After Putin’s Visit to China, What Next?

Shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia’s northern neighbors—Finland and Sweden—decided to join NATO in order to strengthen their security vis-a-vis a belligerent Moscow. In the fifth year of the Russia-Ukraine war, the risks are nevertheless on Europe's doorstep, and some argue that Russia may even launch a kinetic attack against its neighbors in the not-so-distant future—including against Finland. How is Finland responding to these risks? How has NATO membership contributed to Finnish security? Should Europe add diplomacy to its toolkit for dealing with a rogue Russia?Check out the Foreign Affairs piece by Hiski Haukkala and Samuel Charap here.

Despite its public image as a Sino-Russian answer to NATO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a very different beast. Each member state has its own reason for being part of such a vast organization. China uses it as a means of exerting influence, Russia uses it as a tribune for its foreign policy squabbles with the West, and Central Asian countries see it as a source of power and also a chance to portray themselves at home as important global players. As it turns 25, what has the SCO achieved? What are the stumbling blocks to increasing cooperation? Is the organization destined to be dominated by China?

Amid mounting rumors that a new mobilization wave in Russia will follow the State Duma elections in September, there are a lot of questions over Russian military recruitment. How successful is it? How deep is the well of Russian manpower, and what are the Kremlin’s most efficient tools for tapping into it? How can independent experts outside of Russia access and credibly analyze recruitment data in a country that guards all war-related information with a veil of secrecy and censorship? Check out Janis's Substack here.

Since Donald Trump's return to the White House, NATO’s European members have had to adjust to and navigate the new U.S. approach to defense, with the withdrawal of troops from Europe, decreased military support for Ukraine, and changing attitudes toward European security overall. Given the United States’ volatile relationships with its allies, how can European capitals reorganize and restructure among themselves? What role will the United States play in the alliance in future, and how will NATO address the Russian threat?

Following waves of Ukrainian attacks against energy infrastructure in 2024 and 2025, Russia managed to recover quickly. But the most recent drone strikes on Russian refineries were more calculated and impactful. Are they enough to finally topple the goliath of Russian oil revenues that has fed the Russian war machine? What tools does the Kremlin have to mitigate the looming fuel crisis? Will gasoline shortages prove to be the last straw that pushes the Russian public to oppose the war?

While Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan campaigned on a pro-Europe platform in the pivotal vote, the opposition wanted to see the country take a more pro-Russia course. Despite clumsy Russian attempts to influence the outcome of the elections, Pashinyan was victorious. What does his win mean for Armenia, the ongoing peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Russia’s ability to project power in the South Caucasus?

The war in Ukraine has fundamentally altered the strategic environment for Russia on its western border. The conflict has expanded the line of contact with NATO and the alliance’s partners in Ukraine, and it now stretches all the way from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. The nature of the relationship has also changed profoundly, with NATO viewing Russia as a generational threat, and Ukraine emerging as an aggrieved and highly militarily capable nation keen to settle scores with the Kremlin. Advancements in technology have also revolutionized the war and made the strategic landscape far more worrisome for Russia. How does Moscow perceive these changes? And how might future generations of the state security establishment address the challenges? For more in-depth analysis, read Eugene Rumer’s paper, Belligerent and Beleaguered: Russia After the War with Ukraine.

Putin’s Russia has always been China’s pragmatic junior partner while trying to balance its dependency on Beijing, but since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the relationship has become ever more tilted in China’s favor. What are the current dynamics between the two countries, how is China promoting its interests, and what have Putin and Trump’s recent visits to Beijing changed in China’s relationship with Russia?

As the conflict between the West and Putin’s Russia escalates without guardrails, would the Kremlin dare to launch a military incursion into NATO territory in coming years? With the mercurial Donald Trump at the helm of NATO’s most consequential power, how might NATO react to an attack against a member state? These were the questions addressed in a German war game, Ernstfall, co-hosted by Die Welt newspaper and the German Wargaming Center, which has sparked a lively policy debate inside NATO. Alexander Gabuev, who played Vladimir Putin in the exercise, is joined by the two main architects of the war game to take listeners backstage and discuss the making of Ernstfall and its policy implications. Check out the Politico article about the war game, and read Alex Gabuev’s New York Times piece about it here. Excerpts from the Ernstfall podcast are copyrighted by Die Welt and are reproduced here with permission. Listen to that podcast here.

Viktor Orban was one of the most prominent Russia supporters in Europe, blocking aid to Ukraine and trying to soften EU sanctions against Russia. Now that he is gone, will there be a drastic change in Hungary's foreign policy and relations with Moscow? Was Russia able to influence EU policy at all through Hungary? And what can be expected of the new Russia-sympathetic government of Rumen Radev in Bulgaria?