command. He holds degrees from the University of Toronto, the University of Kansas, the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, and the US Army Command and General Staff College.Welcome, Lucas.  Lucas ZillerThank you. Appreciate you having me. Appreciate the opportunity.  HostI’m glad you’re here.  Your article argues that the current US deterrence-by-denial strategy suffers from critical flaws. Why does a purely military, force-centric posture fail to resonate with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) decision-making calculus?  ZillerAppreciate that question. So, I wrote the article primarily because I felt that there was a fairly simple question that my research drove me towards. And that’s, you know, is the US trying to deter China from forced reunification with Taiwan in a way or a method that China actually makes decisions?  I think a lot of discussion about Taiwan focuses on the military capabilities of all sides. How many ships are involved? How many missiles? How many aircraft? How many troops all sides have? Those things absolutely matter. I’m not trying to argue otherwise, but deterrence isn’t just about military capability. It’s also about psychology. It’s about how a adversary perceives things like costs, risk, and opportunities at hand.  So, the more I studied both deterrence theory as well as Chinese strategic thinking, the more I felt that there was a gap between the United States deterrence approach vis-à-vis [China’s] forceful reunification with Taiwan. I think US policymakers assume Beijing will evaluate a Taiwan contingency primarily through a rational cost-benefit calculation, but Taiwan is tied to a Chinese regime, legitimacy, nationalism, [and] Chinese Communist Party identity. Because of that, military costs alone may not have the desired deterrent effect that US policymakers are looking for. So, that led me to ask whether the American approach towards deterrence is complete. And, my conclusion wasn’t that deterrence by denial is wrong, necessarily, it’s that now, by itself, [deterrence by denial] probably isn’t enough, and that kind of drove my analysis as well as my conclusion/recommendations.  HostYour article highlights how Beijing views Taiwan not just as a strategic interest but as a moral imperative central to regime legitimacy. How does this moralization of national interests alter China’s willingness to absorb immense material losses?  ZillerOne thing that stood out to me as I was researching the article is that not all interests are equal. Countries, whether it’s [the] United States or China, routinely negotiate over trade, resources, or territory, but when the leaders of those countries begin to frame the issues in moral terms, or historical terms, compromise between those countries becomes much more difficult. The CCP has routinely and repeatedly described reunification with Taiwan as part of, as they phrase it, a great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. And, that’s a very different framing than saying it’s simply in Chinese or China’s strategic interests. That terminology and other things like it is very heavy with moral and historical connotations. So, when leaders publicly make those kinds of comments over the span of many years or, in China’s case, many decades, they create expectations within their party, the Chinese Communist Party, but [also] among the broader population. And that, ultimately, narrows their room to maneuver or to negotiate with the United States, Taiwan, or any other player within the dynamic. We’ve seen this specific dynamic play out in the past. China accepted enormous costs during the Korean War because Beijing viewed the conflict as tied to their own regime security, as well as their revolutionary legitimacy. And then, more broadly, governments throughout history have often accepted severe economic or military costs because backing down carried even greater political or symbolic costs. It’s not just a tit for tat or a binary choice between costs and interests. I don’t mean to insinuate that conflict is inevitable in any way, and it doesn’t mean that deterrence can’t work. It just means that the United States has to recognize that the CCP may weigh costs differently than America would. Because Taiwan is bound up within that party’s legitimacy/identity, Beijing may be willing to accept costs that traditional deterrence models assume would be unacceptable for any other normal player. Understanding that difference doesn’t weaken deterrence, it actually makes it more realistic and, ultimately, more likely to succeed if certain measures are taken.  HostProponents claim that strategic ambiguity provides vital diplomatic flexibility, but you suggest that it might incentivize incremental Chinese aggression. Why do you believe Washington’s lack of clarity is being misread by Beijing as a sign of weakness or indecision?  ZillerThank you for that question. It’s very apropos to the topic. Strategic ambiguity has served the United States and policymakers for decades now, and there are good reasons why it was adopted in the first place. It gave, and continues to give, policymakers some level of flexibility and helps to discourage unilateral actions by either Beijing or Taipei. For Beijing, it discourages forceful unification, and for Taipei, it discourages unilateral independence or unilateral announcement of independence.  My argument isn’t that the United States should abandon ambiguity overnight but, rather that policymakers should ask whether the strategy is still producing the effects and the effects of the degree that the United States wants. The strategic environment has changed very dramatically since the policy was first adopted, so I think it’s time to kind of revisit the question of strategic ambiguity’s place within the deterrence relationship. This reassessment is warranted. You know, just looking at some recent events (or relatively recent events)over the last several years, there’s been a steady increase in PLA (People’s Liberation Army) air and maritime activity around Taiwan. They’ve carried out larger exercises. They’ve participated in more coercive behavior and more gray-zone operations. To add some specifics to that, to put things in perspective, the PLA aircraft have entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (or ADIZ) roughly 1,700 times in 2023.  Just one year later, so in 2024, that number had climbed to more than 3,600. That’s not a small change. That’s a significant increase in operational tempo. If you’re sitting in Beijing [and] every year, you’re flying more and more aircraft around Taiwan, conducting larger exercises, and spending more time operating around the island, yet, nothing fundamentally changes about how the United States responds, at some point, I think it’s reasonable to ask whether you’re beginning to interpret the signals that you’re giving off differently than Washington intends. So, that’s really the question that I’m raising. Another challenge with strategic ambiguity as a central pillar of deterrence policy is that flexibility for one side can sometimes look like uncertainty to the other. And, one of the central components of deterrence is how all parties, in the case of the three-way deterrence relationship that’s prevalent in the Taiwanese straits, is how everyone perceives each other and the actions that the participants—and the terms of the relationship—are given out. If an adversary isn’t confident about your intentions or your willingness to respond, there’s a greater chance they’ll test the boundaries incrementally rather than through a single dramatic action. That’s, I think, what we’ve been seeing in the last couple [of] years, as those statistics articulate.  Just a final thought on this question. Ultimately, that’s why I think signaling deserves as much attention as the military force posture. It’s not only about what capabilities the United States has. It’s about making sure their actions, diplomatic messaging, as well as military posture reinforce one another, rather than sending any sort of mixed signals or unclear messages.  The most effective deterrent signal isn’t a single military exercise or a single diplomatic statement issued at different points. It’s all of those instruments consistently communicating the same me...

Cheap drones have transformed the character of war by creating a “mass effect” that challenges traditional principles of force concentration. Drawing on lessons from Ukraine, historical theory, and production trends, Erik A. Davis explains why the production of cheap “precision mass” is expected to accelerate.Keywords: drone, sense, strike, mass, Jevons Stephanie Crider (Host)Welcome to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I am speaking remotely with Colonel Erik A. Davis, author of “Drones and the Changing Character of War,” which you can find in the Winter 2025–26 issue of Parameters. Davis has more than 16 years’ experience in US Army special operations. Davis has more than 16 years’ experience in US Army special operations. He is a General Wayne A. Downing scholar, whose assignments have taken him from village stability operations in Afghanistan to preparing for high-end conflict in the first island chain. He is currently in command in Japan, and he writes about data in the Army at https://www.downrange-data.com/. Welcome to Decisive Point, Colonel Davis.  Colonel Erik A. DavisThank you very much, Stephanie. Thank you for having me.  HostWhat inspired you to write this article?  DavisMostly a debate. A couple years ago, I was a senior service college student in ’24, but [I was] heavily influenced by the debate about were drones impactful or not and, if so, why?  HostIn your article, you note that “you need mass to take and to defend objectives, but on a battlefield littered with cheap drones, that same mass gets you killed.” How should commanders navigate this paradox when trying to capture a heavily fortified position?  DavisCredit where credit is due, I really borrowed heavily from Dr. Jack Watling on that one. He’s a RUSI researcher from the UK (United Kingdom). I highly recommend anything he’s written, but he said that when I was in senior service college. I was a fellow in Australia, and he said it to the audience there, and it was a really impactful idea because he’s been arguing [this point] for a while. There’s been a talk about whether this is offense or defense [that] has the advantage right now. And he’s like, it’s not an offense/defense thing. It really comes down to the ability to sense and deliver fires on an offense or a defense. And so, we’ve kind of changed—where we used to have the mass rule, most students I think, are very familiar with the 3 to 1 for an assault. And, that’s not really the math problem anymore. It is [that] you have a time period that affects how effective that mass is. You need to mass forces. You can’t take an objective without them, but at the same time, then you have to disperse afterwards, and how do you sustain and maintain everything—logistics, the security, all of that. And so, weirdly enough, it actually brings me a little more to my SOF [special operations forces] roots, where (Admiral William H.) McRaven had what was called “relative superiority,” and the idea was why SOF works. It works because it only works for a short amount of time. I don’t think that the rest of the military has gotten to that short amount of time, but I do think the rest of the military has to start thinking about that relative superiority. If you have a mass, it’s giving you advantage. However, it’s also starting to draw in enemy and resources, and you’ve got to disperse it.  HostYou also discuss in your article how Jevons’ Paradox and the Red Queen Effect are fueling a relentless race in military innovation. For our listeners who might not know, could you explain what are Jevons’ Paradox and the Red Queen Effect and then a follow-on—given how quickly adversarial drone tactics adapt, what specific changes should the US military make to its procurement process to keep pace with competitors?  DavisTwo theories that come from eighteenth-century Englishmen. It’s very old stuff, and yet it’s not very well known. I’d like to start with the Red Queen Effect. I first heard about [the] Red Queen Effect back in grad school in 2013. I was a Downing Scholar at the London School of Economics (and Political Science), and as soon as I heard it, I thought everybody knew it. I thought it was the last guy to the table, and I’ve discovered since then that most of the military is not familiar with the Red Queen Effect, which comes from Lewis Carroll’s story [Through the Looking Glass]. It talks about the Queen having to constantly run as fast as you can just to stay where you’re at, and it really describes military tactics and military weapons development because you don’t just get to sit back and [think to yourself] I have the right tactics. I have all the things. You’re constantly having to innovate. You’re constantly having to work because the payoffs for finding a gap, finding a seam, finding a newer way to do it is so huge that every military is constantly working towards this. And, I mean, sometimes [people] forget [that] the global superpowers used to be Spain and Portugal. They’re not the global superpowers today. That is because there’s this constant Red Queen Effect. I had a friend who once described all military strategy as just trying to find a flank, and I think that that’s kind of what the Red Queen Effect is. It’s just constantly trying to find an advantage. Sometimes it’s a bigger and better [advantage], but sometimes the bigger and better actually incentivizes the cheaper and the smaller. And, I think that’s where we’re at today is you just see something where the payoff of finding a cheap way to circumvent some of the amazing military capabilities the US military has—that people could never catch up with, they could never build it [because] it is too expensive, [or] it’s too bespoke—is they found a really cheap way [to do it]. And, there’s a huge payoff if you can do that. So, I hope that helps make the Red Queen make sense. It’s a literature thing. You go to Jevons, [and] now you’ve got a standard English economist. He’s looking at coal, and everybody’s worried about whether they’re going to run out of coal, and there’s this notice that all of the engines they’re building are getting slowly more and more efficient. And so, there’s this idea of, okay, we’ll be fine. We won’t have to worry about it. Well, Jevons is the one who notices that not everything, and coal is this input where the more efficient it is, suddenly you start finding uses for it that you didn’t use to use it for. So, there’s actually an increase in demand, even though you’ve managed to make the product more useful. A dumb example I can give you is, like, your water heater. I borrowed this from a guy named Hank Green. He works on Vlog Brothers on YouTube. I’m a nerd. I apologize. But, he talks about water heaters, like, we didn’t used to have water heaters. Hot water used to be only for the richest of the rich. The royalty had hot water, and everybody else didn’t. And then eventually, we invented [the] hot water heater to do a single thing, but then, once everybody started having hot water heaters in the house, now we started making washing machines, clothes washers, all kinds of things. Next, you have electricity going to homes because of this. And so, there’s this feedback. You look at Uber today as a great example. Uber makes no sense until everybody has a GPS-enabled supercomputer in their pocket and then, Uber becomes obvious. And so, Jevons, when you look at a lot of the military hardware, has been going through that. So, I go back to GPS. If you go [to] 1980, the old GPSes were the same size as the radios we had. They were 20 pounds, they were giant bricks, and they cost as much as a house. So, nobody got them. Only a couple of units got them. They were really expensive, really hard to maintain, and they took up a lot of space. Now, a GPS, it’s less than a pair of cards. It’s less than $50. We put them in everything. We put them in things that don’t really even need them just because they’re so cheap. That’s not the only technology—cameras. I remember agonizing after my second combat deployment. I was going to buy my first real camera, a DSLR (digital single-lens reflex), and I spent forever reading reviews and all those things. Now, I have a phone that has seven cameras in it, and I don’t even pay attention because they’re so cheap and they’re so light and they’re so small. [It is similar with] thermal imaging, night vision, [and] storage. Data storage used to cost more. So, for the technology in the military side [and] that Jevons’ thing, what has happened is [that] now, on top of the Red Queen Effect of all of us trying to rapidly innovate, there’s a way to do innovation now that’s so much cheaper that it really upends a lot of it, which, to bring it back to the original point, how do we need to change our acquisitions? Well, we kind of got to do both. Like, we’re still going to need to build submarines. We’re still going to need to build amazing jets and things that can intercept ballistic missiles and tanks. And, those are hard and complicated and big things, but at the same time, we’re also going to be building these very cheap and simple toys and tools that we’re going to be able to give to everybody. How c...

What is the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor and why does it matter to the United States? What does it mean for global trade? Troy J. Bouffard and Les Grau explain.Keywords: Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor, Russia, China, Northern Sea Route, global economy Stephanie Crider (Host)Welcome to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.I’m talking remotely with Troy J. Bouffard and Lester W. Grau, coauthors with Charles K. Bartles and Mathieu Boulègue of “Russian Arctic Land Forces and Defense Trends Redefined by NATO and Ukraine,” which was published in the Autumn 2025 issue of Parameters.Bouffard (US Army, retired) has a master’s degree in Arctic policy and a PhD in arctic defense and security from the University of Alaska Fairbanks, where he’s an assistant professor of Arctic Security. He is the director of the University of Alaska Fairbanks Center for Arctic Security and Resilience and a research fellow with the United States Military Academy’s Modern War Institute.Grau (lieutenant colonel, US Army, retired) specializes in Russian military studies and is a senior analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a PhD from the University of Kansas in Russian and Central Asian history. He has written numerous books and articles on tactical, operational, and geopolitical subjects.The last time we were here, we were talking about your Parameters article.For listeners, if you’re interested, the podcast about the article is episode 6-3.For decades, Russia treated the Northern Sea Route as its national transport artery. Now, it’s talking about the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor. What exactly is this corridor, and why does it matter to the United States and countries like Russia, Europe, and China?Troy J. BouffardYeah, the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor is quite significant. This is a major shift in Russian policy from the Kremlin. Since last century on, and formally, more recent decades, the Northern Sea Route was mentioned by [then–Soviet Union PresidentMikhail] Gorbachev on October 1, 1987, as part of what he called the “zone of peace” for the Arctic region. But, [he] planted that seed that the Northern Sea Route was gonna be the epicenter of how that worked.And then, with time, it became part of federal law exactly what the Northern Sea Route was, according to Russia. And then, it built its international case legally, and otherwise, on how it would manage the Northern Sea Route and—just as important—access to it. And, this has frustrated the West because it deviated from the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and freedom of navigation rules. But Russia had a very strong case because they were consistent.Changes to that definition, though, were a bit of a challenge. Several years ago, Putin had mandated that 80 million tonnes [of cargo] needed to be shipped through the Northern Sea Route by a certain date. And, up to that point, the record had been only about 10 million tonnes. And, that caused a lot of problems for Russian officials who scrambled, knowing that there’s no way, by the due date, that 80 million tonnes could possibly be shipped through the Northern Sea Route, which was largely symbolic, but a strategic move by Putin to show how important the Northern Sea Route was.They got busy and got clever on trying to change the definition of the Northern Sea Route to extend it because it only goes from the Kara Gate[s] to the Bering Strait and doesn’t include, formally, the part of the Barents Sea—where most maritime activity actually happens.So, they tried to extend the definition, and Putin would have none of it because he knows, in accordance with international law, if you change the definition of something like that, you reset everything that was part of building up that case. And, now we see this new position from the Kremlin—not changing the definition of the Northern Sea Route but elevating it to this level that connects Vladivostok all the way to St. Petersburg.Lester W. GrauBasically, these are the two major ports of Russia, and theyhave been very important to Russia for centuries. So, by incorporating these ports as part of a greater route, they’re also kicking other things into being—and it’s called the “transportation corridor.” It’s not just about ships. It’s also very much about railroads. And, to a certain degree, it’s about roads.And, if this is carried through, this could be an extremely major program in Russia, depending how much effort they put into this. If you look at our own history in 1956, we had the National Highways Act [Federal Aid Highway Act], where we built the interstate highway system in the United States. It was expensive, but the results were that it moved a lot of industry to the West Coast and moved a lot of the populace westward.It also moved a lot of people from these city cores out into the suburbs and, basically, has had a fantastic impact on the growth of the United States, as well as giving us the ability to move goods in a hurry in any direction. So, I expect that the railroads are going to be the main beneficiaries. There’s already a good rail system that goes to St. Petersburg from the North Sea, but I expect to see that expanded and extended. Rivers and canals have always been a major part of Russian transport. We’re going to see some more of that as well. One of the things I think the corridor will do is to tie Russia together better. The connection and ties between the eastern part and the western part of Russia is rather tenuous, but this corridor can do major things toward strengthening the unification of the country.HostRosatom is Russia’s state nuclear energy giant, and it now oversees this entire corridor. What will change? And if so, how?Bouffard[I don’t] think anything’s gonna change. Rosatom is one of two state corporations for Russia, the other being Roscosmos. And, this civilian agency was put in charge of the Northern Sea Route administration in operational conduct for many years now. And, it was a surprise to many, but it’s been fairly efficient. The scope and importance of the Northern Sea Route took a while for others to understand how important it was—Russia’s position, Putin maneuvering for international purposes, and all the things involved. Rosatom, [it] turns out, they were actually in a good position to administer. And, they understand how to expand the importance of the Russian Arctic in ways probably no other agency could actually manage.I’m not sure there would be another agency that can handle it like Rosatom. They get it. They understand that the importance of connecting Vladivostok to St. Petersburg formally with a corridor like this is just part of connecting Asia to Europe, and that’s the big picture that Russia sees. This is ultimately what they want, which is [for] China and Southeast Asia to use the Northern Sea Route as much as possible and justify all of the investments, all of the positions that Russia has—the safety, the maritime coordination, the infrastructure development, everything. This has been their ultimate goal for quite a while.And, this particular move, you know, establishing this idea of the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor is really notable. There’s been nothing like this for over a century, where Russia now has a definitive goal of going beyond the Northern Sea Route, which tells me they feel that that position is firmly established well enough to defend internationally, legally, and militarily—if needed. And now, they feel like they’re in a position now to expand. And, the connection is obvious. It’s China and Southeast Asia. They want everyone using the Northern Sea Route as much as possible. And, this is how it’s gonna happen.GrauThe expansion of the Northern Sea route has already started with Chinese transit. Russia moves a lot of fuel, liquid natural gas (LNG), and oil on the Northern Sea Route to China. This last year China had 17 container ships use the Northern Sea Route to get their goods to Europe. The route saves China about two weeks of transit time. This is quite considerable. South Korea is going to make a test run on the Northern Sea Route this summer or fall. Of course, South Korea has long been an ally of ours. But this is trade, this is commerce. And, for South Korea, this makes a lot more sense and saves a lot more money by being able to move, particularly container ships, on the route. It’s a major step.BouffardThat’s a bit of a challenge, too. Container ships that are used throughout global maritime shipping enterprise have become so huge. And that’s in an effort to reduce shipping costs. They’re now named things like Chinamax and Suezmax and Panamamax. And, what that means is these are ships that are just small enough, or just big enough, to get through those canals in those areas. Those will not fit in the Arctic. They may fit, someday, through the Trans-Arctic Corridor when sea ice, perhaps, allows, but through the Northern Sea Route, the max-size container ship, [will not], right? This is the kind of ship that really moves the goods and [carries out] commerce that Les mentioned, [and it] is limited to what’s called an Arcticmax ship, which is about half the size of a Panamamax.For many years now, as we debated the viability of the North being part of shipping, a lot of myths popped up. A lot of studies happened, and it’s pretty clear. Obviously, for keel and depth, Arcticmax is about your limit, f...

The fundamentals the Irish National Army used in the Irish Civil War (1922–23) are a model for the successful application of a classic counterinsurgency which, if understood earlier, could have made a difference in the United States’ most recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. John A. Nagl and Gareth Prendergast explain. Keywords: counterinsurgency, Ireland, Irish Civil War, military strategy, treatyStephanie Crider (Host)       Welcome to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.I am speaking with Gareth Prendergast and John A. Nagl today.Prendergast is a serving colonel in the Irish Army and the author of Clear-Hold-Build: How the Free State Won the Irish Civil WarNagl is the General John J. Pershing Professor of Warfighting Studies in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College. They coauthored “Turning Tactical Victories into Strategic Success: Counterinsurgency in the Irish Civil War, 1922–23,” which you can find in the Summer 2026 issue of Parameters.This podcast has been a long time in the making. Thank you both for showing up today.John A. NaglDelighted to be here, Stephanie.Gareth PrendergastHello, Stephanie.HostLet’s just start at the beginning. How did you two meet?Prendergast  I met John at a conference in, Ireland, well, 15 years ago. And, I’d heard all about him. I’d read his book. I bought him a pint of Guinness, and we were chatting at the bar for the evening in the officer’s mess. I felt we obviously made a connection. So, a few years later, when I asked him if he’d like to write the foreword to my book, he was very generous, and he said he would—but I had to invite him to Ireland and buy him a pint of Guinness.So, I did that.NaglThat seemed reasonable to me. It seemed like a reasonable ask on my part.PrendergastYeah.So, I met him in Ireland, and he says, “Oh, you’re not the guy I remember. You’re a different person.” So…But he still came all the way over to Ireland, and he still wrote the foreword to my book. And, I hope we’ve become good friends ever since.And, I would like to thank him.Nagl   Yeah, Gareth and I have spent time together, both, on his island and, here in the United States. And, I was really honored to write the foreword to his book, which is another example of the basic principles of counterinsurgency being applied to a case that many people on this side of the Atlantic don’t know very well.And, it illustrates, to me, the enduring value of the counterinsurgency doctrine that General David Petraeus, General Jim Mattis, [Dr.] Conrad [C.] Crane of our own Army War College, [and] a number of people wrote, now 20 years ago.And, that continues to, I think, influence how—not just the American military, but a number of militaries around the world—think about this very challenging kind of war.Host   Why did you decide to write this article?Prendergast  It’s primarily from my book. And, I just wanted to highlight to people in America (and to a newer audience) the dangers, first of all, of a civil war and how you can blindly follow an ideology, or your leadership, as it happened in the Irish Civil War, into a vicious encounter—even though you don’t fully understand what you’re fighting for.And, I also wanted to demonstrate how the clear-hold-build philosophy that was developed by the Americans during the Iraq conflict actually worked during the Irish Civil War. And, I thought the Irish Civil War, as John said earlier, would be a very good case study to study clear, hold, build.And, when John offered to write an article with me, I [said], “Yeah, this would be fantastic to do it in such a prestigious magazine as Parameters.”And it’s just a pleasure to be able to write an article with John Nagl.Host   Well, we’re delighted to have both of you in Parameters.Nagl   We are happy to be in Parameters.Gareth is being modest, I think, which is a bit of the Irish one. First, his brother is a student here at the Army War College this year—his taller and better-looking brother. I think he’s the smart one, and his brother, John, is the good-looking one.His book has done remarkably well in Ireland, and I think deserves more attention here on this side of the pond.PrendergastThanks very much, John, for [those] kind words.Nagl   And, just a reminder that Ireland and America have both suffered from horrible civil wars. And, I think we have a great deal to learn from each other—from each other’s experiences and, the effort [required] to make sure that those sorts of horrors never happen again here, or in other countries, to the extent that we can.Host   A few minutes ago, Gareth, you alluded to the similarities between the Irish Civil War and conflicts in the twenty-first century. What makes this conflict, in your view, so relevant to the challenges faced by armies in the twenty-first century, particularly in places, as you mentioned, like Iraq and Afghanistan?Prendergast  I think one of the key elements of it is why the antitreaty IRA (Irish Republican Army) started the civil war over an ideology. John and I are both graduates of the US Army Command and General Staff College in Leavenworth, [Kansas], (and actually, John is a Marshall Award-winning graduate). But, one of the first things we learn over there is the Clausewitzian quote that no one starts a war, or rather, no one in his sense, ought to do so without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by the war and how he intends to conduct it.We see the protagonists, the antitreaty IRA side, try to win it militarily with no real political or strategic end state. They [believed] that just by killing more of the opposite sides, they would they would win the war.As the war progressed, they weren’t offering an alternative [to the] the people, a strategic end state, a political matter. It just shows to me that you can’t win a war militarily. COA (course of action) counts for insurgency is only 20 percent military. It’s 80 percent everything else.And, the Free State, or the pro-treaty side, realize that, and they competed for the popular will of the population by restoring essential services, the economy, governance, and providing an ulterior end state of a free state that’s not yet a republic, but it’s a stepping stone to a republic.And eventually, they won the popular narrative with the population, alienating and isolating the antitreaty IRA side.    Host   A key pillar of the Irish Free State success was the use of locally recruited soldiers and police who lived among the population, which contrasts with modern approaches that rely largely on isolated forward operating bases. What are the key advantages of this embedded local-first approach, and why do you think it is so difficult for modern military forces to replicate?Prendergast  I agree with that 100 percent because when I was a young officer in Lebanon, back in the early 1990s, we lived in the towns and villages. We had our platoon bases inherent and embedded with the local population. We would have our meetings with the mayors and the mukhtars on a weekly, if not daily, basis.Now, that was dangerous, but it still afforded us a common bond with the people we were there to protect, and you can’t just commute to work, as they say in counterinsurgency. But, as it got more dangerous, the Irish and other UN nations retreated into bigger bases, and I think the same happened in Iraq and Afghanistan, during the conflict. John can correct me if I’m wrong.It was only during the surge that they later came back out and started to push into the population areas. And, I’m saying that the Free State, the national army during the Irish Civil War, realized this, and they realized that they had to spread out into the Irish countryside. And in total, they set up nearly 380 bases throughout Ireland with an army that rose to the size of 60,000 soldiers.And, even in the county of Cork, where I concentrate my studies, they set up 64 different platoon-size bases, so as to provide the security, to get the general information, and to basically win the confidence of the population. And, the British Army could never achieve that in the previous war of independence against the IRA. They say the young British soldier in the bases had as much strategic awareness as a soldier in Nepal as he has of Cork.So, I think the lessons from the Irish Civil War are very prevalent today [regarding] what happened in Iraq, what happened in Afghanistan, and what might happen in the future. So,there’s a lot of learnings from that.Nagl   I think that’s exactly right. And, I think there’s a question of risk. In order to succeed in these kind of wars, you have to be willing to accept risk for your soldiers in order to keep the population safer, and it is only if your soldiers are taking that risk in support of the population that the population will trust you with the information you need to reduce the insurgents and win the war. So, there’s a trust basis that has to be formed between the population and the people conducting the counterinsurgency, and it took a long time to develop that. And, some hard lessons had to be relearned, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, from previous conflicts, including the one that Gareth and I write about.Host   Part...

In this episode, Henry Sokolski discusses how proportionality can serve as a concrete tool for winning wars and maintaining alliances and defines the roles the Lieber Code, the Geneva Conventions, precision weapons, and public narratives play in warfare.Keywords: proportionality, civilian infrastructure, nuclear targeting, military strategy, international lawStephanie Crider (Host)Welcome to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests, and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.Henry Sokolski is joining me remotely today. Sokolski is the author of “A Case for Military Proportionality: Disabling Nuclear Plants,” which was published in the Autumn 2025 issue of Parameters.           He is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and has worked in the Pentagon as the deputy for nonproliferation policy, as a consultant to the National Intelligence Council, as a member of the CIA's Senior Advisory Group, and as a senate military and legislative aide. He is also the author and editor of numerous volumes on strategic weapons proliferation issues.      Welcome back, Henry.Henry Sokolski         [It is] good to be back. Thank you for having me.HostIn your article, you argue that proportionality should not just be viewed as an abstract legal or moral constraint but as a concrete tool for winning wars. How does a commander distinguish between a strike that is legally permissible under the Lieber Code—which focuses on military necessity and protecting civilians, among other things—but is strategically self-defeating in the long run?Sokolski         Well, first of all, who is Mr. [Francis] Lieber? Well, he advised President [Abraham] Lincoln, and he wanted to have a code that was more civilized than the European military codes—particularly on the question of, you guessed it, slavery. But along the way, he wanted to make sure that other things were attended to, like the unnecessary harassment and abuse of civilians and the things critical to civilian life.The Lieber Code basically became international law later. So, this guy is very important to understanding the law of war. Now, in there, he made this effort to protect civilians and civilian objects. However, he knew that commanders would do what they would do, and he gave them a get out of jail card, if you will, a free pass. Well, if they think it’s militarily essential to hit something that might cause a lot of harm to civilians or the objects they need to survive, it’s okay. It becomes extremely subjective.So, I don’t think there’s any problem for someone to do something legal under the Lieber Code. They’re given wide swath, as long as they can claim (or insist) that they had to do it. However, the distinction would be not so much between the Lieber Code and what makes sense but, rather, simply trying to understand what victory requires in the way of military operation.In this case, I think most military experienced hands can tell the difference between achieving the objective by avoiding aggravating the locals, if you will—by killing innocents unnecessarily and destroying civil objects that are not critical to winning the military objective—or achieving it and not. And, those military hands can actually see someone misbehaving and discipline them and say, “Stop doing that.”I think that it’s much more along those lines than some kind of legal determination. So, for example, if you destroy a dam or you spew radioactivity on the field that you have to march over, you’re marching slower, it gets in the way of what you need to do. And of course, it harms the civilians that are, you know, underneath the water or exposed to radiation.If you want to repatriate quickly and restore services, destroying something would make far less sense than temporarily disabling it. If you want lines of communication to be wide open, you don’t want to annoy and anger the locals so much that they become active enemies. All of these points were understood by generals as far across the spectrum from [German Field Marshal Erwin] Rommel, who [served the Nazis], to [General Dwight D.] Eisenhower. And so, it’s not as though this isn’t available historically to any sound commander who’s doing his studies properly.How shall I put it? This may be art, but you can tell what art is and [it] isn’t as subjective as the Lieber Code, which says, “Well, whatever it is, if you claim it was necessary, you’ve got legal cover.”This is not a legal concept. This is a military operational concept. And, I think leadership is found in generals who command those beneath them to pay attention to being efficient and achieving their military goals, and that requires a due respect and due regard to sensible proportionality.HostYou also mentioned that modern precision weapons allow for disabling nuclear plants without releasing radiation. Does the existence of this technology make civilian infrastructure more likely to be targeted? And if it does, does that create a more dangerous, permissive environment for military planners?SokolskiYou’re going to be firing at more things when you have precision, precisely because you can disable without physically obliterating the target. Now, when you get sloppy (or you get impatient and you run out of your precision munitions and just start lobbing things to flatten the entire facility), that’s no longer precise. It can’t be said that, “Well, the precision led to non-precision and, therefore, you shouldn’t try to be precise.”I mean it’s a little bit too much, but there is a problem, and that is—in “new generation warfare,” coined by our Russian friends that we are backing into understanding we’re going to have to wage—you’re going to be firing more munitions at more objects, civilian objects, in the future. And, it’s all the more reason to pay closer attention to the dividing line between precision strikes that disable temporarily—or, you know, maybe disable permanently—and things that physically obliterate and release hazardous forces.  You want to draw that line, and you want to discipline anybody who goes over it because once you get into the habit of being reckless and indiscriminate, you lose the good order and discipline of the troops. And when you lose that, you lose. No matter what your weapons are or how good your plans are, you will not prevail.           Host   Your article highlights a friction point where 174 nations have ratified Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, but the United States has not. What does Protocol I say, and how does this legal discrepancy jeopardize military cohesion and joint operations during an active conflict with a peer adversary like Russia?SokolskiWe had a game in which Russia starts taking potshots at NATO reactors, not just Ukrainian ones. And at some point, there’s a mild release of radiation because they cause a loss-of-coolant accident and some radiation is vented. And, there’s quite a lot of confusion in the game as to how much radiation [is leaked] and what the effects are. And, let’s just say the fog of war doesn’t get any better when you hit one of these things, and it starts releasing some radiation. Panic ensues, [among] the locals. Whereas the United States says, “Well, you know, we signed this thing, but we didn’t ratify it. You folks in NATO ratified it. And, of course, you’re closer to the radiation. So, your interpretation of what we ought to do about this, whether it’s a clear violation of international law, and whether we should respond by firing in kind or doing something, quote unquote proportionate against the Russians, we have a different view than you.”Well, how does that work? Well, you spend a lot of time debating about what to do, and the operations get paused or hung up, [while you] figure out what to do next. You want the momentum of campaign, if you will, not be interrupted by legal debates or moral debates or debates about how you feel or how comfortable you are with the radiation levels that are confusing. So, it would be better if we were reading from a similar sheet. That would be the point. And, I think that Protocol I doesn’t prohibit hitting reactors, but it has a presumption against doing so.I think that presumption against doing so is not quite as clear in the [US Law of War Manual], which says, “[We’d], like to [follow this presumption] but, of course, you’re free if you have to, to go ahead and possibly hit one of these things and release dangerous forces—if it’s necessary.”Going back to the Lieber Code, that’s a little too sophisticated for clarity. You know, in military affairs, much as in politics, a certain amount of, I wouldn’t say simplicity, but clarity, is required for success. [America’s legal position on proportionality] is lawyer sophisticated, if you will, and I think it’s not helped.HostOne of your primary recommendations is for the Pentagon to share more public narratives regarding infrastructure protection. How do you answer critics who argue that making these tear sheets public would provide a roadmap for adversaries to more effectively sabotage US utilities?Sokolski         Well, first, let’s understand what a tear sheet is. A tear sheet isn’t to get everything that’s classified out in the public. It’s where you tear the sheet between truly sensitive information and information that you can share with the public, and you ought to. We have used secrecy to try to solve the problem—and it’s an increasing one—of the vulnerability of critical civilian objects an...

In this episode, Tim Devine and Jon Gerson argue that the US Army must restore the primacy of mobilization planning to prepare for the growing likelihood of a protracted large-scale war involving the United States. While the Army’s transformation initiatives have emphasized important tactical matters, Devine and Gerson call attention to critical strategic vulnerabilities associated with mobilization—one of the Army’s enduring core functions. They offer insights, identify challenges, and offer recommendations for contemporary leaders and practitioners by analyzing the body of thought on mobilization planning during the interwar period (1919–41) and drawing connections to the present day.Keywords: mobilization, strategic planning, large-scale war, readiness, Interwar PeriodStephanie Crider (Host)Welcome to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Today we’re discussing national mobilization.While the United States military pivoted to an era of great-power competition years ago, the strategic environment continues to evolve. Joining us remotely today is Lieutenant Colonel Tim Devine, an active-duty Army strategist, author of “Restoring the Primacy of Army Mobilization Planning: Lessons from the Interwar Years, 1919–41,” which was published in the Summer 2025 issue of Parameters. He has strategic planning experience on the Army Staff and in the Indo-Pacific and is currently an instructor at the Army’s Command and General Staff College.Tim, welcome.Tim DevineThanks, Stephanie. It’s a pleasure to be here.HostWe’re also joined by Colonel John Gerson, a Title 10 National Guard officer and senior planner at the National Guard Bureau. He brings experience from several key assignments in the Joint Staff, the Army War Plans Division, the office of the Secretary of Defense (now Secretary of War), and the Guard Bureau.John, thanks for joining us.Jonathan GersonThanks, Stephanie. Thanks for inviting me on. It’s always great to share the mic with Tim.HostTim, your article is the foundation for our conversation today. In it, you argue the Army must restore the primacy of mobilization planning. To start, could you summarize why you believe looking back 100 years to the interwar period is so crucial for the challenges the Army faces right now?DevineAbsolutely. And first, I’ll emphasize that I’m a practitioner. I’m not a professional historian, but I was struck just by how much of this history is relevant for our contemporary time. Right after World War I, it was really the last time that the Army had to build a mass mobilization model almost from scratch. And World War I mobilization was chaotic and, although it was ultimately successful, there was a long list of shortcomings that illuminated the need for systematic reform.And, this experience had a profound effect on those who took part, particularly those in the Army who later held prominent roles throughout the interwar years—so, Chiefs of Staff like [General] John [J.] Pershing, General [Douglas] MacArthur, [General Malin] Craig and, of course, General George [C.] Marshall. And, each of them advanced proficiency in strategic planning in their own way.Now, fast forward to today, and there’s a lot that we can apply from this period. And, even during my time in uniform, which is approaching the 20-year mark, I’ve lived through the Army’s shift from the two decades of counterinsurgency to renew the focus on large-scale combat—or LSCO, as we call it. And given this shift institutionally, it’s clear that the Army is wrestling with how to prepare its forces for the growing likelihood of these potentialities.This impacts everything—how the Army organizes itself, how we train our forces, how we equip them, how we measure readiness, and how we view and anticipate the character of war changing. There’s a lot of credible sources out there that have expressed the fact that there is a growing chance for large-scale conflict involving the United States. And, I know that’s a sobering aspect of the conversation today, but that reality emplaces an important demand signal on the Army. And, that demand signal is not only to fight the nation’s wars—fight and win the nation’s wars, rather—but to generate the force needed to do so. And, of course, these two things go hand in hand, but today’s discussion will focus on the latter.And, I want to stress, too, that the force I’m talking about—the war-winning force—in all likelihood, far exceeds what we have today. And I’m not just talking about the active component. This includes the reserve component, which consists of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. So, in other words, there must be a plan for generating the right mix beyond the force in being, and that could be difficult to imagine. So, the interwar period offers us a blueprint, not for perfect solutions, but of the intellectual journey needed to prepare.HostYou mentioned the Army developed a planning ecosystem to tackle this challenge. What did that look like?DevineOverall, it was a network of institutions and processes that was really meant to build intellectual capital. And, through this ecosystem, the Army learned to speak the language of national mobilization. And, to me, that’s really the biggest takeaway that I gained from studying this period. And, during my research, a colleague of mine recommended I read Henry [G.] Gole’s book titled The Road to Rainbow.And, I’m sure that title is familiar to many of your listeners, but for those that are not familiar with this, Rainbow, of course, refers to the famous Rainbow Series plans. These replace the so-called Color Plans that were, as one Army historian put it, “little more than abstract academic exercises.” But, to get us to an integrated set of plans, Gole explores this ecosystem—the planning ecosystem—created by the Army, which consisted of four pillars.First was professional military education. The second was practicums—think like war games and exercises and so forth. The third was studies, and the fourth was continuous planning. There’s really a lot I could go into about Gole’s work, but just given that we’re constrained on time here, I’ll focus my comments about the cumulative effect of it all—so, the formal education, follow-on assignments to the War Plans Division, [of] which Colonel Gerson and I are proud alumni, constantly writing and rewriting these plans.All of that proved invaluable. And, while the plans themselves were riddled with flaws, especially the early plans during the 1920s, it was the process, really, that revealed not only the problems’ immense complexities but also the extraordinary scope. So consequently, over time, the plans got better and, eventually, they linked force-generation requirements to operations envisioned by the regional war plans. They drew connections between the two chief commodities, which I like that term. It’s one I borrowed from the readings that I found during my study—the two chief commodities, the mobilization, manpower, and materiel. And, the assumptions became more realistic. The calculations got better. So, when war finally came, this intellectual capital gain from these integrated planning frameworks was arguably the most valuable strategic asset that the Army had.HostYour article highlights significant disconnects during that period between manpower and materiel plans and between defensive assumptions and offensive war plans. Do you see similar gaps today?DevineI do, and I touched on this briefly, so I’m glad you’re giving me a chance to unpack the idea further. For me, during my study of the interwar years, it illuminated how important those connections are. And, I’m talking about the connections between the interrelated parts of an immensely complex system that we call national mobilization. So obviously, many of these parts, like supply chains, for instance, transcend the Army, but they’re all related.[The] first point I’d like to make is [that we should] consider these two basic commodities that I mentioned earlier, manpower and materiel. And, the World War I mobilization experience was really a failure to synchronize the two. I mentioned it was a success in the long run, but this is one of the big points that came out of it. And I really like the quote from Arthur Herman, who’s the author of Freedom’s Forge, to illustrate this point.And that’s another title many of your readers are probably familiar with. So, Herman writes “[Of] the 10,000 75mm artillery pieces the War Department ordered, only 143 ever reached the front—and not one American-made tank.”So, interestingly, the disconnect between manpower and materiel planning remained prevalent throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s. And, it’s easy to see the flaw here, but I assure you that planning stovepipes are still alive and well. The second point [is] throughout most of the interwar period, there was a huge disconnect between the concepts guiding the mobilization plans and those for the regional war plans. So, the mobilization plans were based on defensive concepts like hemispheric defense, whereas the regional war plans like War Plan Orange were offensive.So, in other words, if the Army had to fight War Plan Orange, there was not a corresponding mobilization plan to generate the force needed to do so. And those that know their history here, the Army of the interwar years was a Spartan-sized, poorly equipped force that really couldn’t handle any contingency scenario, let alone any...

In this episode, Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II and Major Brennan Deveraux discuss the Strategic Competition Center, its mission and anticipated activities, and Echevarria's inaugural Strategic Competition Corner article.Keywords: intrastate strategic competition, interstate strategic competition, doctrine, National Security Strategy, Joint Concept for Competing Stephanie Crider (Host)You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the United States Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.I’m in the studio with Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II and Major Brennan Deveraux today. Echevarria is currently a professor of strategy at the US Army War College. He has held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research and the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies and is the author of six books on military strategy.Deveraux is a US Army strategist serving as a national security researcher at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). He has three defense-related master’s degrees and focuses his research on military innovation, emerging technology management, and the characteristics of future warfare. Brennan, over to you.Brennan DeverauxThanks, Stephanie.So, today I’m going to have the opportunity to sit down and talk to Dr. Echeverria about a new center that we’re standing up at the Strategic Studies Institute—the Strategic Competition Center. We’re gonna talk about why that’s important, what it is, and what it means for our listeners. So, real quick, before we really dive into the center, Dr. Echevarria, if you could just tell me a little bit about why you’re pushing for this change. You’ve been with the (US Army War College) Press now for over a decade. Why the switch? What’s your motivation?Antulio J. Echevarria IIYeah, well, after 12 years as editor of Parameters and then editor in chief of the Press, I decided it was time to get back to what really got me into this business in the first place, which is researching and writing, trying to tackle tough security questions, and offering the best solutions I could. I missed all of that and so, I’m really looking forward to getting back into it. So, that was really the genesis.DeverauxOkay. And, I heard you joke the other day, maybe [this change involves] a shift to focusing on your work versus putting all that time into everyone else’s.EchevarriaYeah. Yeah. Instead of trying to fix everybody else’s [work], I can finally focus on trying to fix my own, and we’ll see where that goes.DeverauxYeah. Yeah. Well, as [an] aspiring young author, I’ve enjoyed your feedback when you were fixing my own. Hopefully, we can replace you.So, let’s talk [about] the Strategic Competition Center. What is it and, kind of, why? The defense community has been talking about great-power competition for years. Do we need a new center? And then, why here at the Army War College?EchevarriaI think it was General [James N.] Mattis who helped reorient the defense community away from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations and to great-power war, great-power competition, which then became strategic competition, back in his National Defense Strategy some years ago. It was not a knock on our efforts to do counterinsurgency and counterterrorism better, as the years went on. It was really to widen our aperture and to provide more strategic context for these kinds of missions and their potential outcomes and effects moving forward.So, it really is to broaden the aperture here at the Army War College, provide a service that connects practitioners, strategists and scholars, students, faculty members all together, and play on a little bit of that synergy, working [with] everyone together.So, that’s why here and why now.DeverauxOkay.So, you can do that as an author. You can do that through just your engagements with the students. What exactly is the center bringing to the table? What kind of tangible things should I be on the lookout for—apart from, you know, Dr. Echeverria’s, you know, got the pen again and he’s back at it?EchevarriaYeah. No, that’s a dangerous thing to have the pen in my hand and to be back at it. Like I said, I’m looking forward to that, though.The center will offer a Strategic Competition Corner in Parameters each issue. And I’m open to any feedback. Then, we’ll have a section in the annual Strategic Estimate (Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment) that the Army War College produces.We’ll also bring in guest speakers who’ll do noontime lectures for us. Our first one will be Sir Hew Strachan, coming from (the University of) St. Andrews. And, we’ll have practitioners and scholars talking about strategic competition and bringing to bear their expertise. Again, this is a service to reach students [and] faculty members, and to, kind of, play on the resultant synergy from all of that, I hope.We’ll have a podcast series. It’ll be monthly at first. This is our inaugural one for that, and then I hope to go to one every two weeks, and I will bring in other speakers, so you don’t always have to hear my voice. There’ll be other people, as well, participating in this. So, that’ll be a good thing. We’ll probably have integrated research projects. We already have had one on great-power war, deterring China, and the other major adversaries the United States faces at the moment. So, that was published last summer.Then we’ll have some specific dedicated research projects. We will always serve our clients who are interested in that—and with a Joint perspective, and even an Army focus, where necessary.So, we have a lot that is already on the plate. There are other things that we had not yet anticipated that I’m sure will come down the pike, and then we’ll flex to do those, as well.Right now, though, I’m an army of one. So, the center is small right now, but I’m hoping to grow that over the coming months and years.DeverauxTwo things real quick before we dive into any of those. First, thanks for the shoutout to the Strategic Estimate (Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment). [It is] worth checking out. We push that every year. I think it’s a great product. I also might be biased because I’m heavily involved in said product. And second, for our listeners, [regarding] the integrated research project that was mentioned—so, one was published already, [and] one is underway—it’s a unique project that is DoD-sponsored, faculty-led, student-driven. So, this last one that came out—Understanding and Deterring Great-Power War (Understanding, Deterring, and Preparing for a Great-Power War in the Twenty-First Century), [was] sponsored by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. And then, the chapters were written by nine separate students who collaborated [on] it through the year. Myself, Dr. Echevarria, and Dr. Larry Goodson were the lead[s].HostI’d like to circle back to your Strategic Competition Corner. Can you give us a recap of what’s in the article?EchevarriaYeah, so in that [inaugural] Corner, I look at the nature of strategic competition. I start with the concept as it’s outlined in the Joint Concept for Competing (JCC). I use that as a start point, and I build off that. My main difference with the way it was laid out in the JCC is that it stresses strategic competition was what goes on between wars, while I would argue that strategic competition also uses wars. Think Rome and Carthage and using wars to progressively weaken your adversary or your rival. And then, you get to a point where that rival can no longer really effectively resist you or prevent you from pursuing your most important interests, as it were. And also, the JCC stresses that strategic competition is about winning without fighting but, tying into what I just said, I think fighting goes a long way to understanding [strategic competition]. It is a key component in strategic competition.We could argue that there’s a spectrum of strategic competition. Far on the left side might be competition with fair rules and everyone behaves according to the rules, and you bargain your way into beneficial scenarios or situations and all of that. That’s fine, and I wouldn’t necessarily reject that. But what really concerns, I think, the Joint Force is the nature of strategic competition as you begin to move away from that left side of the spectrum, across the center of the spectrum, into [the area] where you are not just struggling or competing or vying for particular interests, you are also increasing the hostility toward your adversary or your rival, and it starts to become clear that there can only be one winner in this kind of game. And so, that’s what I think I want to focus on because that’s the hardest one, I think, to really deal with. And, as far as the Joint Force doctrine and concept development and all those things [are concerned], I would like to see us focus more on that side of the strategic-natured continuum, if you will.DeverauxThe conflict you’re talking about, in my head, I couldn’t help but go to competition with the Soviet Union in the Cold War. [And] when you talked about going to actual escalation, [I was] thinking about the Vietnam War or the Korean War, or even now [the conflict] with Russia and Ukraine. Does that also kind of fit in your model that maybe [includes] fighting a proxy or fighting indirectly through, you know, the foreign military sales or training?EchevarriaOh, yes. The use of proxies is a big part of it. So, we had a cont...