International report

This week’s joint naval exercises between Turkey and Egypt in the eastern Mediterranean are the latest move in a burgeoning partnership, as Ankara intensifies its efforts to draw Cairo closer and loosen its bonds with Turkish rivals Greece, Cyprus and Israel. The "Sea of Friendship 2026" naval drills, held from 4-9 November off the coast of Alexandria, follow five years of rapprochement after nearly a decade of mistrust sparked by the 2013 ouster of Mohamed Morsi, a close ally of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, by Egypt's President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. It is the second year in a row that Turkey and Egypt have held the joint drills, after a 13-year break. “I think it's already a sign that the two countries are getting closer,” said Africa expert Elem Tepecikoglu of Ankara’s Social Sciences University. In her view, the naval exercises are part of an evolving partnership. “This normalisation process started five years ago in the diplomatic realm,” she explained. “And then we see cooperation in the security domain as well. So this is why I say I'm optimistic that Egypt might come closer to the Turkish side.” The strengthening alliance between Turkey and Egypt is stirring unease in Israel, at a time when Israeli-Turkish relations are already frayed by the war in Gaza and Ankara’s support for Hamas. “Obviously, Israel does not see this as necessarily positive, because of the heightened tensions between Israel and Turkey,” warned Turkey analyst Gallia Lindenstrauss of the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. She noted that Israel is growing ever more wary of Turkey’s expanding reach in the eastern Mediterranean. “There is concern that Turkey and Egypt can cooperate in ways that will squeeze Israel’s room to manoeuver, politically but also militarily.” Lindenstrauss said she does not see this as a likely scenario, affirming that the 1979 peace agreement between Israel and Egypt is “still very much in place, despite many geopolitical turnovers”. “But there was always a fear that the other countries surrounding it would unite and act against Israel,” the analyst added. Lindenstrauss believes Egypt’s strong ties with Turkey’s rivals, Greece and Cyprus, allay fears of Israeli encirclement. “It is very important that this relationship keeps going ahead because it is a source of stability in the eastern Mediterranean,” she said. Houthi war risks dragging Israel and Turkey into Horn of Africa standoff Turkish leverage Egypt, Greece, Cyprus and Israel are bound by a tightly knit strategic energy alliance centred on the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, a regional organisation formed in 2020 that has its headquarters in Cairo. Just last month, they stood united in condemning the Libyan parliament's ratification of a maritime deal with Turkey that encroached on Greek and Egyptian waters. Still, Jalel Harchaoui, a regional expert at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, a London-based think tank, observes that Turkey and Egypt are forging ever-closer collaboration on issues ranging from Libya to the Sudanese civil war to the Horn of Africa. Harchaoui suggests this growing cooperation is steadily boosting Ankara’s leverage over Cairo. “I think observers should ask, can Egypt afford to do without Turkey? And the answer is probably no, and Turkey probably is aware of it,” he said. Even so, Harchaoui doubts Cairo is ready to pivot fully toward Ankara. “If [Egypt] switches 180 degrees, it would be a disaster for the other side. I'm talking about Greece and Cyprus and Israel. So you could also ask yourself, can Egypt afford to anger its traditional friends?” Libya-Turkey maritime deal stokes tensions in eastern Mediterranean Egypt's balancing act Ankara is stepping up its diplomatic courtship of Cairo, hoping to lure Egypt away from its longstanding partners. But Turkish ambitions stumbled when Egypt declined to join the Mecca Defence Alliance with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in August. Analyst Lindenstrauss sees this as a clear sign of the boundaries in Turkish-Egyptian ties. “Egypt has already moved closer to Turkey than was imaginable a few years ago,” she said. “However, at the end of the day, there are limits to how much it can accept greater Turkish influence. I think Turkey pretty much reached where Egypt is willing to agree to, and it will not give Turkey concessions in the eastern Mediterranean that will endanger its relationship with Greece and Cyprus, or its peace agreement with Israel.” Lindenstrauss believes that despite diplomatic tensions with Israel over the war in Gaza, it still remains in Egypt’s interests to maintain ties with all sides. “Because of Egypt's importance in the region, I think it can definitely go ahead with this balancing act. It gives it all the gains and the risk is relatively low compared to having Egypt choose sides,” she added. Ankara stands ready to ramp up its campaign to win over Cairo as the battle for influence in the eastern Mediterranean intensifies. In the unfolding rivalry between between Turkey on one hand and Greece, Cyprus and Israel on the other, Egypt is emerging as the pivotal player.

The ratification of a maritime agreement between Libya and Turkey is stoking tensions across the eastern Mediterranean. Athens has condemned the deal as illegal, amid wider regional concern over Turkey’s growing influence. On Thursday, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis criticised the deal, which Libya’s eastern-based parliament ratified on 20 October, calling it “blatantly illegal, null and void”. The agreement sets out an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) between Libya and Turkey that encompasses the Greek island of Crete. Libya’s internationally recognised government in Tripoli signed the agreement in 2019, but the rival administration in eastern Libya had refused to ratify it until October. “I don’t think it’s possible to overestimate its political and symbolic importance. The whole world knows that Turkey has been pursuing this parliamentary ratification,” said Libya expert Jalel Harchaoui of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, a London-based think tank. “People thought that eastern Libya was a reliable friend of the enemies of Turkey, and that the process was going to drag on for several years,” he added. According to Harchaoui, the ratification is a bold step in Ankara’s broader strategy to assert its influence across the region, known as the Blue Homeland doctrine. Turkey courts Libya's rival factions in bid to further Mediterranean ambitions “We should never forget that the exclusive economic zone is a corollary of the Blue Homeland doctrine,” he said. “And the Blue Homeland doctrine is really about nationalism, commitment to projecting Turkish influence across all of Africa, across the sea.” Divided country Libya has been divided since Muammar Gaddafi was toppled in a Nato-backed uprising in 2011. The Government of National Unity rules the west from Tripoli, while the Government of National Stability holds sway in the east from Benghazi. Ankara has long backed the Tripoli-based government, but it has recently set out to win over the Benghazi administration, hoping to bridge Libya’s deep divide. Benghazi’s approval of the maritime deal is seen as a direct result of these diplomatic efforts. “It’s one of the most critical diplomatic achievements recently in the Mediterranean,” said Elem Eyrice Tepeciklioglu, professor of African studies at the Social Sciences University of Ankara. “This agreement is also a reflection of Turkey’s efforts to engage with both parts of the country.” Tepeciklioglu expects the EEZ to bring economic rewards. “The region covered by the deal has significant energy resources. So it’s important for energy exploration as well,” she said. Regional resistance Ankara now faces strong opposition in the region. Greece, Cyprus and Egypt have all condemned the agreement, arguing that it encroaches on their territorial waters, while the European Union and the United States have also voiced concerns. With vast energy reserves believed to lie beneath the disputed waters, Federico Donelli, professor of international relations at the University of Trieste in Italy, warns that tensions could rise. Turkey and Egypt turn page on decade of friction with show of friendship “The more immediate risk is an increase in diplomatic tension and especially competing activities in disputed maritime areas,” he said. “So exploration licences, seismic surveys, naval deployment and even some naval drills could be used to reinforce competing claims, and the possibility of incidents could increase.” Donelli suggests that Italy, which has close ties to both Turkey and Libya, could play a key role in easing tensions with its fellow EU members Greece and Cyprus. Meanwhile, Ankara is reaching out to Cairo and has invited Egypt to join the maritime pact. Libya expert Aya Burweila of the Athens-based Center for Hellenic and Mediterranean Studies says the ratification caught Greece off guard. “For Athens, symbolically, it’s a huge blow. I don’t think they expected it,” she said. “If you see the map, you know, it basically cuts across Crete’s maritime waters.” Despite Greece’s tough rhetoric, Burweila believes diplomacy can prevail. “It’s [the agreement] more symbolic than anything else, because I don’t see how it can be enforced,” she said. “So I think this is an opening for negotiations with Egypt and Greece and other countries. And I think these talks are already happening between Libya and Egypt.” France hosts global push to promote stability in Libya, keep elections on track Israeli concern The agreement also risks inflaming tensions between Israel and Turkey, which have already been sharpened by Ankara’s support for Hamas and the war in Gaza. Israel is increasingly worried about Turkey’s regional ambitions. In September, Israeli Navy commander Vice Admiral Eyal Harel warned of Turkey’s growing assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean. Harchaoui believes Israel’s concerns are likely to grow. “Turkey was able to pull off an extraordinary win. If you look at just the area of influence, it has almost won eastern Libya. Turkey is going to just sell more weapons; it’s going to build more airstrips, so it’s literally expanding… So they [Israel] have to decide: are they going to remain in the rhetorical space or do something about it?”

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a staunch advocate of Muslim rights, has been notably silent on Azerbaijan’s recent hijab ban in schools. For years, Erdogan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev have shared a close alliance, but the ban is putting the Turkish president in a tight spot. School uniform rules introduced in September in predominantly Muslim Azerbaijan, which is a secular state, have been used to bar pupils wearing the hijab. Teachers have also reported being excluded. The new rules do not explicitly mention hijabs, but prohibit clothing deemed incompatible with school uniforms or secular education. With Turkish social media awash with videos of Azerbaijani children wearing hijabs and pleading to be let into their schools, the ban has sparked outrage among Turkey’s religious conservatives. Yet Erdogan, a vocal defender of Muslim rights both at home and on the world stage, has remained silent on the issue. "He's unusually muted because Azerbaijan and Turkey, of course, had this extremely good relationship,“ said Turkish political analyst Sezin Oney. "If it were another country, he would have had a harsher reaction.” ‘We're fighting a daily battle': Iranian women dare to shed hijab in public Baku's response Erdogan, who is religiously conservative, rose to political prominence in the 1990s by challenging a similar ban in Turkish universities, and went on to become a global advocate of Muslim rights. Oney predicts his silence on Azerbaijan will damage this reputation. "[It's] a far cry from the days when Erdogan could stand up against the powerful of the world. That was the image he projected, and now he cannot even stand up to Aliyev." Aliyev has publicly dismissed criticism of the hijab ban by one of the Turkish president’s advisors and Baku has issued international arrest warrants for several prominent Turkish Islamist and conservative figures, along with banning others from entering the country after similar criticism.  Azerbaijani officials accuse the critics of threatening its sovereignty and national security. Shifting status Aliyev and Erdogan have enjoyed close ties for more than two decades, built on economic and defence cooperation, with the mantra of ‘two states, one nation’.  “Erdogan and Turkey [still] see Azerbaijan as a little brother,” explains Tbilisi-based defence and security expert Eugene Kogan. “I think that's not the perspective that comes from Baku because they say quite clearly that their relationship is no longer between a big brother and a little brother, and their relationship is now of equals.” He added: “I think this phrase 'equal' is not fully accepted in Ankara. So that puts a strain on bilateral relations between the two countries." Energy-rich Azerbaijan is growing in economic importance, in comparison with Turkey’s struggling economy. It is also among Turkey’s largest foreign investors. Earlier this month, the two countries signed arms agreements worth more than $500 million. Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR says it has invested around $19.5 billion in Turkey. “SOCAR is the flagship of investments in Turkey – it's huge," said Turkish analyst Atilla Yesilada of Global Source Investments. “Turkey has a chronic deficit in plastics and petrochemicals. In fact, there are plans to establish a huge petrochemical complex in the Adana or Antalya area with a cost of $10 billion. I don’t think domestic capital has that kind of funding. Eventually, if Turkey wants to cover its petrochemical deficit, it needs SOCAR to get involved." Shipping attacks threaten Turkey's resolve to keep warships out of Black Sea Relations with Israel Azerbaijan’s deepening relationship with Israel, despite its Turkish ally’s condemnation of Israel’s war in Gaza and broader escalating tensions, is another source of friction with Ankara. International media reported that Azerbaijan signed a $235 million arms deal with Israel’s Elbit Systems this month, although neither side has commented on the reports. Azerbaijan also remains a key oil supplier to Israel, with oil piped through Turkey and shipped from the Turkish Ceyhan port. In 2024, Erdogan moved swiftly to suppress mounting protests against these exports – protests led largely by religious conservatives who form a crucial part of his political support. However, Kogan believes Israel will not try to exploit any rift between Baku and Ankara. “The stability of relations between Ankara, Baku and Tel Aviv is very, very important for Tel Aviv,” Kogan said. Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance strained by opposing stances on Israel Baku last year hosted talks between Turkey and Israel aimed at defusing tensions over Syria. '[Isreal] understands that it could come to war [with Turkey] and Baku can still act as a meeting point for both countries. I cannot really think of another meeting point between Ankara and Tel Aviv at the moment,” Kogan said. With Turkey the main export route for Azerbaijan’s oil and gas, mutual dependency remains a powerful means to contain any tensions. Gasimov suggests the current rift is part of a learning process. “I wouldn’t read it as reshuffling or rebalancing, but rather as a new chapter that may have opened up now, if the two sides learn from it and are ready to accept these kinds of differences." As Turkey wrestles with mounting financial and economic woes, Erdogan is expected to look for ways to smooth things over with his affluent neighbour. But the full impact on their ties of this dispute remains to be seen. 

A wave of deadly attacks on cargo ships in the waters of NATO members Bulgaria and Romania has jolted the alliance into calling an emergency meeting on Black Sea security. Yet any move to send NATO ships hinges on Turkey reversing its steadfast refusal to allow warships into the Black Sea. Thursday saw two chemical tankers struck by drones close to a Romanian port. It follows two similar attacks in Bulgarian waters in the past week. More than 20 sailors have been killed or remain missing. “The war has come in full force to the Black Sea now,” said Yoruk Isik, a maritime analyst who runs the Istanbul-based Bosphorus Observer consultancy. “With the change in technology compared to the beginning of the war, drones really disrupted maritime traffic.”  According to Isik, the latest attacks underscore the growing spread of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. “Russian ports and Ukrainian ports are heavily targeted, but now even in NATO waters ships are getting hit, in Bulgarian waters, Romanian waters. “We are at a point where there is no safe place.” The latest strikes targeted vessels along a key Ukrainian shipping route, casting Russia as NATO’s prime suspect as Moscow intensifies its assault on Ukrainian trade. After meeting on Thursday with the leaders of Bulgaria and Romania, both NATO members, Secretary-General Mark Rutte said the military alliance would “continue to work closely with our allies in the Black Sea, adjusting our deterrence and defence posture as needed”. Romanian President Nicușor Dan said NATO would hold a crisis meeting next week to discuss the situation. Gatekeeper to the Black Sea NATO could deploy air defence systems against drones to protect Bulgarian and Romanian waters. But any deployment of naval ships will depend on NATO member Turkey, which controls access to the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits under a long-standing international treaty, the 1936 Montreux Convention. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Ankara has blocked entry of Russian and Ukrainian warships or military vessels belonging to NATO members without a Black Sea coast, arguing for a diplomatic solution. In recent weeks the Turkish government has sought to broker a ceasefire on commercial shipping, without success. Isik claims that failure, coupled with the latest escalation in attacks, is increasingly calling into question Ankara’s reliance on diplomacy alone. “Either they’re going to have a breakthrough and the Kremlin is going to de-escalate, or Ankara is going to accept the reality that there needs to be a more credible force here – bigger vessels have to come,” the analyst said. He pointed out that the navies of Romania and Bulgaria are not equipped to handle such an operation alone, with Cold War-era ships nearing the end of their lifespan. “So Turkey's engagement is key to any successful NATO planning in the Black Sea.” Russian leverage Despite Turkish-owned cargo ships coming under attack in recent weeks, and Turkey’s deep reliance on Black Sea trade, Ankara has so far kept its powerful navy on the sidelines. International relations expert Huseyin Bagci, of Ankara’s Middle East Technical University, says Turkey fears an escalation in the conflict and will be wary of allowing NATO ships into the Black Sea. “I do not think the government would dare,” said Bagci. “Probably the government considers this a provocation to drag Turkey into the war... Turkey is afraid of getting involved in the Black Sea against Russia, this is somehow a trauma in the Turkish mind.” Moscow also retains powerful leverage over Ankara, he suggested. Russia’s state nuclear company Rosatom is about to complete a multi-billion-dollar nuclear power station in Akkuyu, southern Turkey. Ankara sees it as vital to the drive to reduce its heavy dependence on imported energy. “It is illogical to oppose Russia now while you let the Russians complete the nuclear plant,” said Bagci. Erdogan hints at larger nuclear partnership with Russia, unsettling Turkey's allies Ankara also knows that letting NATO vessels in while barring Russian warships could provoke Moscow into contesting Turkey’s prized status as the gatekeeper to the Black Sea. However, retired Turkish diplomat Selim Kuneralp, an expert on the Montreux Convention, warns Turkey’s control over Black Sea access is likely already in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s sights. “This has probably had an impact on Russia’s ability to conduct the war, and I doubt that Putin is very happy with the situation,” said Kuneralp. “So if he were to win the war, there is a very strong risk that he will take the initiative of saying: ‘this is unacceptable and we want to have free passage of warships from now on, regardless of whether there is a war’.”  As a signatory, Moscow has the right to call for a revision of the Montreux Convention every five years. For centuries, Russia fought repeated wars with the then Ottoman Empire for control of the Turkish Straits. In the early years of the Cold War, even Joseph Stalin tried his hand, but the United States intervened and thwarted him. Now Ankara walks a tightrope between Moscow and its NATO partners to avoid a resurrection of those historical rivalries.

The escalating clash between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia now threatens to ignite the already tense rivalry between Israel and Turkey in the Horn of Africa. This week, Turkey threw its military weight behind Saudi Arabia, while Somaliland – a self-declared state recognised only by Israel – is urgently seeking Israeli military support. Somaliland, a breakaway state from Somalia, is calling on Israel to provide military hardware. “We need air defence systems,” Mohamed Osman Fadal, a senior foreign affairs adviser to Somaliland’s president, said in a Middle East Eye interview this month. Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi made a similar request last month for Israeli military support. Last December, Israel became the first nation to recognise Somaliland, which declared independence from Somalia in 1991. Because of its close ties to Israel, Somaliland now fears it could become a target for the Houthis, who operate from Yemen just across the Gulf of Aden and have previously targeted Israel. “The Houthi threat is growing; it’s a major issue,” said Gallia Lindenstrauss of the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. “Access to the Red Sea and Somaliland’s location just across from Yemen are very important, and I think this is where Israel recognises that it’s difficult to deal with the threat only from afar, and it’s important to have allies in the Horn of Africa,” she added. Israel, which is in the midst of an election campaign ahead of the 27 October vote, has not commented on the request. But Lindenstrauss predicts a favourable response. “Obviously, if you look at the location, there should be some military support," she said. Turkey’s backing for Somalia Yet Somaliland’s call for military aid is fuelled by more than just anxiety over the Houthis. Somalia’s government is still intent on reclaiming Somaliland, branding it a rogue state. At the same time, Turkey has stepped up its military support for Somalia, deploying F-16s and advanced drones in January, and running its largest overseas military base to train Somali troops. Somaliland president makes 'historic' visit to Israel “Turkey has strong defence cooperation with Somalia; Somaliland sees that as an issue for them. It sees them as a potential future threat down the road. And so that’s why they’re calling for Israeli security support,” explained Horn of Africa analyst Omar Mahmood of the International Crisis Group. “I think what’s happening is both sides, Somalia and Somaliland, are drawing external actors into their local dispute,” added Mahmood. “So it’s elevating what has been an unresolved but a local dispute for quite some time into something broader, something more regional.” Tensions between Turkey and Israel have also been mounting, fuelled by Israel’s ongoing wars in Gaza and Lebanon and Ankara’s vocal support for Hamas. Both nations now see each other as an increasing threat. “There is a security dilemma evolving between Turkey and Israel,” warns Lindenstrauss. “What Turkey does for its security, Israel sees as threatening. What Israel does for its defences in [Syria] is seen as threatening.” Soli Ozel, an expert on Turkey at the Institut Montaigne in France, warns that because Somalia holds such strategic value for Turkey, any Israeli military involvement in Somaliland could dangerously escalate the situation. “They may consider the deployment of Israeli missiles in Somaliland another destabilising factor,” said Ozel. “But I don’t think that the F-16s or the drones would be used against Somaliland, honestly; at least for the moment, I wouldn’t expect that to happen.” Lebanon becomes latest battleground in Turkish-Israeli tensions Containment, not conflict Ozel argues that while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan are trading increasingly bellicose rhetoric, both countries are engaged in a high-stakes battle of containment rather than conflict. “The theatrics and the realities of Turkish-Israeli relations may not be exactly the same,” explained Ozel. “I don’t think they will fight, but they are both showing their colours, right? Israel sent missiles to Somaliland; the Turks send F-16s and drones in order to set limits to what the other party will do.” Turkey is preparing to expand its military footprint in the region. This week, Turkey and Pakistan pledged armed support to Saudi Arabia against the Houthis under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed in August, a pact binding the three nations to mutual defence. While the specifics remain unclear, Lindenstrauss notes that despite rising friction between Turkey and Israel, both countries may still find common cause in confronting the Houthis. “I think the recognition that the Houthis are not something that is seen as only Israel’s problem, and it’s not just a minor proxy of Iran, but it’s a major problem that many states have to join together to deal with. I think that’s actually good news,” said Lindenstrauss. Turkey warns it could be Israel's 'next enemy' as tensions escalate Yet Mahmood cautions that as clashes in the Red Sea escalate, Israel’s possible deployment of military hardware to Somaliland points to a worrying new trend. “Horn actors need to realise that while they’re inviting external actors in to support their own ambitions locally, to get one step over their political adversaries, they risk turning their theatre into a wider proxy battleground. And so certainly, I think there’s a risk that those types of tensions can spill over,” he warned.

Attacks by Yemen's Houthi rebels on Saudi Arabia are putting Turkey's new defence pact with the kingdom to its first major test – forcing Ankara to weigh support for its ally against the risk of being drawn deeper into the conflict. Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement on 7 August, committing themselves to the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all. The three countries' military chiefs met in the Saudi capital on Friday, a day after the Iran-backed Houthis launched their latest barrage of missiles targeting Riyadh and Saudi Aramco oil facilities in Yanbu. In recent weeks, Saudi Arabia has reported intercepting numerous Houthi drone and ballistic missile attacks from neighbouring Yemen. The military chiefs discussed intelligence sharing, military coordination and integrating their capabilities, Saudi and Pakistani statements said. Turkey's defence ministry did not comment on the meeting. Erdogan hints at larger nuclear partnership with Russia, unsettling Turkey's allies Saudi expectations Turkey has so far stopped short of committing itself to military action. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said this month that Ankara was looking into providing what he called “technical support”, without elaborating on what that could involve. Saudi Arabia could look to Turkey for air defence systems, counter-drone technology, radars and maritime security, given the expertise and capabilities of the Turkish military and defence industry, said Amed Khuzaie of the Washington-based think tank N7 Foundation. “The Mecca Agreement pact will prove its vitality and importance only if it's deemed to be functional,” Khuzaie told RFI. The Riyadh meeting followed talks in New York on Thursday involving the Saudi and Turkish foreign ministers and Pakistan's deputy prime minister and foreign minister on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. Turkish media citing foreign ministry sources said the meeting focused on ongoing “technical negotiations”. But providing support to Saudi Arabia could expose Turkey to retaliation from the Houthis. “By God, if Turkey and Pakistan become involved, we will strike them with an iron fist,” Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a senior member of the Houthis, said in an Iraqi television interview. Turkey seeks Black Sea shipping deal as attacks threaten grain trade Risk of retaliation The warning should be taken seriously given the Houthis' military presence around the Bab al-Mandeb strait, a critical waterway linking the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, explained Amed Nagi, a Yemen expert at the International Crisis Group. “[The Houthis] targeted US and UK shipping in the Red Sea,” Nagi said. “They could do the same beyond [that] to the Gulf of Aden, because we know Turkey is very active in the Horn of Africa. "So I think these are the areas that the Houthis will think about if there is any sort of retaliation against Turkey.” In 2024, the Houthis attacked US military and commercial shipping in the Red Sea, damaging the Gibraltar Eagle bulk carrier with a cruise missile and sinking the British-linked cargo ship MV Rubymar. Saudi Arabia could also look to Israel for support if its new partners do not provide what it needs, Khuzaie said. “Who has better intelligence in the region than the Israelis today?” he said. “Diversifying resources, if one fails you, you have another side that could assist.” The risks for Ankara go beyond possible Houthi retaliation. Turkey must also manage its relationship with Iran, which backs the Yemeni group. “It is not in the interest of Turkey to have a direct confrontation with any actor in the region, and the Houthis have become a proxy of Iran; Turkey doesn't want a confrontation with Iran directly," said Bilgehan Alagoz, an international relations professor at Istanbul's Marmara University. "Turkey is trying to solve the issue from a diplomatic point of view.” In a joint statement last week, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt said that dialogue and diplomacy were the only sustainable way to resolve the region's conflicts, while affirming Saudi Arabia's right to defend itself under international law. Fidan met his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi in New York on Friday. Fidan later said they discussed Iran's negotiations with the United States and conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, but that diplomatic efforts had yet to produce a breakthrough. What the SDF’s dissolution means for Syria’s Kurds and neighbouring Turkey Iran balancing act The diplomatic efforts come as Turkey's relationship with Iran faces other strains. Turkey-based international relations analyst Soli Ozel said Ankara has for decades walked a “fine line” between rivalry and cooperation with Tehran while balancing its relationships with Iran and Western allies, particularly the United States. Turkey's banking regulator recently revoked the operating licence of Iran's Bank Mellat branch in Istanbul, although the official notice did not say the move was intended to enforce US sanctions. The US Treasury also said Ankara had agreed after talks with Washington to stop flights by Iran's Mahan Air as part of efforts to comply with US measures against Tehran. Three Turkish airlines also suspended flights to Iran. Turkish authorities have also repeatedly accused Iran of hostile operations inside the country, including assassinations and abductions of Iranian dissidents. In January, security forces arrested six people suspected of spying for Iran and gathering information about the Incirlik air base, which is used by US forces. Becoming involved in the conflict against the Houthis could upset Ankara's already delicate relationship with Tehran, Ozel told RFI. “The Iranians who actually have a lot of [intelligence] capabilities in Turkey, we’ve seen that before, then you find yourself in a hot or cold war,” he said.

Turkey has jailed dozens of people pending trial as a sweeping crackdown on LGBTQI+ groups widens, prompting international condemnation and protests outside Turkish embassies on Friday. By Thursday, courts in several provinces had jailed at least 82 people following raids on LGBTQI+ organisations, clubs, cafes and homes. The cases include LGBTQI+ activists and members of rights groups as well as people accused of prostitution, drug offences and other crimes. Not everyone jailed is accused of gay rights advocacy.The United Nations human rights office has called on Turkey to uphold human rights without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity and to immediately release anyone arbitrarily detained. Protests were held outside Turkish embassies in cities including Paris, Brussels, London, Oslo and Washington on Friday. The crackdown began on Saturday, when police carried out coordinated raids targeting nine LGBTQI+ organisations. Justice Minister Akin Gurlek said legal action was being taken against 162 people, nine associations and 13 businesses in 15 provinces. Turkey arrests dozens in ongoing crackdown on LGBTQI+ groups Mass detentions The raids prompted protests across Turkey, including outside Istanbul’s main courthouse on Tuesday. Police broke up the demonstration and detained more than 100 people, including journalists. They were later released. “I am here because I want to say that LGBTQ+ friends are not alone in this country,” said Ayse, a protester who asked to be identified only by her first name. “I want to support them and to stay in solidarity with them, which is not easy these days in Turkey, but they are not alone, and we are not alone, and we will be here until the end.” Opposition DEM Party parliamentarian Ozgul Saki remained at the protest, protected from arrest by parliamentary immunity. “This oppression against LGBTQ+ people is an attempt to compress society into a single type; to build an Islamist, Turkish, racist society,” Saki said. “Those who are here say, 'No! Society will live equally, freely and honourably with all its diversity,' and that's why they were all detained.” The operations have been defended by Gurlek, from President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP). “No criminal organisation, abuse network or illegal activity which targets children, youths or families will be tolerated,” Gurlek posted on social media. Among the organisations affected was Istanbul-based SPoD, which provides psychological support to LGBTQI+ people. “As a community, we were expecting that such an operation would come one day. But we didn't imagine it as that violent, that much unlawful,” said a SPoD representative who asked to remain anonymous. “They raided our office; I think four or five have been detained, and they are still in custody. What will happen to the LGBTQ+ community after this day? Like they can implement a kind of informal criminalisation upon our community, so my personal feeling is an immense feeling of uncertainty.” Surge in anti-LGBTQ disinformation targets Pride in Europe Obscenity allegations Homosexuality has been legal since the foundation of the Turkish republic in 1923, but authorities are using an obscenity law as part of the crackdown. “All of our board members are detained due to the allegations of obscenity,” said Yildiz Tar of Ankara-based KAOS GL, Turkey’s leading LGBTQI+ news portal. “They look into our social media account, and our news articles are seen as obscene because, for example, there is one picture of two women kissing, and they see that it's obscene. So that is why they have been detained.” The measures resemble actions taken against LGBTQI+ communities in Russia and Egypt, Tar said. “It's very similar to Russia and Egypt, like the things they want to do is very similar to anti-gay propaganda laws, and there were huge operations, and people got detained,” Tar said. “So it's very similar to both countries. And actually, like the Turkish government is very fond of Putin's way of dealing things.” The crackdown has also drawn condemnation from the European Union and international human rights groups. “It's an attempt to show LGBTQ+ people as immoral and against the family. But in fact, none of this does anything to protect the family at all,” said Emma Sinclair-Webb, who leads Human Rights Watch’s Turkey office. “It's all about discrediting and stigmatizing people for their sexual orientation or gender identity.” Turkey marks a decade since the coup that never was, but never really ended Wider crackdown The arrests form part of a broader crackdown on people regarded as opposing the government, Sinclair-Webb said. “This operation should be set in the context of a very wide crackdown on anybody who is regarded as oppositional to the government, whether in terms of being politically or in terms of their lifestyle or their outlook… there is a general attempt by the government to impose as well as, you know, ideological conformity on people, lifestyle,” Sinclair-Webb said. President Erdogan routinely refers to LGBTQI+ people as perverts and has stepped up his rhetoric ahead of much-rumoured early elections. Gurlek has called on prosecutors to increase investigations into the LGBTQI+ community, fuelling fears of further arrests. The crackdown has also prompted condemnation across Turkish civil society, with trade unions, doctors’ associations and opposition parties voicing their opposition. For Tar, that support offers some hope amid fears over what could follow for Turkey’s LGBTQI+ community. “If this attack won't be stopped, it would mean a lot of maltreatment and torture; it can also cause hate crimes; it incites hatred inside the country too,” Tar said. “And it will mean that you cannot be openly queer; if they succeed in their operation, that is a really, really hellish scenario.”

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is signalling a move to expand nuclear power cooperation with Russia, just as his country’s first Russian-built nuclear station prepares to go live later this year. The deepening partnership is likely to unsettle Turkey’s western allies. On the sidelines of a recent gathering of regional leaders in Kyrgyzstan, Erdogan told his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, that Russia and Turkey “will take steps together to open some new power plants, along with the opening of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant”. The Akkuyu nuclear power plant, built by Russia’s state nuclear company Rosatom on Turkey's Mediterranean coast, is due to go online later this year. Erdogan’s announcement comes amid strained ties with Russia, as the Turkish leader has deepened relations with United States President Donald Trump. Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, head of the Ankara office of US think tank the German Marshall Fund, describes Erdogan’s move as a “gesture” to Putin. “Although Turkey is competing with Russia geopolitically, and although Turkey is firmly anchored in NATO and is improving its relationship with the United States, it does not intend to sever all ties with Russia,” Unluhisarcikli explained. “Indeed, Turkey sees the Turkey-Russia relationship as a long-term strategic one. And this is, by the way, consistent with Turkey's balancing act.” Trump tests Turkey's energy dependence on Russia with lure of US power Nuclear lifeline For Ankara, nuclear energy promises to help it break free from its heavy reliance on imported power. Once operational, the Akkuyu plant in southern Turkey will supply as much as 10 percent of the country’s electricity. Rosatom owns the Akkuyu power plant and will recoup the estimated €21.5 billion construction costs by selling electricity to Turkey, generating annual income of around €2-3 billion. Such income could be a vital tool for Moscow to mitigate tightening sanctions by both the European Union and the United States. “The Akkuyu nuclear power plant allows Russia to build itself various state-to-state payment channels to store liquidity in Turkish banks without necessarily interfering with any sanctions regulations,” according to George Voloshin of Acams, a global organisation dedicated to anti-financial crime, training and education. Voloshin believes that, given the project's 60- to 80-year lifespan, Turkey’s commitment to Russian nuclear power will shape bilateral ties for the long term, with consequences. “It will be a source of scrutiny from western partners of Turkey. At the same time, nuclear energy has been so far shielded from any sanctions, so for Russia it is clearly a kind of lifeline,” he said. Turkey seeks Black Sea shipping deal as attacks threaten grain trade Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Ankara has maintained that it is not bound by EU or US sanctions on Moscow. Yet behind the scenes, it has quietly followed many restrictions and secured crucial waivers, especially for Russian gas. By leveraging its pivotal location near Syria and Iran, Ankara has walked a diplomatic tightrope between its western partners and Moscow. However, deepening nuclear cooperation with Russia threatens to complicate the already difficult balancing act. “It would reinforce the already existing distrust between Turkey and Europe and Turkey and the United States,” warned Unluhisarcikli. “But at the same time, Turkey is in talks with other countries, the United States and South Korea. These are the main two competitors for Russia.”  Mutual dependency Turkey’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels has stirred unease at home, and the idea of doubling down with Russian nuclear energy only heightens the sense of anxiety. “It is a dilemma,” Unluhisarcikli conceded. Yet with Russia willing to shoulder the hefty construction costs, cash-strapped Ankara has a strong incentive to continue the partnership. Russia expert Zaur Gasimov of Istanbul’s Turkish-German University points out that more than a decade of joint investment makes it tough for Turkey to turn to alternative suppliers. "It's quite a profound project,” said Gasimov, “Russia conducts the training of Turkish specialists in the field of nuclear energy, which started 15 years ago. We now have three or four waves of Turkish engineers who stayed for longer periods in Russia; they learn the Russian language for two years, and you have an infrastructure of specialists.” However, Gasimov stresses that, given the scale of investment by both sides, it has created an important mutual dependency. “Its importance makes the two sides, somehow, at the end, interested in preserving a certain level of the relationship,” he said. This shared reliance might help keep Turkish-Russian rivalries in check, from North Africa to the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Black Sea. Yet any step toward deeper nuclear cooperation is bound to invite sharper scrutiny and rising suspicion from Ankara’s western allies.

Turkey is racing to restore safe passage for cargo ships in the Black Sea as attacks on shipping disrupt grain exports and push up prices. Russia and Ukraine are major global wheat exporters, but Black Sea trade has been severely disrupted as both sides step up attacks on shipping and port infrastructure. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan announced this week that Turkey was working on a plan to ensure safe passage in the Black Sea for commercial shipping and said he was in touch with both Ukraine and Russia. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan confirmed that he raised the issue with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on the sidelines of a gathering of regional leaders in Kyrgyzstan. The Turkish move comes as Ukraine and Russia have ramped up their attacks on shipping and ports in and around the Black Sea. In 2022, Turkey and the United Nations brokered a deal between Ukraine and Russia to ensure safe passage for Ukrainian grain exports through the Black Sea. The agreement lasted a year. While Turkey has maintained good ties with both sides, reaching another agreement will be much harder, warned international relations professor Huseyin Bagci of Ankara’s Middle East Technical University. “The tension is increasing more than ever before,” Bagci said. “It's not enough to have good relations, because the two sides – the Ukrainians and Russians – should sit down and talk about a common solution to this problem. Turkey cannot solve this problem alone.” What the SDF’s dissolution means for Syria’s Kurds and neighbouring Turkey Growing attacks In August Ukraine offered a ceasefire on commercial shipping, but the offer was rejected by Moscow, which said it wanted a broader deal. Ukrainian drones continue to strike Russian shipping, while Russia has continued missile attacks on Ukrainian ports and ships. This surge in attacks comes as both nations rush to export their grain harvests. Grain prices have risen sharply, by as much as 30 percent, international grain broker Can Atbasoglu said, even as both sides scramble to find new routes for their exports. “Russia will do their best to export as much as they can, both from Russian Baltic ports and EU Baltic ports like Latvia and Lithuania; they're also exporting,” Atbasoglu said. “Ukraine will also export as much as they can from Romania as well and through the Danube ports. But the export pace will be definitely lower. So it will definitely stay bullish for the markets. Prices are definitely going to stay like this or can have a further increase.” Fears of wheat price surge amid Ukraine-Russia clashes in the Black Sea Ships staying put At one of Istanbul's many shipyards, the docks are crowded with ships that once braved the Black Sea. One vessel bears the scars of a drone attack and is under repair. Others undergo routine maintenance as shipowners hesitate to risk new journeys into dangerous waters. The superintendent of one ship, speaking anonymously, says repairs are nearly finished, but uncertainty clouds the future. “We wanted to take the ship out to the Black Sea before entering the shipyard, but because of that risk, we didn’t enter the Black Sea and didn’t take on any cargo. We’ve been in the shipyard for 50 days for repairs, but we don’t know what will happen once the repairs are finished,” the superintendent said. Turkish shipowners warn that many are on the brink of bankruptcy, as idle ships rack up costs of up to 50,000 euros a month in mooring and crew expenses. Ziya Ustel, CEO of Turkish shipping company VI-ZA STAR, says high freight rates are being offered for Black Sea routes, but the risks are too great. “They are offering high freight rates, etc,” Ustel said. Without a diplomatic solution, few shipowners will be prepared to risk their vessels, Ustel warned. “The main thing is to find out a real solution,” Ustel added. “Otherwise, no one will try anything anymore.” Turkish diplomacy Ankara is expected to step up its efforts to find a solution. Grain brokers say hopes of a diplomatic breakthrough may be one reason prices have so far remained below the record highs seen at the start of the war. But if Turkish efforts fail and attacks on Black Sea shipping continue, higher grain prices could have a considerable impact, especially on the world’s poorest nations, many of which depend on Russian and Ukrainian grain.

Nearly a week after the Syrian Democratic Forces agreed to dissolve, the consequences are beginning to take shape for Syria's Kurds and neighbouring Turkey. As the former US-backed force is absorbed into the Syrian state, questions remain over what the country's Kurds have secured in return – from language and political rights to protections for women – and what the end of more than a decade of Kurdish-led autonomy means for Turkey's own conflict with Kurdish militants. SDF leader Mazloum Abdi announced the force's dissolution last Tuesday, saying its fighters would be integrated into the Syrian army. At its height, the predominantly Kurdish force numbered around 100,000 fighters and controlled nearly a fifth of Syrian territory in the northeast, including major oil fields and fertile land. Under SDF rule, Kurds gained cultural and political rights denied to them under previous governments in Damascus. “It means the end of Kurdish autonomy. After more than one decade of freedom, now they are under the control of Damascus,” said Syria expert Fabrice Balanche of Lyon University, who frequently visited the region. Kurdish rights “There are no guarantees for the Kurdish language because it's just a presidential decree: ‘let the Kurds use their language and teach Kurdish in schools,’ but there is nothing in the constitution,” Balanche said. The decree, issued by President Ahmed al-Sharaa in January, recognised Kurdish as a national language and allowed it to be taught in schools in areas with significant Kurdish populations. It also restored citizenship to Kurds who had been left stateless under measures stemming from a controversial 1962 census and made Nowruz, the Kurdish New Year festival, an official national holiday. The Education Ministry followed up on 27 August with rules providing for three Kurdish-language classes a week in public and private schools in areas with significant Kurdish populations, with marks counting towards pupils' final grades. ‘Words and promises not enough’ as Syria’s Kurds face uncertain future Abdi was also appointed as an adviser to al-Sharaa on Friday, days after announcing the SDF's dissolution. It remains unclear whether the role will be more than ceremonial. But questions remain over what the end of the Kurdish-led administration will mean for women. The SDF and affiliated institutions used a system in which governing bodies were jointly headed by a man and a woman. “During these 10 years of autonomy, men and women were equal,” Balanche said. “In the region’s administration. It was always a co-presidency. In Raqqah, for example, the mayor was Leyla Mustafa, a woman, and the co-president was a man. Now that is no longer the case.” Balanche also said the change could threaten restrictions on polygamy introduced under the Kurdish-led administration. Another unresolved question is what will happen to female SDF fighters as the force is absorbed into Syria's armed forces, which currently have no female troops. Shifting alliances For years, the SDF was Washington's main partner on the ground in Syria in the fight against the Islamic State group. But its position weakened as the United States built closer relations with Syria's new rulers. A Syrian government offensive in January seized large areas held by the SDF and pushed the Kurdish-led force back into negotiations over integration with Damascus. Washington, meanwhile, has increasingly embraced al-Sharaa's government, dismantling broad sanctions against Syria in 2025 and last week removing the country from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. Turkey has emerged as one of al-Sharaa's main foreign allies and has long pressed for the SDF to disarm and integrate into the Syrian state. Ankara considers the SDF a terrorist organisation linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which launched an insurgency against the Turkish state in 1984. The SDF has rejected Turkey's claim that it is an extension of the PKK. A year after Assad's fall, Syrian hopes for transitional justice are fading The United States and European Union designate the PKK as a terrorist organisation, but not the SDF. Turkey has carried out several cross-border military operations against the SDF in northern Syria since 2016 and still has thousands of troops stationed in the country. Ankara says those forces will remain until the security threats it faces have been eliminated. The SDF's dissolution therefore achieves a longstanding Turkish objective in Syria. Turkey's ruling AK Party welcomed the move last week as an important step towards strengthening Syria's unity. “Stability in Syria means Turkey perhaps being able to divert some of the resources it's been spending on counterterrorism into other areas of its defense that are absolutely necessary at a time like this, a time of regional turmoil,” said Turkey expert Asli Aydintasbas of the Washington-based Brookings Institution. Turkey's Kurdish conflict The SDF's dissolution could also remove an obstacle to the fragile peace process between Ankara and the PKK. The process is intended to end the PKK's decades-long armed campaign against the Turkish state through the group's disarmament and dissolution. Jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan called on the group to disarm and disband in February 2025, and the PKK announced three months later that it would do so. A group of militants symbolically burned their weapons at a ceremony in northern Iraq in July 2025. Turkey's parliament passed a law in August establishing a legal framework for the PKK's disbandment. Kurdish politicians have said broader democratic and legal reforms will also be needed for lasting peace. Macron to become first Western European leader to visit post-Assad Syria For Ankara, however, the process does not stop at Turkey's borders. It has repeatedly insisted that the SDF must also dissolve, because it regards the Syrian force as part of the same militant movement as the PKK. The SDF has disputed that characterisation, with Abdi saying in 2025 that the PKK's decision to disarm did not apply to his forces in Syria. The dismantling of groups Ankara regards as PKK affiliates across the region is essential to the process, said Middle East expert Serhan Afacan of Istanbul's Marmara University. “The PKK should not exist anywhere in the region. This is what Ankara has been saying for more than a year,” Afacan said. “If there is going to be any kind of peace process or reconciliation, the PKK is not supposed to exist anywhere in this region, in Turkey, in Iran, in Iraq, Syria.”