Zevachim 52 - November 5, 14 Cheshvan

The braita in Zevachim 51 extrapolates from the third mention (by the nasi) of the base of the altar that for all sacrifices on the outer altar the remainder of the blood is poured on the base, the yesod. The braita then raises a question: perhaps the extrapolation should be different — that the sprinkling of sacrificial blood on the outer altar must be performed only on the sides where there is a base, i.e., not on the southeast corner, since the base did not extend there. A difficulty on that suggestion is drawn from the verse's wording. The verse states "to the base of the altar of the olah," which suggests relevance to all sacrifices on the outer altar rather than only to the olah. But the sin offering, which is placed on the outer altar, is positioned on all four corners and not limited to the three corners where there is a base. If the verse had intended the latter ruling, it should have been phrased "to the base of the olah," referring specifically to the burnt offering where that limitation would apply. The Gemara resolves this difficulty by explaining the unique inclusion of the word "altar" in the verse: it teaches that when blood is spilled on the base, it must be spilled on the roof of the base (top flat surface) and not on the wall of the base. With this reading, the subsequent lines of the braita, where Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva each say the law could have been derived by a kal va'chomer are reread including mention of the roof of the base. Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva appear to assert the same logical argument using slightly different wording. Rav Ada bar Ahava and Rav Papa propose possible distinctions between their positions. Rav Ada argues that because Rabbi Akiva used more extended language about the remainder of the blood, that it "does not atone" and "does not come for atonement purposes," Rabbi Akiva must regard pouring the remainder as nonessential. Rabbi Yishmael, having said only "it doesn't atone," must hold that pouring the remainder is essential. Rav Papa rejects this reading, maintaining that no one posits an obligation to pour the remainder of the blood. He narrows the difference between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva to the specific case of the bird sin offering: whether mitzui, squeezing out the remainder of the blood and placing it directly on the wall of the altar while squeezing, is essential. Rav Papa understands Rabbi Yishmael to require mitzui, while Rabbi Akiva does not. A braita is then cited to support Rav Papa, showing that Rabbi Yishmael holds pouring the remainder is not essential. A difficulty is raised against Rav Papa's position, but the Gemara resolves it. Rami bar Hama introduces a tana who maintains that for sin offerings whose blood is placed on the inner altar, pouring the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar is essential; Rava, however, rejects this understanding of the braita and its conclusion. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi dispute whether Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Akiva actually differ on the question of whether the remainder of the blood for inner sin offerings is essential.    

Study Guide After suggesting that one can learn from Rabbi Meir's opinion about melika of a bird that is a treifa, that one can learn a binyan av from a kal va'chomer in kodashim, sacrificial items, the Gemara rejects this explanation because it is derived from chulin, not kodashim. Can one derive a law through a binyan av and then use another method of hermeneutics to derive something else? The Gemara only suggests an answer for a binyan av on a binyan av, but that answer is rejected since the method of derivation in the braita does not make sense. It must be derived from a verse in the Torah, Vayikra 2:6, and the braita is just being used as an asmachta. The remainder of the blood of the inner offerings is poured on the base of the altar on the western side. This is derived from Vayikra 4:7 where it states, "opposite the entrance to Ohel Moed," which refers to the exit of the sanctuary, which is by the western side of the altar. In Vayikra chapter 4, the phrase "pour on the base of the altar" is mentioned for three different sacrifices. Each one teaches a different law relating either to the base of the altar or to the pouring of the remainder. The Gemara explains why these verses were available to be extrapolated and were not necessary for their straightforward meaning.

Study Guide The Gemara explores various hermeneutical methods used to derive halakhic laws - juxtaposition (hekesh), gezeira shava (verbal analogy), kal va'chomer (a fortiori reasoning), and binyan av (paradigm from precedent). It raises the question: can a law derived through one method serve as the basis for further derivation, either by the same method or a different one? They systematically examine each possible permutation, presenting logical arguments and textual proofs to evaluate the validity and limitations of such compound derivations. Importantly, this entire discussion is confined to laws pertaining to sacrificial items (kodashim) alone.

From where do we derive that the law regarding slaughtering of the burnt offering must be in the North, and that if not, it is disqualified? Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North, and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering, a logical argument is made that the same requirement must apply to the burnt offering itself: how can a secondary prohibition be more strict than the primary prohibition? Three halakhot are brought to challenge this logic, but all difficulties are resolved. The Gemara then presents a second derivation for the requirement of the North for a burnt offering, based on the repetition of this requirement in Vayikra 4:29, following its initial mention in verse 24. The guilt offering must also be slaughtered and its blood collected in the North, and if not, it is disqualified. This is derived from two verses: Vayikra 7:2 and 14:13. A difficulty is raised regarding the use of the second verse, which relates to the sacrifices brought by the leper during the purification process, as that verse is needed for a different drasha. However, this challenge is resolved. The verse concerning the leper's sacrifices juxtaposes the guilt offering with both the burnt offering and the sin offering. If the law of the North for a guilt offering is derived from the burnt offering, why is the sin offering mentioned in that verse as well? Ravina explains that its inclusion teaches the principle that a law derived through juxtaposition cannot be used to teach that same law in another case through juxtaposition. Rava derives this principle from a different source: the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, Vayikra 4:9–10. Can a law derived by juxtaposition be used to teach something through a gezeira shava? Initially, a proof is brought from the law regarding leprous clothing, which is derived from the law concerning a person with leprosy—originally derived through a gezeira shava. Rabbi Yochanan rejects this proof, arguing that the rules for deriving laws related to sacrificial items differ from those governing other laws. This distinction is demonstrated by the requirement of the North in the case of a guilt offering, which could have been derived from a gezeira shava from the sin offering, but was not - precisely for this reason.  

Why does the Mishna begin with the bull offering of Yom Kippur as its first example? Given that the primary halakha regarding slaughtering in the northern part of the Azara (Temple courtyard) is derived from the burnt offering, one might expect that to be the opening case. Why would the inner sin offerings appear before regular sin offerings? The verse that establishes the requirement of slaughtering in the North appears in the context of the sheep burnt offering. From this, the rabbis extrapolate the same requirement for burnt offerings brought from cattle. This derivation hinges on the presence of a connecting vav ("and") in the verse about sheep, which links it to the preceding section discussing cattle. The vav serves as a bridge, allowing the laws of the later section to inform those of the earlier one. However, the Gemara challenges this method of derivation, questioning how it can be valid for those who reject such connections and brings a braita to prove that there is a debate regarding this issue. The debate is about whether one brings a hanging guilt offering if one is in doubt that one committed mei'la, misuse of consecrated property. After initially suggesting that the disagreement was about whether one can derive laws of one section from another if they are connected by a vav, this explanation is rejected, and three alternative interpretations are proposed. Of these, only the final one is accepted. The sin offering, like the burnt offering, must be slaughtered in the North of the Azara. This is derived from Vayikra 4:29, which states that the sin offering is slaughtered "in the place of the burnt offering." Additional verses establish that not only must the blood be received in the North, but the priest receiving it must also be standing in the North. These requirements are shown to be essential and not merely ideal. In Vayikra 4:24, the verse says, "And he shall slaughter it in the North." The Gemara analyzes the word "it" to determine what it might exclude. Four possibilities are considered, and after rejecting three, the Gemara concludes that the correct interpretation is that the animal itself must be in the North, but the person performing the slaughter need not be. Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North—and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering—a logical argument is made that the same strict requirement applies to the burnt offering itself.

A sin offering that is slaughtered for the sake of a non-sacred animal, the sacrifice is valid. However, if the owner slaughtered it thinking that the animal was not sacred, it is disqualified. The second category is called mitasek, one who did not at all intend to do the act. The source for this disqualification is brought from two verses, as two are necessary to prove that the intention for the act of slaughtering a sacrifice is an essential component. The Gemara explains that both tanna kama in the Mishna and Rabbi Yosi hold that the intention that is necessary, and can disqualify, is that of the kohen performing the sacrificial rites (or non-kohen who slaughtered). However, Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Yosi holds that the owner's intention can disqualify a sacrifice. Abaye brings two others who seem to have a similar opinion to Rabbi Elazar regarding other areas of halakha. Each case involves an instance where one person is performing an action on someone else's item, and the owner's intent can determine the status of the item. One case deals with slaughtering for idol worship, and the other is whether or not an item is considered significant enough to be liable for carrying on Shabbat. The fifth perek specifies details relating to all the sacrifices, including the location of the slaughtering and acceptance of the blood, where the blood is placed, etc. It begins with kodshei kodashim, a higher level of sanctity. The slaughtering of these sacrifices must take place on the northern side of the Azara. Before the Mishna details each of the offerings, it begins with a general statement about all kodshei kodashim and says their slaughtering is performed in the North. Why didn't it also mention another issue that is true for all of them - that their blood is collected in a sacred vessel? The Gemara explains that at first, they thought the blood of the leper could be collected in the kohen's hand, but they then realized that his hand can be used only for the blood going on the leper's ear, finger, and toe. The blood that is placed on the altar must first be placed in a sacred vessel. Since they originally thought otherwise, and two kohanim accept blood, each in a different manner, this is omitted from the opening line of the Mishna.

What is the source in the Mishna for the halakha that one is not liable for the laws of notar and impurity when eating blood? Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis disagree about whether one is liable for eating items that are not fit for consumption while in a state of impurity. Is their dispute limited to items that themselves became impure, or does it also apply to a person who is impure and eats sacrificial items that are pure? Sacrificial offerings are slaughtered with six intentions: for a specific sacrifice, for a specific person, for God, for consumption by fire, to produce a pleasing aroma, and to be accepted by God. In addition, sin and guilt offerings must be slaughtered with intent for the specific sin they atone for. Rabbi Yosi stated that even if the slaughterer did not explicitly have all these intentions in mind, the offering remains valid. This is due to a stipulation enacted by the court that the slaughterer should not articulate all these intentions, in order to prevent errors that could invalidate the sacrifice, as the intention is performed by the one slaughtering/offering the sacrifice, not the owner of the sacrifice.   

The halakha was decided according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Shimon regarding pigul in the inner sin offerings. Rava (and some say Rav Yosef) wondered: Why is halacha being decided on a matter that is no longer relevant in our times? To this, Abaye responded: "Expound and receive reward." Is there a difference between offerings brought by non-Jews and those brought by Jews? Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yosi disagree on this matter. From which verses does Rabbi Shimon derive that certain laws do not apply to offerings brought by non-Jews? A baraita is brought which states that the tzitz (forehead plate of the High Priest) does not atone for offerings brought by non-Jews. Does this baraita align with the opinion of Rabbi Yosi as well? The prohibition against eating notar (leftover sacrificial meat) and tamei (impure items) applies even to offerings that do not have elements permitting consumption. What is the source for these halakhot?

Study Guide Zeiri explains a very complicated braita referring to leniencies and stringencies regarding an impure person eating consecrated items and why each needed to be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. A braita is brought to explain the source of the law that one receives karet for eating part of a sacrifice that became pigul only if there is an action that permits it to be eaten or burned on the altar. The braita brings drashot on the verse in Vayikra 7:18 explaining how it applies to sacrifices other than peace offerings. It also specifies what items can and cannot become pigul. The braita says the oil of the leper can become pigul, but libations that are brought with a sacrifice cannot. This seems to contradict, as the oil follows Rabbi Meir's position and the libations follow that rabbi's position. Three possible solutions are suggested, but the first is rejected. From where do we derive that the meat of the bird sin offering is permitted for the kohen to eat? Rabbi Elazar cites a position of Rabbi Yosi that while there is pigul in the sin offerings whose blood is brought on the inner altar, it is only if both the action when the pigul thought occurs and the action that the thought is about occurs outside the sanctuary, in the Azara.  

Study Guide The Mishna enumerates items that cannot become pigul - meaning that even if the offering is rendered pigul due to improper intent during the sacrificial process, consuming these items does not incur the punishment of karet. This is because pigul applies only to items that are permitted through another action. For example, sacrificial meat becomes permitted only after the imurim (the parts of the sacrifice designated to be burned on the altar) are burned. Items that cannot become pigul include the kometz (a handful of meal offering), incense, meal offerings that are entirely burned, and others. Some items are subject to tannaitic debate, such as the libations that accompany sacrifices and the oil used in the ceremony for leper purification. The libations may be considered an integral part of the sacrifice, and therefore become pigul, just like the sacrifice itself, and the oil may be permitted only after the placement of the blood from the guilt offering, which would also then enable it to become pigul. Conversely, the Mishna lists items that can become pigul, as they are permitted through a specific action. In some sacrifices, like a burnt offering, the sprinkling of blood permits the meat to be burned on the altar; in others, like a sin offering, it permits the meat to be eaten by the kohanim. Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul applies only to sacrifices offered on the outer altar. Ulla presents an ambiguous statement: he claims that if a kometz becomes pigul but is nevertheless burned on the altar, its pigul status is nullified. He supports this by arguing that if the kometz were not considered properly offered (due to its pigul status), it could not serve as a valid matir (an enabling act) for the remainder of the meal offering to become pigul. The Gemara explores Ulla's intent. Initially, it suggests that one who eats a kometz rendered pigul is not punished by karet, but this is rejected as it is explicitly stated in the Mishna. The second suggestion is that, although ideally it should not be placed on the altar, if it is placed there, it should not be removed. This too is taught in a Mishna. The third suggestion is that if it were placed on the altar and fell off, it may be returned. However, this is also addressed in a Mishna, which rules that it should not be replaced. The Gemara ultimately concludes that Ulla refers to a case where the kometz fell off after the fire had begun to consume it. Although Ulla discusses this elsewhere, the teaching here emphasizes that this principle applies not only to a limb of an animal that is partially burned, where even the unburned portion is considered connected, but also to a kometz, where even if only part was burned, the entire portion is treated as a single unit and may be returned to the altar. Rabbi Yochanan is quoted as saying that pigul, notar, and impure items that were offered on the altar lose their forbidden status. Rav Chisda challenges the inclusion of impure items, arguing that the altar does not function like a mikveh to purify them. Rabbi Zeira responds by qualifying Rabbi Yochanan's statement: it applies only when the item was already being consumed by the fire. Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna raises a difficulty from a braita that categorizes sacrificial meat as something whose impurity cannot be removed. This challenge is resolved in three distinct ways: by Rava, whose answer is rejected, and by Rav Papa and Ravina. The braita above is then cited in full. It includes four different drashot that aim to prove that the verse in Vayikra 7:20 refers to a person who was impure and ate sacrificial meat, rather than a pure person who ate meat that had become impure. One of the opinions presented is difficult to understand in terms of its derivation. Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi is praised for offering a clear and insightful explanation, which is then brought and elaborated upon.