Sunday Morning Musings: The Field Notes Were Never Innocent
What if the DSM’s clues tell us as much about the observer as the person observed? From autistic literalism to psychiatric authority, I revisit an old essay and ask who decided which differences needed explaining.I’ve been rereading an essay I wrote earlier this year, Internal Architecture: The DSM’s Quiet Clues, and something about my original argument has been bothering me. I had imagined the DSM as a kind of field notebook—a collection of observations that might contain traces of cognitive architectures the observers themselves had not fully understood. Echolalia, idiosyncratic language, conversational reciprocity, and the familiar claim that autistic people are literal thinkers. But field notes are taken by somebody. Someone decides what deserves recording, which differences matter, and what those differences are supposed to mean. And that has sent my Sunday morning thoughts wandering in a rather unexpected direction.I find myself remembering two encounters from my younger years. One involved three invitations to a Sadie Hawkins dance, three enthusiastic answers, and the discovery that everyone else apparently understood a set of social obligations nobody had thought to explain. The other involved my cousin Mark, a hired rowboat, and a lake draining towards a 150-foot waterfall. Both began with an uncomplicated yes. Both became considerably more complicated. And both could be retrospectively described as examples of autistic literalism, although the circumstances, expectations, and consequences were profoundly different. Why should the explanation be located within my autism before anyone has investigated the organisation of the encounter itself?That question returns me to something I have been asking for years: where does my autism end and my gestalt processing begin? My experience of meaning often arrives whole, before the language needed to communicate its constituent parts becomes available. Yet autism and gestalt language processing have largely been described through their observable manifestations. Researchers can identify patterns, classify behaviours, and develop useful interventions without necessarily establishing the architecture producing those observations. The difficulty arises when the classification itself becomes the explanation. A name for a pattern tells us something about what has been observed. It does not necessarily tell us how the experience was organised before anything became observable.From there, my thoughts wander into the history of psychiatry, including Samuel Cartwright’s extraordinary 1851 invention of drapetomania—a supposed disorder explaining why enslaved people attempted to escape captivity. The example raises a question that reaches beyond the circularity of behavioural diagnosis: who decided that the behaviour required a pathological explanation, and whose interests were served by that decision? I find myself thinking about hysteria, borderline personality disorder, the experiences of late-identified autistic women, and racial disparities in how children’s behaviour is interpreted. These are different histories and different clinical constructs, but each invites examination of the assumptions through which an observer determines what constitutes disorder.As a special education teacher, these questions are part of my working life. A child refuses an instruction. Is the child oppositional, overwhelmed, unable to access the language of the task, protecting a fragile bit of regulation, or simply exercising an entirely reasonable wish to be left alone? ODD and PDA raise difficult questions about authority, autonomy, and the legitimacy of demands. Schools have responsibilities, and children sometimes need substantial support, but the demand itself should remain open to examination. The observer, the environment, the expectations, and the relationship all contribute to what becomes visible. Even conversational reciprocity requires two people, although the diagnostic record can make it sound like a characteristic possessed or lacking in only one.I return, eventually, to the old essay with more questions than I had when I began. The DSM may indeed contain clues about cognitive architecture, but those clues also carry the history of the people who selected and interpreted them. Some observed differences may reflect underlying processing, some may emerge through relationships and environments, and some may become conspicuous because a diagnosis has already supplied the observer with an explanation. I still do not know where my autism ends and my gestalt processing begins. Perhaps the boundaries are not where the categories suggest. Perhaps the more important inquiry begins with the person holding the notebook. And somewhere beneath all these questions, there remains a young queer femme who received three invitations, answered each one sincerely, and really did just want to dance.The AutSide is a reader-supported publication. To support my work, consider becoming a paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit autside.substack.com/subscribe