Zevachim 27 - Shabbat October 11, 19 Tishrei

How can the verse “do not touch kodesh” be used by Reish Lakish to teach that one cannot eat sacrificial meat in a state of impurity, when that verse is needed to derive the prohibition for an impure person to eat sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled? To resolve the difficulty, the Gemara explains how both can be derived from the same verse.  There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding an impure person who eats sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled – is it punishable by lashes or not? Abaye and Rava disagree about the scope of the debate. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish also disagree about whether one who brings parts of the body of a non-kosher animal onto the altar receives lashes or not. However, after raising a difficulty with this, they explain that all agree it is forbidden, but not punishable by lashes, as it is a negative commandment that is not written explicitly, but derived from a positive commandment. The debate is regarding a different, but similar issue - bringing a non-domesticated animal – is it a violation of a positive commandment, or is it only forbidden ab initio? Three versions of a question are brought regarding shirayim. If a disqualified person accepted and sprinkled the blood, does it render the animal disqualified from being used for a sacrifice, e.g. can one take more blood from the animal and sprinkle it on the altar? Or, if a cup with the blood was taken out of the Azara, can one get more blood from the animal? Or, if multiple cups were used to get blood from the animal and one was used for the altar, does the blood from the other cups also get poured on the base of the altar (as shirayim)? How does the Mishna allow for some mistakes to be rectified? Why are there three different cases like this mentioned in the Mishna – what is unique about each case?

Study Guide Ulla said in the name of Reish Lakish that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara (Temple courtyard), it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover. Despite his impurity, he is permitted to proceed with the purification process, which requires partial entry into the Azara. Ulla resolves this difficulty. A braita is brought in support of Ulla’s statement, discussing the smicha (laying of hands) on the guilt offering of a leper, which is performed outside the Azara. The implication is that if partial entry were permitted, the leper could simply insert his hands into the Azara to perform the smicha. Rav Yosef rejects this support, and there are two distinct versions of how he rejects this. A difficulty is raised against the content of the braita: if the guilt offering requires smicha by Torah law, and if smicha must be performed immediately prior to slaughtering, then it should be permitted to perform the smicha inside the Azara. Rav Ada bar Matna resolves this challenge, though there are differing accounts of how he does so. Ravina and Ravin each offer alternative resolutions to the difficulty with Ulla’s statement. Ravina maintains that partial entry into the Azara is prohibited only by a penalty of lashes, without the more severe punishment of karet. Ravin, on the other hand, argues that Ulla’s citation of Reish Lakish was inaccurate. According to Ravin, Reish Lakish was referring to lashes incurred by one who touches sacrificial items (kodashim), not one who enters the Azara. This leads to a broader debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the interpretation of the verse “do not touch kodesh.” Reish Lakish understands it as referring to sacrificial items, while Rabbi Yochanan interprets it as referring to teruma. A question arises: how can Reish Lakish derive both the prohibition to touch and the prohibition to eat sacrificial items from the same verse, as he does in a separate debate with Rabbi Yochanan? The Gemara addresses this and explains how both prohibitions can be learned from the same textual source.  

Who is permitted to slaughter an animal for a sacrifice? The Mishna presents the matter in a way that suggests slaughter by a non-priest is only valid post facto. However, this seems to contradict another source that explicitly permits such slaughter ab initio. Upon further analysis, this apparent contradiction is resolved: non-priests are indeed permitted to slaughter sacrificial animals from the outset. If an impure person performs the slaughter, the sacrifice remains valid. Yet another source seems to prohibit this. The resolution lies in distinguishing between biblical and rabbinic law: while biblically valid, rabbinic authorities forbade impure individuals from slaughtering as a precaution, lest they come into contact with the sacrificial animal and thereby render it impure. There are two different versions of a braita relating to the prohibition for an impure person to slaughter or do smicha on the animal. Each version has a different understanding of the prohibition to enter the Azara (Temple courtyard). Is it prohibited even for a small part of one’s body to enter or only for the majority?   Ulla, in the name of Reish Lakish, holds that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara, it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover, who is allowed to go ahead with the purification process, which requires a small part of his body to enter the Azara. Ulla resolves the difficulty. Rav Yosef infers from Ulla’s resolution that in a parallel case—where zavim became impure through contact with the dead before Passover—the same ruling would apply. Abaye, however, raises two objections to Rav Yosef’s inference.  

Study Guide Various cases are examined involving combinations of “outside of time” and “outside of location” thoughts, with the central question being whether they incur the punishment of karet. The Mishna’s statement, that a thought about eating and burning does not combine, is analyzed to address questions raised by Rav Ashi and Rava, and to highlight an apparent contradiction within the Mishna itself. That contradiction is ultimately resolved. Slaughtering may be performed by non-kohanim, including women, slaves, and even someone who is ritually impure, as long as the ritually impure person does not physically touch the animal. Consequently, a pigul-intent during slaughtering by such individuals can invalidate the offering and render it pigul.

Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite. A difficulty is raised against each one. The one against Rabbi Yochanan is resolved, but the one against Ilfa is left unresolved. A debate in Masechet Temurah 25b between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi regarding a similar situation is brought as a comparison. Abaye and Rava disagree about their understanding of the debate and whether it is similar to the debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis in our Mishna. There is a discussion about the language in the Mishna – is it referring to a case of a thought about “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” or “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk.” What are the ramifications of the different versions? Which is established as the correct version, and how?

Rava explains the Torah source for cases of improper intent (machshava) that disqualify sacrifices - specifically, when one intends to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial parts, or eat the meat “outside its time” or “outside its location.” The intent of outside its time renders the sacrifice pigul and incurs the punishment of karet for one who eats the meat, whereas outside its location does not carry that penalty. Rava explains that all these laws are derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:18, which also serves as the basis for additional halakhot related to pigul. An alternative interpretation is cited in a braita, which understands that verse as referring to someone who actually ate the meat beyond its designated time (on the third day), rather than to a disqualifying thought during the sacrificial process. Various drashot are brought on the wording of that verse and related verses, such as Vayikra 19:7, to further clarify the scope and implications of pigul. If one has a disqualifying thought of outside its time, but the sacrifice is also performed incorrectly in another way, such as outside its location, the punishment of karet does not apply. However, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and rules that if the outside its time thought occurred first, the sacrifice is considered pigul and punishable by karet. Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite.  

  Study Guide In discussing various cases of improper intent that render a sacrifice pigul, the Mishna presents a scenario in which one intends to eat the skin under the tail either outside the azara or beyond the designated time. Since the skin of the tail of the sheep is generally not eaten, but burned on the altar, this case is difficult to interpret. Shmuel, Rav Huna, and Rav Chisda each offer distinct explanations. Rabba, Abaye, and Rava explore the Torah sources for the prohibition against improper intent that invalidates sacrifices - specifically, when one intends to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial parts, or eat the meat “outside its time” or “outside its location.” An intent of “outside its time” renders the offering pigul and subjects one who eats it to the punishment of karet, whereas “outside its location” does not carry that penalty. These laws are derived from Chapters 7 and 19 of Vayikra, though there is disagreement over the precise derivation. Challenges are raised against the interpretations of Rabba and Abaye, and their views are ultimately rejected.  

Study Guide Three distinct explanations—by Shmuel, Reish Lakish, and Rabbi Yochanan—are presented to clarify the Mishna that disqualifies a sacrifice if its blood was sprinkled either in the wrong location on the altar or on the wrong altar entirely. Each interpretation is examined in depth, with challenges and questions raised based on other sources and halakhic principles.

Study Guide If one leg of the animal was outside the azara at the time of slaughter or blood collection, does that disqualify the animal and on what does the ruling depend? If the meat of an animal with a lower level of sanctity leaves the azara before the blood is sprinkled, is the sacrifice disqualified? Shmuel’s father poses several questions to Shmuel about whether the animal, the slaughterer, or the kohen who received blood that was suspended in the air would invalidate the sacrifice. When the blood was placed in the wrong location on the altar or on the wrong altar, the Mishna rules that it is disqualified. Shmuel reads this to mean the blood is accepted and the owner receives atonement, while the meat itself is disqualified. A Mishna in Zevachim 32 is cited to raise an apparent contradiction with Shmuel, which is subsequently resolved.

In the Torah verse regarding the purification of the leper (Vayikra 14:17), the word “right” appears three times - once in reference to the hand, once to the foot, and once to the ear. Rava explains that each mention teaches the requirement to use the right hand in a different ritual: one for kemitza (taking a handful of flour) in meal offerings, one for chalitza (the release ceremony of levirate marriage), and one for piercing the ear of a Jewish slave. According to Rabba bar bar Hanna, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, wherever the Torah uses the term “kohen,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Based on this, Rava’s drasha regarding kemitza teaches that not only the taking of the kometz (handful) must be done with the right hand, but also its placement into the kli sharet (sanctified vessel). Rabbi Shimon, who either does not require this part of the process or does not require it to be done with the right hand, agrees that the kemitza itself must be performed with the right hand, as derived from Vayikra 6:10, which compares the meal offering to the sin offering. Therefore, Rava’s interpretation applies specifically to the meal offering of a sinner, brought as part of a sliding scale offering. The Mishna rules that if the blood spills directly onto the floor from the animal, without first being collected in a sanctified vessel, the blood is disqualified. A braita teaches that the blood to be collected must be the spurting blood from the act of slaughter - not blood from a cut, nor residual blood that flows after most of the blood has exited the animal. The blood must flow directly from the animal into the kli sharet, from which it will be sprinkled on the altar. These laws are derived from Vayikra 4:5, in the context of the sin offering of the Kohen Gadol. Rav rules that all of the blood must be collected, based on Vayikra 4:7. According to Shmuel, the knife must be lifted immediately after slaughter to prevent blood from dripping off the knife into the vessel, since the blood must come directly from the animal. Rav Chisda and Rabbi Yochanan explain that the animal’s throat must be held directly over the vessel to ensure the blood flows straight into it. Rabbi Asi posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding the airspace above a vessel. The Gemara brings three versions of the question and Rabbi Yochanan’s response: If the bottom of the vessel broke before the blood reached it, but the blood had already entered the vessel’s airspace, does this count as if the blood had reached the vessel? If so, the blood could be collected from the floor and used on the altar. To answer the question, Rabbi Yochanan cited a braita regarding a barrel into which fresh water streamed into its airspace, disqualifying it for use in the red heifer purification waters, as it is considered as though the water entered the vessel. However, this comparison is problematic, since the red heifer case does not involve a broken vessel. To justify the citation, the Gemara reframes the question as a two-pronged inquiry. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was drawn from the aforementioned braita. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was derived from the laws of sacrificial blood, which must reach the vessel directly. Since the blood passes through the airspace first, this implies that the airspace is treated as part of the vessel. If the animal becomes blemished after slaughter but before the blood is collected, brought to the altar, or poured, the blood is disqualified. A source is cited from the laws of the sin offering to support this. The Gemara attempts to extend this ruling to offerings of lesser sanctity, such as the Paschal sacrifice, but the proof is ultimately rejected.