Zevachim 119 - January 11, 22 Tevet

During the period when the Tabernacle stood in Nov and Givon, it was permitted to offer sacrifices on private bamot. This is derived from Devarim 12:9: "For you have not yet arrived at the menucha and the nachala." Menucha refers to Shiloh, and nachala refers to Jerusalem. The additional word "to" between them serves to separate the two stages, indicating that bamot were permitted in the interim period. Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan why maaser sheni is not mentioned in the Mishna regarding the period of Nov and Givon. Rabbi Yochanan answered that when there is no Ark, there is no maaser sheni, based on a gezeira shava linking the two. When Reish Lakish challenges this - arguing that according to that gezeira shava, the Pesach offering and other sacrificial foods should also not be eaten - Rabbi Yochanan offers a different explanation: the Mishna follows Rabbi Shimon's view that only obligatory sacrifices with a fixed time were brought, which excludes animal tithes. Since maaser sheni (grain tithes) is comparable to animal tithes, it too would not apply. According to this second explanation, Rabbi Yehuda would hold that maaser sheni was brought during the period of Nov and Givon, a view supported by a statement of Rav Ada and a braita cited by Rav Yosef. Although the verse in Devarim 12:9 was initially explained as referring to Shilo and Jerusalem through the terms menucha and nachala, three additional interpretations are presented, each examined in the context of the verse. The Mishna states that one who consecrates an animal for sacrifice at a time when bamot are permitted, but offers it when bamot are forbidden, is not liable for karet. Rav Kahana limits this exemption to slaughtering outside the Temple; one who actually offers the sacrifice outside is liable for karet. After Rav Kahana explains his derivation, Raba rejects his position on two grounds. The Mishna lists several differences between the sacrificial procedures on the large bama and on smaller bamot. The Gemara provides the Torah sources for each distinction. Two versions are recorded regarding a limitation taught by Rami bar Hama, and a braita is cited to either challenge or support his view. Finally, an alternative position is presented in the name of Rabbi Elazar.

The Gemara explains the basis of the disagreement in the braita between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, and how the second position of the Rabbis differs from the first position in the name of the rabbis in that same braita. Rabbi Shimon's source in the Torah for his view limiting the communal offerings brought in Gilgal is a verse in Yehoshua 5:10, which describes the Jews bringing the Paschal offering just a few days after crossing the Jordan River into the Land of Israel.  The reason the structure of Shilo was built with stone walls while its ceiling was only a curtain is derived from seemingly contradictory verses - some referring to Shilo as a "house" and others as a "tent." Four rabbis each cite a different verse to explain the law that during the period when the Tabernacle stood in Shilo, kodshim kalim and maaser sheni could be eaten anywhere within sight of Shilo. There is also a debate about whether the Tabernacle in Shilo was located in the territory of Yosef or Binyamin.  A braita discusses how many years the Tabernacle remained in each location and explains the calculations: thirty-nine years in the desert, fourteen in Gilgal, fifty-seven in Nov and Givon, and three hundred sixty-nine in Shilo.

Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai held that during the period of the Temple there were four distinct "camps," since the Ezrat Nashim constituted its own camp. However, in the period of Shilo there were only two camps. The Gemara struggles to identify which camp, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai, did not exist in Shilo, since the Torah clearly assigns separate zones for each category of impurity - one who is impure from contact with a corpse, a zav, and a leper - implying the need for three distinct camps. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Shimon's statement refers to an entirely different issue: during the period of Shilo, the Levite area did not function as a place of refuge for someone who killed unintentionally. This implies that in the wilderness the Levite camp did serve as a refuge zone, a point further supported by derashot on Shemot 21:13. A braita presents five different rabbinic opinions regarding which sacrifices were offered during the fourteen years after entering the Land, when the Tabernacle stood in Gilgal. Some maintain that only voluntary offerings brought by individuals were permitted. Rabbi Meir holds that meal offerings and Nazirite offerings were also brought. Rabbi Yehuda adds that even obligatory offerings could be brought in the Tabernacle (bama gedola), distinguishing between the central sanctuary and other locations. Rabbi Shimon limits which public offerings were brought. The Gemara then cites the scriptural basis for Rabbi Meir's position. Shmuel restricts the dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Meir specifically to the obligatory offerings of a Nazirite. However, after Rava introduces a contradictory braita, the Gemara revises Shmuel's statement, concluding that the dispute concerns specifically the voluntary offerings of a Nazirite. The Gemara brings a source from the Torah for the opinion of the rabbis (the second view) in the braita.

Before the Tabernacle was erected, even blemished animals or male or female could be offered as sacrifices. This is derived from the juxtaposition of animals to birds in Bereishit 8:20, which describes the offerings Noach brought after the Flood; since blemishes do not disqualify birds and females can be brought as burnt offerings, they likewise did not disqualify blemished animals or females. However, if an animal was missing a limb, it could not be offered. This is learned from Bereishit 6:19, "From all live animals," implying that only fully intact animals were acceptable. The Gemara asks why this verse is not used to exclude a treifa, and answers by identifying a different source for excluding a treifa. Only kosher animals could be offered, even before the Tabernacle was built. But since this was before the Torah was given, how could there be a distinction between kosher and non‑kosher animals? Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani explains that the distinction refers to animals that would eventually be considered kosher. Noach brought two of each species into the Ark, but of the kosher species he brought seven of each so that he would have animals available for sacrifice after the Flood. How did Noach know which animals would later be deemed kosher? Either this was revealed miraculously, or the animals entered the Ark on their own, with the kosher species arriving in groups of seven while the non‑kosher species arrived only in pairs. There is a tannaitic dispute regarding whether, before the Tabernacle was erected, people brought only burnt offerings or also peace offerings. This debate hinges on whether the descendants of Noach were permitted to bring peace offerings, a question derived from Hevel's sacrifice - specifically the phrase "from the fat thereof" - and from a verse in Shir HaShirim 4:16. A challenge is raised against the opinion that peace offerings were not brought, based on Yitro's offering of peace offerings. The resolution depends on whether Yitro's sacrifice occurred before or after the giving of the Torah. Indeed, there is a tannaitic dispute about the timing of Yitro's arrival, rooted in the question of what he heard that motivated him to come and convert: Israel's victory over Amalek, the giving of the Torah, or the splitting of the Sea. Non‑Jews may offer sacrifices anywhere and at any time, since the prohibition against sacrificing outside the Temple applies only to Jews. However, Jews may not serve as their agents in performing the sacrifice. The Gemara relates a story about Ofrah Hermiz, the mother of the Persian king Shapur, who asked him to bring a sacrifice on her behalf. Rava advised her on the matter but arranged for non‑Jews to perform the actual sacrificial act. In the desert, the Israelites were permitted to eat kodashim kalim anywhere within the camp. Rav Huna stated that they could eat them anywhere that Jews were present. The rabbis sought to clarify his statement, given that the desert encampment clearly consisted of distinct camps, while his words seemed to imply otherwise.

The Mishna rules that one who offers the leper's guilt offering outside the Azara before the proper time for the owner to bring it (i.e., before the eighth day of purification) is exempt from liability. Rav Chilkiya bar Tuvi limits this exemption to a case where the offering was brought for its own sake. If, however, it was offered not for its own sake, one would be liable for offering it outside, since such an offering could theoretically be valid if brought inside. Rav Huna disagrees with Rav Chilkiya. He maintains that if an offering cannot be brought for its own sake - because its proper time has not yet arrived - it also cannot be accepted when brought for the sake of a different sacrifice. A challenge is raised against Rav Huna from the case of the Pesach offering, which, when brought at a time other than Pesach, is offered as a peace offering even though it cannot be brought as a Pesach. This challenge is rejected, as the Pesach offering is unique: an animal designated as a Pesach automatically assumes the status of a peace offering on all other days of the year. Three sources are cited in support of Rav Chilkiya's position. The first two are dismissed as inconclusive, but the third appears to confirm his view, both according to Rav Dimi and Rav Ashi. An interpretation is brought that reconciles even this final source with Rav Huna's position. A braita derives scriptural sources for the Mishna's rulings that one is exempt from liability for offering outside items that are meant to be eaten, as well as for performing actions that do not constitute the final stage of the sacrificial service. The Mishna further states that the firstborns served as priests until the construction of the Tabernacle, at which point the kohanim replaced them. Rav Huna, however, asserts that the kohanim began their service earlier - at the time the Torah was given, nearly ten months before the Tabernacle was erected. This apparent contradiction is resolved by noting that the matter is the subject of a tannaitic dispute.

Study Guide What actions are performed on public bamot but not on private bamot? What is considered "outside its gat," as mentioned in connection with the slaughtering and burning of the para aduma (red heifer)? There is a dispute between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan, which is rooted in an earlier disagreement about whether the Flood reached the Land of Israel. Each of them raises three challenges to the other's position.

The Gemara explains that the Mishna follows Rabbi Nechemia's opinion regarding the status of the remainder of the blood. Why did the Mishna compare the case of two cups of blood to a sin offering that was lost and replaced with another? The Gemara explains that this comparison was introduced in order to teach the law regarding a case that can be derived from the Mishna. It clarifies the distinction between an animal designated to replace a lost offering and a situation in which a person designates two animals from the outset so that one will serve as a backup. The Mishna presents numerous cases in which the laws of offering sacrifices outside the Temple do not apply - either because of the type of offering (one that is not brought inside the Temple) or because of the animal itself (a disqualified animal), or because the item is not meant to be offered at all (such as edible portion of a sacrifice). Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the rabbis in three cases where the item will eventually be permitted to be placed on the altar.  The Mishna also provides a historical overview: When were sacrifices permitted to be offered outside the Temple (on bamot), and when were they prohibited? What were the laws governing each period - both when bamot were allowed and when they were forbidden? And during the time when bamot were permitted, which sacrifices could be offered anywhere?  

  The rabbis and Rabbi Elazar disagree about a case involving liability for performing water libations outside the Temple. Three amoraim debate the precise scenario in which they disagree and the underlying basis of their dispute. According to Rav Papa, their disagreement stems from a debate - found in other sources as well - regarding whether libations accompanied sacrifices during the Israelites' time in the desert. This question has practical implications for whether libations were ever offered on private bamot, and whether such libations required sanctified vessels. That, in turn, affects whether one would be liable for performing a libation outside the Temple when it was not placed in a sanctified vessel. Rabbi Nechemia maintains that one is liable for offering the remainder of the blood outside. Rabbi Yochanan explains that this view is rooted in Rabbi Nechemia's position that the pouring of the leftover blood is an essential component of the sacrificial rite. A challenge is raised from a baraita in which Rabbi Nechemia debates Rabbi Akiva on this very issue, but the contradiction is ultimately resolved. The sugya then analyzes liability for offering a bird sacrifice outside the Temple: does liability depend on whether the bird was slaughtered (shechita) or melika was performed inside or outside? All four possible combinations are examined. Rabbi Shimon disputes one of the rabbis' rulings, but it is initially unclear what aspect of their position he rejects. After systematically eliminating all possibilities, the Gemara proposes three explanations - either expanding the Mishna to include another case or revising the formulation of Rabbi Shimon's statement as it appears there.  

Study Guide A third answer is introduced to resolve the contradiction between Rabbi Elazar's ruling in the Mishna concerning the incense and Rav's statement about Rabbi Elazar's position in a braita. The second answer,Abaye's, had been rejected earlier, but Rav Ashi reinstates it by resolving the difficulty raised against it. The Gemara asks: If part of a sacrificial item is missing after it has already been taken out of the Temple courtyard, is one liable for offering the remainder outside? Three sources are brought to address this question, but each is ultimately rejected. If the fatty portions of a peace offering are burned outside together with the meat, one is liable, even though the meat should theoretically constitute a barrier (chatzitza). The Gemara offers three explanations for why it is not considered a chatzitza in this case. If the kometz was never taken from a meal offering, one is not liable for offering the entire mixture outside, since such an act would not fulfill the mitzvah of offering a mincha even inside the Temple. However, if the kometz was taken and then returned to the rest of the mincha, one would be liable for burning the entire mixture outside. The Gemara asks: why is the kometz not nullified in the remainder? A meal offering is brought through the burning of both the kometz and the frankincense. If only one of these is burned outside, the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar again disagree about liability, since the act is only partial. Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha asks whether burning the kometz permits half of the remainder to be eaten by the priest, or whether it merely weakens the prohibition on the remainder. The Gemara first analyzes according to whose view the question is posed, and then leaves the matter unresolved. One who sprinkles part of the blood outside is liable, even according to Rabbi Elazar, consistent with his position regarding the Yom Kippur goat in a case where the blood spills midway through the sprinklings of blood. Rabbi Elazar also rules that one who pours the water libation outside the Temple on Sukkot is liable. Rabbi Yochanan cites Rabbi Menachem Yodafa, who explains that Rabbi Elazar must follow the view of his teacher, Rabbi Akiva, who holds that the water libation on Sukkot is a Torah obligation derived from the laws of wine libations. However, Reish Lakish raises three objections to this explanation.