Bekhorot 6 - September 24, 13 Tishrei

Does Rabbi Shimon require an offspring to resemble its mother in its head and most of its body (ראשו ורובו) to be permitted for consumption, or does his requirement of its head and most of its body apply exclusively to firstborn (bekhorah) status? Three braitot are brought to answer this question, but all are deemed inconclusive. Is donkey urine permitted or forbidden? While horse and camel urine are thin and clearly just excreted water, donkey urine is thick and resembles milk. Is it absorbed and derived from the animal's body (and thus forbidden as an excretion of a non-kosher animal), or is it merely ingested water that became cloudy from body heat? Rav Sheshet proves from our Mishna ("that which emerges from the non-kosher is non-kosher") that donkey urine is forbidden because it derives from a non-kosher species. There are two versions of Rav Sheshet's proof and how it is derived from the Mishna, with potential halakhic ramifications between the two versions. A difficulty is raised against Rav Sheshet's opinion from a braita permitting honey—even though it is produced in the body of a non-kosher creature—as it comes from something outside the body. To resolve this, it is explained that Rav Sheshet follows a different tanna who permits honey because it is derived from a drasha in the Torah and is an exception to the rule, not the rule. Fallow deer secretions (chalei d'yachmurta) and the skin/placenta covering a donkey foal's face (or haba k'neged panav) are permitted as mere waste matter (pirsha). If a non-kosher fish swallows a kosher fish, the swallowed kosher fish is permitted for consumption. However, if a kosher fish swallows a non-kosher fish, the non-kosher fish remains forbidden because it is not the product of the kosher fish's growth. If one did not witness the swallowing, one might assume a non-kosher fish found inside a kosher fish was actually birthed by it (as non-kosher fish give birth to live young, while kosher fish lay eggs). This last point raises a difficulty, which four answers are brought to resolve.

Following the dispute between the tanna of our Mishna and Rabbi Yosi HaGelili, where each derived from a different verse the exemption from firstborn status for an animal that gave birth to an offspring resembling a different species, the Gemara clarifies what Rabbi Yosi HaGelili derives from the proof-verses of our tanna ("peter hamor" twice). Rabbi Yosi HaGelili derives from there the source for exempting horses and camels from firstborn status. Rav Achai raises a difficulty against his derivation, but the Gemara answers his objection. Our tanna derives this rule (exempting the firstborn of horses and camels) from a general rule and a detail (klal u'phrat): "All your livestock you shall designate as male" is a general rule, "ox and sheep and donkey" is a detail, and a general rule includes only that which is in the detail; therefore, firstborn laws apply only to a donkey and not to other non-kosher animals. The Gemara discusses a series of uncertainties regarding an animal that gave birth to a different species that possesses some of the mother's features: regarding a cow that gave birth to a donkey-like offspring, do we judge it like a goat that gave birth to a sheep-like offspring that looks somewhat like its mother, which is subject to firstborn status because both are subject to firstborn status, or perhaps here the laws are different because one is sanctified with intrinsic holiness (kedushat haguf) and the other with monetary value (kedushat damim), and one is kosher while the other is not? Subsequently, the Gemara inquires about a donkey that gave birth to a horse-like offspring and a cow that gave birth to a horse-like offspring. From the braitot, the Gemara proves that the obligation when there are partial features was stated regarding a cow that gave birth to a donkey-like offspring, but it remains unclear regarding the other questions. Regarding eating, the Mishna clarifies the principle that what emerges from the non-kosher is non-kosher, and it is not judged according to the offspring's appearance but rather according to its mother - this rule was intended to remember the law. The source showing that a kosher animal born from a non-kosher mother is forbidden to be eaten is from the verse "These you shall not eat," whereas a non-kosher offspring born from a kosher mother is permitted, as it is said, "the camel... it is non-kosher" - it is non-kosher, but a non-kosher born from a kosher mother is kosher. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and forbids a non-kosher animal born from a kosher mother based on the repetition of the word "camel" in Leviticus and Deuteronomy, and he derives the prohibition of milk from a non-kosher animal from the phrase "et ha-gamal" (the camel), whereas the Sages forbid milk from "camel" "camel" and do not derive laws from the word "et." To show that there are those who derive laws from the word, et, the Gemara brings the position  of Shimon HaAmsoni, who derives laws from that word, but changed his position when he reached "You shall fear the Lord (et Hashem) your God," until Rabbi Akiva came and taught that it serves to include Torah scholars. The Gemara clarifies why a special verse was needed to forbid the milk of a non-kosher animal and presents two possible explanations. Afterwards, it discusses the source for permitting the milk of a kosher animal and presents six proofs, of which three are rejected. The Gemara cites a braita stating that a sheep that gave birth to a goat-like offspring or a goat that gave birth to a sheep-like offspring is exempt from firstborn status unless it possesses some of the mother's features, and Rabbi Shimon disagrees, maintaining that it is not obligated until its head and most of its body resemble its mother. The Gemara concludes with the question: Does Rabbi Shimon require its head and most of its body to resemble its mother regarding the prohibition of eating as well?

The Gemara continues analyzing the dispute regarding whether firstborns were sanctified in the desert. According to Reish Lakish, they were not sanctified until entering the Land, whereas Rabbi Yochanan holds they were already sanctified in the wilderness. Rabbi Eleazar explains that Rabbi Yochanan derived his position from the verse "לי יהיו" ("they shall be Mine") – b'havayatan yehu, meaning that their holiness remains intact and does not lapse. Rabbi Yochanan explains the verse "והיה כי יביאך... והעברת" in accordance with the exposition of the Academy of Rabbi Yishmael: perform this mitzva so that you will inherit and enter the Land. Rav Mordechai notes to Rav Ashi that in his academy the dispute was taught with reversed attributions - Rabbi Yochanan said they were not sanctified (meaning they did not need to be sanctified anew), while Reish Lakish said they were sanctified. Rav Ashi clarifies that the underlying explanatory principle is the exact same, but a person is obligated to speak in the language of his teacher. Two questions are asked by the officer Quntroqos to Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai. First, regarding the discrepancy between the detailed count of Levites (22,300) and their total sum (22,000), Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai explains that those additional 300 Levites were firstborns themselves, and a firstborn cannot discharge the firstborn obligation of another, as Abaye adds that it suffices for a firstborn to discharge his own personal holiness. Second, regarding the discrepancy between the silver collected (half a shekel for 601,550 men, equaling 201 kikar and 11 maneh) and the silver gathered and accounted for (100 kikar and 1,775 shekels, which equals 101 kikar and 11 maneh), Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai responds that Moses our teacher was a trustworthy treasurer and skilled calculator, and that the sanctuary maneh was doubled. After two failed attempts, Rav Chisda proves from a verse in Ezekiel that the sanctuary maneh was indeed doubled, and the Gemara establishes three principles regarding measures: additions may be made to measurements, additions cannot exceed a sixth, and this sixth is calculated from the outside. Rabbi Chanina relates three questions he asked Rabbi Eliezer in the Great Academy. Regarding why firstborn donkeys were singled out for redemption over horses or camels, Rabbi Eliezer explains that it is a divine decree (gezeirat hakatav), and also because donkeys assisted Israel during the Exodus, as every Israelite brought out ninety loaded Libyan donkeys with the silver and gold of Egypt. Regarding the place names Rephidim and Shittim, Rabbi Eliezer holds that they are literal place names, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua interprets them homiletically as allusions to behavior: Rephidim signifies that they loosened their grasp on Torah study, and Shittim signifies that they engaged in acts of folly. The Mishna rules that a cow giving birth to an offspring resembling a donkey, or a donkey giving birth to an offspring resembling a horse, is exempt from bekhora, as the repetition of the words "peter chamor" teaches that both the mother and offspring must be donkeys. Regarding consumption, an offspring born of a kosher animal that resembles an non-kosher animal is permitted to be eaten, while an offspring born of a non-kosher animal that resembles a kosher animal is forbidden, based on the principle that whatever emerges from the non-kosher is not kosher, and whatever emerges from the kosher is kosher. The Gemara compares our Mishna to a Mishna dealing with a ewe that gave birth to an offspring resembling a goat. Rav Yehuda derives from the verse "אך בכור שור..." that both parent and offspring must be of the same species, instead of using the verse in our Mishna. The Gemara explains the dispute between the tanna of our Mishna and Rabbi Yose HaGelili (upon whose view Rav Yehuda relied) regarding whether the textual derivations apply to monetary consecration (kedushat damim) and from there we learn to inherent sanctity (kedushat haguf) or the reverse. What does each do with the verse of the other?

The Mishna rules that Kohanim and Levites are exempt from bekhora (firstborn male donkeys) based on a kal v'chomer: if they exempted the firstborns of Israelites in the desert, logic dictates that they exempt their own. The Gemara challenges the Mishna's premise as the Levites themselves did not exempt the donkeys of the Israelites – they themselves exempted the Israelite firstborn males, and their animals exempted the Israelite firstborn donkeys. Two answers are offered to resolve this question, by both Abaye and Rava. Abaye answers that the Mishna means the livestock of the Levites exempted their own livestock. Rava rejects Abaye's interpretation on two grounds: first, the Mishna uses the verb "they exempted", referring to the Levites themselves; second, if Abaye were correct, Levites' kosher firstborn animals should be exempt from bekhora also, yet a Mishna explicitly teaches that Kohanim and Levites are obligated in the firstborn of kosher animals and exempt only from redeeming their sons (pidyon haben) and firstborn donkey (peter chamor). Rava provides his own answer, explaining that the Levites exempted themselves (their human firstborns) via kal v'chomer from what transpired in the desert where the Levites exempted the Israelite firstborns. To derive their exemption from the firstborn donkey (peter chamor), the Gemara cites a verse equating human firstborns with impure animal firstborns ("האדם ואת בכור הבהמה הטמאה תפדה"), establishing that whoever is exempt from human firstborn is exempt from the redemption of the donkeys. Rav Safra raises four difficulties against both Abaye and Rava: if the exemption depends on the Levites' exchange in the desert, what about those who were not involved in the exemption, such as a Levite who did not own animals or was under a month old, or a female Levite, or Aharon? All difficulties are resolved. Three other questions are asked and answered, namely, the source for kohanim being included in this exemption, that this exemption applies for future generations, and that the redemption of a firstborn donkey in the desert was performed specifically with a lamb (seh) just as it is for future generations. Rav Chanina states that a single lamb belonging to a Levite exempted multiple firstborn donkeys of Israelites in the desert. Abaye attempts to prove this from the fact that Scripture notes how many excess human firstborns there were compared to Levites, but did not mention any excess firstborn animals. After rejecting Abaye's proof, the Gemara proves this from the precise phrasing "ואת בהמת הלוים תחת בהמתם" – "an animal (single) of the Levites in place of their (Israelites) animals (plural)", and Rava notes that this aligns with a Mishna ruling that one may redeem with a lamb multiple times, and the Gemara explains that Rabbi Chanina's statement was meant to give the reason for that Mishna. Rabbi Yochanan challenges Reish Lakish from two tannaitic sources, but both difficulties against Reish Lakish are resolved. An alternative version suggests that the second difficulty was brought by Reish Lakish to challenge Rabbi Yochanan's position. A third source is brought by the Gemara to prove Rabbi Yochanan's position, but Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak provides an alternative explanation of that source to reconcile it with Reish Lakish. Following a difficulty on this explanation, raised by Rav Papa, the Gemara is forced to slightly adjust Reish Lakish's view: it is clear that at the beginning of their stay in the desert, firstborns were sanctified; according to Reish Lakish, it was only after that specific event (the exchange of the firstborns for the Levites) that they ceased to sanctify them until entering the Land of Israel.

The Mishna rules that if a Jew buys a donkey embryo from a non-Jew, sells one to him, enters into a partnership with him, or receives or gives an animal under a sharecropping agreement (kablanut), the offspring is exempt from bekhora. The Gemara questions why the Mishna needs to enumerate all these individual cases, and explains that each is necessary: selling must be taught so we do not fine a Jew who removes an animal from sanctity; partnering excludes Rabbi Yehuda's view that a joint partnership with a non-Jew is obligated in bekhora; and sharecropping (kablanut) is needed because the primary animal belongs to the Jew, and had we exempted it from the firstborn law, we might have thought this would cause people to think that in a regular animal there is no law of firstborn. The Gemara asks what Rabbi Yehuda's position is regarding selling an embryo to a non-Jew, given that he elsewhere permits selling a broken animal (shevura). Is an embryo treated like a broken animal because it cannot work, or is selling an embryo forbidden because it is standard practice, unlike a broken animal where there is a clear distinction (heker) since it is not standard practice? The Gemara first attempts to prove this from the Mishna, which mentions that selling an embryo is forbidden without noting a dissenting opinion. However, this proof is rejected, as Rabbi Yehuda clearly disagrees with another part of the Mishna without being mentioned there, so no proof can be brought from the Mishna. Next, a braita detailing fines for sharecropping (kablanut) transactions is brought to show that Rabbi Yehuda forbids it. However, the Gemara rejects this proof, clarifying that the fine in the braita applies specifically when giving a pregnant animal to be fattened. Ultimately, Rav Ashi proves from Rabbi Yehuda's own rationale in another braita—that a broken animal is permitted because it cannot heal—which implies that selling an embryo is forbidden, as it naturally grows and "heals." This entire sugya was also taught in a different manner, as a question of whether the Mishna's prohibition on selling an embryo is only according to the Rabbis or if Rabbi Yehuda agrees with it as well. As in the previous version, the conclusion is that Rabbi Yehuda also forbids it. The Gemara asks whether selling a healthy animal solely for its fetus is permitted, analyzing the doubts according to both Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis. An attempt is made to resolve the question from the Mishna regarding one who gives an animal under sharecropping (kablanut for offspring), as the phrase "even though he is not permitted" is omitted there. However, the Gemara ultimately concludes that in other forbidden cases (such as partnership) the Tanna also omits "even though he is not permitted," so no answer to the question can be derived from the Mishna.

Introduction to Masechet Bekhorot

Hadran Ceremony Text