
In dominant forms of Western ethics (consequentialism, virtue ethics, and deontology), moral status is typically decided on the basis of pre-existing properties belonging to the individual, e.g. whether something possesses consciousness or sentience or has the capacity to experience emotional states, like pain or pleasure. Gunkel contests this standard operating procedure, and he does so in various steps. One step identifies and critically examines three seemingly intractable philosophical difficulties with the standard properties approach to resolving the question regarding the moral status of others. In response to these demonstrated difficulties, another step is to introduce and describe an alternative model, one which shifts the emphasis from the properties of an individual entity to the extrinsic social circumstances and relationships. Yet another step is to consider important objections to this relational turn and provide responses to these criticisms. Gunkel concludes by explaining how the goal in all of this is not to complicate things but to introduce and formulate an ethical theory that is more agile in its response to the unique opportunities and challenges of the 21st century.
Host and production: Sune With, [email protected]
Research Unit for Robophilosophy and Integrative Social Robotics:
https://cas.au.dk/en/robophilosophy
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