211: Christopher Meyer on PRC strategic corruption and political warfare (Part I)

Today, Sam Cooper, founder of the news outlet The Bureau, guest hosts Christopher Meyer, a former U.S. official and China expert during the Bush One and Two Administrations. Meyer currently serves as the head of the U.S. Micronesia Council and founded Wide Fountain, a platform for in-depth geopolitical analysis.  In this the first of a two-part episode, Sam and Christopher discuss PRC strategic corruption and political warfare. So, let's get started.  Sam Cooper's The Bureau: https://www.thebureau.news/ Christopher Meyer's Wide Fountain platform: https://widefountain.substack.com/ --- One CA is a product of the civil affairs association a and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership. We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.  To contact the show, email us at [email protected]  or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org --- Special thanks to Cozy Ambience for a sample of "February Cafe Jazz - Instrumental Bossa Nova Music for Work, Study and Relax - Background Music" retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hmq8Ht-sNwQ --- Transcript 00:00:01    Introduction Welcome to the One CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. One CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at [email protected]. or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org. I'll have those in the show notes. Today we welcome Sam Cooper, founder of the news outlet The Bureau, as he interviews Christopher Meyer, a former U.S. 00:00:44    SAM COOPER official and China expert during the Bush I and II administrations. Meyer currently serves as the head of the U.S. Micronesia Council and is the founder of Wide Fountain. a platform for in -depth geopolitical analysis. This is the first of a two -part episode. Sam and Christopher discuss PRC strategic corruption and political warfare. So let's get started. 00:01:07    SAM COOPER Today I'm excited to introduce Chris Myers. Chris is a longtime China expert and former U .S. government diplomatic and economic issues officer, and he explains how military intelligence and influence networks embedded deeply with organized crime are a central feature of the global strategy employed by the families that really are running communist China. And when I say that, we're going to discuss your research on the family of Xi Jinping, the Xi family, and you call it the Yezi clique. But first, tell our viewers your background in getting into China and your career. 00:01:46    CHRISTOPHER MEYER Thank you very much, Sam. I started a keen interest in China when I was 16. And I read the history of the opium wars and I was outraged. And I decided I wanted a career to be involved in business and diplomacy between the U .S. and China. And then as an undergrad student, I did research on the special economic zones. This was in the early 80s and the special economic zones were just announced. And my research led me to see the geopolitical aspects. There were some. across from Macau, across from Hong Kong, and across from Taiwan. So I sort of had an eye to that. And then I did business. I was, for five years, I was with a Fortune 500 company. And I had the opportunity to do some business in Xiaomon. And I saw some things that set off alarm bells in my mind. And I kind of filed that. And I had some experiences that informed my research later. I worked in the government in Bush 1 and Bush 2. I was involved in Indo -Pacific affairs. really helping American companies do business in the region, and then became a consultant to part of the government that administered our territories in the Pacific. So I saw some things there that, again, set off alarm bells in my mind. And in 2016, I happened to cross an old colleague who kind of gave me some more information. And basically from 2016 until 2022, I conducted a lot of independent research. I decided I wanted to know exactly what was going on because proxies in the region seemed emboldened to take on the U .S. And they didn't have a government portfolio, but they acted like they did. And so my research sort of started in Micronesia. I had the great opportunity to come across your book. You totally informed. parts of what I was looking at and kind of put the spotlight on what happened in Canada. And I kind of worked the two sides to the middle and conducted most recently research that kind of takes us from Mao Zedong's death until the 90s. And I believe that there was a click. I call it the yes, she click. There were scores to settle. There were powerful families that were on the cusp of greatness or recognition for all their good work, and they were purged. And it led some individuals to become extremely militant in their conduct of political warfare against the U .S. So that sort of sets the table for what we might be talking about. 00:04:28    SAM COOPER Yeah. So to get into this, let's start with the Ye family. They're mysterious, but for experts, they're very clearly a clan that has tremendous kingmaking power in China. So maybe let's start with who they are and then bridge into how they connect with Xi's father. 00:04:46    CHRISTOPHER MEYER So the patriarch, Lie Jianying, was literally the kingmaker of Mao Zedong. He came from Guangdong province, and he was involved in the very earliest movements of the Communist Party in China. And he fled one of those, I think it was the Guangzhou uprising, with Zhou Enlai, and they escaped to Hong Kong. So Ye Jianying is one of the original revolutionaries in China, and he had the title of Marshal Ye. And when he crossed paths with Mao Zedong, he was actually the aide -de -camp to a very powerful Communist Party operator out of Beijing who had an army of tens of thousands. And he rolled up to Mao and his very small group of long marchers and said, follow us, we're going to Sichuan province. And Mao was like, no, I don't think that's a safe bet. The locals are going to tear you up. And Ye Jianying kind of heard a truth in Mao and he deserted this powerful general and with him brought the code books. So Mao gets Ye Jianying and the code books and he's able to communicate with the Comintern. And lo and behold, that general did get wiped out in Sichuan. He returned to Mao's base. With a few thousand troops from then, Mao became the most powerful leader in the communist ecosystem. So Ye Jianying had a very high regard for Mao. Mao called him the savior of the Communist Party and the Communist Revolution. And so fast forward it right through the revolution. Ye gets a very top position as the party secretary for Guangdong province, the largest and economically most powerful province in the country. And Mao wants to conduct his land reform in Guangdong, just as he does everywhere. And it's a violent thing where landowners are hunted down and put to death. Yeah, because he was a native Cantonese, understood that the landowners in Guangdong were not of the same ilk as those throughout China. They actually worked the lands. They had a very cooperative relationship with labor. And he tried to resist. But Mao forced Lin Biao into Guangdong. And Ye lost his government role. And if he hadn't been in the military, he would have been completely out of power. But because he had a military portfolio, he was able to stay on the peripheries. And he was actually part of the small group that brought down the Gang of Four and ended the Cultural Revolution. So Ye Jianying went through the Mao Zedong grinder, but he did it so early in the 50s that he was able to... maintain power and have it going forward. Another Long March hero was Xi Jinping's father, Xi Zhong Chun. And his claim to fame in the Communist Party was he maintained security over the area where Mao was camped in Yan 'an. And he was able to provide Mao and his group with enough security that they could camp there through a winter and survive. Not only that, but he negotiated and he conducted diplomacy with the tribesmen in the Northwest, in Qinghai, in Xinjiang, and in Tibet. And he was loved. And he got a lot of rebels and insurgents among these minority populations to join the Communist Party. And Mao gave him great profs for that and referred to him as one of the heroes of the Three Kingdoms period. brilliant statesman who was able to ingratiate with the minorities and make them part of the Chinese nation. Unfortunately, though, Xi Jinping's father, Xi Zhongchun, he was purged, but he was purged later. He was purged in 1962. And from Xi Jinping's age nine until he was 25, Xi Jinping's father was under arrest. Without trial, it was just the culture revolution. He was under arrest because his office published a book that was deemed not flattering to Mao Zedong. Basically, he was promoting some thought within the Communist Party that Mao didn't like. So Xi's father is in jail from 62 to 78. And because Ye Senior and Xi Zhongchun had a relationship, Ye Jianying kind of became a godfather of sorts for Xi Jinping. Xi was sent to work in the countryside and he escaped and he tried to get back to Beijing and it wasn't safe for him to be reunited with his family. And Ye intervened. And Ye made sure that Xi joined the Communist Party, even though these tragedies were all around him, and made sure that he got the semblance of an education, although he really never did. He was a guide for Xi Jinping throughout his younger years. in place of his father. 00:10:02    Sam Cooper Before we continue how those families dovetail together, can you describe in China's political economy, what is the power of Marshal Ye? 00:10:13    CHRISTOPHER MEYER So in the 50s, he was jettisoned out of the political arena. His main work was in the PLA. He was a marshal and he became minister of defense in China. And he was responsible for procurement. And to sort of give you a sense, when the Korean War started, the United Nations put a blockade on trade with China because they were arming the North Korean army. Marshal Yeh was responsible for making sure that supplies got to North Korea. And that was a big role that he fulfilled. And his sons kind of brought that along. So it's curious because Marshal Yeh was one of the most powerful stars in the communist lineup, but he was also a minority. He was from Guangdong and he was a Haka Chinese. So some people would say that Haka Chinese within China, there's a lid sometimes on their ability to move up. And so perhaps he was never considered for the echelon, but he did arise very high. But in some ways, and his sons adopted this even more so, they had to become very combative. in their political dealings. But no doubt about it, Marshal Yeh had a chance to handle huge volumes of military supplies, and there was an opportunity to skim and generate great wealth, which probably was the case. The way that Marshal Yeh fulfilled the supply chains for the North Korean army was through organized crime. And it just happened that two of The individuals, Henry Falk and Stanley Ho, were also Hakka Chinese. And they became the kingpins of organized crime in Hong Kong and Macau. Both of them are on record as saying they made their fortunes supplying the Korean War. 00:12:15    SAM COOPER Right. So people that read my book are very familiar with Stanley Ho, according to U .S. government intelligence. the absolute king of Chinese international mafia with connectivity to casinos, banking, political influence operations in Canada, triad leadership in Canada. So I think we've set the table for the 90s in Guangdong, Fujian. Xi Jinping is now starting to come on the scene politically there. The Ye family, who were partners essentially of Xi's father. had a little bit of a godfather eye on Xi's movements within the party. We can say that they're the power behind a throne that they want to see continue to rise. So can you take us into the 90s, the sort of Stanley Ho connectivity to Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and how that combines the Hong Kong tycoons slash triad leaders with the communist powers in Fujian? 00:13:21    CHRISTOPHER MEYER Yes. Mao passed away in 78. Deng Xiaoping came to power. And Deng was all about economic reform and catching up to the West. So in southern China, Fujian and Guangdong province, Deng looked to Ye Jenying and his sons. His sons were in their 30s now. And he also looked to Xi Zhongshan. Xi Zhongshan became party secretary for Guangdong province. in the early 80s. And Deng kind of put together this group. The Ye's and the Xi's were family friends. They celebrated Chinese holidays together. The Xi's were northern Chinese, but they kind of encamped in Guangdong province after a certain amount of time. And that's where Xi's father retired. But in Guangdong, the son of Ye, his name was Ye Xuanping. Basically, he was mayor of Guangzhou and the governor of Guangdong. And very quickly, he was referred to as the emperor of the south. So in the 80s, he was running Guangdong province. And he became so powerful that the CCP sought to have him step down. And he actually threatened to withhold tax to Beijing from the province of Guangdong unless they negotiated with him. He wanted a vice chair of the CPPCC, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee. And he wants to be a vice governor of the CPPCC. And he wanted to be allowed to maintain his power base in Guangdong. And this is a rare case where the CCP actually deferred to these wishes. Just to get him out of running the most powerful province in China, they said okay. So he goes over the CPPCC. And he takes with him the kingpins of organized crime in Hong Kong and Macau. Stanley Ho never had a position, but Henry Falk and the other top lieutenants in these organized crime entities all wound up on the CPPCC. And to give you a sense of like, what was some of the magic Stanley Ho had when he won the monopoly on gaming in Macau? He devised this VIP room concept where... He owned the casino, but the VIP rooms were run by basically triads and junkets, powerful friends from mainland China and triads. And the triads conducted all kinds of crime that the Vancouver model got in a very big dose. So it was racketeering and prostitution and all kinds of things, but also collections. So Stanley Ho didn't have to work on collections because his muscle did it for him. But the strongest of these triad operators wound up in the CPPCC, as long as they were effective in what they were doing for the government. And 14K is dominated by Hakka Chinese. Most of the most powerful triads have a very strong Hakka element to it. And I don't mean to suggest that this wonderful race of Chinese called Hakkas is all bad. Lee Kuan Yew, the premier of Singapore, was Hakka Chinese. phenomenal Chinese, but there were also some very nefarious and very effective in their criminal activities that were Haka Chinese. So the Ye's were in the middle of this. And Chinese language social media accounts in Hong Kong will talk about the Ye's dominance over these gaming operators in Macau. 00:17:07    SAM COOPER Let's get into that and explore that more. I just want to ask a side question. As I'm aware of a very important figure, in what we call the Hoag Commission in Canada. I'm just going to leave it at that. This is our inquiry into foreign interference that stemmed from my investigative reporting. And there is a politician at the center of that that my sources close to them said went off to a haka conference in China for weeks or something like that, you know, while being an elected politician in Canada. Knowing what you know, and I'm just coming out of the blue with this question, is there anything good for Canada that they could be doing on that trip? 00:17:45    CHRISTOPHER MEYER There could be a lot of normal cultural activity, but I'll say one thing, that the powers that are doing the kinds of things that I'm concerned with are definitely represented in those groups. There might be a wink and a nod and things look very normal on the surface, but there's no free lunch in China. Everybody has to pay the piper, and the piper is the communist party of China. 00:18:11    SAM COOPER So let me ask you this. Viewers of the Bureau know that I've pressed away in journalism in explaining that the United Front Work Department and international money laundering and organized crime are synonymous. They're one and the same. The CIA says the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference is really the core unit of the United Front. So what you're getting at... I think the Ye family, these power brokers that are behind Xi and his power in southern China, you're saying they essentially formed this United Front and organized crime compact as sort of a political tool, a smuggling tool, a military tool? 00:18:55    CHRISTOPHER MEYER Yes. And I want to say that the United Front was an early Communist Party creation. And the thing about the Communist Party... They infiltrated the Kuomintang. When the Kuomintang had more power and they were the power base in China, the communists used political warfare to infiltrate them and really become their undoing. And the United Front is basically one way to get all parts of society under the control of the CCP. So within the United Front, the CPPCC is sort of the big leagues. And all the other organizations are the feeder groups. So if you get in a small united front group and you deliver in a big way, you can get promoted all the way to this PCC. And Ong Lapsung is an example of that. So the whole idea of the united front is to harness and control all the resources from academia, the private sector. from all aspects of society and to make them work for the Communist Party. And I feel that any united front operation, and there's so many in Canada and the U .S., they should just be called assets of the Chinese government. That's one way for the Chinese to increase their headcount of diplomatic officers within any given country. 00:20:26    Close Thanks for listening. If you get a chance, please like and subscribe and rate the show on your favorite podcast platform. Also, if you're interested in coming on the show or hosting an episode, email us at [email protected]. I'll have the email and CA Association website in the show notes. And now, most importantly, to those currently out in the field working with a partner nation's people or leadership to forward U.S. relations, thank you all for what you're doing. your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes of One CA Podcast.   Episode 2 00:00:01    Introduction Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at [email protected]. or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org. I'll have those in the show notes. Today we welcome Sam Cooper, founder of the news outlet The Bureau, as he interviews Christopher Meyer, a former U .S. 00:00:44    Introduction official and China expert during the Bush 1 and 2 administrations. Meyer currently serves as the head of the U .S. Micronesia Council and is the founder of Wide Fountain. a platform for in -depth geopolitical analysis. This is the second of a two -part episode. Sam and Christopher discuss PRC strategic corruption and political warfare. So let's get started. 00:01:08    SAM COOPER I feel that any United Front operation, and there's so many in Canada and the U .S., they should just be called assets of the Chinese government. That's one way for the Chinese to increase their headcount of diplomatic officers within any given country. And they should be labeled that way and they should be treated that way. And they're conducting operations for China. So to get back to the Ye family, I just want to say very briefly, so Deng Xiaoping taps the older brother, Ye, and he's in the government and he has a nine, 10 -year run in Guangdong. The younger brother, his name is Ye Xuanning. He's the dangerous one. He's a real interesting cat. So, yeah. was in college during the Cultural Revolution. And just to give you an idea of the thin ice that you could be skating on in China, he graduated from college and he was thrown in jail. And he was thrown in jail because, you know, Mao wanted to send a signal to the Ye family, I'm in control here. You're not in control. He got out of jail and he had a job in a radio factory or something like that. And he must have been so distraught, he lost his arm in an accident. throwing boxes into a crusher and he lost his arm. So he became a calligrapher with his left hand. And if you know Chinese, like every time you write calligraphy, your hand is going across what you're writing. If you're left -handed, I don't know how he did it. I'm left -handed. And he became an accomplished calligrapher with his left hand. So it just gives you a sense of the spirit of this guy. He's not your normal. person. I think he was a genius. I think he was extremely hardworking. And one of his first positions, he was involved in a small United Front operation in Beijing. Then he became secretary for Kang Xian, who was sort of the head of the oil faction in China. And he was a very powerful individual. And then he found himself in Guangdong. And when his brother was appointed head of the province and the city of Guangzhou, He got into Espionade, and he became the spymaster for the PLA, working in the GDP. And he really had it. He sort of hit his stride there, and that's how he ended his career. The spymaster for the PLA. I think any other rival couldn't even hold a candle to him. He was totally gifted. And his brother and he were able to leverage all of their... contacts with organized crime because he used them in operations around the world. And I think he's the one who weaponized it to the point where, number one, organized crime figures were making money for the military, a lot of it. And number two, they were almost pre -trained in operations. They were bold. They would go anywhere and do anything. And Aung La Pseung is a good example of that. 00:04:11    CHRISTOPHER MEYER I was going to say, because not everyone knows these names like you and I do, but Enlap Sang, nominally a real estate developer from Macau. My Files, he's a huge international organized crime figure known for the so -called Clinton Gate or White House visits. He's the guy that got next to the Clinton White House or got inside, you know, maybe five to ten times. He ends up getting done, as they say, in a United Nations corruption case, which of course connects to a very important guy in Australia that successfully sued my colleague, John Garneau, and yet is at the top of Chinese organized crime funding Australian politics. He was involved in that FBI case. So to bring it back, what I've picked up in my book and in my repeated reporting efforts at the Bureau is these international Chinese businessmen in real estate and casinos, tech these days, they go around the world, they get next to our politicians, and that's their job. They're being tasked by whoever the Ye family spymaster of today is, is sending them abroad to do that. At some point, Xi Jinping comes into this and says it's okay. 00:05:30    SAM COOPER okay. And it's still evolving. I mean, I came on to this. When I read your book and I saw your story of Lai Changxin, I said, holy shit, I have to get into this. You see the level of danger that it brings to a country like Canada and North America. But I think that Ye Xuen Ning created the mechanism for the CCP to use and leverage organized crime to, 00:05:51    SAM COOPER mechanism for the CCP to use and leverage organized crime to, number one, fund military operations. and other things, and to extend influence operations. Like the United Front is all about influence operations. But if you introduce organized crime elements into parts of the United Front, you can weaponize it and you can get a lot more bang for your buck using these nefarious creatures that you're managing, you're controlling them. And I want to mention something. How does the CCP have control over organized crimes? So I want to say, In the late 90s, Macau No. 1 was about to be returned from Portuguese administration to Chinese. And 2, the kind of monopoly of the casinos license was coming up in 2002. And what happened was these triad operators were starting to push back against Stanley Ho. Stanley Ho's right -hand man was shot in the face in Victoria Park during this period. And the Portuguese sent an official to try to calm down the situation. And that individual was shot when he arrived. And the Communist Party kind of went in and took control. When the monopoly came up, Stanley Ho and his family, they got the coverage. But that's because he's completely loyal to the CCP. And so the CCP has so much leverage over these entities. Completely, he devised the strategy to integrate organized crime. And then he passed away in 2016. And then the institutional steps took place after that. They had to transfer from sort of a control of one man to the government running it. And you can see examples around 2016 of a lot of large -scale Chinese operations having disruption during this period. One of the reasons they were able to do this for so long was that Ye Xuanning was completely secretive. I mean, he managed these operations in a very keen and brilliant way, and he was never identified. Xi Jinping's role is interesting. Ye Xuanning told his brothers to help Xi Jinping. And you can kind of see like an increase in their efforts when Xi's father... He was in Beijing, and he had a very high role. He pulled a bureau standing committee, and he was sent down because of Tiananmen. He was on the reformer side, and he publicly admitted it. He was a very admirable individual, and he said he was supporting Hua Guofeng. So he faced early retirement in 1993, and the Ye brothers were so upset about this, and probably Xi too. They sort of doubled down on their efforts on behalf of this political warfare. It's almost as if they were pissed off at the Communist Party, but they took it out on North America. It's like they had to become more radical in what they were doing because in order to get power in China, you had to outflank Li Peng and the hardliners. So there's an interesting element there. 00:09:13    CHRISTOPHER MEYER You talk about this combination of military intelligence and organized crime. and political warfare and global influence operations. Trade is obviously involved. Explain what you mean by radicalization of that tool in operations. 00:09:31    SAM COOPER So there were about 10 operations in the 1990s that I believe were masterminded by the Yeshi Clay and primarily Yeshi Ning. The most outrageous, there was one and probably several. smuggling of military -grade machine guns into the U .S. from China. And one of the groups that was set up, helped finance the military, was the Poly Group. And the Poly Group, they were on the bill of lading for these. They were labeled as something else, but they came into the port of Oakland. And the interesting thing was the CEO of Poly Group, who was a princeling himself, was meeting in the White House and had his photo taken with President Clinton. At the time, these machine guns were on the water. That's bold. Yes. And when I ponder this, it's like I know how much the Chinese love photographs. That photo shown by Xi Jinping to all the cronies in Beijing would get him a lot of brownie points. And these machine guns were being distributed to gangs in the area. Street gangs in California. So this kind of thing, right? Right. And so that one was uncovered. But how many others slipped by? And there have been cases similar magnitude in Tennessee and Florida. 00:10:57    CHRISTOPHER MEYER Yeah, and this is where it gets into the leaked Sidewinder report that I touched on in the book. But yeah, that report refers to Pauley Group laundering 2 ,000 AK -47s into California. You're saying you believe that not only is Xi Jinping supported by this Ye family intelligence, who I have no problem believing are behind the United Front organized crime nexus. You're saying you think Xi Jinping is a mind involved in this kind of thing as well. 00:11:30    SAM COOPER Originally, as I was doing my research, I thought Xi was the mastermind. But as I did a deep dive to what his contemporaries said of him, The big knock on Xi was that he wasn't educated. Like age nine to age 25, his dad has been persecuted and locked up without trial. And he's forced to work in the countryside and he's not happy about it. I mean, he wasn't educated. And that's the biggest knock on Xi Jinping. And when you look at the history of Xi in Fujian, first of all, he goes to the Ministry of Defense and then doesn't do... anything of note there as a young man. But then he goes into Hebei province and he's working in Hebei province as a middle level provincial official. And he's not doing much. I mean, his big contribution was suggesting that they film a TV show in that province and kind of burned out. He wasn't favored by the Communist Party officials there. You know, he's brought to Fujian. Communist Party officials bounce around provinces and each time they have an increasing role. Well, he stays in Fujian for 17 years. And it's almost like he's being babysat by the Yehs. And I mean, the Yeh family compound was a two and a half hour drive from where she was in Fujian. And so I don't think he was the mastermind, but he was definitely the beneficiary. And I think that it was a long term project. And the Yeh brothers. put the pieces on the table to help promote Xi Jinping. And here's an interesting thing. In 1997, there was a big Central Party conclave, the 15th Central Party plenary meeting. And Ye wasn't even named as an alternate delegate. So you've got hundreds of delegates coming from all over the country. And he's a princeling. And he's been in provincial government for 12 years. And he's not even named. Somebody forced him onto the list of alternate delegates. There were 150. He was the 151st alternate delegate. He didn't receive one vote. He was pushed on. And I think somebody in the realm said, you know what? We're running all these operations and we're doing it so secretively. Nobody knows that this is for Xi Jinping. So they started gradually to kind of promote Xi as. the mastermind of this. And the years were okay with that. But Xi Jinping was on his way to becoming the leader of China by 2002. 00:14:08    CHRISTOPHER MEYER And I was over in Taiwan, invited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over a year ago with international journalists. And we had kind of a dinner talk where their political intelligence expert was going to talk about some of this Klan details and things like that. And they said, yeah, within the princelings, Xi Jinping was the least likely, the least talented to reach chairman. 00:14:37    CHRISTOPHER MEYER And so, OK, you know, I'm not the expert. If someone from Taiwan is telling me that, you're saying that. So if true, and you're saying the power behind the throne is this Ye family that boosts him. And they're the ones you're saying that are the masterminds of what I'm going to call modern political Chinese communist warfare using proxies, organized crime, dirty tycoons. So this is where we're going. 00:15:06    SAM COOPER Yep, this is where we're going. And let me just touch on a few of the operations in the 1990s, just to give you a sense for what was going on and the fact that the Chinese were never completely called out on the carpet for it. Just let them continue doing it. And one of the themes of my research is it's time to call the Chinese out. And to do that, you have to be very specific. I think there needs to be a large group of countries that has their research done and they call out Xi Jinping for this political warfare that absolutely is hyper -destructive. 00:15:41    CHRISTOPHER MEYER So you're saying this is an intelligence operation? Yeah. For the last 10 minutes or so, In direct relationship to this network you're talking about, the 90s, 2000, aggressive combination of international organized crime, Hong Kong tycoons, Macau tycoons, in Chinese military influence operations, also people smuggling, also drug smuggling, illegal migration and, you know, fentanyl. There is a basis that Chinese triads and Mexican cartels are working together on those things and that Canada is a, you could call it, if this is a company, the controlling minds of a lot of this are in Vancouver and Toronto. Canadian ports are very deeply infiltrated by China, along with some Iranian mafia and intelligence. It's a fact. So where do we go from there? I myself, as a Canadian, the good countries of the world need to get together to combat this approaching, if not already into early stages of the access of China, Iran, Russia, North Korea. We're at loggerheads and they're using Canada, I believe, unfortunately. 00:17:01    SAM COOPER Right. And I do believe that Yeshua Ning is a genius and he looked at North America and he wants to inflict pain on the U .S. When he set up these plans in the early 90s, the Chinese GDP was a fraction of the U .S. So he had a lot of ground to make up. And he chose Vancouver because the resources to combat his efforts were probably deemed to be significantly less than the resources in the U .S. So I feel that the attack on Canada, the Vancouver model. if you will, which spread right across to Toronto and then down into Queens and across to LA and permeates everything. I believe that the US and Canada should try to get on the same page about this and to the extent possible, Mexico as well. And then the UK and Australia haven't been unaffected by this. There should be a big effort to get on the same page with the West because this is a totalitarian regime doing its level best to take us out. 00:18:07    CHRISTOPHER MEYER The controlling mind, I'm saying, of the Mexican cartels, I think it's Chinese triads. That's the real power there. 00:18:15    SAM COOPER I think we're both in agreement. If you want to draw a word picture that says what this is, picture that there's a really bad actor and he's throwing a really illegal party and selling drugs and he's bringing it all in. And the U .S. is going after the people who own the land where all of this took place. You have to go after China. And I believe that China is making 98 % of the precursors for fentanyl, and then they're laundering the money. That's the other piece. They're laundering it. They're operating this massive money laundering operation for the cartels. So I say the gloves do come off, but I would love to see them come off in unison. And all of these, at least in North America, Mexico, Canada, and the U .S., we're all on the same page. And we speak with one voice. And I'll add to this. Xi Jinping has been as painful towards his own population as he has been externally and internationally. So he's inflicted pain on the Chinese and he's about to go down. I mean, he's got his wings clipped in the last few months and he may not be in power very long. There's some serious movement in China. 00:19:30    CHRISTOPHER MEYER You sound like my friend Harry Tsang, the ambassador for Taiwan and Ottawa. He's bearish on Xi Jinping in a big way. 00:19:38    SAM COOPER Yeah. Well, I think it's a good time for the West to approach China and say, look, we got off on the wrong foot. Let's reboot. And by the way, there's some reparations needed here. 70 ,000 people have been dying a year from this, and it's a Chinese operation. You know, the cartels are definitely part of it, but... I think there's good reason for the West to get on the same page. 00:20:02    CHRISTOPHER MEYER Absolutely. So we will end it there for a first great chat. And I think next time we'll get into the juicy story of Lai Cheng Zing, the bigot China's supposed most wanted. Or what was he? So I'll leave it at that and we'll pick it up next time. You have to say, 00:20:21    SAM COOPER have to say, I'm sitting there doing my research. I get your book. And all of a sudden, within 50 pages, the lights are going off because you wrote about Lai Changxin and it just completed some thoughts that I was mulling over. And yeah, we're going to have an interesting conversation about Lai Changxin. 00:20:40    CHRISTOPHER MEYER That touches my heart because I've always been a brother of the United States and I've felt so disheartened that bad people have gotten in between us and we have to stop that. And as you say, we need to get together on this. I've reached some good thinkers in the US and there's now things brewing. So let's keep it going. You got it. 00:21:01    Close Thanks for listening. If you get a chance, please like and subscribe and rate the show on your favorite podcast platform. Also, if you're interested in coming on the show or hosting an episode, email us at [email protected]. I'll have the email and CA Association website in the show notes. And now, most importantly, to those currently out in the field, working with a partner nation's people or leadership to forward U .S. relations. Thank you all for what you're doing. This is Jack, your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes, One CA Podcast.

Welcome to the One CA Podcast. I'm your host, Jack Gaines.  Today, Colonel Andreas Eckel, commander of the NATO CIMIC Center of Excellence, joins us to discuss the center's work to prepare the alliance for future crises or disasters.    So, let's get started.  --- One CA is a product of the civil affairs association  and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership. We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.  To contact the show, email us at [email protected]  or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org --- Special thanks to Jan Křtitel Novák, Jimmy McHugh, and Dorothy Fields for the original version of Diga Diga Do, which aired in 1928 and was then performed by Duke Ellington.  Ellington's version can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e3aJ_9IAIjQ&t=1s --- Transcript 00:00:05 JACK GAINES Welcome to the One CA podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. Today, Colonel Andreas Echel, commander of the NATO Civic Center of Excellence, joins us to discuss the center's work to prepare the alliance for future crisis and disasters. So let's get started. 00:00:19 ANDREAS ECKEL What we need to understand a little bit better, and I think that was a very brutal lesson we identified in Afghanistan and in Mali as well, is that military functions in different societies. very, very differently. We have an idea how military looks like and how it works. It might work more the Italian style or the German style or the US style. But basically, I think we have a common set of ideas how military works. And military works completely different in Mali than in Afghanistan than in Germany. And that is based on different societies. So how do we figure that out? It's a very good question. If I had a quick and sharp answer to that one, I think I would be the winner of the $1 million question. There are some ingredients to tackle that problem. And one of the ingredients is to understand the environment a little bit better. And that leads to civil military cooperation. The one centerpiece of civil military cooperation is to understand the environment better. to nest military activities in the civil environment in a better way. It creates more converging effects and creates less harm to the civil population. And I think the next thing is you need to have long -lasting relationships. Relationship that is built up, that's great. If it lasts one year, that's great. And if you just end it then, Basically, you have achieved almost nothing. So long -lasting relationships and to understand the civil environment better. And we have to understand that we are not the ivory tower of knowledge. What do we know? What does the military know about Mali and Afghanistan? Basically nothing. We have to be more and better in contact with the civil organizations, with academia, with knowledge centers. that are engaged in those areas since 20, 30, 40, 50 years. And we have to be in a dialogue with them and have to extract their knowledge about the key civil factors and have to integrate that better in military considerations. 00:02:32 JACK GAINES So you have to be a diplomat in two directions because you've got to be reaching out to the partner nation like Mali, working with her counterparts there. You have to be a diplomat with partner agencies within the government and academia, as you were saying, or else you're going to miss a step. So you really have to work your way across the spectrum. 00:02:52 ANDREAS ECKEL Yeah, I like your picture of being a diplomat because exactly as you mentioned, it's a diplomat in both ways, but you have to be a translator as well. So civil environment, civil actors, civil counterparts speak a different language than we. And we really have to make sure that what they say. is understood by the military and what the military means properly translated in how the civilians understand it. 00:03:17 JACK GAINES You know, and that's a good point because I've seen civil affairs civic officers come in and try to brief leadership on certain issues. And if it wasn't absolutely clear and in the language that that matter knew, they usually were dismissed and it wasn't as effective an operation because of it. 00:03:34 ANDREAS ECKEL And by the way, at the beginning of my career in the military function of CIMIC, it happened to me too. So one of my first appearance of the stage briefing the commander about some civil factors was a complete disaster because I underestimated how many minutes I only have to bring over some key messages to the commander. So I talked too long and did not come to the point. And I think that's the point where the CCOE is really in a responsibility. We have to provide in our courses the overview, the background, and we provide expertise and challenge them with tasks to apply the expertise. But at the very end of every course, we tell them, hey, CIMIC is important, and it is important to understand the environment, and it is important to integrate civil factors and military considerations. However, when you are confronted with decision makers, Your product needs to be crisp and sharp. If you provide a product to your commander, which exceeds three pages, then you can throw it in the dustbin. By the way, one page is better than three pages. And I think simakers have the tendency, and I include myself specifically into that one, to speak too long and to explain too long and not to come to the point. And if at the end of your statement there is no so what and what's next, well, then don't say anything. That's better. 00:05:08 JACK GAINES Well, for this podcast, I appreciate you speaking too much. That's a good thing. But I also understand it's a challenge, but once you get used to it, I think it's super, super helpful. 00:05:19 ANDREAS ECKEL helpful. What we both concluded coming to the point should not be mixed up with not doing your analysis. Only because you have two minutes to brief your commander about a major actor that will impact his operation. doesn't mean that your analysis should only be two minutes. So you have to provide the analysis for an in -depth briefing, if required, to integrate that knowledge and your assessment in the staff work of the other branches. So it needs to be both a very in -depth, precise analysis and assessment. And then it is your time on the stage. The light will shine on you for two minutes. That's it. 00:05:59 JACK GAINES That brings up a story on my side. sent one of my pitch decks to a former boss. And he took it, he read it, and then he read all of the sources that I had put in the back. And so he knew the subject just as well as I did when we met. And I was like, holy cow. Yes, it's important to do good research before you put together your summary because you never know how deep somebody's going to dive into an issue. And if you've done bad research and they catch it, you're done. So one of the things that... Being that diplomat, both to the military and to other government bodies. One thing that I found at the Strategic Foresight Conference, and it was in your report as well, is that SIMIC needs clarification of capabilities in peace and crisis. And what feedback I got from meetings was that not all militaries have a strong relationship with their public. That's a big concern because if a military doesn't have the trust. When you get to a crisis or a disaster, you've got to really overcome a lot in order just to provide aid and support. 00:07:07 ANDREAS ECKEL Yeah, that's a crucial point. I have two takes on that. The first one is we have nations that do allow, on the very lowest tactical level, the interaction between military and the civil world. But it is a question of being honest to ourselves. That is not applicable in all countries. Our countries in the alliance are very restrictive interaction with civil environment, with civil authorities, at least on the lower tactical level. And that brings me to my second point. It's a national responsibility. So when we talk about CIMIC as a military function, then we have to look at it from two sides. One is NATO CIMIC is embedded in a NATO command structure, NATO force structure. However, NATO is operating. on the soil of sovereign nations. So we promote and stimulate that nations build up, maintain, and integrate a kind of simic capability. We call that domestic simic. We made a proposal for what domestic simic is. However, nations are completely free to fill that skeleton with their structures. They can call it a domestic simic. They can call it territorial forces. They can call it Homeland Defense Forces. It doesn't matter how they fill in that skeleton as long as they do provide civil factor integration, as long as they execute civil -military interaction. And for the Alliance as a whole to plan and prepare and conduct successful operations, we need to plug in to the national simic domains and the domestic simic domains. And we have to do that. via the national military structures. So what we do in deterrence and defense -related scenarios is a little bit differing from what we have done in international crisis management in the past. When CIMIC teams from the alliance or whatever security force was implemented in that, we very often did the civil -military interaction with civil partners on the ground by ourselves without using any layer in between us. But when we do that now as NATO in Germany and Poland, Lithuania, Romania, and we have to plug into their military structures and via them with the civil actors on the ground. And nations consider that very differently. So there are nations that say, hey, great that you're in. Please feel free to speak to our civil organizations by yourself. It would be nice if you inform us afterwards. Everything's great. The nations are more restrictive and say, hey, guys. a ministry, whenever you talk to an organization, whenever you talk to civil partners, please do that via us and ask us first. So there is a variety of how nations would like to have that executed, and we as Symmakers have to adapt. 00:10:08 JACK GAINES Right. What I've seen is that disaster relief and crisis coordination between the military and the civil governments is fairly good, but I'm not seeing the emotional side as much. What I mean is, We just had the Marine Corps Marathon. And people all crossed D .C. and around the country came. They ran their 24 miles. These kind of military events where people go, they see some type of form of patriotism, honor guards at sporting events or marathons or the military band performing on the park plots. Those things make a difference. And I don't know if that was also included in your... Have you seen anything like that? 00:10:55 ANDREAS ECKEL In the last years, when we talked about the use of military assets in our nations, it was to overcome disasters. It was to provide military assistance to civil organizations to overcome flooding, fires, or whatever. But the situation has changed a little bit. And now it is not so much about military assistance in case of man -made big disasters. It's more about civil defense. It's more about stimulating the civil support to military operations and the mutual support in case of crisis and war. And I think that notion is quite new to many European countries. In Germany, it was... support of the military to the civil authorities in case of disasters. But when you look into Sweden, Norway, and Finland, they have since decades a kind of total defense strategy. They have a DNA about that the whole of the nation needs to be ready to defend the nation. And that starts already when you go into your cellar. Is there water? Is there food? Are there batteries? And when you do that in Finland, Sweden, Norway, the answer is yes, there is food and there is water. And I was quite astonished. A couple of years ago, I had a NATO course in Helsinki. At that time, when Helsinki was still a NATO partner and not a NATO nation. And it was an exported course from NATO School of Ammergau. And during the weekend, we had the opportunity to visit Helsinki. And we... came across a protection infrastructure was located to protect the civilians. And the lady asked us, do you have an idea for how many citizens of Helsinki we have shelter? And I said, well, 50%. And she was smiling and she was collecting all the numbers. And then she came up and said, for every citizen in Helsinki, there is shelter. And that's the difference. A regularly trained system of civil defense. And military defense working hand in hand. I think that makes a difference. And I see that coming up in Europe. And again, I would like to use the example of Germany. Since the last couple of years, a lot of more effort has been put into the training and the exchange of information and the exercising of those structures. And I think we are getting there. The point is... When you have dismantled those structures, those strategies since 1990, because our enemy was disappearing, never disappeared. He was just dormant and has been woken up a couple of years ago. But to reinstall that, reactivate that, revitalize that, that takes years and years. So we are at the beginning. I'm a very optimistic person. I strongly hope that we are getting to a point quick enough that when The Russian beer is looking again to Europe when he has solved his problem in Ukraine, that we are ready at that point. And there are substantial measurements that we need to be ready latest in four to five years. And CIMIC plays a role in that because your armed forces can be as good as possible when the civil environment is vulnerable and stays vulnerable and is not able to absorb shocks and to compensate the shocks at a better level after the shock. then you will lose the conflict. That's crystal clear. Even in that time in 2023, where it seemed, at least for some time, that the Ukrainians have regained the initiative, the Russians did attack the civil infrastructure, the energy infrastructure, the transport infrastructure, the health infrastructure. And they were still winning at that battlefield, although they had massive casualties on the fighting battlefield. And I think where Ukraine will run into massive problems this year is that the Russians may not have the big tactical victory. They may not have the breakthrough through the Ukrainian defense lines. But what they will do is they will seriously damage the Ukrainian energy infrastructure, health infrastructure, transport infrastructure. Third year in a row. And I'm not sure if the Ukrainians will be really able to compensate that this time. 00:15:40 JACK GAINES It's a real challenge. The thing that I see with Ukraine is that there's also a recruiting issue. They're struggling to keep up with manpower. And there's some international volunteers coming in, but probably not enough compared to what the Russians are bringing in. So it's a challenge of numbers in a lot of ways. They do build that trust and that familiarity with the military. So having the military band come out and play on the Konigstrasse makes a difference. Or like they did in Poland, having American and Polish troops go with a vehicle and park in the middle of a Platz and take photos with kids, it makes a difference. 00:16:24 ANDREAS ECKEL You're right. Your argument is good. And it connects pretty well with the... decisions we have to make in Europe right now. And that decision is that we have to nest the military better into the societies. But what needs to be installed, reactivated, and built up is a whole of society approach for resilience and civil defense. 00:16:52 JACK GAINES Okay. The biggest challenge right now is sabotage, which has been happening. in and around Europe, the Chinese ship that cut the communication lines, the water poisoning in Germany. So there seems to be already challenges in security. 00:17:09 ANDREAS ECKEL SIMIC plays, first of all, a vital role in understanding the impact of such events, as we do not only look at the impact on military infrastructure and military organizations and units, but it's our task to look how those events impact the civil actors in the civil environment. And that will have definitely a result on the capability of a civil environment to provide support to military activities. So it's a kind of circle. And we are pushing that constantly to have a permanent assessment cycle on what we do, what happens to us, how does that impact the civil environment and the impacted civil environment? How is that still able? to provide the support to the military. And I think as we are in that position to have those connections to the other organizations and to provide a holistic assessment about the civil environment, that plays a vital role in that one. Absolutely. 00:18:11 JACK GAINES So do you see that as the future of CIMIC from now going forward is to build that more holistic partner nation? 00:18:17 ANDREAS ECKEL I would like to use the... definition of multi -domain operations as it is currently used in NATO, and that is the orchestration of all military activities to achieve converging effects. And I see the future role of CIMIC very much in that synchronization effort. So military capabilities are much, much less available than in the past. So when we think about what we need about capacities and resources to achieve our military strategic objectives, when we go into the details, 60, 70, partly 80 % of what we need as resource is not generated within the military. It needs to be contracted and provided by a civil environment. And that means that there needs to be a constant assessment process about the availability of those 60, 70, 80 % civil support. And it needs to be thoroughly assessed because that has a pushing out effect on the civil environment. When we use the trains for military equipment, then those trains cannot be used to support and supply the civil environment. So I think the future of CIMEC is in that synchronization bit with the non -military activities to reach those converging effects. And that pretty much fits into the whole of government, whole of society approach of defense. 00:19:49 JACK GAINES Interesting. So CIMIC is in multi -domain operations, has its own multi -domain operation because it's coordinating the civil, government, NGOs, whoever is not formal military. in cooperation or in conjunction with the military's multi -domain operations. So you've got a multi -tiered coordination process. 00:20:12 ANDREAS ECKEL process. I think we do not run our own multi -domain operations. A multi -tiered task, I think that that captures it quite well. But I personally prefer to speak more about cooperation because coordination is a very tricky expression, especially in Europe. as coordination requires someone who allows to be coordinated and someone who has a coordinating authority. And in the interaction with our civil partners, it's more cooperation, ranging from we do exist beside each other to full integrated planning and operations. There's a continuum of that area of cooperation. So I do really prefer to speak more about cooperation than coordination. 00:21:04 JACK GAINES Is there any other topics or thoughts that you want to add to the conversation? 00:21:11 ANDREAS ECKEL For me, it's really important to highlight the future concepts like multi -domain operations and to establish and maintain the connection with the current concepts. So it is important to keep the future world of NATO connected to the current operational world of NATO. That is exactly why we run the annual Simic Foresight Conference, is to connect the here and now with the time period of one to two years to the future concepts, 10, 20 years. And secondly, the closer connection and the better synchronization of the national efforts with the alliance efforts. That is really, I think, a key centerpiece of our future success. So in my understanding, it is ongoing. It is happening in the alliance as we speak right now. So alliance, joint headquarters, strategic headquarters have established contacts to national military authorities and do exchange information. But I think that needs to become more intensive, more regularly and more information flow to both sides. And that needs to be not only... foreseen conceptually and structurally, it needs to be trained and exerciseda reagularly. And I think that's really a clear measurement of success if we are able to exercise it in the future massively. And thirdly, I think the aspect of human security and protection of civilians, that is something which creates a dilemma for every military leader because he would like to achieve his military objectives. That is either to defeat the enemy or to force him to do something or to force him to stay away from something, which means the application of massive violence to the enemy. However, when we learn something from the recent international crisis or from the war in Ukraine, then what we have learned is the battlefield is full of civilians that have requirements, that have needs. The battlefield is full of organizations, non -governmental governmental organizations that try to provide a certain amount of services to the civilians. And it doesn't matter if it is a war zone or the rear area or the area behind the rear area. We have to realize that it is and will remain full of civilians. To evacuate a city like Kiev is nonsense. That will never happen. 23 million people. Yeah, good luck with that one. And even if you try, the majority of the capabilities will be provided by the civilian world. So human security, protection of civilians are concepts which are mandatory for NATO. NATO has adhered to it. We have adopted it in our strategies, in our plans, into our operations. But what does that really mean? How do we really translate protection of civilian and human security? into operations on the operational and even on the tactical level. And I think that needs some assistance, how to operationalize it, how to conduct, how to do it. This assistance, in my understanding, is called mindset and SIMIC. Terrific. It's good to do SIMIC, but you have to talk about it. It's good to increase the awareness, but you have to publish it. So I am very grateful and very thankful to have the opportunity to talk with you. Thank you very much. I appreciate you coming on. Thank you very much and have a good day. 00:25:00 JACK GAINES working with a partner nation's people or leadership to forward U.S. relations. Thank you all for what you're doing. This is Jack, your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes, One CA Podcast.

In this episode Brian Hancock talks with Kurt Dykstra and Joshua Weikart to discuss the 38 Golf Program, the Functional Specialty Team Construct, and the recent Functional Specialty Team Symposium. Major Dykstra and Captain Weikert, welcome to the show. Thank you very much. Wonderful to be here. --- One CA is a product of the civil affairs association  and brings in current or former military personnel, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with the people and leadership of a partner nation. We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.  To contact the show, email us at [email protected]  or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org --- Special thanks to Art Music for a sample from the song "January | Instrumental Background Music." Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2E0orz_C33I --- Transcript 00:00:03 INTRODUCTION Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with a partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at [email protected] or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org. I'll have those in the show notes. 00:00:39 BRIAN HANCOCK I'm Lieutenant Colonel Brian Hancock, and I will be your host for this session. Today, we have with us Major Kurt Dykstra and Joshua Weikert  and  Joshua Weikert  and Captain Joshua Weikert to discuss the 38 golf program and the recent Functional Specialty Team Symposium. Major Dykstra and Captain Weikert, welcome to the show. Thanks very much. Wonderful to be here. Thank you, sir. 00:01:26 BRIAN HANCOCK A quick disclaimer while we're here that the remarks of myself and the participants are solely ours. All right, gentlemen, let's jump into it. From the beginning, what attracted you to U.S. Army civil affairs? Well, I can start that answer. So I'm a bit older, as you might have gathered from my bio. 00:01:43 KURT DYKSTRA a bit older, as you might have gathered from my bio. And at various points in my adult life, I had thought about entering into military service. And for one reason or another, It just didn't happen. And it was always a great regret in my life that I had not served and saw it as something that I wish I would have done. And then about four or so years ago, I got a call from a friend of a friend who at the time was a major who was recruiting for this new golf program. And we really didn't know each other, but we sort of had moved in similar circles and knew the same people and those sorts of things. And my wife and I were hiking the Appalachian Trail and I was having breakfast one morning and got a phone call from Colonel Koinga, as he retells the story, I think within an hour or two, I said something like, sounds good to me, let's do it. Of course, I did talk with my wife and those sorts of things, but that's my pathway in and a bit unique perhaps, but I think a story that has some resonance with many of the other gulfs, particularly those who were not prior service, that this was fulfilling an opportunity that they had, that they had wished that they had taken earlier, which was to serve the country through the military. 00:02:51 BRIAN HANCOCK the country through the military. Well, first of all, Kurt, you're not that old. You look very young and healthy to me. And so you're doing something right. So good for you. I'm thrilled that you have chosen to give both the Army and civil affairs a chance. We definitely need the type of skills that you bring to the table. Now, let me turn to you, Captain Weicker. Tell me a little bit about your journey getting here. Well, I was a prior service soldier. 00:03:16 JOSHUA WEIKERT  prior service soldier. Also being the pre -law advisor at my university, I had a pre -law student who was interested in the Army JAG program. And she had asked me to look into direct commissioning programs in the Army in general, knowing that I was a veteran and had some experience in this area. And I stumbled across the 38 Gulf page on the Army Talent Management website. And it was such an immediately obvious fit because I teach politics, but I also do politics. I work for the House of Representatives. And for that matter, when I go out looking for faculty members to hire, I like looking for people who are practitioners as well as being scholars. And this really dovetailed very nicely into that model. And it struck me as something with a very clear need. It also struck me as something that, especially as we think about lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan and 20 years of deployments, that this was an area where the Army could really bone up its skills and get more into capacity building both within our formations and also the places where we operate. So it struck me as something that was both important and extremely interesting. 00:04:13 BRIAN HANCOCK Well, very glad that you're here. The background that you both have in politics and helping. do governance on an almost daily basis. It makes me wonder, how would we train something like transitional governance? This is one of our core capabilities. I don't know if the program does things like that. I think there's a big future for us in this area. And both of you have the background to help us move in that direction. Well, in the early 2000s, 00:04:44 JOSHUA WEIKERT  the DOD had... conducted a review of all the civil administration and civil affairs tasks that were out there that the Army engages in. And they came up with a list of something like 1 ,400 different tasks. And they combed through this list and started identifying things that are not currently met. So where are the areas where the Army needs help? And out of that derived these 18 skill identifiers within the 38 Gulf program, covering a broad range of civil skills. And these include things like... finance, education, and border security, and law, regulation, and policy, and this cultural heritage and property protection. And the goal of the program is essentially to enhance a commander's ability to operate in a stable civil environment, to foresee and address any likely challenges that should crop up, so that commanders can focus on accomplishing their primary image. 00:05:33 KURT DYKSTRA AND  JOSHUA WEIKERT  Yeah, if I might jump in a little bit on that as well, either read the book or see the movie Monuments Men, then that gives you a little bit of a sense. In World War II, The U .S. were heading across Western Europe. They needed help to identify certain things, whether it's art, whether it's the significance of structures. And those are skills that the Army just didn't have. So the George Clooney's of the world, who at the time were art historians and museum curators, were brought into the Army's orbit to assist in those tasks. And that's kind of the history of the program that goes way back when, and then it was recently restarted in many ways and broadened as Captain Weigert. has been describing. So in some ways, I describe our role as consultants with specific civilian side expertise that the Army simply does not have to assist the Army to be able to do things that it otherwise might not be able to do. So we get called upon to assist in some of those areas that are more specialized than what the Army generally might have. And in other ways, like other civil affairs officers, you know, we're kind of the Army's diplomatic corps. So it's really those combinations, but the Gulf program specifically brings a very specific and in -depth civilian skill set to be used for Army purposes. 00:06:47 BRIAN HANCOCK set to be used for Army purposes. It sounds a little bit similar to some of the specialists we have with surgeons and lawyers, but also different at the same time. When we were deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, we definitely could have used these capabilities in all of these special functional areas. The Department of State tries their best to fill that gap, but the reality is that they're a relatively small organization that isn't necessarily equipped to go to non -permissive environments for extended periods of time. So for transitional governments, I think the heavy lift tends to fall on the military, and you really can't rebuild a government without trying to rebuild the economy and those other threads that tie into that tapestry. I'm very excited for the future with you guys on board. One of the initial challenges is that there wasn't necessarily a clear career progression through every rank for these soldiers. They couldn't follow the 38 Alpha career progression. Has that been relooked at? We do have a quasi -path through your military education. 00:07:57 JOSHUA WEIKERT  a quasi -path through your military education. We do not yet have a basic officer leadership course, though we are currently piggybacking on Medical Services Bullock down here at Fort Sam. which is actually where they both are right now. But my understanding is that a 38 golf at CA Bullock course is in development, and I volunteered some of my time doing some of the course materials for that. And of course, we do have the civil affairs captain's course as well as an option. Beyond that, I'm not certain at all. But for Major Dykstra, if he has more information on that. 00:08:26 KURT DYKSTRA AND  JOSHUA WEIKERT  Much of this has been like jazz. There's been a certain underlying beat that's there, and there's a lot of improvisation that happens along the way. And Captain Weikert is exactly correct that we do DCC largely with the JAG DCC. And then we sort of peg on BOLIC, either AG or AMED, and AMED seems to be the preferred course right now. And to me, this is an area for improvement. We've gone through two school experiences without having any sort of direct training for what it is that we do. And that feels to me like an area that we can improve upon. And I think that is in process, as Captain Weikert mentioned with. With large organizations, particularly the U.S. Army, all that sort of thing takes time. Yeah, it does. But I do think that as the program matures, as there are more people within it for longer periods of time, a lot of the questions about career path and specifics along those lines, frankly, either be worked out by doctrine or they'll be worked out by the process of having people going through these programs and through the ranks and getting OERs and those kinds of things. So I'm not as concerned about that. A ladder piece is what I think that it would be beneficial for the golf program to have better formal education laid out sooner as we see with most other MOCs. 00:09:37 BRIAN HANCOCK other MOCs. It makes sense to me. It is clever, though, to piggyback on a professional MOS. Many reservists have a similar challenge who aren't 38 golfs because a lot of the professional military education that we funnel through. is geared towards combat arms. And of course, for reserve soldiers, what we do is largely support. But in terms of professional military education, understanding some of these other professions like medicine and pieces of logistics and information operations, professional military education historically has not been geared to advance the tradecraft of those individuals. So I think there's a larger movement within the Army at large, though, to create more specialized training. Unlike the Marine Corps, where they have fewer MOSs and folks have to be a little bit more of a generalist, the fact that we have so many specialty MOSs in the Army, I think, lends itself to the ability to stand up individual branches that can run its own training. And within the functional specialties of the 38 golf program, you might even need an entire course dedicated. to each of those functional areas because they're really quite different. 38 golfs are contained within the functional specialty team construct, like the building where they live within a civil affairs unit. Some folks tend to conflate the 38 golf program with the functional specialty team, not the same. But let's take it a step further. Since the functional specialty team which houses the 38 golf program is a military unit, It, of course, has non -commissioned officers in it as well as officers. Three of us happen to be officers, but non -commissioned officers are very important for us to get things done in the Army. What right now is the role of the non -commissioned officer within functional specialty teams? And gentlemen, where do you see that going? Go ahead, Captain Martin. I think that's exactly right. 00:11:40 JOSHUA WEIKERT  right. And in addition, the just traditional roles that NCOs play in almost any unit in formation in terms of like training plan development and... upward input and things like that. I think the role of NCOs is all the more valuable and important in an FXFB section that includes a significant number of direct commission officers. You need that reinforcing experience even more in that set. And also, as we found out at the symposium in April, many of we had NCOs in attendance, and many of these NCOs are themselves fairly accomplished within their careers on the civilian side. So they have SI. contributions to make as well. So they're an essential part of this formation. 00:12:19 KURT DYKSTRA AND  JOSHUA WEIKERT  Yeah. One of our NCOs was a lawyer of 35 plus years, had done really remarkable things in the civilian side. So the idea that I, as a newly commissioned officer, would come in as the experienced person on the civilian side and he was more experienced on the Army side was true on the one hand, but it also was so much more than that because his civilian expertise was also first rate and really quite impressive. 00:12:41 BRIAN HANCOCK first rate and really quite impressive. That's amazing. And I don't know if the functional specialty teams will select for that type of talent. It certainly exists, at least within the Army Reserve. We're very skill -rich. That is exciting to me. Now, prior to the establishment of the 38 golf program, who was manning the functional specialty teams? 00:13:03 JOSHUA WEIKERT  There is great talent in our formations already. So we had, for example, veterinarians. We had public health practitioners. and people that have civil affairs and what we now think of as sort of 38 Gulf skill sets. With the 38 Gulf program, you have subject matter experts who can get a little further into the weeds in areas where we don't have as much expertise. If someone came up to a practicing JAG lawyer and said, look, we need to design a judiciary system because we're about to massively disrupt the civil administration of this country, they're going to be in the ballpark. They understand courts and civil and criminal procedure and things like that. but they might clearly consider things that I would think of in terms of governmental engineering around separation of powers, how those are selected. And that is what I think 38 Gulfs add to that functional specialty. It lets us accomplish a lot more within the same formation. That makes sense to me. 00:13:51 KURT DYKSTRA AND  JOSHUA WEIKERT  Yeah, I completely agree with that. And clearly the civil affairs units and the FXSPs in particular were doing tremendous work prior to the visioning of the 38 Gulf program. In many cases, it seems as though it might be because of the particular and unique skill sets of those officers and NCOs. I think the Gulf program is trying to actually more systematically identify and bring into the Army persons who have depth to skill. 00:14:17 BRIAN HANCOCK to skill. What I'm hearing is that 38 Gulfs bring out more capability and apply it to the often very complex civil social problems that we work on in the civil affairs community. I read a fair amount of peer -reviewed literature, and I can tell you from that standpoint, since the 38 Gulfs have entered the community, I've seen a lot more peer -reviewed literature coming out. So I think there definitely is some effect from this program, and I'm really excited to see where it's going to lead. Now, at the end of April, the 304th Civil Affairs Brigade, which is commanded by Colonel Toby Humphries, convened the first -ever functional specialty team symposium. How did that come about? What's the history there? Colonel Daniel Fletcher is the FXSP chief of the drill fourth. 00:15:03 KURT DYKSTRA AND  JOSHUA WEIKERT  chief of the drill fourth. So I was as green as they come. And Colonel Fletcher, he was incredibly helpful and kind to me to help me figure out some things. And through that, he learned that there was an onboarding and utility gap of how are we supposed to use these golfs? And he asked around up and down the chain in other units and found out that lots of people were having the same kind of question. So this, I think, was the impetus that he had then to say, well, let's get some people together to talk about some of these issues and see if we can't find solutions to some of these challenges. And then he and our CEO, Colonel Humphreys, talked. And Colonel Humphreys was, as I'm told, immediately enthusiastically on board for this effort. And then through lots of laboring hours and the work of many good officers and NCOs, we put together this symposium. It was a really rich learning experience, let alone a great networking opportunity. 00:16:01 BRIAN HANCOCK That sounds amazing. I almost wish I had been there. I know one of my mentors, Colonel Bradford Hughes, was there, and probably some of his team as well. What were some of the topics you guys discussed, and did you come to any conclusions or lessons learned that you'd like to share with the community? We had essentially three large chunks. 00:16:19 JOSHUA WEIKERT  three large chunks. One was around organization and operations of 38 golfs and ethics SP sections. One was around training and doctrine. And then we specifically also discussed recruitment and personnel and lengthy discussions around accessions and initial onboarding. And we covered a lot of ground in three days. The white paper that is just about ready to be disseminated details the findings and does make some recommendations. But I think far more important than any particular recommendation that came out of it was the fact that we were able to draw all these discussions into one place and one location at one time. I have to believe, greatly increases the likelihood that they are ultimately acted upon because we were able to draw from everyone's best practices and identify where our collective gaps were. And as we sort of pass this up to USKPOC and the command level, this is something that is going to be a little more valuable simply because we were able to reach consensus on even just our concerns. 00:17:17 KURT DYKSTRA AND  JOSHUA WEIKERT  Exactly. It was a tremendously rich experience and a breadth of topics. And you mentioned Colonel Hughes. And he and his team have, I think, sort of set the pace for many of the KCOMs in terms of how they're using gulps in particular. And so I was a bit familiar with him through the literature and through various email types of things, but I'd never really talked with him before. Unfortunately, he couldn't be there in person, so he was presented by a team. But then got the chance to meet him this summer in Madison, Wisconsin, at a training event at the University of Wisconsin. And you want to talk about officers who are... just stellar in terms of their knowledge, but also stellar in terms of character and quality of person. Carl Hughes is right up there as well. So it was just an incredible experience to learn from other KCOMs and to understand history and some of the doctrine issues that arise and to identify road bumps or landmines and avoid them or fix them. But a really great experience that I think was appreciated by all who attended. 00:18:17 JOSHUA WEIKERT  all who attended. One of the things that came out of the symposium for me in terms of like genuinely new things that I learned, is that at one point there was the establishment of this Institute for Military Support to Governance, which was formed specifically to identify and support reservists with civilian acquired skills that were applicable to these functional areas. And it sounds like it was a forerunner in many ways to what we think of as the 38 Gulf program today. And it still exists, at least as far as we can tell, absolutely unclear what current status is. But this is something that came up several times during the symposium, is that that could be something that could function as a vehicle to address some of the coordinating. challenges we face and maybe even some of the accessions on board be challenged. And it will just remain to be seen if that's something we can vitalize or revitalize. I love the way you're thinking. 00:19:01 KURT DYKSTRA AND  JOSHUA WEIKERT  Sir, this is part of the benefit of having an academic like Captain Weikert in the planning team. He thinks institutionally and thinks strategically in terms of the doctrine aspect of things. It's not just operational or tactical. The other thing I would mention is Captain Weikert mentioned The white paper from the symposium is soon to be published, but there was an article in the latest edition of The Shield that gives a more thinner or more popular description of what the symposium did and what it accomplished and who was there. So I would encourage any listener who is at least somewhat curious about the symposium to check out The Shield article and then be able to look out for the upcoming white paper. 00:19:40 BRIAN HANCOCK Let me ask you, gentlemen, a test question now that I've got you both warmed up and unsuspecting here. Field manual, three -tack, five -step, civil affairs operations, our Bible, recently updated. It added this new task of civil network development and engagement, or CNDE, which in itself is pretty complicated because we're talking about mapping and engaging interrelated complex adaptive systems. Okay, so mathematically, at least, it's already very complicated. Now, considering how deep the expertise is, within the 38 Gulf community, I would suspect that those folks with those credentials in those communities are probably in a very good position to advance civil network development engagement within their specialty areas. Now let's talk about that concept within the broader Army concept. We're all professionals at this level of our career. How are we as an institution, in your opinion, measuring the strength of the professional networks that we are bringing with us, which are an asset for both civilian and the military? How could we include the strength of someone's network as, say, part of their promotion or board packages? Do you have any thoughts how the Army as an institution could take a better measure? of our professional networks and ability to leverage them to achieve commander's effects. I can say that it did come up at the symposium among that group of 38 Golfs and FXSP members in attendance that this was an essential part of just understanding what our own capabilities were and how do we track and map where everyone lands in terms of their skill sets. 00:21:13 JOSHUA WEIKERT  that it did come up at the symposium among that group of 38 Golfs and FXSP members in attendance that this was an essential part of just understanding what our own capabilities were and how do we track and map where everyone lands in terms of their skill sets. So it was something of general interest at the symposium, and it also came up in the context of how we developed training. for 38 golfs and for civil affairs units more generally. And those efforts are likely to be ongoing. But in terms of how to do it, I think it should be relatively straightforward because we already have some of these things sort of populated in the soldier talent profile at HRC, for example. And if we simply adapt that and augment it to specifically identify for civil skills and civil networks, it shouldn't be too challenging to at least get that on paper. Now, how you operationalize that and put it to work is a more challenging question, obviously. 00:22:03 KURT DYKSTRA But it does seem to me as though there is a lot of ad hoc -ness to the way this is happening so far. The point and purpose of the Gulf program is to really get into uniform persons with skills that the Army was lacking. And if we simply have them but don't know about them and don't utilize them and leverage them and execute on them, then maybe to put it in a more concrete way, if we're simply relying upon, I know a guy or I know a gal who has that experience and they happen to be over there. in the 352, well, that's better than not having that information. But it's not really how you want to be running a program like this. Better to have a much more institutionalized, formalized means of understanding networks so that we can affect the broad array of a civil society. Because as we all understand, if a civil society breaks down, it's not just one thing that needs to be addressed. It's about 175 things that need to be addressed. in order for civil society to work. So there's still work to be done there, but I am heartened by the fact that the Gulf community is a robust one intrapersonally and continuing to be more so. And these topics of more institutionalizing that kind of knowledge is absolutely on the topic of conversation for many people who are thinking more seriously about how to do that. 00:23:18 BRIAN HANCOCK people who are thinking more seriously about how to do that. I love the fact that this community is actually thinking about these difficult questions that not only affect the army, but... affect the force as a whole and strategically affect our ability to compete and deter, ideally avoiding conflict altogether. And these are things that we have to understand. What networks, how do we invest in them? How do we, if necessary, appropriate them to steer the world away from costly conflict? That is something that needs more attention, 00:23:49 JOSHUA WEIKERT  more attention, is there is a very, very, very robust peace mission for 38 Gulf. And I think it's important to remember, too, as we think about how we exploit these talents. For example, the same way our conservationists and cultural property protection folks have a partnership with the Smithsonian, we would want to see that within every skill identifier, that institutional partner becomes a potential warehouse of understanding what their aside people can do and how they can contribute as well. So I think at present, it is very interpersonal, and it's great that we do have that network of folks. But I also think that that is something that will get augmented once we have everything built out to its fullest expression. Carty, do you have a thought on that? 00:24:26 KURT DYKSTRA  I was just going to say that we want to be in a spot to have those networks built out and an understanding of the places in which we operate before any hostilities break out. These things are happening and they're happening because of the good work of a whole lot of people, but the program is still pretty young. So we're still gaining our legs and still building it out. And with the kind of caliber of people we have in uniform now through this program, I have no doubt that the future is really, 00:24:50 BRIAN HANCOCK have no doubt that the future is really, really bright. That's wonderful to hear. The Army has done conflict for a long time, right? This idea of competition is still somewhat new to us, so we're not going to expect overnight our doctrine and schooling to change to be able to help us secure that win in competition. But I'm seeing encouraging signs, and I know we're going to head in that direction, and I really believe the 38 Golfs are going to have a very big role as we look to maximize our return on investment and competition, ideally avoiding conflict altogether. Now, at the symposium, I imagine maybe behind closed doors, a very professional and upfront group who's not afraid to talk about challenges. Within those conversations, what... at present, do you see as the single greatest challenge that needs to be overcome within the 38 Golf community? And what are your suggestions to do so? I'll say one thing. 00:25:52 KURT DYKSTRA  To a person who was there, yes, there were some frustrations or constructive criticism ideas, but there was not a person in that room who was not enthusiastic about the program and grateful to be a part of it. So I think part of the challenge in a twofold piece, and both of these things have to do with the program being relatively new. The first one I would say is the accession process and the identification process. How does someone go from never having worn a uniform in the history of their life to commissioning? And how does that process work? And how long does it take for that to happen? Part of the challenge that we see, and I think it's getting better, I was maybe second class of Gulfs that came in, is that it was an on -again, off -again process for close to two years. And if we are trying to identify highly skilled, highly talented, highly experienced civilian personnel to come into uniform, a two -year process is problematic. 00:26:51 BRIAN HANCOCK is problematic. It's strange to me because my recruiter had me in boots before I left his office. And that was actually part of the discussion. 00:26:59 KURT DYKSTRA AND  that was actually part of the discussion. In so many other areas, Army recruiting is really, really strong, and there's a clearly established path that you do. And because of the newness and kind of quirkiness of this program, there's less of that, and we're sort of building the ship as we're sailing. Yesterday in the hotel here at Fort Sam, I met a thoracic surgeon who was newly commissioned. And some of those areas that maybe have experience with highly skilled civilian practitioners. coming newly into the Army that have paths that are a bit more developed than what the golf program is. So again, I think it has gotten much better, but it takes time. 00:27:36 JOSHUA WEIKERT  time. I think as the program grows and we sort of meet our staffing benchmarks and as we get more practice and more reps in the process, I do believe a lot of this will hire. I think it will as well. The other thing I would say is having the ability for a civil affairs bullet to come into play. 00:27:49 KURT DYKSTRA  having the ability for a civil affairs bullet to come into play. We latched on with mainly the JAG officers for GCC and there's... a lot that's great about that, especially as a lawyer. It was very strange. So there were about 100 of us in our Bolick class. All but five of us, I think, were JAG officers. But I was the lawyer who wasn't the JAG. And I was the old guy. So it was really, it was a fascinating couple of months and a lot of fun. But we were sort of sitting along the side as they were talking lots of things about JAG school and what happened next for them. And then to be at AMED Bolick, again, it's a similar sort of thing. And there's, especially for someone new to the Army like me, being around people in the Army is invaluable, regardless of whether it's directly related to my MOS or not. But at some point, it would be helpful to get some specialized training about what it is that the Army expects me to do, apart from the civilian experience that I bring to the table. 00:28:45 JOSHUA WEIKERT  In terms of challenges within 38 Gulf, I also find that, organizationally speaking, is how we connect 38 Gulfs with commanders and missions. Because at present, we are relying on these informal networks to pass information along about we need six Delta to go to Poland in two weeks. Who's available? You know, things like that. That's always going to be inefficient, for one thing. We realize a little too much on that ad hoc communications network. And it also means that commanders can't go looking for 38 Gulfs either. So what I think will have to happen sooner or later is having some kind of centralized. repository of mission and or task information that 38 Gulfs can go to and look at ongoing missions or missions in planning. And at the same time, some kind of searchable database where commanders can go find those people. And there are institutions and organizations that have this set up in existence. So it's not something we need to reinvent. It's just something we need to consolidate because it is just very unlikely that every formation in a civil affairs unit will happen to have the right people for their region and their missions. We need to be better to get good information down to every individual 38 golf and up to every commander. And that's just going to take time and awareness to them. 00:29:51 BRIAN HANCOCK time and awareness to them. That makes perfect sense. So that would help you grow in your skill set and mature your capability as well for everyone's benefit. Totally sold on that. And I think in time, as you mentioned, that's probably going to be developed and roll out. We've talked a lot about the 38 golf program today. Very exciting. I think certainly the best thing that's happened to civil affairs in decades. And I believe over time it'll be one of the best things that's ever happened to the Army and to the military at large. Very exciting. Those in the audience who are listening, who are interested in learning more and perhaps going through that application process, which will shrink in time, of course, what are those steps they need to take? If someone raised their hand and says, sign me up to 38 Golf, what do they do? 00:30:44 JOSHUA WEIKERT  the Army and Hound Management website. If you just Google 38 Gulf Army, I believe the first tip that you'll see. And it's been built out over the past three years, adding more context, more information about the steps. But it essentially begins with laying out the basic requirements for the program, which is at least a master's degree in a relevant SI field, and at least professional experience in that as well. Once you've cleared those hurdles, you're then looking at developing your packet, and it does provide good guidance on that. I have already fielded some inquiries from interested NCOs and officers, and there are also some groups that you find on LinkedIn and Signal as well that are very active in discussing this process and how it's going. 00:31:18 BRIAN HANCOCK it's going. Professional football teams don't just recruit from their neighborhood. They go all over the place to get the right specialties, to put them together in the right combination for the right missions and matchups. I love the way you're thinking about putting something together like that. I've honestly felt that... As an institution, one of the things that we should do a little bit better job with in general is knowledge management within the military. If you have deep subject matter expertise, if it's in a very tight area like tech support, they have knowledge bases that you can search. We don't have a lot of tools like that, and we spend a lot of our money on human capital who are producing intellectual property, some of which is lost when a unit rips out or when there isn't a good continuity plan. And of course, the deep knowledge that you're describing, we definitely need a better way to collect, analyze, maintain, and make that accessible. So thinking about 38 Gulfs, and it was described as a consultancy within the Army. 00:32:12 JOSHUA WEIKERT  it was described as a consultancy within the Army. So essentially, a staff officer or commander pauses and says, wait, how do I fill in the blank? That should trigger a call at an RFI down to some kind of 38 Gulf to fill that need. Yeah, and two more comments on that. One, this isn't unique to the Army. 00:32:29 KURT DYKSTRA AND  JOSHUA WEIKERT  to the Army. Any organization of any size will sort of talk about knowledge walking out the door. So this is not a unique situation to the Army, though, of course, it's magnified given the size, scale, and scope of what the U .S. Army does. The second thing I would say is, and this was part of the discussion at the symposium, the Colonel Hughes panel, what the 351st does is they house all of their goals at the KCOM level, as opposed to embedding them in brigades or battalions. And that way... Whether it's the ultimate solution or whether it's a matter of a way to actually get their arms around it, they have a sense as to what their capacity is within the 351st because they're all at the KCOM level and can understand that, oh, we have this issue of an agricultural thing happening in the Philippines. Wonderful. We know who we can send to help out on that mission. As things continue to get better, and they clearly have gotten better. But as this program is longer and more experienced and has more people in it and more knowledge shared through it, I fully expect that the process will get better and the knowledge that we're able to share in social life. 00:33:31 BRIAN HANCOCK I definitely think it will. We're approaching our time for the show. I wanted to give you a few last minutes for each of you. Do you have any final thoughts that you would like to share with the community? First of all, thanks for having us on, 00:33:46 KURT DYKSTRA AND  JOSHUA WEIKERT  on, sir. It's been a real treat to be able to talk with you. In addition to the great resources that Captain Weikert mentioned, feel free to reach out to us if you have questions on the golf program. We may not have all the answers, but we can probably be a good conduit into the network to help get you the answers, or at least the right people who would have the answers. So happy to field any phone calls or emails about the golf program. Awesome. 00:34:07 JOSHUA WEIKERT  And I would just say to anyone who's currently in the pipeline or is thinking about applying or has recently commissioned and is very sort of new to the process, patience is the key. I know it seems like it's taking forever. It has gotten better with every iteration. It seems like the sort of processing time is getting smaller and smaller and all these things. So just hang in there and it does reach a conclusion eventually. 00:34:26 BRIAN HANCOCK a conclusion eventually. Well, thank you both very much, Major Dijkstra and Captain Weikert for coming on the show. That concludes this issue of 1CA Podcast. 00:34:37 Close Thanks for listening. If you get a chance, please like and subscribe and rate the show on your favorite podcast platform. Also, if you're interested in coming on the show or hosting an episode, email us at [email protected]. I'll have the email and CA Association website in the show notes. And now, most importantly, to those currently out in the field, working with a partner nation's people or leadership to forward U.S. relations, thank you all for what you're doing. This is Jack, your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes. One CA Podcast.

Please welcome back Grant Newsham, retired marine colonel and author of When China Attacks,  A Warning to America. Grant came on the show to discuss the state of the Japan Defense Forces and the PRC threat.  This is a two-part episode. Grant's biography: https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/author/grant-newsham/ Book link: https://www.regnery.com/9781684513659/when-china-attacks/ A recent article: https://andmagazine.substack.com/p/the-us-in-the-pacific-getting-the?utm_source=substack&publication_id=746580&post_id=151553726&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&utm_campaign=email-share&triggerShare=true&isFreemail=true&r=ercjf&triedRedirect=true --- One CA is a product of the civil affairs association  and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership. We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.  To contact the show, email us at [email protected]  or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org --- Special thanks to the site Cool Jazz Hot Bossa for the sample of Cool Jazz Hot Bossa. (59:00). Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bdWUj2NYDYQ --- Transcript: (Part I) 00:00:05 JACK GAINES Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at [email protected]. Or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org. I'll have those in the show notes. Please welcome Grant Newsham, retired Marine Colonel and author of When China Attacks, A Warning to America. Grant came on the show to discuss the state of the Japan Defense Forces and the PRC threat. This is the first of a two-part episode, so let's get started. 00:00:56 GRANT NEWSHAM I was effectively MarforPak's guy in Asia for a number of years. which worked well in both directions. So I was obviously in Japan, but also did a lot of work for them throughout the region, Southeast Asia as well, Taiwan even, which was a lot of fun. 00:01:13 JACK GAINES Yeah. And you've become a foreign policy advocate in the area. 00:01:16 GRANT NEWSHAM Yeah. At some point, maybe seven or eight years ago, figured I'd actually done enough stuff to maybe have a few ideas. So I started writing and speak a lot as well. So I guess I'm part of the commentariat. But I seem to write about once a week some topic related to often Asian defense, but sometimes economics, politics, sometimes organized crime. And I do get invited to speak here and there and seem to get a number of television or radio interviews as well. That's really cool. I didn't say I get invited to good things, but I do get the occasional invitation. I used to think it was because I had such insight. Someone told me not all that long ago that actually, if you'll say yes to an interview, you're likely to get more of them. Because the people who book them, they just want to get somebody on. And I thought it was because of my particular wisdom. 00:02:07 JACK GAINES of my particular wisdom. 00:02:09 GRANT NEWSHAM I'm joking a little bit. But obviously, you must have something useful to say. But it is funny. There's one place in Singapore that calls me a lot. It's like their CNN. And they've been calling me. Probably eight years at least, or almost every time, I'll tell the presenters that basically they don't know what they're talking about. And I always think, well, this is the last one, but they keep calling me up. They mislike you because you're the contrarian. 00:02:34 JACK GAINES mislike you because you're the contrarian. 00:02:36 GRANT NEWSHAM Oh, I can blame things in a way that sort of suits broadcast and that sort of regular people can understand, you know, 00:02:42 GRANT NEWSHAM that sort of regular people can understand, you know, being a regular person myself. 00:02:47 JACK GAINES Yeah, you learn to disagree without offending. 00:02:49 GRANT NEWSHAM Usually. And it's always sort of a relief, actually, when you can have a different look at things. 00:02:56 JACK GAINES That's good. I always thought you were going to say it is a relief sometimes when you just peel the coat off and then yell at them. 00:03:02 GRANT NEWSHAM The facts speak for themselves. Right. And if it's a presenter, their role is different, and they will generally not have the substantive knowledge that most of the people on the show will have. Right. And so much of what I have to say is often not... in line with accepted wisdom, particularly when it comes to Japan. Sure. So it's often that I'll have to present a different take on things, but they don't seem to be offended. 00:03:27 JACK GAINES Right. You mostly talk about Japan in its current defense fashion or in its foreign policy actions. 00:03:33 GRANT NEWSHAM A lot of that because people have a perception of Japan, for example, as a pacifist country. It cannot fight. It's peace loving. Right. etc. They have a nuclear allergy. You know, just the idea of nuclear weapons in Japan is out of the question. You often hear, well, their constitution won't let them fight. And none of those things are actually true. But it's the received wisdom. It's what people think. And when you simply point out the realities of Japan, that ultimately, at the end of the day, it's a country just like every other. And that the stereotypes about it really aren't correct when it comes to defense security. In fact, they use that the Constitution won't let them have a military. You probably heard it. Yeah. That's the idea. And they don't even call it a military. But the fact is they've got a military, which, according to some ratings, is the fifth most powerful in the world. It depends on how you calculate it, of course. But they call it something else. And what is the actual distinction between offensive and defensive weapons? 00:04:35 JACK GAINES It's usually the strike space. If it's inside your own country defending, then it's a defense space. Once you go out and start taking out other people's cities and moving forces in. 00:04:44 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, for example, they don't have much what you call power projection capability very far off their borders. But they do have a submarine fleet, say over 20 submarines. There's no reason you couldn't send them to the coast of China and start sinking ships. 00:04:59 JACK GAINES True. 00:05:00 GRANT NEWSHAM They've got F -16s. You can put long -range missiles on them and you can fly out of ways and cause people a lot of trouble. But their military really, I would say, is not so good at offense. It's not so good at defense either. And that's something that comes as a surprise to a lot of people. 00:05:15 JACK GAINES Well, do they exercise defense and offense? 00:05:18 GRANT NEWSHAM Oh, they have exercises, training, and they put on a pretty good show, particularly when they have visitors come. But they really, until very recently, and even now, they can't do joint operations, which means the air, sea, and ground forces. can't operate together. In fact, they don't even have a radio with which they can communicate easily. They have to jury -rig some relations, these connections. And that's something most people don't understand, because you look at it on paper. Japan has 250 ,000 people in its military, and it's got ships, aircraft, all of it modern and good stuff. 150 ,000 people in its ground self -defense force, their army. But it's not even the sum of its whole. If you imagine each of your limbs, your arms and your legs, each doing whatever it wants without the coordinating function provided by a brain. 00:06:10 JACK GAINES Sounds like me dancing. 00:06:12 GRANT NEWSHAM It would be, yeah. I think that I can picture that, whereas I'm more of an Arthur Murray kind of guy. But it's like that. And nobody can believe that because they think, well, this is the Japanese. It's this advanced modern country, big military, the rich country. And I mean, they can't even do these simple things. Right. The short answer is no, except in some limited circumstances. After 60 years of the U .S.-Japan defense relationship, 80 years after World War II, they still cannot do some of the basic things that a military needs to do, or do them very well, put it that way. But they do train, they exercise, the personnel quality is excellent. You know, we tend to say, well, we've got Japan as our ally, Japan has a military. But the reality is that the U .S. and Japanese forces cannot work very well together. There's one exception, and that's the two navies. The U .S. Navy and the Japanese Navy, called the Maritime Self -Defense Force, they actually do work well. And they show what's doable. 00:07:15 JACK GAINES They probably do dynamic exercises as well as structured ones, so they have to change, have to practice new orders and maneuvers. 00:07:22 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, the nature of naval operations is you can go out... into the sea, and you have more freedom to actually do stuff. But part of it actually was when Admiral Arleigh Burke, who was later chief of naval operations for many years, he was in charge in Japan. He basically laid down the ground rules, which was that the American Navy was going to treat the Japanese like friends, like allies. And that set the tone for everything. So they had a more relationship of equals, people who wanted to operate together. And that is why they have a good relationship today. in my opinion. So as a result, after all these decades, the two militaries are not really very good at operating together. There's no joint headquarters. There never has been in Japan. At best, they've operated in isolation. Do they recognize they don't have a joint access? Oh, they know. The Japanese military knows this. And US Indo -PACOM has not pushed the issue. And then you had... The State Department side, on the civilian side, people saying, well, if we ask the Japanese to get better at defense matters, well, they'll get angry. And if they do, then the Chinese will be mad. So you have the U .S. on the U .S. side. We're thinking of at least 10 reasons why Japan cannot improve its defenses. That's changed enough in recent years. But you see how many decades we've lost. 00:08:51 JACK GAINES Right. I can see part of what the State Department is saying in that a lot of those countries along the Asian coast were under Japanese rule during World War II. They're concerned that by showing favor and coordinating with them in defense might offend places like the Philippines or Korea. It is a concern to be weighed, but I don't know how much weight you would put to it. 00:09:14 GRANT NEWSHAM I wouldn't give it hardly any. With the Japanese, when you actually think about it, I would say within... 30 years of the end of the war, but certainly today, and for the last at least 20 years ago. The new century. Even before that. The Japanese and World War II is not really an issue in almost all of Asia. The Chinese, of course... Play it up. That's a good way to put it. Of course, they do remember what the Japanese did, and it was barbaric. Although the Chinese Communist Party afterwards killed 50 million Chinese in peacetime and good weather, which the Imperial Japanese Army couldn't have dreamed of doing. But World War II is an issue in China. Korea as well, the relationship is dicey. Up to a point. I mean, little old ladies go and sit in front of the embassy still. 00:10:05 JACK GAINES the embassy still. 00:10:06 GRANT NEWSHAM There are, and then you just had a South Korean amphibious ship come to Yokosuka in Tokyo on a visit. In Korea, there's a fundamental sort of suspicion of the Japanese. Sometimes it is a real dislike. But most people, it's not a big issue. But except for those two countries, you go down the list in Asia, and there is no after effect of World War II. I find the Filipinos get along very well with the Japanese. The Indonesians do. They, in fact, see the Japanese as being the people who freed them from the colonial yoke. Okay. The Malays, they actually didn't have that bad a time during the occupation. The Chinese in Malaysia did. So the Malaysians don't have any really hard feelings against the Japanese. Taiwan, same thing. They've got a very good relationship. And then there's one plus billion Indians who actually have an excellent relationship with Japan and see Japan as real friends and vice versa. So you're starting to get a good chunk of Asia, which, as you can see, actually sees Japan as a good country, useful economically. It's been very generous. And they like to see a Japanese military that's strong enough, allied with the United States, able to deal with China. 00:11:27 JACK GAINES Right. And why would we have such a different balance as we do with Germany and Europe? Because no one's questioning this in Holland or in France. That's just another country. They freely trade, they freely access each other. So maybe mindset just needs to shift to say the reform of Japan is just like Germany, and we need to start treating them and partner nations the same and start advocating for a joint staff. 00:11:52 GRANT NEWSHAM And you could do that in an afternoon, but the Japanese will not speak up for themselves. And an old New York Times reporter, Richard Halloran, I remember him telling me once that all the people he ever dealt with in the world... The Japanese were the worst at explaining themselves. And there's a reticence which slows them down. But also the Americans are afraid to tell them what we need. And that is a huge problem, because if we don't tell them, the Japanese are not blind readers, and they won't do what we think we'd like them to do, but we're afraid to ask. And in fact, one of the Japanese prime ministers in 1970, so 50 -some years ago, He gave some very good advice to the Americans, and it was at the time the Americans were trying to put an aircraft carrier into Yokosuka, the naval base near Tokyo. They wanted to assign it there permanently. And the U .S. side was thinking of excuses why it was too hard for the Japanese. They'll cause political difficulties. The Japanese have an election coming up. The timing just isn't right. And finally, the Japanese side sent a message to the Americans saying, tell us what you need. And don't back down. And they said it out of exasperation, really. And it was the best advice the Americans have ever been given. And we've refused to follow it ever since then. And really, it's almost a cultural trait, sort of a Confucian system. They actually are happy to have experts tell them what they ought to do. Sure. Whereas we are more of the Socratic method. And it doesn't, it just doesn't work. That's why after all these years, the Americans and the Japanese forces, except for the navies, And except for missile defense, we really don't operate together anywhere near where we need to be. We're not even close. And another very interesting fact a lot of people don't know is the Japanese military missed its recruitment targets by about 50 % last year. 5 -0? 00:13:50 JACK GAINES -0? 00:13:50 GRANT NEWSHAM 5 -0. And it routinely misses them by 20 -25%. So this, you can see, is a problem. It's now an older force, doesn't have enough people. In order to fulfill its missions, it would probably have to be twice as big, both personnel -wise and in terms of ships and hardware. Its war stocks are basically non -existent, doesn't know anything really about casualty care, combat casualty replacements, logistics. 00:14:20 JACK GAINES Well, if the media looks down on it and the political class looks down on it, it's not going to get a lot of positivity in the public mindset. So that's got to be part of it. It's not a vote -getter to push for a strong defense. 00:14:31 GRANT NEWSHAM vote -getter to push for a strong defense. I mean, if you're a politician, no one's going to say, he's the defense guy, let's give him our vote. But people vote for other reasons. But you do get used to, after that horrific experience in World War II, that for decades people didn't want to really think about defense, and they were glad to have the Americans around to handle it, and particularly when it seemed like there wasn't any real threat anywhere. People were happy with that, and even the U .S. side. didn't mind it as well. But I'd say it should have started to change at least 20 years ago. And it didn't until maybe four or five years ago. Well, 00:15:10 JACK GAINES when did the risk indicators really start popping up with China? 00:15:14 GRANT NEWSHAM I think by... It can't be back when Nixon went. 00:15:15 JACK GAINES It can't be back when Nixon went. Well, it should have, 00:15:16 GRANT NEWSHAM it should have, you know, I think. But about 2005 is when it was obvious what was coming. 00:15:19 JACK GAINES But about 00:15:21 GRANT NEWSHAM when it was obvious what was coming. And even before that, if you knew what to look for. But as I said, some of us... We knew what needed done and what the problems were. And there were Japanese who did too. And that's why when we put together their amphibious force, it was sort of an effort to address the shortcomings in Japan's self -defense force. Also to improve the overall U .S.-Japan relationship because it was so imbalanced. Right. Where the Japanese weren't doing anything near enough to defend themselves. And that over time creates a lot of friction in a relationship. So we were trying to address that with the amphibious force, and that was 2011, which we were pretty successful at that because we didn't ask permission from anybody. I was going to say, if you were successful, 00:16:10 JACK GAINES did you get fired? 00:16:11 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, it's not that people didn't try. 00:16:11 JACK GAINES Well, it's not that people didn't try. Sorry, that was sarcastic. But I was a reservist, so they couldn't quite get a bead on me. 00:16:15 GRANT NEWSHAM I was a reservist, so they couldn't quite get a bead on me. Yeah. And didn't quite know what we were doing. And also you had people like General Gregson, who was then at... Department of Defense, who had been in Japan many years, and he knew the importance of it all. So he would provide some cover. But the real success there was because the Japanese side took the ideas and ran with it. And the Americans provided some cover and some know -how and some advice. But it was the Japanese who did that. Once the Japanese took on the mission, well, what are the Americans going to say? But I was even told that at Indo -PACOM, that there were people who gotten wind of this and were very much opposed because the idea that Japanese having an amphibious force was provocative. Not just provocative, but it was going to cause the Japanese to go on the rampage again, like in 1941. I'm not making this up. 00:17:11 JACK GAINES So when Germany starts building the Leopard 2, were they expected to go on a rampage too? 00:17:17 GRANT NEWSHAM No, those are Europeans. Oh, okay. You know how the Europeans are okay. 00:17:19 JACK GAINES okay. You know 00:17:21 GRANT NEWSHAM But the fact that Germans have been allowed back into polite society. tells you something, and the Japanese are just as deserving of it as well. 00:17:30 JACK GAINES Did you see the movie Godzilla Minus One? No. It's an interesting portrayal of post -World War II Japan. And Godzilla, which is this giant monster, comes out of the sea, tears up Japan, and has an atomic breath that shoots off nuclear explosions, which sounds a lot like the United States in a mythological way. One thing that... the show did that was interesting is it kind of engaged post -military era and had talked about it. And it seemed like it was trying to reconcile the past with now and build out a notion that the military is okay, that after the war, there were good things that happened and that we should embrace a military in the future. So there might be some societal impulses out there that are promoting and supporting a more built -up military in Japan. 00:18:24 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, you're actually right. The public at large has always been pretty supportive of the military. For example, when they have open base days, when they put on so -called firepower demonstrations, which is like an exercise you can watch where they shoot off stuff, that they're always oversubscribed. And people just pour into these things because they're interested. And the central government, or say the ruling class, are the ones who are gun -shy or... I'm really hesitant, but the public at large, you know, when you ask them, you know, should Japan have a normal military? The replies to that are like 85%. Well, yes, of course. And I think they would be horrified if they knew the actual state of the Japanese military. I mentioned this to a Japanese politician last year, and he was horrified at the idea. And the public as well would have a similar reaction. Regular Japanese people say they have a pretty good understanding of what Japan needs to do to defend itself and of the importance of having a national defense, but the government doesn't explain it very well. When they do, the reaction, there's a Japanese expression, it's called like, it's atarimae. And it means like, well, yeah. It's like, duh. 00:19:42 JACK GAINES Abnautually. And that's what it means. 00:19:42 GRANT NEWSHAM And that's what it means. Should Japan have a good defense? Atarimae. And yeah, what's the question here? But if you ask that question in the political world, then you'll get all sorts of emming and hawing. They wanted nothing of that. By the late 70s, certainly by the 90s, that they sort of outlived that. But it was comfortable to continue with it, particularly if you're the government, because you don't have to spend money on defense. And the Americans are covering that. So it was as if the Americans were giving. I'd say at least $50 billion a year in free defense coverage, at least, probably more. And, you know, if you're a government, you think, well, why should we do anything different? And so they got used to that. We got used to it. And then at some point, the friction builds up where you just can't do that. And the Japanese themselves start to be resentful. 00:20:37 JACK GAINES Right. Keeping them handicapped, probably. 00:20:40 GRANT NEWSHAM Yeah. You know, they're not letting us be self -fulfilled. I think that's sort of the marriage counselor's analysis. And so that imbalance was such that it was creating huge problems in the relationship. But the defense relationship, you know, pointing out, well, you know, you guys really aren't very good, except for the Navy. You know, and we can't work with you very well, except for the Navies. And as a result, that's why we are where we are today. By now, if we had a more sort of capable U .S.-Japan defense relationship, where the two services could... operate together, and we're conducting a joint defense of Japan and the surrounding areas, which includes, say, to Taiwan even, that that would have, I think, deterred a lot of the problems that we're having. But by pretending everything was okay, we've gotten ourselves in a position where we now face a real threat out there. And we're trying to make up for lost time. And I don't know. And I don't know which side I would bet on. I'd bet on ours because I'm an American. But that's how out of whack it has gotten. It used to be maybe till 20 years ago, we were in pretty good shape. But you can see that advantage eroding. And nowadays, depending on how a fight were to take place, if it does take place, it would be less of a sure thing than it once was. And that's, I think, putting it very nicely. 00:22:04 JACK GAINES Well, tell me about the threat. 00:22:05 GRANT NEWSHAM What are you seeing? It's China. led by the Chinese Communist Party. (Part II) 00:00:02 JACK GAINES Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at [email protected]. or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org. I'll have those in the show notes. Please welcome back Grant Newsham, retired Marine colonel and author of When China Attacks, A Warning to America. Grant came on the show to discuss the state of the Japanese defense forces and the PRC threat. This is the second in a two-part episode, so let's get started. 00:00:56 SPEAKER_02 It's China. led by the Chinese Communist Party. They built up a military which is just gradually but steadily expanding its reach and its coverage. And it is compared to, say, 2020, now instead of just being able to operate a little bit off their coast, they can reach Guam, Hawaii, and onwards. The Chinese military doesn't tend to develop into a force able to operate worldwide just like the U .S. can. And their ship numbers. They've got more than we do. Something like 350 versus our 290. 00:00:58 JACK GAINES the Chinese Communist Party. 00:01:06 JACK GAINES its reach 00:01:11 JACK GAINES say, 2020, now instead of just being able to operate a little bit 00:01:15 GRANT NEWSHAM off their coast, they can reach Guam, Hawaii, and onwards. The Chinese military doesn't tend to develop into a force able to operate worldwide just 00:01:25 JACK GAINES like the U .S. can. And their ship numbers. They've got more than we do. Something like 350 versus our 00:01:37 SPEAKER_02 Well, fortunately, in terms of quality, they're pretty good. And they know what they need to do, and they're getting better. For some things like carrier operations, they're not at our level yet. But if you look at the speed at which they have developed, they're in pretty good shape. But let's just say the South China Sea, which is one and a half times the size of the Mediterranean. Whenever U .S. ships go in there, and we do publicize our transits and operations and exercises, for every ship we put in there, For every ship we put in, the Chinese can match it with at least 10. And that doesn't include ground -based and air -launched anti -ship missiles, for example. So if the Chinese pick their spot, 00:01:39 JACK GAINES they're pretty good. And they know what they need to do, and they're getting better. For some things like carrier operations, they're not at our level yet. But if you look at the speed at which they have developed, they're in pretty good shape. But let's just say the South China Sea, which is one and a half times the size of the Mediterranean. 00:02:00 JACK GAINES and we do publicize our transits and operations and exercises, for every ship we put in there, For every ship we put in, the Chinese can match it with at least 10. And that doesn't include ground -based and air -launched anti -ship missiles, for example. 00:02:16 SPEAKER_02 if the Chinese pick their spot, pick their timing, I wouldn't want to be the destroyer skipper who's got 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. And he's got eight seconds to figure out what to do. The point is they have had de facto control of the South China Sea since about seven, eight years ago. And yes, we can go in there. But once we're gone, the Chinese close back up and they've pretty much got it. Beyond that, it's harder for them, but they're steadily expanding their capability to conduct operations. It's a military that has its problems, like every military, but they are trying to correct them. They are building a military which they want to be able to defeat a country that has aircraft carriers, which is us. In many respects, they are our equals. Have you ever heard a Korean War veteran who said he wanted to fight the Chinese again? And these were Chinese. These was the Chinese of 1950s. It's a very different place today. And I'm not saying that they can't be defeated, but I'm not saying that they can't be defeated. An adversary that could give us a lot of trouble. When their intentions are to first dominate regionally and locally, and then push that farther afield to all the Pacific and beyond. And they're setting up the infrastructure worldwide with ports and airfields to do that. They're investing in long -range transports, these naval replenishment ships that you need to be able to operate the way we do, and that's their mission. And we have pretended until about 2017 that this wasn't the case. In fact, you couldn't even say China was an adversary. And guys who did, like Captain James Fennell, who was the head of intelligence at Pack Fleet. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. The then administration hated him and got rid of him. And that's how bad it was. And I saw this all firsthand. Experience some of it, not as bad as Captain Fennell did. So we've allowed them to build up into a military that we had better take very seriously. And the Chinese do see this as a tool for their... 00:02:16 JACK GAINES if the 00:02:17 SPEAKER_03 Chinese pick their spot, pick their timing, I wouldn't want to be the destroyer skipper who's got 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. 00:02:28 JACK GAINES figure out what to do. The point is they have had de facto control of the South China Sea since about seven, eight years ago. 00:02:39 JACK GAINES we're gone, the Chinese close back up and they've pretty much got it. Beyond that, it's 00:02:45 SPEAKER_03 but they're steadily expanding their capability to conduct operations. It's a military that has its problems, like every military, but they are trying to correct them. They are 00:02:55 JACK GAINES a military which they want to be able to defeat a country that has aircraft carriers, which is us. In many respects, 00:03:03 JACK GAINES our equals. Have you ever heard a Korean War veteran who said he wanted to fight the Chinese again? And these were Chinese. These was the Chinese of 1950s. It's a very different place today. And I'm not saying that they can't be defeated, but I'm not saying that they can't 00:03:22 JACK GAINES a lot of trouble. When their intentions are to first dominate regionally and locally, and then push that farther afield to all the Pacific and beyond. And they're setting up the infrastructure worldwide with ports and airfields to do that. They're investing in long -range transports, these naval replenishment ships that you need to be able to operate the way we do, and that's their mission. And we have pretended 00:03:50 SPEAKER_03 until about 2017 00:03:51 GRANT NEWSHAM that this wasn't the case. In fact, you couldn't even say China was an adversary. And guys who did, like Captain James Fennell, 00:04:01 JACK GAINES who was the head of intelligence at Pack Fleet. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. The then administration hated him and got rid of him. And that's how bad it was. And I saw this all firsthand. Experience some of it, not as bad as Captain Fennell did. So we've allowed them to build up into a military that we had better take very seriously. And the Chinese do see this as a tool for 00:04:30 SPEAKER_02 The idea is if you have a powerful military, well, that's when you can lean on people. That's when you can intimidate people. You can dominate them. And they're happy with the psychological domination, political domination. It doesn't have to be occupying, but dominating. And they're in every field, from outer space, long -range missiles, undersea warfare, really putting a lot of effort into it. And there is a certain sort of ingenuity that goes into their operations. Well, they can't invent things. They don't develop things on their own. They just steal things. So they reverse engineer things. So they reverse engineer. 00:04:32 SPEAKER_03 well, that's when you can lean on people. That's when 00:04:39 JACK GAINES And they're happy with the psychological domination, political domination. It doesn't have to be occupying, but dominating. And they're in every field, from outer space, long -range missiles, undersea warfare, really putting a lot of effort into it. And there is a certain sort of ingenuity that goes into their operations. Well, they can't invent things. They don't develop things on their own. They just steal things. So they reverse engineer things. 00:05:09 SPEAKER_02 Well, it... You know, it's kind of true up to a point, but look at us. The Yankee ingenuity was taking stolen British technology and making it better. And so the fact they may not be as innovative as us, well, sometimes it just has to be good enough. So they've got now a military to combine with this desire for political domination as well as considering their economic power as just as important as the military. And you see how successful that has been. When you have U .S. business leaders giving Xi Jinping two standing ovations last November in San Francisco, that tells you how successful they've been on the economic front. And the Japanese know they have a huge problem. You would often hear the Japanese military saying, one thing Taiwan's defense is Japan's defense. But I've even seen the calculations they did, like at which point the Japanese Navy would be outmatched by the Chinese Navy. And they had the date almost down to when it was. And our side, we were late recognizing this. We refused to. We refused to. 00:05:11 GRANT NEWSHAM kind of true up to a point, but look at us. The Yankee ingenuity was taking stolen British technology and making it better. And so the fact 00:05:20 SPEAKER_03 be as innovative as us, well, sometimes it just 00:05:23 JACK GAINES has to be good enough. So they've got now a military to combine with this desire for political domination as well as considering their economic power as just as important as the military. And you see how successful that has been. When you have U .S. business leaders giving Xi Jinping two standing 00:05:45 JACK GAINES San Francisco, that tells you how successful they've been on the economic front. And the Japanese know they have a huge problem. You 00:05:53 SPEAKER_03 would often hear the Japanese military saying, one thing Taiwan's defense is Japan's defense. But I've even seen the calculations they did, like at which 00:06:03 JACK GAINES point the 00:06:06 JACK GAINES be outmatched by the Chinese Navy. And they had the date almost down to when it was. And our side, we were late recognizing this. We refused 00:07:18 SPEAKER_02 Yeah, as he described it well. Ultimately, the military part of the fight is extremely important. But it's almost a sideshow. But it's almost a sideshow to the other activities, the other fight that China's been waging for the last 30, 40 years, almost ever since we opened up to them. And that has been generally referred to as political warfare, with components being economic warfare, financial warfare, drug warfare, which is the word the Chinese use. So all this fentanyl that's been pumped into America for the last decade that's killed up towards a million Americans, almost all of it comes from China. And they know exactly what they're doing. And so every year they're taking like the equivalent of two or three divisions off the battlefield. You've destroyed neighborhoods. You've destroyed successful economic warfare. Drive 30 miles up the road to Baltimore. Go to Sparrows, Baltimore. Where there used to be steel mills. And now you have Amazon fulfillment sectors at best. But you've seen just the gutting of American society, the so -called working class, the Rust Belt. And this was done intentionally. And this was done intentionally. In large part, Chinese economic warfare directed at the United States. And then you have cyber warfare as well. You have cyber espionage. Well beyond what countries normally do. But they have used it very effectively. And the Chinese just... Recently put out their new fighter. That's called the J -35. That is a dig at the Americans. Because it is based on stolen blueprints for the F -35. I don't know. 00:07:20 SPEAKER_03 Ultimately, the military part of the 00:07:26 SPEAKER_03 it's almost a sideshow. 00:07:29 JACK GAINES sideshow to the other activities, the other fight that China's been waging for the last 30, 40 years, almost ever since we opened up to them. And that has been generally referred to as political warfare, with components being economic warfare, financial warfare, drug warfare, which is the word the Chinese use. So all this fentanyl that's been pumped into America for the last decade that's killed up towards a million Americans, almost all of it comes from China. And they know exactly what they're doing. And so every year they're taking like the equivalent of two or three divisions off the battlefield. You've destroyed neighborhoods. You've destroyed successful economic warfare. Drive 30 miles up the road to Baltimore. Go to Sparrows, Baltimore. Where there used to be steel mills. And now you have Amazon fulfillment sectors at best. But you've seen just the gutting of American society, the so -called working class, the Rust Belt. And this was done intentionally. 00:08:26 JACK GAINES warfare directed at the United States. And then you have cyber warfare as well. You have cyber espionage. 00:08:34 SPEAKER_03 Well beyond what countries normally do. But they have used it very effectively. And the Chinese just... Recently put out their new fighter. That's called the J -35. That is a dig at 00:08:47 GRANT NEWSHAM it is based on stolen blueprints for the F -35. 00:08:55 GRANT NEWSHAM know. It's been a while. I don't know. It's been a while. 00:09:02 SPEAKER_02 Unfortunately, Copperfish is leapfrogging over stages. Yes, it may take them a little longer, but they will popscotch through it. And so... So I take it pretty seriously. Their Y -20, their long -range transport, is basically the C -17. And they've just been immensely successful at this sort of espionage. And at the same time, we've done nothing to push back on them. Then there's the propaganda angle of this, which really good old Jesuit meaning of the word just means to explain yourself or articulate your position. So people understand that they've been very successful in getting Americans to buy the Chinese line. China's rise is peaceful. China's rise is peaceful. China's never attacked anybody. China's never attacked anybody. It's not true. All great nations do this. So who are we to complain? America has its problems, too. America has its problems, too. Who are we to complain about the Chinese taking live organs out of Uyghurs and prisoners of conscience? And we've been able to convince ourselves that we've been able to convince ourselves that we've not only can we not do anything, we shouldn't do anything. This is changing. But you can see we were very late getting started. And this has all been done without firing a shot. Chinese economic inroads, Chinese economic inroads, which leads to political influence, is in, for example, South America and Africa. Just immense how fast that has come, how solid it is. Pacific Island, something similar is going on, something similar is going on. Look at the difficulties the Germans have had, weaning themselves off of this Chinese addiction. And as a result, 00:09:03 GRANT NEWSHAM is leapfrogging over stages. Yes, it may take them 00:09:07 SPEAKER_03 but they will 00:09:09 GRANT NEWSHAM popscotch through it. And so... So I take it pretty seriously. Their Y -20, 00:09:16 JACK GAINES their long -range transport, is basically the C -17. And they've just been immensely successful at this sort of espionage. And at the same time, we've done nothing to push back on them. Then there's the propaganda angle of this, which really good old Jesuit meaning of the word just means to explain yourself or articulate your position. So people understand that they've been very successful in getting Americans to buy the Chinese line. China's rise is peaceful. China's rise is peaceful. China's never attacked anybody. China's never attacked anybody. It's not true. All great nations do this. So who are we to complain? 00:09:49 SPEAKER_03 America has its problems, too. America has its problems, too. Who are we to complain about the Chinese taking live organs out of Uyghurs and prisoners of conscience? And we've been able to 00:10:00 JACK GAINES that we've been able 00:10:00 SPEAKER_03 to convince ourselves that we've not only can we not do anything, we shouldn't do anything. This is changing. But you can see we were very late getting started. And this has all been done without firing a shot. 00:10:10 JACK GAINES Chinese economic inroads, Chinese economic inroads, which leads to political influence, is in, for example, South America and Africa. Just immense how fast that has come, how solid it is. Pacific Island, something similar is going on, something similar is going on. 00:10:27 SPEAKER_03 Look at the difficulties the Germans have had, weaning themselves off of this Chinese addiction. 00:10:34 SPEAKER_02 as a result, they have been able to improve their position politically, psychologically, economically, and they've been able to do this globally without having to use their military. 00:10:36 SPEAKER_03 their position 00:10:40 GRANT NEWSHAM and they've been able to do this globally without having to use their military. 00:10:51 SPEAKER_02 Yeah, that's the idea. Is you don't want to. So our view of warfare is like a hundred -yard dash. Wherever the two sides come to the line, shake loose, and then someone fires a gun, and then someone fires a gun, and then it's game on. To the Chinese, the war has started long ago. And you're wearing down your opponent. You're weakening his ability to resist. You're creating chaos in his own country. There's a word called entropy. Which is just breaking down. Entropic warfare is a word that sometimes gets used. For you're breaking down his ability to resist. And at the same time, of course, the Chinese are building up a military, which is very serious. Yes, it's not showing up off of San Diego just yet. But places closer to China, it's much more of an issue. Japan knows the problem they have with the People's Liberation Army. Pacific Island, Southeast Asia. You are seeing more of a Chinese presence. And the point is, when the time comes, you may not even be able to resist if the Chinese have done this other sort of warfare. 00:10:53 JACK GAINES want to. So our view of warfare is like a hundred -yard dash. Wherever the two sides come to the line, shake loose, and then someone fires a gun, and then someone fires a gun, and then it's game on. To the Chinese, the war has started long ago. And you're wearing down your opponent. You're weakening his ability to resist. You're creating chaos in his own country. There's a word called entropy. Which is just breaking down. Entropic warfare is a word that 00:11:19 SPEAKER_03 sometimes gets used. For you're breaking down his ability to resist. And at the same time, of course, the Chinese are building up a military, which is very serious. 00:11:28 JACK GAINES Yes, it's not showing 00:11:33 JACK GAINES places closer to China, it's much more of an issue. Japan knows the problem they have with the People's Liberation Army. Pacific Island, Southeast Asia. You are seeing more 00:11:46 JACK GAINES Chinese presence. And the point is, when the time comes, you may not even be able to resist if the Chinese have 00:11:52 SPEAKER_03 this other 00:12:31 SPEAKER_02 That's exactly what it is. It's mental warfare. You're attacking the mind. You're attacking how people think about things. Some people use the word cognitive warfare. You're the popular word. Yeah, you're attacking the mind. And so you can see how well it worked. And the Russians had a much poorer hand to play than the Chinese do. Because we do so much business with China. And you see how hard it is to do things like ban TikTok. We can't even get that done. 00:12:33 JACK GAINES mental warfare. You're attacking the mind. You're attacking how people think about things. Some people use the 00:12:42 JACK GAINES You're the popular word. Yeah, you're attacking the mind. And so you can see how well it worked. And the Russians had a much poorer hand to play than 00:12:50 GRANT NEWSHAM the Chinese do. Because we do so much business with China. And you see how hard it is to do things like ban TikTok. We can't even get that done. 00:12:59 SPEAKER_02 We can't even get that done. 00:13:03 SPEAKER_02 Look, 72 hours, if that for the Indians do, we can do it. And you see how Chinese successfully use what they call lawfare, which is using our own legal system. And the idea is that you get proxies, influential foreigners in your target country to actually do your bidding for you. The Chinese have like five aces to play. The Russians might have won, but you can see how successful the Russians have been just with that. 00:13:04 JACK GAINES for the Indians do, we can do it. And you see how Chinese successfully use what they call lawfare, which 00:13:13 JACK GAINES the idea is that you get proxies, influential foreigners in your target country to actually do your bidding for you. The Chinese have like five aces to play. The Russians might have won, but you can see how successful the Russians have 00:13:41 SPEAKER_02 Uh -huh. Uh -huh. 00:13:46 SPEAKER_02 Well, you're right about the Russians, but the Chinese understand that the term gray zone paralyzes Americans. We have no idea what to do because of our view of warfare being until the shooting starts. That it is we're not really at war. There's still hope of working something out. 00:13:51 GRANT NEWSHAM paralyzes Americans. We have no idea what to do because of our view of warfare being until the shooting starts. That it is we're not really at war. There's still hope of working 00:14:03 SPEAKER_03 something out. 00:14:05 SPEAKER_02 That has been our rote response for all these years, is to not get the Chinese mad, don't provoke them, and we have convinced ourselves that we have to have Chinese help with fill -in -the -blank, North Korea transnational crime, nuclear weapons proliferation, climate change, and therefore we cannot challenge the PRC because we won't get their cooperation. That's what we've effectively handcuffed ourselves, but when it comes to that so -called hybrid warfare, it's not all that It's not all that complicated if you recognize what it is and how it fits into China's behavior, its strategy. But you also would do well to attract from other directions where they're particularly vulnerable. And that is where you take advantage of the fact, for example, the Chinese currency is not freely convertible, which means that outside of China, nobody really wants Chinese money. It's like the script at a... It's like the script where you can use it to buy caramel corn and go on the rides. 00:14:05 SPEAKER_03 has been our rote response for all these years, is to not get the Chinese mad, don't provoke them, and we have convinced ourselves that 00:14:14 JACK GAINES have Chinese help with fill -in -the -blank, North Korea transnational crime, nuclear weapons 00:14:22 JACK GAINES climate change, and therefore we cannot challenge the PRC because we won't get their cooperation. That's what we've effectively handcuffed ourselves, but when it comes to that so -called hybrid warfare, it's not all that It's not all that complicated if you recognize what it is and how it fits into 00:14:42 JACK GAINES its strategy. But you also would do well to attract from other directions where they're particularly vulnerable. And that is where you take advantage of the fact, for example, the Chinese currency is not freely convertible, which means that outside of China, nobody really wants Chinese money. It's like the script at a... It's like the script where you can use it to buy caramel corn and 00:15:06 SPEAKER_02 That's it. Nobody wants it. So choke that off and China's got some real problems. Another is the just thoroughgoing corruption of China's ruling class. And most of them have wealth overseas, foreign bank accounts. foreign bank accounts, relatives with green cards, relatives with green cards, some operate businesses overseas. And this is illegal. And this is illegal. 00:15:08 JACK GAINES it. So choke that off and China's got some real problems. Another is the just thoroughgoing corruption of China's ruling class. And most 00:15:19 GRANT NEWSHAM overseas, foreign bank accounts. foreign bank accounts, relatives with green cards, relatives with green cards, some operate businesses overseas. And this 00:15:31 SPEAKER_02 And this is where that really scares them. Because in 2011 or 2012, New York Times and Bloomberg actually put out some good stories about the overseas wealth of China's top people, including Xi Jinping's family. I've never seen a reaction from the Chinese like that one. This bothered them. 00:15:33 JACK GAINES scares them. Because in 2011 or 2012, New 00:15:37 SPEAKER_03 York Times and Bloomberg actually put out some good stories about the overseas wealth of China's top people, including Xi Jinping's family. 00:15:46 GRANT NEWSHAM I've never seen a reaction from the Chinese like that one. 00:15:53 SPEAKER_02 More than anything else we've ever done. That's... 00:15:53 GRANT NEWSHAM than anything 00:16:14 SPEAKER_02 One way to do it. Another way to do it. That would be a tactical thing. Say you were to release, say, every Friday. Say at 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 00:16:16 JACK GAINES way to do it. That would be a tactical thing. Say you were to 00:16:19 SPEAKER_03 release, say, every Friday. Say at 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 00:16:25 SPEAKER_02 Which of the top 50 Chinese Communist Party officials? And make sure it reached everywhere in China. The thing that the public really hates is this corruption. And by the top dogs. And that is something that really bothers them. And you note that the Chinese leadership is very willing to have the average Chinese citizen absorb any amount of punishment. And they even talk about it. 00:16:27 SPEAKER_03 Chinese Communist Party officials? And make sure it 00:16:29 GRANT NEWSHAM reached everywhere in China. The thing that the public really hates is this corruption. And by the top dogs. 00:16:38 JACK GAINES is something that really bothers them. And you note that the Chinese leadership is very willing to have the average Chinese citizen 00:16:49 JACK GAINES they even talk about it. 00:16:51 SPEAKER_02 But when it's personal, then they see it very differently. And this is one of the few ways to really make it personal for them is to capitalize on this corruption. So when we talk about... Dealing with Gray's own operations, we're probably not going to be all that successful. Because they have more ships, they can be in more places. 00:16:51 JACK GAINES when it's personal, then they see it very differently. And this is one of the few ways to really make it personal for them is to capitalize on this corruption. So when we talk about... Dealing with Gray's own operations, we're probably not going to be all that successful. Because they have more ships, they can be in more places. 00:17:14 SPEAKER_02 But expose that. They can do that. Have we made a concerted effort to expose Chinese bribery, the illicit payments, the corruption that they put into everywhere they go? Everywhere there's a Chinese presence, you have corruption of the society, the political class as well. And do we ever target that? Do we consider it a priority effort? I don't even think we consider it an effort at all. Exposure is the one thing that has a huge effect. This is why investigative journalists get big. It's why like Irish. gangsters try to murder them in Malta they get blown up because they're effective because they're effective which is the thing that makes it very hard for corruption to work and that's where I think 00:17:15 JACK GAINES can do that. Have we made a concerted effort to expose Chinese bribery, the illicit payments, the corruption that they put into everywhere they go? Everywhere there's a Chinese presence, you have corruption of the society, the political class as well. And do we ever target that? Do we consider it a priority effort? I don't even think we consider it an effort at all. Exposure is the one thing that has a huge effect. This is why investigative journalists 00:17:44 SPEAKER_03 get big. It's why like Irish. gangsters try to murder them in Malta they get blown up because they're effective because they're effective which 00:17:52 SPEAKER_02 is the thing that makes it very hard for corruption to work and that's where I think We have some real opportunities to make it very clear what's being done. And this is something that, if you expose it, you can really capitalize on it. Just make it too hard to do this. And it also gives oxygen to the honest people in a country. It gives them something to work with. It gives them something to work with. To take on these repressive regimes, these corrupt regimes, these corrupt regimes, administrations. And get rid of them and replace them with honest people. I've never met anywhere, anywhere I've been. Over the years. Where people like to be cheaters. Where people like to be cheaters. Where they like their leaders to be corrupt. I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. It's just nothing you can do. But it's just nothing you can do. It really has an effect. And that's where I think government for sources could be effectively devoted. And particularly once you get local reporters in on it. Once you get the local. Honest locals in on it. Honest locals in on it. And that's where I think we could be very effective. Corruption, as you've mentioned, that really is the grease to everything the Chinese communists do globally. Take it away and then take away their access to dollars, convertible currency. And they've really got some problems. But they have played their hand very well today. But in some ways it's a house of cards. I don't think it's that hard to take on. But the longer you wait, the harder it gets. 00:17:52 SPEAKER_03 is the thing that makes it 00:17:54 JACK GAINES corruption to work and that's where I think We have some real opportunities to make it very clear what's being done. And this is something that, if you expose it, you can really capitalize on it. Just make it too hard to do this. And it also gives oxygen to the honest people in a country. It 00:18:16 JACK GAINES to work with. To take on these repressive regimes, these corrupt regimes, these corrupt regimes, 00:18:23 JACK GAINES them with honest people. I've never met anywhere, anywhere I've been. Over the years. Where 00:18:32 JACK GAINES I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. It's just nothing you can do. But it's just nothing you can do. It really has an effect. And that's where I think government for sources could be effectively devoted. And particularly once you 00:18:46 GRANT NEWSHAM reporters in on it. Once you get the local. Honest locals in on it. Honest locals in on it. And that's where I think we could be very effective. 00:18:56 JACK GAINES Corruption, as you've mentioned, that really is the grease to everything the Chinese communists do globally. Take it away and then take away their access to dollars, convertible currency. And they've really got some 00:19:12 JACK GAINES today. But in some ways it's a house of cards. I don't think it's that hard to take on. But the longer you wait, the harder it 00:19:28 SPEAKER_02 In regards to U .S. policy, in policy, there really is a... a desire that the United States stays around in Asia, that maintains its military might, and is able to effectively safeguard what you call freedom consensual government. Because if you go around the region, nobody wants to be dominated by the PRC. But they do have a huge advantage, particularly economically, that they're seen by leaders and business people in a lot of these countries. That's really the source of... some wealth, some prosperity. And we would do well, for example, to see the fight as just as much an economic one as a military one. Because we could build up our military, rebuild it, and we could have 800 ships in the Navy, and still lose. If we don't fight on these other fronts, we don't want you here because we're doing too much business with China. And that's where the U .S., along with its friends, the Japanese, the Koreans, the Indians, the Australians, we would do well to operate together more and to see the economic front and the political warfare fronts as a priority effort as much, if not more, than the military. 00:19:30 SPEAKER_03 in policy, there 00:19:31 JACK GAINES really is a... a desire that the United States stays around in Asia, that maintains its military might, and is able to 00:19:45 JACK GAINES Because if you go around the region, nobody wants to be dominated by the PRC. But they do have a huge advantage, particularly economically, that they're seen by leaders and business people in a lot of these countries. That's really the source of... some wealth, some prosperity. And we would do well, for example, to see the fight as just as much an economic 00:20:09 GRANT NEWSHAM one as a military one. Because we could build up our military, rebuild it, and we could have 800 ships in the Navy, and still lose. If we don't 00:20:19 JACK GAINES on these other fronts, we don't want you here because we're doing too much business with China. And that's where the U .S., along with its friends, the Japanese, the Koreans, the Indians, the Australians, 00:20:30 GRANT NEWSHAM we would do well to operate together more and to see the economic front and the political warfare fronts as a priority effort as much, if not 00:20:40 JACK GAINES more, than the 00:20:45 SPEAKER_02 They have a role to play if they're properly harnessed. But you do know that these days you don't see the Yankee trader that used to exist. You'd run to Americans everywhere trying to sell something to do business. Not so much these days. And we've almost ceded the far -flung part to the world. Because, well, the return on investment isn't enough. That's not an attractive enough proposition. Well, then let's make it one. Plus, you do have, say, the Japanese, the Indians, who are much better at operating in these places, to put it together into a coherent plan. Understand what it is, political warfare, and not just block the Chinese political warfare effort, but actually have our own campaign. And it really is worth doing some homework, I think, for a lot of people into what political warfare is. One sees the opportunities, but it takes a certain type of person who's good at it. versus a civil affairs guy. Versus a civil affairs guy. He's going to see different... He's going to see parts of the battlefield in a different way. Yes, sometimes you want the tank. But then there's this other part of it all. That is almost like a liberal arts test. Here you have to figure out the motivations for things. You have to figure out how a society works. And then how do you appeal to it using the things that are parts of political warfare? And this is where you can really make some mileage. You've got to have both. Make no mistake. If you're not able to destroy things and kill people, the civil affairs part isn't going to get you very far. But combine the two, and then you've really got something that's very hard to take on if you're the bad guys. We talk about defending Taiwan, and how important it is, and it is, I think, indispensable, that China does not take Taiwan and enslave 23 million people. If they did that... 00:20:47 JACK GAINES they're properly harnessed. But you do know that these days you don't see the Yankee trader that used to exist. You'd run to Americans everywhere trying to sell something to do business. Not 00:20:59 SPEAKER_03 so much these days. And we've almost ceded the far -flung part to the world. Because, well, the return on investment isn't enough. That's not an attractive enough proposition. Well, then let's 00:21:10 GRANT NEWSHAM make it one. Plus, you do have, say, the Japanese, the Indians, who are much better at operating in these places, to put it together into a coherent plan. Understand what it 00:21:20 JACK GAINES is, political warfare, and not just block the Chinese political warfare effort, but actually have our own campaign. And it really is worth doing some homework, I think, for a lot of people into what political warfare is. One sees the opportunities, but it takes a certain type of person who's good at it. versus a civil affairs guy. Versus a civil affairs guy. He's going to see different... He's going to see parts of the battlefield in a different way. 00:21:50 SPEAKER_03 Yes, sometimes you want the tank. But then there's this other part of it all. That is almost like a liberal arts test. Here you have to figure 00:22:00 JACK GAINES for things. You have to figure out how a society works. And then how do you appeal to it using the things that are parts of political warfare? 00:22:10 JACK GAINES make some mileage. You've got to have both. Make no mistake. If you're not able to destroy things and kill people, the civil affairs part isn't going to get you very far. But combine the two, and then you've really got something that's very hard to take on if you're the bad guys. We talk about defending Taiwan, and how important it is, and it is, I think, indispensable, 00:22:32 GRANT NEWSHAM that China does not take Taiwan and enslave 23 million people. If they did that... 00:22:39 SPEAKER_02 Asia would turn red overnight, as every country tried to cut the best deal they could. No country anywhere on Earth would have much confidence in American promises that will protect them. But one of the ways to actually defend Taiwan is, yes, they could maybe use F -35s and long -range missiles and smart pines, etc. You do have to have all of this stuff. Is it enough, 00:22:39 GRANT NEWSHAM would turn red overnight, as every country tried 00:22:42 SPEAKER_03 to cut the best deal they could. No country anywhere 00:22:46 JACK GAINES on Earth would have much confidence in American promises that will protect them. But one of the ways to actually defend 00:22:51 GRANT NEWSHAM Taiwan is, yes, they could maybe use F -35s and long -range missiles and smart pines, etc. You do have to have all of this stuff. Is it enough, even? Particularly if the other side says, okay, we'll absorb whatever you can send at us, but you're finished. But one of the ways that... But one of the ways is to give them a free trade agreement to improve their economy to the point that the government felt like it had money to spend on defense. 00:23:02 SPEAKER_02 Particularly if the other side says, okay, we'll absorb whatever you can send at us, but you're finished. But one of the ways that... But one of the ways is to give them a free trade agreement to improve their economy to the point that the government felt like it had money to spend on defense. You get a certain confidence in the entire society when they're more prosperous. Salaries are very low in Taiwan. Make it so people feel like they've got more money. Can they can buy a house? Can they can buy a condominium? build up the economy and that has a ripple effect throughout the society and on their military itself. And yet we didn't do that. And I think that's where we should apply some effort. 00:23:11 JACK GAINES give them a free trade agreement to 00:23:16 JACK GAINES point that the government felt like it had money to spend on defense. You get a certain confidence in the entire society when they're more prosperous. Salaries are very low in Taiwan. Make it so people feel like they've got more money. Can they can buy a house? Can they can buy a condominium? 00:23:35 JACK GAINES the economy and that has a ripple effect throughout the society and on their military itself. And yet we didn't do that. And I think that's where we should apply some 00:24:25 SPEAKER_02 I think you're right. And it's essential that we start to understand. You look at much of the debate about us in China. What happens when the two forces go at each other? And that's almost like... Going up behind the Waffle House. Going up behind the Waffle House. To see who's the toughest guy in Prince William County. To see who's the toughest guy in Prince William County. Out back. But think of all the things that go into whether or not the two hoodlums. There's all sorts of reasons why. No, there may not. 00:24:27 JACK GAINES essential that we start to understand. 00:24:32 JACK GAINES us in China. 00:24:33 SPEAKER_03 What happens when the two forces go at each other? And that's almost like... Going up behind the Waffle House. Going up behind the Waffle 00:24:43 JACK GAINES House. To see who's the toughest guy in Prince William County. To see 00:24:52 JACK GAINES whether or not the two hoodlums. 00:24:56 JACK GAINES of reasons why. No, there may not. 00:24:59 SPEAKER_02 Or that will affect the outcome, actually. None of them have to do with force on force. And that's so much of our debate on the US -China military problem. Is that a problem? Would our Navy take on theirs? Is there long -range missiles outrange ours? Yes, it's important. Make no mistake. Yes, it's important. Make no mistake. It's only one part of the battle. It's only one part of the battle. And it's the last part. 00:25:02 JACK GAINES of them have to do with force on force. And that's so much of our debate on the US -China military problem. Is that a problem? Would our Navy take on theirs? Is there long -range missiles outrange ours? Yes, it's important. Make no mistake. Yes, it's 00:25:21 JACK GAINES of the battle. And it's the last part. 00:25:22 SPEAKER_02 And if you look at the other part, it's a political warfare. And every part of that, then you have the chance, one, not to lose. You can actually shape things to your advantage. But if you don't, and the other guy is the only one playing that, well, you're likely to find yourself at 2 a .m. outside the Waffle House, and he's actually ready. We talk about bases. 00:25:22 JACK GAINES if you look at the other part, it's a political warfare. And every part of that, then you have the chance, one, not to lose. You can actually shape things to your advantage. But if you don't, and the other guy is the only one playing that, well, you're likely to find yourself at 2 a .m. outside the Waffle House, and he's actually ready. We talk about bases. 00:25:45 SPEAKER_02 We talk about bases. Well, what if we don't have the access because Chinese political warfare has made us so the locals won't let us into a place? They won't let us operate. 00:25:45 JACK GAINES talk about bases. Well, what if we don't have the access because Chinese political warfare has made us so the locals won't let us into a place? 00:25:53 GRANT NEWSHAM They won't let us operate. 00:25:55 SPEAKER_02 They won't let us operate. Oh, that's a pretty good example. Is that a pretty good example? One hoodlum can't get a ride to the awful house, but the other one can. So we've really got to start thinking about these things from a much broader perspective. And it's unfortunate that we're reinventing the wheel here. But the game's not over. It may be the bottom of the 7th and we're down by 6th. We're the old Washington Senators. We're the old Washington Senators. and debate how far we're behind. At the end of the day, we've got a good hand to play. I hope we start playing it. 00:25:58 JACK GAINES Is that a pretty good example? One hoodlum can't get a ride to the awful house, but the other 00:26:08 JACK GAINES thinking about these things from a much 00:26:15 JACK GAINES the wheel here. 00:26:18 JACK GAINES It may be the bottom of the 7th and we're down by 6th. We're the old Washington Senators. We're the old Washington Senators. and debate how far we're behind. At the end of the day, we've got a good hand to play. I hope we start playing it. 00:26:35 SPEAKER_02 Glad to be here. Thank you. Glad to be here. Thank you. 00:26:40 JACK GAINES Thanks for listening. If you get a chance, please like and subscribe and rate the show on your favorite podcast platform. Also, if you're interested in coming on the show or hosting an episode, email us at [email protected]. I'll have the email and CA Association website in the show notes. And now, most importantly, to those currently out in the field, working with a partner nation's people or leadership to forward U .S. relations, thank you all for what you're doing. This is Jack, your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes. One CA Podcast.

Please welcome Grant Newsham, retired marine colonel and author of When China Attacks, A Warning to America. Grant came on the show to discuss the state of the Japan Defense Forces and the PRC threat.  This is a two-part episode. Grant's biography: https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/author/grant-newsham/ Book link: https://www.regnery.com/9781684513659/when-china-attacks/ A recent article: https://andmagazine.substack.com/p/the-us-in-the-pacific-getting-the?utm_source=substack&publication_id=746580&post_id=151553726&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&utm_campaign=email-share&triggerShare=true&isFreemail=true&r=ercjf&triedRedirect=true --- One CA is a product of the civil affairs association  and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership. We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.  To contact the show, email us at [email protected]  or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org --- Special thanks to the site Cool Jazz Hot Bossa for the sample of Cool Jazz Hot Bossa. (59:00). Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bdWUj2NYDYQ --- Transcript: (Part I) 00:00:05 JACK GAINES Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at [email protected]. Or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org. I'll have those in the show notes. Please welcome Grant Newsham, retired Marine Colonel and author of When China Attacks, A Warning to America. Grant came on the show to discuss the state of the Japan Defense Forces and the PRC threat. This is the first of a two-part episode, so let's get started. 00:00:56 GRANT NEWSHAM I was effectively MarforPak's guy in Asia for a number of years. which worked well in both directions. So I was obviously in Japan, but also did a lot of work for them throughout the region, Southeast Asia as well, Taiwan even, which was a lot of fun. 00:01:13 JACK GAINES Yeah. And you've become a foreign policy advocate in the area. 00:01:16 GRANT NEWSHAM Yeah. At some point, maybe seven or eight years ago, figured I'd actually done enough stuff to maybe have a few ideas. So I started writing and speak a lot as well. So I guess I'm part of the commentariat. But I seem to write about once a week some topic related to often Asian defense, but sometimes economics, politics, sometimes organized crime. And I do get invited to speak here and there and seem to get a number of television or radio interviews as well. That's really cool. I didn't say I get invited to good things, but I do get the occasional invitation. I used to think it was because I had such insight. Someone told me not all that long ago that actually, if you'll say yes to an interview, you're likely to get more of them. Because the people who book them, they just want to get somebody on. And I thought it was because of my particular wisdom. 00:02:07 JACK GAINES of my particular wisdom. 00:02:09 GRANT NEWSHAM I'm joking a little bit. But obviously, you must have something useful to say. But it is funny. There's one place in Singapore that calls me a lot. It's like their CNN. And they've been calling me. Probably eight years at least, or almost every time, I'll tell the presenters that basically they don't know what they're talking about. And I always think, well, this is the last one, but they keep calling me up. They mislike you because you're the contrarian. 00:02:34 JACK GAINES mislike you because you're the contrarian. 00:02:36 GRANT NEWSHAM Oh, I can blame things in a way that sort of suits broadcast and that sort of regular people can understand, you know, 00:02:42 GRANT NEWSHAM that sort of regular people can understand, you know, being a regular person myself. 00:02:47 JACK GAINES Yeah, you learn to disagree without offending. 00:02:49 GRANT NEWSHAM Usually. And it's always sort of a relief, actually, when you can have a different look at things. 00:02:56 JACK GAINES That's good. I always thought you were going to say it is a relief sometimes when you just peel the coat off and then yell at them. 00:03:02 GRANT NEWSHAM The facts speak for themselves. Right. And if it's a presenter, their role is different, and they will generally not have the substantive knowledge that most of the people on the show will have. Right. And so much of what I have to say is often not... in line with accepted wisdom, particularly when it comes to Japan. Sure. So it's often that I'll have to present a different take on things, but they don't seem to be offended. 00:03:27 JACK GAINES Right. You mostly talk about Japan in its current defense fashion or in its foreign policy actions. 00:03:33 GRANT NEWSHAM A lot of that because people have a perception of Japan, for example, as a pacifist country. It cannot fight. It's peace loving. Right. etc. They have a nuclear allergy. You know, just the idea of nuclear weapons in Japan is out of the question. You often hear, well, their constitution won't let them fight. And none of those things are actually true. But it's the received wisdom. It's what people think. And when you simply point out the realities of Japan, that ultimately, at the end of the day, it's a country just like every other. And that the stereotypes about it really aren't correct when it comes to defense security. In fact, they use that the Constitution won't let them have a military. You probably heard it. Yeah. That's the idea. And they don't even call it a military. But the fact is they've got a military, which, according to some ratings, is the fifth most powerful in the world. It depends on how you calculate it, of course. But they call it something else. And what is the actual distinction between offensive and defensive weapons? 00:04:35 JACK GAINES It's usually the strike space. If it's inside your own country defending, then it's a defense space. Once you go out and start taking out other people's cities and moving forces in. 00:04:44 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, for example, they don't have much what you call power projection capability very far off their borders. But they do have a submarine fleet, say over 20 submarines. There's no reason you couldn't send them to the coast of China and start sinking ships. 00:04:59 JACK GAINES True. 00:05:00 GRANT NEWSHAM They've got F -16s. You can put long -range missiles on them and you can fly out of ways and cause people a lot of trouble. But their military really, I would say, is not so good at offense. It's not so good at defense either. And that's something that comes as a surprise to a lot of people. 00:05:15 JACK GAINES Well, do they exercise defense and offense? 00:05:18 GRANT NEWSHAM Oh, they have exercises, training, and they put on a pretty good show, particularly when they have visitors come. But they really, until very recently, and even now, they can't do joint operations, which means the air, sea, and ground forces. can't operate together. In fact, they don't even have a radio with which they can communicate easily. They have to jury -rig some relations, these connections. And that's something most people don't understand, because you look at it on paper. Japan has 250 ,000 people in its military, and it's got ships, aircraft, all of it modern and good stuff. 150 ,000 people in its ground self -defense force, their army. But it's not even the sum of its whole. If you imagine each of your limbs, your arms and your legs, each doing whatever it wants without the coordinating function provided by a brain. 00:06:10 JACK GAINES Sounds like me dancing. 00:06:12 GRANT NEWSHAM It would be, yeah. I think that I can picture that, whereas I'm more of an Arthur Murray kind of guy. But it's like that. And nobody can believe that because they think, well, this is the Japanese. It's this advanced modern country, big military, the rich country. And I mean, they can't even do these simple things. Right. The short answer is no, except in some limited circumstances. After 60 years of the U .S.-Japan defense relationship, 80 years after World War II, they still cannot do some of the basic things that a military needs to do, or do them very well, put it that way. But they do train, they exercise, the personnel quality is excellent. You know, we tend to say, well, we've got Japan as our ally, Japan has a military. But the reality is that the U .S. and Japanese forces cannot work very well together. There's one exception, and that's the two navies. The U .S. Navy and the Japanese Navy, called the Maritime Self -Defense Force, they actually do work well. And they show what's doable. 00:07:15 JACK GAINES They probably do dynamic exercises as well as structured ones, so they have to change, have to practice new orders and maneuvers. 00:07:22 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, the nature of naval operations is you can go out... into the sea, and you have more freedom to actually do stuff. But part of it actually was when Admiral Arleigh Burke, who was later chief of naval operations for many years, he was in charge in Japan. He basically laid down the ground rules, which was that the American Navy was going to treat the Japanese like friends, like allies. And that set the tone for everything. So they had a more relationship of equals, people who wanted to operate together. And that is why they have a good relationship today. in my opinion. So as a result, after all these decades, the two militaries are not really very good at operating together. There's no joint headquarters. There never has been in Japan. At best, they've operated in isolation. Do they recognize they don't have a joint access? Oh, they know. The Japanese military knows this. And US Indo -PACOM has not pushed the issue. And then you had... The State Department side, on the civilian side, people saying, well, if we ask the Japanese to get better at defense matters, well, they'll get angry. And if they do, then the Chinese will be mad. So you have the U .S. on the U .S. side. We're thinking of at least 10 reasons why Japan cannot improve its defenses. That's changed enough in recent years. But you see how many decades we've lost. 00:08:51 JACK GAINES Right. I can see part of what the State Department is saying in that a lot of those countries along the Asian coast were under Japanese rule during World War II. They're concerned that by showing favor and coordinating with them in defense might offend places like the Philippines or Korea. It is a concern to be weighed, but I don't know how much weight you would put to it. 00:09:14 GRANT NEWSHAM I wouldn't give it hardly any. With the Japanese, when you actually think about it, I would say within... 30 years of the end of the war, but certainly today, and for the last at least 20 years ago. The new century. Even before that. The Japanese and World War II is not really an issue in almost all of Asia. The Chinese, of course... Play it up. That's a good way to put it. Of course, they do remember what the Japanese did, and it was barbaric. Although the Chinese Communist Party afterwards killed 50 million Chinese in peacetime and good weather, which the Imperial Japanese Army couldn't have dreamed of doing. But World War II is an issue in China. Korea as well, the relationship is dicey. Up to a point. I mean, little old ladies go and sit in front of the embassy still. 00:10:05 JACK GAINES the embassy still. 00:10:06 GRANT NEWSHAM There are, and then you just had a South Korean amphibious ship come to Yokosuka in Tokyo on a visit. In Korea, there's a fundamental sort of suspicion of the Japanese. Sometimes it is a real dislike. But most people, it's not a big issue. But except for those two countries, you go down the list in Asia, and there is no after effect of World War II. I find the Filipinos get along very well with the Japanese. The Indonesians do. They, in fact, see the Japanese as being the people who freed them from the colonial yoke. Okay. The Malays, they actually didn't have that bad a time during the occupation. The Chinese in Malaysia did. So the Malaysians don't have any really hard feelings against the Japanese. Taiwan, same thing. They've got a very good relationship. And then there's one plus billion Indians who actually have an excellent relationship with Japan and see Japan as real friends and vice versa. So you're starting to get a good chunk of Asia, which, as you can see, actually sees Japan as a good country, useful economically. It's been very generous. And they like to see a Japanese military that's strong enough, allied with the United States, able to deal with China. 00:11:27 JACK GAINES Right. And why would we have such a different balance as we do with Germany and Europe? Because no one's questioning this in Holland or in France. That's just another country. They freely trade, they freely access each other. So maybe mindset just needs to shift to say the reform of Japan is just like Germany, and we need to start treating them and partner nations the same and start advocating for a joint staff. 00:11:52 GRANT NEWSHAM And you could do that in an afternoon, but the Japanese will not speak up for themselves. And an old New York Times reporter, Richard Halloran, I remember him telling me once that all the people he ever dealt with in the world... The Japanese were the worst at explaining themselves. And there's a reticence which slows them down. But also the Americans are afraid to tell them what we need. And that is a huge problem, because if we don't tell them, the Japanese are not blind readers, and they won't do what we think we'd like them to do, but we're afraid to ask. And in fact, one of the Japanese prime ministers in 1970, so 50 -some years ago, He gave some very good advice to the Americans, and it was at the time the Americans were trying to put an aircraft carrier into Yokosuka, the naval base near Tokyo. They wanted to assign it there permanently. And the U .S. side was thinking of excuses why it was too hard for the Japanese. They'll cause political difficulties. The Japanese have an election coming up. The timing just isn't right. And finally, the Japanese side sent a message to the Americans saying, tell us what you need. And don't back down. And they said it out of exasperation, really. And it was the best advice the Americans have ever been given. And we've refused to follow it ever since then. And really, it's almost a cultural trait, sort of a Confucian system. They actually are happy to have experts tell them what they ought to do. Sure. Whereas we are more of the Socratic method. And it doesn't, it just doesn't work. That's why after all these years, the Americans and the Japanese forces, except for the navies, And except for missile defense, we really don't operate together anywhere near where we need to be. We're not even close. And another very interesting fact a lot of people don't know is the Japanese military missed its recruitment targets by about 50 % last year. 5 -0? 00:13:50 JACK GAINES -0? 00:13:50 GRANT NEWSHAM 5 -0. And it routinely misses them by 20 -25%. So this, you can see, is a problem. It's now an older force, doesn't have enough people. In order to fulfill its missions, it would probably have to be twice as big, both personnel -wise and in terms of ships and hardware. Its war stocks are basically non -existent, doesn't know anything really about casualty care, combat casualty replacements, logistics. 00:14:20 JACK GAINES Well, if the media looks down on it and the political class looks down on it, it's not going to get a lot of positivity in the public mindset. So that's got to be part of it. It's not a vote -getter to push for a strong defense. 00:14:31 GRANT NEWSHAM vote -getter to push for a strong defense. I mean, if you're a politician, no one's going to say, he's the defense guy, let's give him our vote. But people vote for other reasons. But you do get used to, after that horrific experience in World War II, that for decades people didn't want to really think about defense, and they were glad to have the Americans around to handle it, and particularly when it seemed like there wasn't any real threat anywhere. People were happy with that, and even the U .S. side. didn't mind it as well. But I'd say it should have started to change at least 20 years ago. And it didn't until maybe four or five years ago. Well, 00:15:10 JACK GAINES when did the risk indicators really start popping up with China? 00:15:14 GRANT NEWSHAM I think by... It can't be back when Nixon went. 00:15:15 JACK GAINES It can't be back when Nixon went. Well, it should have, 00:15:16 GRANT NEWSHAM it should have, you know, I think. But about 2005 is when it was obvious what was coming. 00:15:19 JACK GAINES But about 00:15:21 GRANT NEWSHAM when it was obvious what was coming. And even before that, if you knew what to look for. But as I said, some of us... We knew what needed done and what the problems were. And there were Japanese who did too. And that's why when we put together their amphibious force, it was sort of an effort to address the shortcomings in Japan's self -defense force. Also to improve the overall U .S.-Japan relationship because it was so imbalanced. Right. Where the Japanese weren't doing anything near enough to defend themselves. And that over time creates a lot of friction in a relationship. So we were trying to address that with the amphibious force, and that was 2011, which we were pretty successful at that because we didn't ask permission from anybody. I was going to say, if you were successful, 00:16:10 JACK GAINES did you get fired? 00:16:11 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, it's not that people didn't try. 00:16:11 JACK GAINES Well, it's not that people didn't try. Sorry, that was sarcastic. But I was a reservist, so they couldn't quite get a bead on me. 00:16:15 GRANT NEWSHAM I was a reservist, so they couldn't quite get a bead on me. Yeah. And didn't quite know what we were doing. And also you had people like General Gregson, who was then at... Department of Defense, who had been in Japan many years, and he knew the importance of it all. So he would provide some cover. But the real success there was because the Japanese side took the ideas and ran with it. And the Americans provided some cover and some know -how and some advice. But it was the Japanese who did that. Once the Japanese took on the mission, well, what are the Americans going to say? But I was even told that at Indo -PACOM, that there were people who gotten wind of this and were very much opposed because the idea that Japanese having an amphibious force was provocative. Not just provocative, but it was going to cause the Japanese to go on the rampage again, like in 1941. I'm not making this up. 00:17:11 JACK GAINES So when Germany starts building the Leopard 2, were they expected to go on a rampage too? 00:17:17 GRANT NEWSHAM No, those are Europeans. Oh, okay. You know how the Europeans are okay. 00:17:19 JACK GAINES okay. You know 00:17:21 GRANT NEWSHAM But the fact that Germans have been allowed back into polite society. tells you something, and the Japanese are just as deserving of it as well. 00:17:30 JACK GAINES Did you see the movie Godzilla Minus One? No. It's an interesting portrayal of post -World War II Japan. And Godzilla, which is this giant monster, comes out of the sea, tears up Japan, and has an atomic breath that shoots off nuclear explosions, which sounds a lot like the United States in a mythological way. One thing that... the show did that was interesting is it kind of engaged post -military era and had talked about it. And it seemed like it was trying to reconcile the past with now and build out a notion that the military is okay, that after the war, there were good things that happened and that we should embrace a military in the future. So there might be some societal impulses out there that are promoting and supporting a more built -up military in Japan. 00:18:24 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, you're actually right. The public at large has always been pretty supportive of the military. For example, when they have open base days, when they put on so -called firepower demonstrations, which is like an exercise you can watch where they shoot off stuff, that they're always oversubscribed. And people just pour into these things because they're interested. And the central government, or say the ruling class, are the ones who are gun -shy or... I'm really hesitant, but the public at large, you know, when you ask them, you know, should Japan have a normal military? The replies to that are like 85%. Well, yes, of course. And I think they would be horrified if they knew the actual state of the Japanese military. I mentioned this to a Japanese politician last year, and he was horrified at the idea. And the public as well would have a similar reaction. Regular Japanese people say they have a pretty good understanding of what Japan needs to do to defend itself and of the importance of having a national defense, but the government doesn't explain it very well. When they do, the reaction, there's a Japanese expression, it's called like, it's atarimae. And it means like, well, yeah. It's like, duh. 00:19:42 JACK GAINES Abnautually. And that's what it means. 00:19:42 GRANT NEWSHAM And that's what it means. Should Japan have a good defense? Atarimae. And yeah, what's the question here? But if you ask that question in the political world, then you'll get all sorts of emming and hawing. They wanted nothing of that. By the late 70s, certainly by the 90s, that they sort of outlived that. But it was comfortable to continue with it, particularly if you're the government, because you don't have to spend money on defense. And the Americans are covering that. So it was as if the Americans were giving. I'd say at least $50 billion a year in free defense coverage, at least, probably more. And, you know, if you're a government, you think, well, why should we do anything different? And so they got used to that. We got used to it. And then at some point, the friction builds up where you just can't do that. And the Japanese themselves start to be resentful. 00:20:37 JACK GAINES Right. Keeping them handicapped, probably. 00:20:40 GRANT NEWSHAM Yeah. You know, they're not letting us be self -fulfilled. I think that's sort of the marriage counselor's analysis. And so that imbalance was such that it was creating huge problems in the relationship. But the defense relationship, you know, pointing out, well, you know, you guys really aren't very good, except for the Navy. You know, and we can't work with you very well, except for the Navies. And as a result, that's why we are where we are today. By now, if we had a more sort of capable U .S.-Japan defense relationship, where the two services could... operate together, and we're conducting a joint defense of Japan and the surrounding areas, which includes, say, to Taiwan even, that that would have, I think, deterred a lot of the problems that we're having. But by pretending everything was okay, we've gotten ourselves in a position where we now face a real threat out there. And we're trying to make up for lost time. And I don't know. And I don't know which side I would bet on. I'd bet on ours because I'm an American. But that's how out of whack it has gotten. It used to be maybe till 20 years ago, we were in pretty good shape. But you can see that advantage eroding. And nowadays, depending on how a fight were to take place, if it does take place, it would be less of a sure thing than it once was. And that's, I think, putting it very nicely. 00:22:04 JACK GAINES Well, tell me about the threat. 00:22:05 GRANT NEWSHAM What are you seeing? It's China. led by the Chinese Communist Party. (Part II) 00:00:02 JACK GAINES Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at [email protected]. or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org. I'll have those in the show notes. Please welcome back Grant Newsham, retired Marine colonel and author of When China Attacks, A Warning to America. Grant came on the show to discuss the state of the Japanese defense forces and the PRC threat. This is the second in a two-part episode, so let's get started. 00:00:56 SPEAKER_02 It's China. led by the Chinese Communist Party. They built up a military which is just gradually but steadily expanding its reach and its coverage. And it is compared to, say, 2020, now instead of just being able to operate a little bit off their coast, they can reach Guam, Hawaii, and onwards. The Chinese military doesn't tend to develop into a force able to operate worldwide just like the U .S. can. And their ship numbers. They've got more than we do. Something like 350 versus our 290. 00:00:58 JACK GAINES the Chinese Communist Party. 00:01:06 JACK GAINES its reach 00:01:11 JACK GAINES say, 2020, now instead of just being able to operate a little bit 00:01:15 GRANT NEWSHAM off their coast, they can reach Guam, Hawaii, and onwards. The Chinese military doesn't tend to develop into a force able to operate worldwide just 00:01:25 JACK GAINES like the U .S. can. And their ship numbers. They've got more than we do. Something like 350 versus our 00:01:37 SPEAKER_02 Well, fortunately, in terms of quality, they're pretty good. And they know what they need to do, and they're getting better. For some things like carrier operations, they're not at our level yet. But if you look at the speed at which they have developed, they're in pretty good shape. But let's just say the South China Sea, which is one and a half times the size of the Mediterranean. Whenever U .S. ships go in there, and we do publicize our transits and operations and exercises, for every ship we put in there, For every ship we put in, the Chinese can match it with at least 10. And that doesn't include ground -based and air -launched anti -ship missiles, for example. So if the Chinese pick their spot, 00:01:39 JACK GAINES they're pretty good. And they know what they need to do, and they're getting better. For some things like carrier operations, they're not at our level yet. But if you look at the speed at which they have developed, they're in pretty good shape. But let's just say the South China Sea, which is one and a half times the size of the Mediterranean. 00:02:00 JACK GAINES and we do publicize our transits and operations and exercises, for every ship we put in there, For every ship we put in, the Chinese can match it with at least 10. And that doesn't include ground -based and air -launched anti -ship missiles, for example. 00:02:16 SPEAKER_02 if the Chinese pick their spot, pick their timing, I wouldn't want to be the destroyer skipper who's got 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. And he's got eight seconds to figure out what to do. The point is they have had de facto control of the South China Sea since about seven, eight years ago. And yes, we can go in there. But once we're gone, the Chinese close back up and they've pretty much got it. Beyond that, it's harder for them, but they're steadily expanding their capability to conduct operations. It's a military that has its problems, like every military, but they are trying to correct them. They are building a military which they want to be able to defeat a country that has aircraft carriers, which is us. In many respects, they are our equals. Have you ever heard a Korean War veteran who said he wanted to fight the Chinese again? And these were Chinese. These was the Chinese of 1950s. It's a very different place today. And I'm not saying that they can't be defeated, but I'm not saying that they can't be defeated. An adversary that could give us a lot of trouble. When their intentions are to first dominate regionally and locally, and then push that farther afield to all the Pacific and beyond. And they're setting up the infrastructure worldwide with ports and airfields to do that. They're investing in long -range transports, these naval replenishment ships that you need to be able to operate the way we do, and that's their mission. And we have pretended until about 2017 that this wasn't the case. In fact, you couldn't even say China was an adversary. And guys who did, like Captain James Fennell, who was the head of intelligence at Pack Fleet. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. The then administration hated him and got rid of him. And that's how bad it was. And I saw this all firsthand. Experience some of it, not as bad as Captain Fennell did. So we've allowed them to build up into a military that we had better take very seriously. And the Chinese do see this as a tool for their... 00:02:16 JACK GAINES if the 00:02:17 SPEAKER_03 Chinese pick their spot, pick their timing, I wouldn't want to be the destroyer skipper who's got 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. 00:02:28 JACK GAINES figure out what to do. The point is they have had de facto control of the South China Sea since about seven, eight years ago. 00:02:39 JACK GAINES we're gone, the Chinese close back up and they've pretty much got it. Beyond that, it's 00:02:45 SPEAKER_03 but they're steadily expanding their capability to conduct operations. It's a military that has its problems, like every military, but they are trying to correct them. They are 00:02:55 JACK GAINES a military which they want to be able to defeat a country that has aircraft carriers, which is us. In many respects, 00:03:03 JACK GAINES our equals. Have you ever heard a Korean War veteran who said he wanted to fight the Chinese again? And these were Chinese. These was the Chinese of 1950s. It's a very different place today. And I'm not saying that they can't be defeated, but I'm not saying that they can't 00:03:22 JACK GAINES a lot of trouble. When their intentions are to first dominate regionally and locally, and then push that farther afield to all the Pacific and beyond. And they're setting up the infrastructure worldwide with ports and airfields to do that. They're investing in long -range transports, these naval replenishment ships that you need to be able to operate the way we do, and that's their mission. And we have pretended 00:03:50 SPEAKER_03 until about 2017 00:03:51 GRANT NEWSHAM that this wasn't the case. In fact, you couldn't even say China was an adversary. And guys who did, like Captain James Fennell, 00:04:01 JACK GAINES who was the head of intelligence at Pack Fleet. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. The then administration hated him and got rid of him. And that's how bad it was. And I saw this all firsthand. Experience some of it, not as bad as Captain Fennell did. So we've allowed them to build up into a military that we had better take very seriously. And the Chinese do see this as a tool for 00:04:30 SPEAKER_02 The idea is if you have a powerful military, well, that's when you can lean on people. That's when you can intimidate people. You can dominate them. And they're happy with the psychological domination, political domination. It doesn't have to be occupying, but dominating. And they're in every field, from outer space, long -range missiles, undersea warfare, really putting a lot of effort into it. And there is a certain sort of ingenuity that goes into their operations. Well, they can't invent things. They don't develop things on their own. They just steal things. So they reverse engineer things. So they reverse engineer. 00:04:32 SPEAKER_03 well, that's when you can lean on people. That's when 00:04:39 JACK GAINES And they're happy with the psychological domination, political domination. It doesn't have to be occupying, but dominating. And they're in every field, from outer space, long -range missiles, undersea warfare, really putting a lot of effort into it. And there is a certain sort of ingenuity that goes into their operations. Well, they can't invent things. They don't develop things on their own. They just steal things. So they reverse engineer things. 00:05:09 SPEAKER_02 Well, it... You know, it's kind of true up to a point, but look at us. The Yankee ingenuity was taking stolen British technology and making it better. And so the fact they may not be as innovative as us, well, sometimes it just has to be good enough. So they've got now a military to combine with this desire for political domination as well as considering their economic power as just as important as the military. And you see how successful that has been. When you have U .S. business leaders giving Xi Jinping two standing ovations last November in San Francisco, that tells you how successful they've been on the economic front. And the Japanese know they have a huge problem. You would often hear the Japanese military saying, one thing Taiwan's defense is Japan's defense. But I've even seen the calculations they did, like at which point the Japanese Navy would be outmatched by the Chinese Navy. And they had the date almost down to when it was. And our side, we were late recognizing this. We refused to. We refused to. 00:05:11 GRANT NEWSHAM kind of true up to a point, but look at us. The Yankee ingenuity was taking stolen British technology and making it better. And so the fact 00:05:20 SPEAKER_03 be as innovative as us, well, sometimes it just 00:05:23 JACK GAINES has to be good enough. So they've got now a military to combine with this desire for political domination as well as considering their economic power as just as important as the military. And you see how successful that has been. When you have U .S. business leaders giving Xi Jinping two standing 00:05:45 JACK GAINES San Francisco, that tells you how successful they've been on the economic front. And the Japanese know they have a huge problem. You 00:05:53 SPEAKER_03 would often hear the Japanese military saying, one thing Taiwan's defense is Japan's defense. But I've even seen the calculations they did, like at which 00:06:03 JACK GAINES point the 00:06:06 JACK GAINES be outmatched by the Chinese Navy. And they had the date almost down to when it was. And our side, we were late recognizing this. We refused 00:07:18 SPEAKER_02 Yeah, as he described it well. Ultimately, the military part of the fight is extremely important. But it's almost a sideshow. But it's almost a sideshow to the other activities, the other fight that China's been waging for the last 30, 40 years, almost ever since we opened up to them. And that has been generally referred to as political warfare, with components being economic warfare, financial warfare, drug warfare, which is the word the Chinese use. So all this fentanyl that's been pumped into America for the last decade that's killed up towards a million Americans, almost all of it comes from China. And they know exactly what they're doing. And so every year they're taking like the equivalent of two or three divisions off the battlefield. You've destroyed neighborhoods. You've destroyed successful economic warfare. Drive 30 miles up the road to Baltimore. Go to Sparrows, Baltimore. Where there used to be steel mills. And now you have Amazon fulfillment sectors at best. But you've seen just the gutting of American society, the so -called working class, the Rust Belt. And this was done intentionally. And this was done intentionally. In large part, Chinese economic warfare directed at the United States. And then you have cyber warfare as well. You have cyber espionage. Well beyond what countries normally do. But they have used it very effectively. And the Chinese just... Recently put out their new fighter. That's called the J -35. That is a dig at the Americans. Because it is based on stolen blueprints for the F -35. I don't know. 00:07:20 SPEAKER_03 Ultimately, the military part of the 00:07:26 SPEAKER_03 it's almost a sideshow. 00:07:29 JACK GAINES sideshow to the other activities, the other fight that China's been waging for the last 30, 40 years, almost ever since we opened up to them. And that has been generally referred to as political warfare, with components being economic warfare, financial warfare, drug warfare, which is the word the Chinese use. So all this fentanyl that's been pumped into America for the last decade that's killed up towards a million Americans, almost all of it comes from China. And they know exactly what they're doing. And so every year they're taking like the equivalent of two or three divisions off the battlefield. You've destroyed neighborhoods. You've destroyed successful economic warfare. Drive 30 miles up the road to Baltimore. Go to Sparrows, Baltimore. Where there used to be steel mills. And now you have Amazon fulfillment sectors at best. But you've seen just the gutting of American society, the so -called working class, the Rust Belt. And this was done intentionally. 00:08:26 JACK GAINES warfare directed at the United States. And then you have cyber warfare as well. You have cyber espionage. 00:08:34 SPEAKER_03 Well beyond what countries normally do. But they have used it very effectively. And the Chinese just... Recently put out their new fighter. That's called the J -35. That is a dig at 00:08:47 GRANT NEWSHAM it is based on stolen blueprints for the F -35. 00:08:55 GRANT NEWSHAM know. It's been a while. I don't know. It's been a while. 00:09:02 SPEAKER_02 Unfortunately, Copperfish is leapfrogging over stages. Yes, it may take them a little longer, but they will popscotch through it. And so... So I take it pretty seriously. Their Y -20, their long -range transport, is basically the C -17. And they've just been immensely successful at this sort of espionage. And at the same time, we've done nothing to push back on them. Then there's the propaganda angle of this, which really good old Jesuit meaning of the word just means to explain yourself or articulate your position. So people understand that they've been very successful in getting Americans to buy the Chinese line. China's rise is peaceful. China's rise is peaceful. China's never attacked anybody. China's never attacked anybody. It's not true. All great nations do this. So who are we to complain? America has its problems, too. America has its problems, too. Who are we to complain about the Chinese taking live organs out of Uyghurs and prisoners of conscience? And we've been able to convince ourselves that we've been able to convince ourselves that we've not only can we not do anything, we shouldn't do anything. This is changing. But you can see we were very late getting started. And this has all been done without firing a shot. Chinese economic inroads, Chinese economic inroads, which leads to political influence, is in, for example, South America and Africa. Just immense how fast that has come, how solid it is. Pacific Island, something similar is going on, something similar is going on. Look at the difficulties the Germans have had, weaning themselves off of this Chinese addiction. And as a result, 00:09:03 GRANT NEWSHAM is leapfrogging over stages. Yes, it may take them 00:09:07 SPEAKER_03 but they will 00:09:09 GRANT NEWSHAM popscotch through it. And so... So I take it pretty seriously. Their Y -20, 00:09:16 JACK GAINES their long -range transport, is basically the C -17. And they've just been immensely successful at this sort of espionage. And at the same time, we've done nothing to push back on them. Then there's the propaganda angle of this, which really good old Jesuit meaning of the word just means to explain yourself or articulate your position. So people understand that they've been very successful in getting Americans to buy the Chinese line. China's rise is peaceful. China's rise is peaceful. China's never attacked anybody. China's never attacked anybody. It's not true. All great nations do this. So who are we to complain? 00:09:49 SPEAKER_03 America has its problems, too. America has its problems, too. Who are we to complain about the Chinese taking live organs out of Uyghurs and prisoners of conscience? And we've been able to 00:10:00 JACK GAINES that we've been able 00:10:00 SPEAKER_03 to convince ourselves that we've not only can we not do anything, we shouldn't do anything. This is changing. But you can see we were very late getting started. And this has all been done without firing a shot. 00:10:10 JACK GAINES Chinese economic inroads, Chinese economic inroads, which leads to political influence, is in, for example, South America and Africa. Just immense how fast that has come, how solid it is. Pacific Island, something similar is going on, something similar is going on. 00:10:27 SPEAKER_03 Look at the difficulties the Germans have had, weaning themselves off of this Chinese addiction. 00:10:34 SPEAKER_02 as a result, they have been able to improve their position politically, psychologically, economically, and they've been able to do this globally without having to use their military. 00:10:36 SPEAKER_03 their position 00:10:40 GRANT NEWSHAM and they've been able to do this globally without having to use their military. 00:10:51 SPEAKER_02 Yeah, that's the idea. Is you don't want to. So our view of warfare is like a hundred -yard dash. Wherever the two sides come to the line, shake loose, and then someone fires a gun, and then someone fires a gun, and then it's game on. To the Chinese, the war has started long ago. And you're wearing down your opponent. You're weakening his ability to resist. You're creating chaos in his own country. There's a word called entropy. Which is just breaking down. Entropic warfare is a word that sometimes gets used. For you're breaking down his ability to resist. And at the same time, of course, the Chinese are building up a military, which is very serious. Yes, it's not showing up off of San Diego just yet. But places closer to China, it's much more of an issue. Japan knows the problem they have with the People's Liberation Army. Pacific Island, Southeast Asia. You are seeing more of a Chinese presence. And the point is, when the time comes, you may not even be able to resist if the Chinese have done this other sort of warfare. 00:10:53 JACK GAINES want to. So our view of warfare is like a hundred -yard dash. Wherever the two sides come to the line, shake loose, and then someone fires a gun, and then someone fires a gun, and then it's game on. To the Chinese, the war has started long ago. And you're wearing down your opponent. You're weakening his ability to resist. You're creating chaos in his own country. There's a word called entropy. Which is just breaking down. Entropic warfare is a word that 00:11:19 SPEAKER_03 sometimes gets used. For you're breaking down his ability to resist. And at the same time, of course, the Chinese are building up a military, which is very serious. 00:11:28 JACK GAINES Yes, it's not showing 00:11:33 JACK GAINES places closer to China, it's much more of an issue. Japan knows the problem they have with the People's Liberation Army. Pacific Island, Southeast Asia. You are seeing more 00:11:46 JACK GAINES Chinese presence. And the point is, when the time comes, you may not even be able to resist if the Chinese have 00:11:52 SPEAKER_03 this other 00:12:31 SPEAKER_02 That's exactly what it is. It's mental warfare. You're attacking the mind. You're attacking how people think about things. Some people use the word cognitive warfare. You're the popular word. Yeah, you're attacking the mind. And so you can see how well it worked. And the Russians had a much poorer hand to play than the Chinese do. Because we do so much business with China. And you see how hard it is to do things like ban TikTok. We can't even get that done. 00:12:33 JACK GAINES mental warfare. You're attacking the mind. You're attacking how people think about things. Some people use the 00:12:42 JACK GAINES You're the popular word. Yeah, you're attacking the mind. And so you can see how well it worked. And the Russians had a much poorer hand to play than 00:12:50 GRANT NEWSHAM the Chinese do. Because we do so much business with China. And you see how hard it is to do things like ban TikTok. We can't even get that done. 00:12:59 SPEAKER_02 We can't even get that done. 00:13:03 SPEAKER_02 Look, 72 hours, if that for the Indians do, we can do it. And you see how Chinese successfully use what they call lawfare, which is using our own legal system. And the idea is that you get proxies, influential foreigners in your target country to actually do your bidding for you. The Chinese have like five aces to play. The Russians might have won, but you can see how successful the Russians have been just with that. 00:13:04 JACK GAINES for the Indians do, we can do it. And you see how Chinese successfully use what they call lawfare, which 00:13:13 JACK GAINES the idea is that you get proxies, influential foreigners in your target country to actually do your bidding for you. The Chinese have like five aces to play. The Russians might have won, but you can see how successful the Russians have 00:13:41 SPEAKER_02 Uh -huh. Uh -huh. 00:13:46 SPEAKER_02 Well, you're right about the Russians, but the Chinese understand that the term gray zone paralyzes Americans. We have no idea what to do because of our view of warfare being until the shooting starts. That it is we're not really at war. There's still hope of working something out. 00:13:51 GRANT NEWSHAM paralyzes Americans. We have no idea what to do because of our view of warfare being until the shooting starts. That it is we're not really at war. There's still hope of working 00:14:03 SPEAKER_03 something out. 00:14:05 SPEAKER_02 That has been our rote response for all these years, is to not get the Chinese mad, don't provoke them, and we have convinced ourselves that we have to have Chinese help with fill -in -the -blank, North Korea transnational crime, nuclear weapons proliferation, climate change, and therefore we cannot challenge the PRC because we won't get their cooperation. That's what we've effectively handcuffed ourselves, but when it comes to that so -called hybrid warfare, it's not all that It's not all that complicated if you recognize what it is and how it fits into China's behavior, its strategy. But you also would do well to attract from other directions where they're particularly vulnerable. And that is where you take advantage of the fact, for example, the Chinese currency is not freely convertible, which means that outside of China, nobody really wants Chinese money. It's like the script at a... It's like the script where you can use it to buy caramel corn and go on the rides. 00:14:05 SPEAKER_03 has been our rote response for all these years, is to not get the Chinese mad, don't provoke them, and we have convinced ourselves that 00:14:14 JACK GAINES have Chinese help with fill -in -the -blank, North Korea transnational crime, nuclear weapons 00:14:22 JACK GAINES climate change, and therefore we cannot challenge the PRC because we won't get their cooperation. That's what we've effectively handcuffed ourselves, but when it comes to that so -called hybrid warfare, it's not all that It's not all that complicated if you recognize what it is and how it fits into 00:14:42 JACK GAINES its strategy. But you also would do well to attract from other directions where they're particularly vulnerable. And that is where you take advantage of the fact, for example, the Chinese currency is not freely convertible, which means that outside of China, nobody really wants Chinese money. It's like the script at a... It's like the script where you can use it to buy caramel corn and 00:15:06 SPEAKER_02 That's it. Nobody wants it. So choke that off and China's got some real problems. Another is the just thoroughgoing corruption of China's ruling class. And most of them have wealth overseas, foreign bank accounts. foreign bank accounts, relatives with green cards, relatives with green cards, some operate businesses overseas. And this is illegal. And this is illegal. 00:15:08 JACK GAINES it. So choke that off and China's got some real problems. Another is the just thoroughgoing corruption of China's ruling class. And most 00:15:19 GRANT NEWSHAM overseas, foreign bank accounts. foreign bank accounts, relatives with green cards, relatives with green cards, some operate businesses overseas. And this 00:15:31 SPEAKER_02 And this is where that really scares them. Because in 2011 or 2012, New York Times and Bloomberg actually put out some good stories about the overseas wealth of China's top people, including Xi Jinping's family. I've never seen a reaction from the Chinese like that one. This bothered them. 00:15:33 JACK GAINES scares them. Because in 2011 or 2012, New 00:15:37 SPEAKER_03 York Times and Bloomberg actually put out some good stories about the overseas wealth of China's top people, including Xi Jinping's family. 00:15:46 GRANT NEWSHAM I've never seen a reaction from the Chinese like that one. 00:15:53 SPEAKER_02 More than anything else we've ever done. That's... 00:15:53 GRANT NEWSHAM than anything 00:16:14 SPEAKER_02 One way to do it. Another way to do it. That would be a tactical thing. Say you were to release, say, every Friday. Say at 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 00:16:16 JACK GAINES way to do it. That would be a tactical thing. Say you were to 00:16:19 SPEAKER_03 release, say, every Friday. Say at 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 00:16:25 SPEAKER_02 Which of the top 50 Chinese Communist Party officials? And make sure it reached everywhere in China. The thing that the public really hates is this corruption. And by the top dogs. And that is something that really bothers them. And you note that the Chinese leadership is very willing to have the average Chinese citizen absorb any amount of punishment. And they even talk about it. 00:16:27 SPEAKER_03 Chinese Communist Party officials? And make sure it 00:16:29 GRANT NEWSHAM reached everywhere in China. The thing that the public really hates is this corruption. And by the top dogs. 00:16:38 JACK GAINES is something that really bothers them. And you note that the Chinese leadership is very willing to have the average Chinese citizen 00:16:49 JACK GAINES they even talk about it. 00:16:51 SPEAKER_02 But when it's personal, then they see it very differently. And this is one of the few ways to really make it personal for them is to capitalize on this corruption. So when we talk about... Dealing with Gray's own operations, we're probably not going to be all that successful. Because they have more ships, they can be in more places. 00:16:51 JACK GAINES when it's personal, then they see it very differently. And this is one of the few ways to really make it personal for them is to capitalize on this corruption. So when we talk about... Dealing with Gray's own operations, we're probably not going to be all that successful. Because they have more ships, they can be in more places. 00:17:14 SPEAKER_02 But expose that. They can do that. Have we made a concerted effort to expose Chinese bribery, the illicit payments, the corruption that they put into everywhere they go? Everywhere there's a Chinese presence, you have corruption of the society, the political class as well. And do we ever target that? Do we consider it a priority effort? I don't even think we consider it an effort at all. Exposure is the one thing that has a huge effect. This is why investigative journalists get big. It's why like Irish. gangsters try to murder them in Malta they get blown up because they're effective because they're effective which is the thing that makes it very hard for corruption to work and that's where I think 00:17:15 JACK GAINES can do that. Have we made a concerted effort to expose Chinese bribery, the illicit payments, the corruption that they put into everywhere they go? Everywhere there's a Chinese presence, you have corruption of the society, the political class as well. And do we ever target that? Do we consider it a priority effort? I don't even think we consider it an effort at all. Exposure is the one thing that has a huge effect. This is why investigative journalists 00:17:44 SPEAKER_03 get big. It's why like Irish. gangsters try to murder them in Malta they get blown up because they're effective because they're effective which 00:17:52 SPEAKER_02 is the thing that makes it very hard for corruption to work and that's where I think We have some real opportunities to make it very clear what's being done. And this is something that, if you expose it, you can really capitalize on it. Just make it too hard to do this. And it also gives oxygen to the honest people in a country. It gives them something to work with. It gives them something to work with. To take on these repressive regimes, these corrupt regimes, these corrupt regimes, administrations. And get rid of them and replace them with honest people. I've never met anywhere, anywhere I've been. Over the years. Where people like to be cheaters. Where people like to be cheaters. Where they like their leaders to be corrupt. I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. It's just nothing you can do. But it's just nothing you can do. It really has an effect. And that's where I think government for sources could be effectively devoted. And particularly once you get local reporters in on it. Once you get the local. Honest locals in on it. Honest locals in on it. And that's where I think we could be very effective. Corruption, as you've mentioned, that really is the grease to everything the Chinese communists do globally. Take it away and then take away their access to dollars, convertible currency. And they've really got some problems. But they have played their hand very well today. But in some ways it's a house of cards. I don't think it's that hard to take on. But the longer you wait, the harder it gets. 00:17:52 SPEAKER_03 is the thing that makes it 00:17:54 JACK GAINES corruption to work and that's where I think We have some real opportunities to make it very clear what's being done. And this is something that, if you expose it, you can really capitalize on it. Just make it too hard to do this. And it also gives oxygen to the honest people in a country. It 00:18:16 JACK GAINES to work with. To take on these repressive regimes, these corrupt regimes, these corrupt regimes, 00:18:23 JACK GAINES them with honest people. I've never met anywhere, anywhere I've been. Over the years. Where 00:18:32 JACK GAINES I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. It's just nothing you can do. But it's just nothing you can do. It really has an effect. And that's where I think government for sources could be effectively devoted. And particularly once you 00:18:46 GRANT NEWSHAM reporters in on it. Once you get the local. Honest locals in on it. Honest locals in on it. And that's where I think we could be very effective. 00:18:56 JACK GAINES Corruption, as you've mentioned, that really is the grease to everything the Chinese communists do globally. Take it away and then take away their access to dollars, convertible currency. And they've really got some 00:19:12 JACK GAINES today. But in some ways it's a house of cards. I don't think it's that hard to take on. But the longer you wait, the harder it 00:19:28 SPEAKER_02 In regards to U .S. policy, in policy, there really is a... a desire that the United States stays around in Asia, that maintains its military might, and is able to effectively safeguard what you call freedom consensual government. Because if you go around the region, nobody wants to be dominated by the PRC. But they do have a huge advantage, particularly economically, that they're seen by leaders and business people in a lot of these countries. That's really the source of... some wealth, some prosperity. And we would do well, for example, to see the fight as just as much an economic one as a military one. Because we could build up our military, rebuild it, and we could have 800 ships in the Navy, and still lose. If we don't fight on these other fronts, we don't want you here because we're doing too much business with China. And that's where the U .S., along with its friends, the Japanese, the Koreans, the Indians, the Australians, we would do well to operate together more and to see the economic front and the political warfare fronts as a priority effort as much, if not more, than the military. 00:19:30 SPEAKER_03 in policy, there 00:19:31 JACK GAINES really is a... a desire that the United States stays around in Asia, that maintains its military might, and is able to 00:19:45 JACK GAINES Because if you go around the region, nobody wants to be dominated by the PRC. But they do have a huge advantage, particularly economically, that they're seen by leaders and business people in a lot of these countries. That's really the source of... some wealth, some prosperity. And we would do well, for example, to see the fight as just as much an economic 00:20:09 GRANT NEWSHAM one as a military one. Because we could build up our military, rebuild it, and we could have 800 ships in the Navy, and still lose. If we don't 00:20:19 JACK GAINES on these other fronts, we don't want you here because we're doing too much business with China. And that's where the U .S., along with its friends, the Japanese, the Koreans, the Indians, the Australians, 00:20:30 GRANT NEWSHAM we would do well to operate together more and to see the economic front and the political warfare fronts as a priority effort as much, if not 00:20:40 JACK GAINES more, than the 00:20:45 SPEAKER_02 They have a role to play if they're properly harnessed. But you do know that these days you don't see the Yankee trader that used to exist. You'd run to Americans everywhere trying to sell something to do business. Not so much these days. And we've almost ceded the far -flung part to the world. Because, well, the return on investment isn't enough. That's not an attractive enough proposition. Well, then let's make it one. Plus, you do have, say, the Japanese, the Indians, who are much better at operating in these places, to put it together into a coherent plan. Understand what it is, political warfare, and not just block the Chinese political warfare effort, but actually have our own campaign. And it really is worth doing some homework, I think, for a lot of people into what political warfare is. One sees the opportunities, but it takes a certain type of person who's good at it. versus a civil affairs guy. Versus a civil affairs guy. He's going to see different... He's going to see parts of the battlefield in a different way. Yes, sometimes you want the tank. But then there's this other part of it all. That is almost like a liberal arts test. Here you have to figure out the motivations for things. You have to figure out how a society works. And then how do you appeal to it using the things that are parts of political warfare? And this is where you can really make some mileage. You've got to have both. Make no mistake. If you're not able to destroy things and kill people, the civil affairs part isn't going to get you very far. But combine the two, and then you've really got something that's very hard to take on if you're the bad guys. We talk about defending Taiwan, and how important it is, and it is, I think, indispensable, that China does not take Taiwan and enslave 23 million people. If they did that... 00:20:47 JACK GAINES they're properly harnessed. But you do know that these days you don't see the Yankee trader that used to exist. You'd run to Americans everywhere trying to sell something to do business. Not 00:20:59 SPEAKER_03 so much these days. And we've almost ceded the far -flung part to the world. Because, well, the return on investment isn't enough. That's not an attractive enough proposition. Well, then let's 00:21:10 GRANT NEWSHAM make it one. Plus, you do have, say, the Japanese, the Indians, who are much better at operating in these places, to put it together into a coherent plan. Understand what it 00:21:20 JACK GAINES is, political warfare, and not just block the Chinese political warfare effort, but actually have our own campaign. And it really is worth doing some homework, I think, for a lot of people into what political warfare is. One sees the opportunities, but it takes a certain type of person who's good at it. versus a civil affairs guy. Versus a civil affairs guy. He's going to see different... He's going to see parts of the battlefield in a different way. 00:21:50 SPEAKER_03 Yes, sometimes you want the tank. But then there's this other part of it all. That is almost like a liberal arts test. Here you have to figure 00:22:00 JACK GAINES for things. You have to figure out how a society works. And then how do you appeal to it using the things that are parts of political warfare? 00:22:10 JACK GAINES make some mileage. You've got to have both. Make no mistake. If you're not able to destroy things and kill people, the civil affairs part isn't going to get you very far. But combine the two, and then you've really got something that's very hard to take on if you're the bad guys. We talk about defending Taiwan, and how important it is, and it is, I think, indispensable, 00:22:32 GRANT NEWSHAM that China does not take Taiwan and enslave 23 million people. If they did that... 00:22:39 SPEAKER_02 Asia would turn red overnight, as every country tried to cut the best deal they could. No country anywhere on Earth would have much confidence in American promises that will protect them. But one of the ways to actually defend Taiwan is, yes, they could maybe use F -35s and long -range missiles and smart pines, etc. You do have to have all of this stuff. Is it enough, 00:22:39 GRANT NEWSHAM would turn red overnight, as every country tried 00:22:42 SPEAKER_03 to cut the best deal they could. No country anywhere 00:22:46 JACK GAINES on Earth would have much confidence in American promises that will protect them. But one of the ways to actually defend 00:22:51 GRANT NEWSHAM Taiwan is, yes, they could maybe use F -35s and long -range missiles and smart pines, etc. You do have to have all of this stuff. Is it enough, even? Particularly if the other side says, okay, we'll absorb whatever you can send at us, but you're finished. But one of the ways that... But one of the ways is to give them a free trade agreement to improve their economy to the point that the government felt like it had money to spend on defense. 00:23:02 SPEAKER_02 Particularly if the other side says, okay, we'll absorb whatever you can send at us, but you're finished. But one of the ways that... But one of the ways is to give them a free trade agreement to improve their economy to the point that the government felt like it had money to spend on defense. You get a certain confidence in the entire society when they're more prosperous. Salaries are very low in Taiwan. Make it so people feel like they've got more money. Can they can buy a house? Can they can buy a condominium? build up the economy and that has a ripple effect throughout the society and on their military itself. And yet we didn't do that. And I think that's where we should apply some effort. 00:23:11 JACK GAINES give them a free trade agreement to 00:23:16 JACK GAINES point that the government felt like it had money to spend on defense. You get a certain confidence in the entire society when they're more prosperous. Salaries are very low in Taiwan. Make it so people feel like they've got more money. Can they can buy a house? Can they can buy a condominium? 00:23:35 JACK GAINES the economy and that has a ripple effect throughout the society and on their military itself. And yet we didn't do that. And I think that's where we should apply some 00:24:25 SPEAKER_02 I think you're right. And it's essential that we start to understand. You look at much of the debate about us in China. What happens when the two forces go at each other? And that's almost like... Going up behind the Waffle House. Going up behind the Waffle House. To see who's the toughest guy in Prince William County. To see who's the toughest guy in Prince William County. Out back. But think of all the things that go into whether or not the two hoodlums. There's all sorts of reasons why. No, there may not. 00:24:27 JACK GAINES essential that we start to understand. 00:24:32 JACK GAINES us in China. 00:24:33 SPEAKER_03 What happens when the two forces go at each other? And that's almost like... Going up behind the Waffle House. Going up behind the Waffle 00:24:43 JACK GAINES House. To see who's the toughest guy in Prince William County. To see 00:24:52 JACK GAINES whether or not the two hoodlums. 00:24:56 JACK GAINES of reasons why. No, there may not. 00:24:59 SPEAKER_02 Or that will affect the outcome, actually. None of them have to do with force on force. And that's so much of our debate on the US -China military problem. Is that a problem? Would our Navy take on theirs? Is there long -range missiles outrange ours? Yes, it's important. Make no mistake. Yes, it's important. Make no mistake. It's only one part of the battle. It's only one part of the battle. And it's the last part. 00:25:02 JACK GAINES of them have to do with force on force. And that's so much of our debate on the US -China military problem. Is that a problem? Would our Navy take on theirs? Is there long -range missiles outrange ours? Yes, it's important. Make no mistake. Yes, it's 00:25:21 JACK GAINES of the battle. And it's the last part. 00:25:22 SPEAKER_02 And if you look at the other part, it's a political warfare. And every part of that, then you have the chance, one, not to lose. You can actually shape things to your advantage. But if you don't, and the other guy is the only one playing that, well, you're likely to find yourself at 2 a .m. outside the Waffle House, and he's actually ready. We talk about bases. 00:25:22 JACK GAINES if you look at the other part, it's a political warfare. And every part of that, then you have the chance, one, not to lose. You can actually shape things to your advantage. But if you don't, and the other guy is the only one playing that, well, you're likely to find yourself at 2 a .m. outside the Waffle House, and he's actually ready. We talk about bases. 00:25:45 SPEAKER_02 We talk about bases. Well, what if we don't have the access because Chinese political warfare has made us so the locals won't let us into a place? They won't let us operate. 00:25:45 JACK GAINES talk about bases. Well, what if we don't have the access because Chinese political warfare has made us so the locals won't let us into a place? 00:25:53 GRANT NEWSHAM They won't let us operate. 00:25:55 SPEAKER_02 They won't let us operate. Oh, that's a pretty good example. Is that a pretty good example? One hoodlum can't get a ride to the awful house, but the other one can. So we've really got to start thinking about these things from a much broader perspective. And it's unfortunate that we're reinventing the wheel here. But the game's not over. It may be the bottom of the 7th and we're down by 6th. We're the old Washington Senators. We're the old Washington Senators. and debate how far we're behind. At the end of the day, we've got a good hand to play. I hope we start playing it. 00:25:58 JACK GAINES Is that a pretty good example? One hoodlum can't get a ride to the awful house, but the other 00:26:08 JACK GAINES thinking about these things from a much 00:26:15 JACK GAINES the wheel here. 00:26:18 JACK GAINES It may be the bottom of the 7th and we're down by 6th. We're the old Washington Senators. We're the old Washington Senators. and debate how far we're behind. At the end of the day, we've got a good hand to play. I hope we start playing it. 00:26:35 SPEAKER_02 Glad to be here. Thank you. Glad to be here. Thank you. 00:26:40 JACK GAINES Thanks for listening. If you get a chance, please like and subscribe and rate the show on your favorite podcast platform. Also, if you're interested in coming on the show or hosting an episode, email us at capodcasting at gmail .com. I'll have the email and CA Association website in the show notes. And now, most importantly, to those currently out in the field, working with a partner nation's people or leadership to forward U .S. relations, thank you all for what you're doing. This is Jack, your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes. One CA Podcast.

Today, we welcome Sam Cooper, an author and journalist based in Ottawa. He came in to talk about his reporting on PRC political and economic warfare, its impact on Canada and the United States, and how those tools are being used worldwide, including Taiwan, to undermine the rule of law and each nation's sovereignty. This episode goes fast and has a lot of great information on how China sets conditions for winning without fighting.  The One CA Podcast is here to inspire anyone interested in working in US foreign relations. - Often  called the last three feet of diplomacy. We bring in practitioners from all walks of foreign service including the military, diplomacy, nongovernmental, development, and field agents to talk about their experiences and work.  To contact the show, email us at CApodcasting@gmail (dot) com or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org Special Thanks to Cafe Music BGM channel and their release, "Hip Hop Jazz & Smooth Jazz Instrumental." Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O5yTtDZZiHg ----Transcript---- Transcript: 00:00:00    JACK GAINES Today, we welcome Sam Cooper, author and journalist based out of Ottawa. He came in to talk about his reporting on PRC political and economic warfare and its impact on Canada and the United States and how those tools are being used around the world, including Taiwan, to undermine the rule of law and each nation's sovereignty. This episode goes fast and has a lot of great information on how China sets conditions for winning without fighting. So, let's get started. 00:00:27    SAM COOPER In the course of reporting, I discovered the compound of Tiger Yuan, an individual that was directly investigated in this Chinese underground banking story, had the most weapons in Western Canada, if not across Canada, for a citizen. And so, when my sources said this person is or was PLA, this person has connectivity to the highest levels of organized crime. And this person is very politically connected, and their activity outside of organized crime appears to be directing Chinese state -friendly people what to do in Western Canada. That's when I really started to dig into and understand the Chinese interference story, starting on the West Coast and then moving across. Literally, I started reporting from Ottawa. That's when I got into the political side of it. 00:01:20    JACK GAINES So how many weapons are you talking about? And are you talking about small arms, large arms, tactical, technicals? What was it that you were able to find? 00:01:29    SAM COOPER I'll start with the big picture. I was directed to a compound in Chilliwack, British Columbia. This is very near the United States -Washington state border. It's just outside of Vancouver, and it was a compound of tremendous luxury. In an underground massive parking lot, there were about 80 luxury vehicles. that indicated huge-scale money laundering. There were American military jeeps and vintage machine guns. There was a fire truck. There was a diesel-type rig. There's Ferraris. And so, I was told that this person has vaults of restricted firearms. So, we're talking tactical weapons that you hold against your shoulder and extend your arm out as far as it can. 00:02:16    JACK GAINES Yeah, long guns. 00:02:17    SAM COOPER Right. Long guns. These are military-style weapons. I can't say they're AK -47s or Noriko. He didn't let you in there to mark all the numbers and he didn't give you the inventory sheets. 00:02:24    JACK GAINES let you in there to mark all the numbers and he didn't give you the inventory sheets. 00:02:29    SAM COOPER He didn't give me the inventory sheets, but Canada has to keep a log of the weapons out there as best as it can. And in an open-source photo, you've got a gangster sort of standing downstairs beside a luxury car with a, I believe it was sort of a burp gun. And then in the back corner, you could see an open door with just a room stacked with weapons. You could literally see a vintage machine gun, one of those ones that would have a sort of stand so you can shoot out of a trench, maybe back in the 50s or 60s. And my sources said, we know that this person has the largest cache of restricted and unrestricted weapons in Western Canada. As I wrote in Willful Blindness, this is... Chapo Guzman -style wealth in a Canadian property, and it makes no sense. 00:03:19    JACK GAINES Well, it sounds like this person is a hub for gun running and money and probably drugs. Because if he's got storehouses for weapons, that means he can rotate them out for criminal groups that are moving through the area so that no one really gets tied to a weapon if there's ever a crime committed. But it also sounds like they've got connections 00:03:47    SAM COOPER Yeah. Well, I would say you nailed everything in your question. And to unpack that, on the organized crime side, the information is this person is literally a revered hero from the People's Liberation Army. It's not that China did well in their border assault on Vietnam. They did pretty badly. But this person, Tiger Yuan, is glorified in various Chinese language documents. military veteran, is assessed by Canadian federal police to be in charge of gangs. He would be a person that is handling Chinese mafia in Canada and giving them directions to meet some of the Chinese Communist Party's political objectives. 00:04:30    JACK GAINES So, he's a kingpin. 00:04:31    SAM COOPER He's a kingpin, an intelligence handler involved in organized crime at the highest level and also with the capacity to direct these high -level triads. I think we're talking about what's known as the company. This is elite China -based triads that are active running weapons and drugs sentinel around the world and yet have connections at the highest level to military and intelligence and political figures for the parties. So yes, the type of person involved in trade -based money laundering, the ability to send weapons in and out of Canada, the ability to collect weapons from... Chinese visitors who happen to buy guns in Canada and then want to get rid of them. As you said, this military veteran can be a node to move them. I'm told through police sources; this person is suspected to be involved in the Chinese police station activity. So, as you know, that would include what was exposed by the FBI in New York, where we have purported community associations that are actually running these illegal... 00:05:38    JACK GAINES Community police stations in other countries. 00:05:41    SAM COOPER Exactly. And these would be used to harass dissidents, to go after Xi Jinping's so -called fox hunt targets. So, Tiger Yuan would be central to that. He would be central to meeting with Chinese language journalists. And I'm told giving them directions or coaching on the type of reporting they should be doing. He would be central to types of... fundraising activities that could blend legitimate business with illegitimate business and have those monies go into Canada's political system. Well, 00:06:17    JACK GAINES after reading your book, Willful Blindness, one thing came to me, and that is that it looks like China has successfully mixed profiteering and foreign policy so that they can successfully tie the profits from narcotics to influence and persuasion in countries to achieve their foreign policy goals. I had John Cassara on recently, and he talked about that China has probably half of the global illicit trade profit coming into it. And when people measure China, they measure its GDP. They don't measure that black economy. Because most of it goes right back out into the world to fund these illicit criminal groups that are also complicit with the PRC and the money that goes to the pockets of people willing to take the influence dollars to do what PRC wants. But it was really your book that opened that perspective. And it sounds like what you're seeing is the tuning of that process. and how they're really bringing it to bear to see how far they can go and being successful in moving a country's orbit into the PRC influence space. 00:07:37    SAM COOPER Yeah, I agree with everything you said there, and thank you for saying that. I do think my book had a little bit of a cognitive advance in showing people that when we're speaking about the mercantilism of the People's Republic of China and the trade mixed into that, by design, I believe, is trade -based money laundering in which, of course, there are some honest tycoons or almost as honest as you can be within China's system. But there are many that have both legitimate and underground casino facilitation, capital flake facilitation, direct narcotics trafficking, weapons. But China doesn't look at those people as the government should have a distance from them. China sees those people as ones that have connections abroad, ones that have great influence in diaspora communities. And business persons that are involved in organized crime in Beijing's playbook should be used to influence politicians that are looking for votes in the diaspora. 00:08:43    JACK GAINES Do you think that Xi Jinping and the PRC allow a certain amount of wealth and influence or affluence? in these people that are expats around the world in exchange for conducting these types of operations? 00:09:00    SAM COOPER Yes, I think there's a lot going on, and I'm always trying to clarify my understanding, but some have coined the term strategic corruption. This is what we saw in Ukraine for years before Putin made his move. We saw the oligarchs and the tycoons, people like Semyon Mogilev ich, had great control over the Ukrainian resource industries. A person named Boris Berstein, who settled in Toronto, was a major underground banker and money launderer with connectivity to the KGB. So, we've seen this playbook in Ukraine, having people with gang connections or direct intelligence connections corrupt foreign governments and try to pave the way. And I think China is doing a bigger and even more sophisticated variation on that now, where they want people that are, as I've reported in Canada, we have major real estate developers, major portions of Vancouver and Toronto are in fact Chinese or Hong Kong money. And these big real estate developers, there's no question that Beijing has relationships with them, that they will be protected in their illegitimate business activities if they deliver objectives. to Beijing. And there's so much more going on, but yes, in a nutshell, Beijing offers protection to the highest-level criminals in the world if they will deliver political objectives wherever they are. 00:10:27    JACK GAINES Are you seeing a cohesion of operations between them? How closely tied are they to Beijing? Or is it decentralized to where they say, look, if you build influence and you just let us know who you have contacts with, we'll let you know if we need you. Is it more of a mafia style relationship? How closely tied are they? 00:10:46    SAM COOPER Well, that is the trillion -dollar question. I mean, I'm always trying to get my understanding. And I'm sure they don't just show you. 00:10:52    JACK GAINES I'm sure they don't just show you. Here, here's our relationship map now. I mean, I spent a lot of time thinking about it. 00:10:55    SAM COOPER here's our relationship map now. I mean, I spent a lot of time thinking about it. And as best as I can understand, and I'm always talking to experts to understand more. Sure. But it's not as hierarchical and rigid. I've been told that it is the most fluid. entrepreneurial system you can imagine. There's all types of competition. We have something called Guanxi, which is this very deep sort of transactional cultural relationships between people at high levels in China's system. And we have interrelationships of gangs, interrelationships of intelligence agencies. We have competition among both of those forces. 00:11:40    SAM COOPER To boil it down, I don't think Xi Jinping is able to say, OK, mafia leader A, you're going to go to Canada, specifically Toronto, and achieve this. It's more that we have what you know is the united front system. That is, all these community groups at the end of the day have been co -opted by officials in consulates around the world so that the community groups are controlled directly by Chinese intelligence officials in embassies and consulates. And they have various levels of tasking to these community groups, who I am saying are almost exclusively involved, high -level tycoon type gang associates. And then within these United Front networks, you have intelligence handlers of the type to circle back to this BC case of this PLA veteran, Tiger Yuan, who is able to be like an area manager of legitimate and illegitimate. business activity in various regions. In my understanding, we have some bosses in Toronto, Ontario, for the Eastern Canada, who are this blend of an intelligence handler and a very high-level organized crime person. We have similar bosses in Western Canada. And I'm sure because I've read a corruption case involving a senator in San Francisco. We don't need to name the name, but this senator was allegedly involved in offshore arms trading, an FBI sting operation got him. He was involved in talking to the various families in that area. By families, I mean triads. And so, I have to believe in California, we have these very same type of PLA intelligence handlers that are into that fluid mix of gangsters, businesspersons, politicians. that one way or another, they'll get their guanxi from Beijing if they deliver objectives. Right. 00:13:40    JACK GAINES And then you have the community police there to track people down if they take their wealth and disappear, or if they're not producing, or if they don't feel like they're part of the fold. 00:13:51    SAM COOPER Yeah. The CCP police station really just made everything we're talking about in this fluid network much easier to understand because they had little bricks and mortar shops. Right. that the FBI and others have discovered have both gangsters and traveling CCP officials involved to look over the community. 00:14:11    JACK GAINES Right. Because you have to have an enforcer. If you're going to run a loose network of criminals, you have to have an enforcer of some type in case people get their own ideas or their own ambitions to get them back in line. 00:14:22    SAM COOPER That's absolutely true. I'll keep circling back to this person in the Vancouver area with the largest collections of personal weapons. You're a fan. 00:14:30    JACK GAINES You're a fan. You want to go check out that fire trick. I mean, I know I do. I don't think either of us will be invited in the near future. 00:14:35    SAM COOPER don't think either of us will be invited in the near future. But look, who's the person that's going to be able to keep gangsters in line, keep politicians in line? Right. It's a person with a lot of guns and a lot of respect. Someone that's revered by the diaspora. 00:14:49    JACK GAINES A lot of money. A lot of money. 00:14:50    SAM COOPER lot of money. and a lot of money that they're happy to donate to Beijing's operations because they will have, in turn, the protection to run their operations. 00:15:00    JACK GAINES Sure. So, it's a cooperative. 00:15:02    SAM COOPER It's a cooperative. With a line with teeth. 00:15:03    JACK GAINES With a line with teeth. Okay. And then you were able to go to Taiwan. Was that to talk with Taiwanese officials about what's going on in Canada? Was it to do strategy on their upcoming elections? What were you doing that you can talk about? 00:15:19    SAM COOPER I can say that just as I launched my new journalism platform, I got the invitation from - You got to plug the platform, 00:15:25    JACK GAINES got to plug the platform, start over. 00:15:27    SAM COOPER Yeah. Okay. So yeah, I mean, what I can say is, as soon as I launched the Bureau, my new independent journalism platform - Beautiful. 00:15:36    JACK GAINES Beautiful. 00:15:36    SAM COOPER Beautiful. Right? So that I can report with the depth that I did in my book. I can do this in Canadian media. I was invited by the officials in Taiwan to travel to Taipei in September. And I think their interest was they had understood that I had a good grasp on China's political warfare and election interference in Canada. And I had talked to the officials in Ottawa from Taiwan and they said, there's a lot to report on. We want to have good relationships with international journalists so they can tell the story that Taiwan is an important democracy that really should be understood and valued by the rest of the democratic world. that's under deep threat right now, as you know, Jack, from the People's Liberation Army and all sorts of political warfare. So, I was invited to travel with 17 international journalists, and we had deep and great access to Taiwanese officials, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Mainland Affairs Council, which is essentially, I judge, an intelligence agency. It's the only one that can deal with Beijing because, as you know, Beijing will not talk to Taiwan government to government. They see it as a renegade province. I did four reports from Taiwan, and my focus was, of course, I'm exposing China's activities in Canada, but I'm always looking for corroboration and context and understanding. So, I was asking the Mainland Affairs Council officials. I'm seeing, for example, Fujian organized crime figures running CCP police stations in Sharon and Vancouver. I'm seeing them involved in election interference transfers. Can you tell me about similar activities? And it was very refreshing for me to get a direct answer from an official. He told me, I'm going to break news for you about this new scheme we've discovered. China is using underground gambling networks. in Taiwan, in efforts to influence our upcoming election, they are trying to... And you threw your arms up and said, that's what I said! 00:17:46    JACK GAINES And you threw your arms up and said, that's what I said! 00:17:49    SAM COOPER Well, I said, thank you for confirming from a high -level official of another country what I'm seeing. That is, China is using people that are running underground casinos in Canada to interfere in our elections in very complex ways. And in Taiwan, you're telling me that there's underground betting markets on elections and they try to skew the gambling odds so that this feeds into the actual election day result. 00:17:54    JACK GAINES of another country what 00:18:13    SAM COOPER that this feeds into the actual election day result. 00:18:16    JACK GAINES Right. 00:18:16    SAM COOPER And they told me officials from Beijing are not only working with these organized crime gambling networks, but they're directing them in election interference. So, yes, I think that was a great little story for me to break. I'm not looking for confirmation bias. I'm looking for corroboration, but I got it there. But it's nice to get a little confirmation bias once in a while. 00:18:33    JACK GAINES But it's nice to get a little confirmation bias once in a while. Yeah, it is. Everyone likes a bone. 00:18:35    SAM COOPER Yeah, it is. Everyone 00:18:38    SAM COOPER They threw me a bone, Jack. 00:18:40    JACK GAINES Well, it's interesting because, as you know, the U.S. has a base in South Korea, and the Chinese know about it, and they didn't open their own base in Korea. They opened a casino right in the same area. And I was just like, man, how typical. Yeah. Because that way they're making money and they're able to do espionage at the same time instead of costing the Beijing government a dime. They're actually profitable as they conduct foreign policy and influence in the area. I have to admit, I think it's smart, but it's also the end result that they come out with is not a good society. Because if... Their free trade zones were successful and they started building casinos and pretty soon there's an illegal industry that's so powerful that it's swaying the government to its will. What ends up happening is you get this totalitarian financial government that really leaves out all of the public citizens and just runs things the way PRC wants. And it just doesn't handle well. Does that make sense? I see that as the problem with the PRC's model. 00:19:56    SAM COOPER Yeah, no, I mean, that really resonates with me. I mean, first of all, you're exactly right. It is devilishly clever to use a casino that pays for itself, and they can use that for their gathering. But as you say, it's amoral, right? So, I really do believe that governments are a reflection of the people and the parties that the people elect. To get a little philosophical here, I mean, I think the Chinese Communist Party totally cut corners trying to catch up. And they are just in a moral operation. As I've reported, they leveraged these Hong Kong tycoons and said, look, you teach us how to do capitalism and we'll let you do your organized crime business and we'll profit together. But when you get in bed with the devil, there are other people around the world that don't like it. Right. And so, I think my struggle in Canada is. Maybe I've been a little bit at the tip of the spear. Maybe it's because the upbringing, my father went over to a school in Switzerland and was supposed to be a big businessman and diplomat. And he tossed that aside and became a Christian minister instead. And maybe he hammered it into me that there's good money and there is bad money. I really do believe that. And Beijing, in their mercantilism, they'll use any dirty type of business to try to... overcome governments in the Marshall Islands or what they're doing in Africa. And in Canada, it's my own view that for too long, our elites have turned a blind eye, or as I wrote, they've been willfully blinded to the downside of this Chinese mercantilism. And I do believe that when you see cities start to be overrun with tent encampments because of opioid addiction and fentanyl, you're now directly seeing the price that's paid for that trade -based money laundering. And as I've written, people that work honest jobs being pushed out of the center of cities in Canada because without any exaggeration, illicit flows from China have become material to prices of real estate in Vancouver and Toronto in the same way that the Latin cartels might have influenced real estate in Miami. You just don't win in the long run when organized crime starts to take a big chunk of your economy and they're working for a foreign government. 00:22:10    JACK GAINES So where do you see Canada going? 00:22:12    SAM COOPER It's hard for me to say where Canada will go because there's a Foreign Interference Commission coming up. It's actually going to start at the end of this month that will examine this election interference story that I broke with my former employer, Global News. and that I'm still writing on and still exposing every week for the Bureau. But I don't have a great degree of confidence, and many others don't, that the mandate of that commission is really set up to get to the bottom of the issue. I don't want to get into too much information here, but I've already done reports to the Bureau showing that a mandate only focusing on election interference at the federal election in the past two Canadian national elections. is literally only the tip of the iceberg of China's interference. And my stories through documents have proven that. So where does Canada go? Others that I've interviewed and quoted in my stories say, look, Canada, through no exaggeration, we're facing a saturation of China's influence and interference networks to the point where there's corruption. And Canada is in a position where we need to change some laws. We need more enforcement. for police so they can handle these organized crime networks. We don't have a RICO Act that is a racketeering act in Canada. We don't have a foreign agent registry, which, Jack, I'm sure you're aware, is the very key law that is used in every case so far in the Chinese police stations investigated by the Department of Justice in the United States. Canada lacks these laws, so I won't have any confidence that we're going to turn the corner until we have a government that... put some of these very basic modern laws against hostile state activity in place in Canada. 00:24:03    JACK GAINES Do you think that Canada is in danger of losing its 5i status because of the amount of influence? Or do you see still a core of law enforcement and military that's protecting civil society and protecting that intelligence cooperation? Or how deeply corrupt do you think the influence is? And do you think it is threatening Five Eyes? 00:24:28    SAM COOPER My very basic answer is yes. I think Canada's status in the Five Eyes has already unofficially been downgraded. As you know, Jack, Canada has been left out completely out of AUKUS. And I do believe that part of the reason Canada is not at the big boys' table of the Western alliance... is that we have lost trust. We can just point to examples like this RCMP corruption Cameron Ortis case. Canada's highest intelligence official for law enforcement leaked secrets to international Hezbollah networks. As I've reported, there's another angle to the case. Cameron Ortis have leaked signals intelligence to Beijing. And so that's just one case. But I think this political infiltration... story is an even bigger reason why Canada has lost trust within the five eyes. And I would like to have confidence that the bond of the sort of post -World War II alliance will continue just out of tradition. But practically speaking, I just think it's natural that if Canada keeps going in this direction of having deep interference in each and every federal election, that it would only make sense that Washington starts to leave. out of conversations. 00:25:48    JACK GAINES Or constricting certain accesses. 00:25:51    SAM COOPER Absolutely. It's only prudent that Washington should be starting to hold its cards closer to its chest. I know it's not very easy to say things like that diplomatically, but I just think these are the real conversations. 00:26:03    JACK GAINES Now, you also mentioned Hezbollah. And I remember in our last discussion, you mentioned that Hezbollah and I believe Iranian illicit networks are also had ties in Ottawa. Do you want to expand on that a little bit? And do you think that they're also collaborating with the PRC? 00:26:23    SAM COOPER What I know about Hezbollah really starts with my interest in the transnational money laundering story and how Canadian cities have just been overrun by Chinese networks. So, I started understanding that. And then I had conversations with people that were very involved in the DEA special operations. The DEA has a lot of intelligence around the world because they have access to these elite organized crime actors that have direct connectivity to Russia, Iran, Beijing. And so, through my sourcing, I understood that they were very at first surprised back in around 2008 to uncover that cartels in Colombia had direct relationships with Hezbollah actors. And then furthermore. Hezbollah, I was told, had agents in about five to six Canadian cities that were believed to have command and control of some global Hezbollah networks. And again, my U.S. sources said they went up to Ottawa and said, Canada, you've got a problem. Let's work together on this. We're working together with Australia. 00:27:40    SAM COOPER People running these transnational crime networks know that they can operate in Canada without getting wiretapped because our legal system just isn't set up that way. It's not very enforcement friendly. My sources in the States were just deeply shocked and confused that the RCMP couldn't cooperate with them and do taps on these Haskell operatives. So, I have followed the money laundering story. And as I was reporting on Cameron Ortis, I knew this was big, but... We started to hear more evidence come out that there were networks of Iran -connected currency traders in Toronto running literally billions of dollars through Canadian banks and offshore. One currency trader alone that's been named in an FBI case in California is also an organized crime that moved $3 .5 billion through Canadian banks for these Iranian Hezbollah slash organized crime drug money laundering global networks. Your question was, are they working with China? And my answer is I've seen open source that at some level, Iran and China are working together and they're wanting to see division between Canada and our allies on the Middle East issues. They're wanting to see Western ships blocked up by the Houthi rebels. Chinese ships can pass through there. So, yeah, I think China and Iran are working together. 00:29:09    JACK GAINES Been an easy interview. Is there anything else you want to add or plug? I mean, we've talked about your book. We've talked about your site. Is there anything else you want to discuss? 00:29:21    SAM COOPER Yeah, sure. I think a lot of people often ask me or say, Sam, at the Bureau or your previous work, you were at the cutting edge of reporting on some dangerous people in Canada. People often say, you know, does that get scary? Or do you or Canadian journalists? ever face threats. And Jack, just days after I testified in Ottawa about China's interference against Canadian politicians, Canadian intelligence had warned me as a journalist that Chinese operatives had been tasked in Canada to research my journalism and my networks and to look into my life. And a little bit ironically, maybe shockingly for me, a couple of days after my testimony, The RCMP warned me that they had a threat due to my reporting on the People's Republic of China. And Jack, it wasn't a comfortable experience, but what I want to tell you is I took some measures. I decided I'll find ways to cope for myself and those close to me. But what I'm reporting on must be pretty important if Canada's national security force is telling me that I'm angering China. I have to continue because I have more information. And I just think it's important for your listeners to know that. I'm a proud Canadian, but as I've said, we're at a point where some very deep and serious changes need to be made in this country so that we can get back to being a great Five Eyes partner.  

Welcome to the One CA Podcast. In this episode Assad Raza hosts Henrique Garbino, Joao Mauricio Dias Lopes Valdetaro, and Jonathan Robinson as they discuss their paper and the competing concepts around civil military planning and operations.    You can find "Civil Military What?" online at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/378267976_Civil-military_what_Making_sense_of_conflicting_civil-military_concepts   Special thanks for Nakaboncajon for posting pandeiro // bossa nova. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=npixMWE0QWk --- 00:00:06    Introduction Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at capodcasting at gmail .com. Or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www .civilaffairsassos .org. I'll have those in the show notes. Also, today's guests would like to state that the comments in their interview are their opinions and represent themselves and no other organization. So let's get started. 00:00:52    ASSAD RAZA Welcome to the 1CA podcast. I'm your host, Asad Raza. And today our guests are Henrique Gabino, Jonathan Robinson, and Jao Valdeterro. The authors of Civil Military What? Making Sense of Conflicting Civil Military Concepts. First, I really love your title. As a former civil affairs guy and working with the United Nations in the past, it really demonstrates the different perspectives that we have about civil military operations globally based off of these different lexicons that are out there. So before we start, can you quickly introduce yourselves with a little bit of background for our listeners? 00:01:29    ENRIQUE GARBINO Yes, I can start, I guess. So Enrique Garbino and thank you for having us here. Before I start, kudos to João for the title. That's his creation. So I started off in the Brazilian Army as a combat engineer officer. So I was there for about 12 years. I joined to work with peacekeeping operations after my first deployment to Haiti. I worked with Show Brazil Peacekeeping Training Center, and there I was coordinating the military coordination course with João, who is here with us. And we realized there were a lot of confusions with different concepts, Brazilian concepts, UN concepts, American concepts, regarding civil military relations. I worked for different NGOs, for example, and was in The Hague Civil Military Cooperation Center of Exile, COE. I also worked with a comparison, conceptual analysis between EU and NATO civil military concepts. That was when the CCOE became the department head for semi -military cooperation for the EU as well. And now I'm at the Swedish Defense University, where I don't study semi -military relations, but I'm working the use of landmines by non -state groups, landmines, IEDs, booby traps, things like that. 00:02:42    JOHNNY ROBINSON Thank you. Who wants to go next, John or Jao? Yeah, I don't mind jumping in. Johnny Robinson, and I'm porting the U .S. Naval War College's Humanitarian Response Program. So a global fellow at Brown University's Center for Human Rights Humanitarian Studies. For that, I spent almost a decade working in the Middle East for various humanitarian conflict resolution and private entities. We focused on aid worker security systems for civil military coordination analysis for the Carter Center, Caritas, Switzerland, the International NGO Safety Organization, amongst others. As you can tell from my accent, I'm not originally from the U .S., but I was born in the U .K., but ended up in Prince, Rhode Island, marrying my wife. So, yeah, and I got part of the project. And so, yeah, we've been on this journey together for a few years now. 00:03:34    ASSAD RAZA Hey, John, thank you. One question. You talk about being a fellow at Brown University. Do you know Stanislava? Yes. 00:03:40    JOHNNY ROBINSON Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, I know Stanislav. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Stanislav did an interview with her, 00:03:40    ASSAD RAZA Yeah, 00:03:42    ASSAD RAZA did an interview with her, I think, last year on her book. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, when Rambo meets the Red Cross kind of thing. 00:03:48    JOHNNY ROBINSON meets the Red Cross kind of thing. Like, wow, really, really good. Yeah, no, it's great. Yeah, it's great. Perfect, 00:03:53    JOAO MAURICIO DIAS LOPES VALDETARO, John. Thank you. Thanks, Ata, for having us. And my background's a little different from both of them. I'm still in the Army for the last 21 years. I'm a major engineer reg in the Brazilian Army. I've been working in peacekeeping issues for 10 years already. So I shared, we've got, you know, we worked structures back there in the Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations Center. Regarding Civil Affairs, I had two deployments in Haiti. One of them, I was a platoon commander, but dealt a lot with CEMEC inside the Peacekeeping Mission. And my second deployment, I was T3 of the Brazilian Engineering Company, and also had a lot of publics to attend to. I've also been deployed at Central Africa Republic. We literally set up the first CEMEC branch in the Central African Army. And that's it. This paper has been worked for a while already, and I guess it's almost ready to be published. 00:04:53    ASSAD RAZA Jao, thank you for coming on. It seems like you have a wealth of experience. So let's get into the topic here. So in your opinion, based on your research, how have the definitions or applications of civil military concepts varied among the different organizations like the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO? 00:05:10    ENRIQUE GARBINO This is Henrique. Could you take a quick look at the conceptual framework? like the concepts used by different organizations to organize the relationship between civilians and military actors there is room for a lot of confusion so i'm going to give us some examples so we can kind of visualize them more for example the u .s army civil affairs concept it's a military capability that tries to achieve the military mission through showing civilian actors right The UN civil -military coordination, so the concept used by military UN peacekeepers, is a similar approach. NATO civil -military cooperation is also similar. So you have civil affairs, military cooperation, civil -military coordination, three different terms that mean roughly the same thing. Of course, there are differences between them, but overall, they all mean the same military capability. And you can also have the same term that mean different things. For example, the UN mission has this semi -military coordination for military peacekeepers, but they also have the UN humanitarian semi -military coordination, which is a concept dedicated to promoting and preserving the humanitarian principles in the interaction between military and civilian humanitarian actors in crises and emergencies. So it's a very different thing. The European Union also have the semi -military coordination concept, so the same term, but it's about the coordination between the headquarters level, military bodies, and the civilian bodies in Brussels. So it's something completely different from the other two concepts. The same terms being used, meaning very different things. And then if you start a little digging deeper, you come up with different concepts that you don't really know in which basket you put them, like military civil fusion, a concept being used in China at the moment. Civic military unions, a concept we found in Venezuela. So it's really hard for someone who is not really familiar with that organization in particular to really understand what that term really means. It can get very confusing. And I think the irony here is that most of these civil military concepts, they have a shared understanding between civilians and military actors. The concepts cannot agree among themselves. So I think that's a bit ironic and that's a gap we try to fill. 00:07:34    ASSAD RAZA And I think a lot of people are confused on the different concepts or the terminologies. I myself at times was a little confused. You know, I had the opportunity to work in northeastern Syria and we would coordinate the UN civil military coordination center that was in Jordan on humanitarian aid and trying to de -conflict HA that was coming in from the UN into Syria and some of our operations that not really having a good understanding could never got tied to what these organizations did at the time. So it was a bit confusing. But it was a British guy on the other end. So John, you know. 00:08:03    JOHNNY ROBINSON Yeah, no, I was on the other side, as it were, from you. So I came in from the humanitarian community. And so we also got confused as well by all the different terminologies and civil affairs versus SIMCORD versus SIMIC versus humanitarian -military interaction. And so, yeah, it's a cool problem, right? I think it shows that. It gets complex quite quickly when you have these multinational civilian military environments. 00:08:30    ASSAD RAZA Absolutely. So I know we talked about some of the challenges that you've experienced ourselves as practitioners on the ground. So is there any other challenges that we talk about that we might have missed? 00:08:40    JOAO MAURICIO DIAS LOPES VALDETARO, Maybe you want to talk about Brazilian in Haiti. But it's the same as the Assad was saying. It was something that we used to do back in the old days, but we didn't call it civil affair. We had been doing that for a while. battalion to Haiti. The battalion commander was the man that, hey, send us your semi -mobster to the meeting. And then they were like, what's semi? We were dealing with local population. We were dealing with people in the Amazon forest. We were dealing with civil defense, but all different stuff. So when we arrived in Haiti, and we were teaching in the peacekeeping center, we had a lot of students who just arrived and say, oh yeah, we have this civil social action the army would do to the local population or dealing with local authorities. And when we started to study the UN SEMREC doctrine, it also developed through the time after the mission haze. Within the SEMREC doctrine, what we used to do as civil action, people were arriving in the mission in the beginning, and they were doing exactly the same that they were doing. back home, but we were able in the end to highlight what CIMIC was for them, and they started to do the right stuff. Not under the first contingent, but at least, I can say, half of the mission on, we were doing the right stuff in the head. 00:10:12    ENRIQUE GARBINO I think another aspect of this issue is that what this is referring to is a military civic action. Before, it was done by a soldier in Damned Force. It's not a specialized function. You don't go to special training to do this. The army giving dental care or toys or food to the population. And then in the UN mission context, then you should do much more. You should partner with local organizations. You should not take the lead as a military actor. And those clashes of principles, clashes of modus operandi, that was visible. It's something you need to unlearn first so we could learn the new doctrine. 00:10:50    ASSAD RAZA Yeah, it seems like a really big challenge because you're trying to learn on the fly, on the ground, which causes frustration with some of the other participating organizations, right? Kind of going back to the biases that some people have, especially in a nonprofit NGO organization, like don't want to work in the military because of some of those challenges. So let's go into talking about your analytical tool, your concept that you guys develop. I know the paper, you were talking about like the four core parameters. So can you guys talk about your analytical tool? Yes, of course. Well, the main goal of the project was to come up with a way to sort different concepts so we can see which concepts are similar from each other, 00:11:19    ENRIQUE GARBINO goal of the project was to come up with a way to sort different concepts so we can see which concepts are similar from each other, which ones are different, and also why. So we can learn from each other when comparing, for example, civil affairs experiences with NATO -specific experiences, but we cannot really compare EU and SYNCORDS, so the EU and humanitarian and humanitarian coordination with civil affairs. So this was an abductive process. So we would study a specific concept in detail, like go to the guidance documents, try to break it down into what it means. Then do the same thing for the second concept and the third concept, and then try to find current aspects of that concept. And we tried maybe 20 different parameters, but it boiled out to four, which are the perspective that the concept takes, the scope of the relationship between civilians and military, The level of applicability and the structure. So for the perspective, is it mainly a military concept? It's a concept that serves the military mission. Or is it a civilian concept? A concept that serves the work of civilian organizations. Or is it a joint concept that serves both in an equal level? In terms of scope, to where the relationship between military and civilian actors are placed. For example, is it about internal coordination? For example, I mentioned the European Union concept of civil -military coordination, and that's an internal scope because it's about coordination within the EU, not between the EU and external actors. Other concepts are mainly external, so it's about, for example, the humanitarian organization dealing with military external actors. Some concepts are both internal and external. For example, if you take the UN civil -military coordination concept used by military peacekeepers, That has both an internal component, which is about facilitating the relationship between the UN military component within the mission with the civilian and police components of the same mission. And an external component, so between UN military component and externals and million actors. In level capability, we chose the classical tactical operations strategic level. Some concepts are more in the Dewey aspects, more tactical. Others are more in a coordination operational level, and others are more in setting goals, decision -making processes, the strategic level concepts. Or some also pick up into all levels. The fourth parameter, which we call structure, is whether a concept is a mental tool, something to keep in mind when you're doing your work, or if it's a dedicated structure with personnel, resources, structures, procedures, capability. something that someone is in charge of. So these are the four core parameters, and we took those concepts used by the US, NATO, the UN, and the EU. 00:14:17    ASSAD RAZA the EU. I really like the way you broke it down. You've taken a complex problem and not going to say simplified it, but put it in a way that someone that's working in this space can see the differences or how to engage with these different types of organizations. I really like the main perspective, and I really like the structure. As a practitioner on the ground, we see these terminologies and our assumption is that there's a dedicated personnel there, right? That there's structures and resources dedicated to this mission, but at times not. It's almost ad hoc. 00:14:48    ENRIQUE GARBINO Exactly. And I think that this problem becomes more emphasized when you come from a specific background, in your case, U .S. civil affairs. You expect that your counterpart has a similar understanding of what the concept means. But then you're going to work with an organization that doesn't have the civil military capability as a structure in the US context. So these clashes also happen because of your previous assumptions and experiences. 00:15:13    ASSAD RAZA Yeah, absolutely. We all have our own biases based off our own work experiences. So you kind of always default back to your perspective of how you utilize within your own military, taking that for granted and not really understanding outside of your inner circle. 00:15:27    ENRIQUE GARBINO Exactly. Again, about analytical framework used by the US, EU, UN and NATO, we came up with four ideal concepts. And one of them is what we call semi -military relations or CMR. And that's mostly a strategic level principle, but it's mainly related to how relations should be conducted at a broader strategic level. So here we're talking about... The relationship between the Ministry of Defense and the President, for example, or the Amateur Forces in society as a whole, things like that. And the second concept is civil -military interaction, which is also a non -dedicated function, so there's no one in charge of that, but it's the everyday interaction between military and civilian actors. The idea is that if you are deployed as a soldier or a military actor in a crisis, If you were a cook, if you were a driver, if you were a planner, it doesn't matter. Then you're going to interact with your counterpart somehow in the checkpoint or during your patrol when you go to the groceries. It doesn't matter. And then you have two concepts that are dedicated functions. One takes the military perspective, which we call CIMIC, semi -military cooperation. So then US civil affairs, according to our... Definition would fall into this archetype. And the humanitarian counterpart, which is the military coordination concept, or CMCORD, which is also, again, a dedicated function on the humanitarian side, facilitating interaction between humanitarian actors and the military. Sometimes it may just share information and ensure that humanitarians are not in the same time and space as the military. And sometimes they can be more cooperative activities as necessary and as suitable for the region. So with these different concepts, we can categorize them like that. 00:17:27    ASSAD RAZA Thank you, Henrique. I really like your framework and the archetypes that you just mentioned right here. In your view, do you see NATO or the UN or someone implement it in their doctrines? 00:17:38    ENRIQUE GARBINO I hope so, but I don't want to be too ambitious about it. I think that more than anything else, this could be used as a training and education tool. So what organization can make sense of down -drop training and how it relates to others? 00:17:53    JOAO MAURICIO DIAS LOPES VALDETARO, One important thing, you're going to be deployed, you're going to find organization max, Y, and Z. So we can go there and at least get an initial idea how that organization will work and if they have a dedicated function. And also because of that, we put all the references. Or if you want to go deep on that specific organization, the main reason... or the fact sheets, exactly that. So I'm going to be deployed it. I want to know how that specific organization that I will follow on the ground works. So at least you're going to have an initial idea on how they work, how they organize, and if they're going to have a point of contact. 00:18:32    ENRIQUE GARBINO Well, their feedback was that there's a good approach to looking to different concepts, protection of civilians, for example, as it is stood by the UN versus NATO versus other organizations. or other similar buzzwords used in crisis response. And also some criticism. Okay, so what about the police? How is the police included in this study? And this is a shortcoming we acknowledge in the research that we consider police to fall into the civilian category and black box it there, but there is a way for more research. And it's something that if my main takeaway from this whole project is how many questions we got by conducting this research. And so I think we have a wealth of research questions for the future. 00:19:17    ASSAD RAZA Absolutely. I think you brought something important to the surface because I think for some countries, for example, Panama only has police, but they do also want to get into the UN type mission sets too. So how would they apply this not being military? I think a lot more questions can arise once we start seeing a lot more different capabilities from our partner nations. 00:19:36    JOHNNY ROBINSON Yeah. I mean, I think that was our hope that, you know, people could really use this as a jumping off point. as a tool to start those discussions. You know, we're not trying to say this is the exact way to interpret or use these concepts, but it can be used as a starting point to then compare and contrast the different concepts and hopefully allow for that cooperation to happen more. That was exactly my point. Thanks a lot. Can you kind of talk a little bit about your main findings? 00:20:01    ENRIQUE GARBINO you kind of talk 00:20:02    JOHNNY ROBINSON a little bit about 00:20:02    ENRIQUE GARBINO your main findings? The main finding here is that the four concepts seem to be comprehensive enough. properly fulfilled. And I thought it was interesting, the terms being used, we didn't explore why certain terms are used versus others, but that's what I meant as well. We found that the concept, the term civil -military relations was used to signify all the four archetypes. So we had, for example, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement uses the concept of civil -military relations. along with what we understand as civil -military relations, the strategic level interaction between military and civilians. We also have a known state army group, the More Islamic Liberation Front, for example, that uses civil -military relations as a concept to signify a military capability. We also have CARE International, NGO, that uses CMR, humanitarian and civil -military coordination. So this unilateral humanitarian capability to ensure that humanitarian principles are protected. And then you also have Caritas Internationali's concept of relations with the military, more of a semi -military interaction, the idea that this are non -educated concept that is present in everyday interaction between the militarians and the military in a crisis context. So the same concept or the same term, CMR being used to signify or the other four ideal types. In some terms, you can really see there is an intention about how strong the link between civilians and military is intended. So, for example, you see military -civil fusion, and before that, civil -military integration, which is about capabilities supporting the military effort. So, it's really about joining forces towards land security goal. So you can see that terms used also signify how strong the links between the two sides of the relationship. Some concepts are a bit more into the extreme, which start to be a bit more neutral, like similar military affairs, similar interaction, coordination, and others are a bit more into doing action, similar military cooperation, similar collaboration, similar engagement. So it's interesting to see how these terms vary. A final comment here is that there is a... Clear convergence in the terminology used in the CIMIC category, so the military concepts. Basically, most of them are either following the U .S. tradition called civil affairs, especially in Latin America, so all of these countries have the civil affairs label to it, and civil military cooperation following the NATO tradition, so the CIMIC variant. So it's understandable if you think about interoperability, if you think about multinational deployments within NATO, EU, UN, and other multilateral organizations. So that's no surprise in that. What I think is interesting is that on the other side, in the humanitarian sector, then there is a clear divergence of terms. It seems like every organization wants to be unique. 00:23:23    ASSAD RAZA That's interesting. I like the point that you brought about interoperability and the convergence of CIMIC or civil affairs within the allies, NATO. some of our partners in the Western Hemisphere. And my assumption is that the divergence piece coming from the humanitarian actors, does that contribute to some of the confusion on the military side? 00:23:41    ENRIQUE GARBINO I've had the opportunity to work with the International Great Trust. It's an organization that does not have humanitarian -military interaction nowadays. And before it's a military coordination, they are unique. They are their own thing, which is interesting. It also makes sense from a humanitarian perspective. They've tried to keep their neutrality as much as possible. Working with the military or working with military counterparts, negotiating access, doing visits of prisons of war, delivering aid in territories occupied by another group, this is the bread and butter of the organization. Every job in their COC were supposed to do that. So for that organization, it doesn't make quite sense to have an overarching concept to coordinate that because that's what everybody's doing already. So what I think that this study shows where there might be a gap, it also pretends to understand why is this the case. But of course, this can cause confusion. If you apply as a civil affairs officer expecting to find a counterpart in a humanitarian organization, you most likely will be frustrated because most of them don't have it. And if you're expecting... that your experience working with EU and OCHA is going to be the same when you're working with WSP or with the RCSC or with any other organization, you're going to be frustrated again. So you have to relearn as you go, and that's something that we hope to facilitate with the fact checks. 00:25:09    ASSAD RAZA Henrique, thank you. That's a really good example about ICRC and coordination with the military. So you've identified some conceptual gaps there. Are there any other challenges you want to talk about? 00:25:21    JOAO MAURICIO DIAS LOPES VALDETARO, One thing that we found also is that not all the doctrines or concepts that they find are totally developed. I can say that. So even though when they talk to some people and say, oh, yeah, so we had the manual, we know what we had to do, but we don't have it specifically already developed within the organization. They know what they had to do, but they're not doing it yet. 00:25:51    JOAO MAURICIO DIAS LOPES VALDETARO, Civil military doctrine you follow. We follow the U .S. one. Okay, do we have our own medals? No, no, no. We just follow the U .S. one. So, some countries also had this figure for the U .S. Army or the U .S. doctrine. And they're still following or they're still trying to develop their own doctrine or their own way to do stuff. 00:26:11    ASSAD RAZA Wow. Yeah, that's interesting. Some nations don't have their doctrine. They're following U .S. doctrine. Ones that do have doctrine aren't seeing and training their forces to be able to implement that doctrine. There's a lot of competing priorities and sometimes coordination aspect of civil relations kind of go to the wayside as they focus on other things. So, JV, thank you on that. Any other challenges you guys want to talk about? 00:26:36    ENRIQUE GARBINO Maybe to use this framework to identify conceptual gaps within an organization. And if you look, for example, into the UN system, We found within the UN four different concepts. So you have the UN -SIMIC, you have the UN -CM -CORD, and WSP has its own military interaction concept, and before that had the simulatory coordination concept, which is similar to SIM -CORD, but tailored to the specifics of WSP. And here you can see that all of these concepts are at the operational levels. So there is no overarching strategic level semi -military relations concept, for example, we see in the organization. Does this mean that they need one? That's up for debate. There are other concepts that can be used to fill this gap, like comprehensive approach concept. Try to organize not only the semi -military relations at a strategic level, but the civilian and civilian relations and the military and military relations in a specific context. So it's a broader, beyond semi -military concept. But that could fill this gap, for example. We also saw the UN doesn't have a civil military interaction concept that aims at facilitating the everyday interaction between civilians and military, even though they are not specialized. The relationship between a UN peacekeeper, a civilian UN staff, this concept doesn't exist in the UN. But also think of NATO. It would be interesting to apply our framework to all semi -related concepts of NATO members and see how they match with the NATO standards. Or when one specific organization is deploying into a multinational organization, let's say Brazil deploying to a peacekeeping mission, how does the Brazilian concept matches or differs from the UN concept? And that you can identify and foresee some challenges. in how that member organization is going to adapt to the concept. Here we can foresee some practical challenges, for example. If a U .S. civil affairs officer who is used to receive strategic level guidance on their business, they deploy to a UN peacekeeping mission, then UN CIMIC, which is the equivalent of civil affairs, there is no presence at the strategic level. So they have no specific guidance. from a strategic level on that matter. So they have to sort it out themselves at the operational level. This is just some examples that how our framework can be useful for this type of analysis as well. 00:29:20    ASSAD RAZA It's a perfect sense. People conducting their analysis to see how they're going to engage the different type of concepts that are out there. They're going to engage with their partners for academics operationally flowing to an area to identify some of the challenges on the ground. I think it's a really good tool. So in the future, how do you envision this tool being utilized across the different organizations? 00:29:41    JOHNNY ROBINSON Yeah, I don't mind taking this upon this. Throughout that probability, I think it's a really valuable tool to highlight the differences, similarities, and that can build relations, right? If similar ways of approaching certain problems or challenges within those civil military concepts, I see value. I think it's also... interesting discussion to have looking at the difference between the humanitarian community and how they've approached largely on the operational and tactical level to civil military interaction, coordination, cooperation, whatever you want to call it. Whereas on the military side, it's more of a top -down strategic operational tactical. And I think kind of, you know, where that can meet in the middle is where great coordination and cooperation can happen. In terms of future, I'd love to take the project and look at the civil military training opportunities around the world from different entities, civilian and military, and to also understand that ecosystem. I think that also has value if there's redundancy or occasion of efforts or complementary efforts in places. I think that would be great, particularly for the humanitarian civilian community. Often don't have such a good perspective of what training opportunities. there are out there it's also good to highlight that the fact sheets are made by us we read the concept we read the trend and we came up with the fact sheets so the fact sheets don't apply the organization so our interpretation a specific concept would be good too for someone who are going to be deployed it for someone who wants to study a little bit more specific about that country or that concept itself 00:31:02    JOAO MAURICIO DIAS LOPES VALDETARO, out there it's also good to highlight that the fact sheets are made by us we read the concept we read the trend and we came up with the fact sheets so the fact sheets don't apply the organization so our interpretation a specific concept would be good too for someone who are going to be deployed it for someone who wants to study a little bit more specific about that country or that concept itself 00:31:30    ENRIQUE GARBINO Definitely. And organizations use these concepts in a consistent way. If we expand the research or the framework and start looking into how the media or even academia uses concepts, it's often that in one paper, the author wants to come up with a concept that is really specific to what they're studying on that particular publication. And then they come up with something different. If we expand an academia, then the number of concepts would skyrocket. That's for sure. So there's much less consistency there. When you strive for specificity, we also lose the shared language to relationship between civilians and military actors. And I think that's the greatest irony. 00:32:12    ASSAD RAZA Enrique, that's a good point. The more people you have involved, including academia, media, and more snowball into something bigger and cause a lot more confusion from what you were trying to do is simplify it and have something consistent throughout the different organizations that are working in this civil arena or humanitarian space. that have all these different actors. So that makes perfect sense. Gentlemen, I really want to thank you for taking your time to share your research on this important topic. I've been being a civil affairs guy on the ground before and seeing some of these different concepts. at a time as a young officer not really having an understanding of these different concepts. I think this is a really important research and I really appreciate you guys creating this analytical framework and I hope it gains traction within the different organizations that are working in this space. So thank you for your time and I really appreciate it and we'll see you on the ground somewhere. Thank you. Thanks for listening. 00:33:02    Close listening. If you get a chance, please like and subscribe and rate the show on your favorite podcast platform. Also, if you're interested in coming on the show or hosting an episode, email us at capodcasting at gmail .com. And now, most importantly, to those currently out in the field working with a partner nation's people or leadership to forward U .S. relations, thank you all for what you're doing. This is Jack, your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes. One CA podcast.

Brian Hancock hosts Brad Hughes in a two-part discussion on how Civil Affairs and the 38G civil society programs are helping the U.S. in its foreign policy outreach in the Pacific. This is part one of two.    Brad Hughes Bio: https://www.linkedin.com/in/bradfordhughes/ Brian Hancock Bio: https://www.linkedin.com/in/brian-j-hancock/ One CA is a product of the civil affairs association  and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership. We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.  To contact the show, email us at CApodcasting@gmail dot com or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org   Special thanks to DrSaxLove for the sample of "Nearness of You." Found on Cocktail Party - 40s Music. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dvH-nbindvk ------ Credits Sponsor: Civil Affairs Association Host: Brian Hancock Showrunner / editor: Jack Gaines --- 00:00:07    Introduction Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at capodcasting at gmail dot com. or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www .civilaffairsassos .org. I'll have those in the show notes. 00:00:47    BRIAN HANCOCK Welcome to One Civil Affairs Podcast. I'm Lieutenant Colonel Brian Hancock, and I'll be your host for the session. Today we have with us Colonel Bradford Hughes to discuss innovative training for civil affairs functional specialty teams, or FXSP. building partner capacity, and military governance experimentation. Colonel Hughes, welcome to the show. 00:01:07    BRADFORD HUGHES It is great to be here, and I am excited to talk about the civil affairs and specifically initiatives with the 38 Golf Program. 00:01:16    BRIAN HANCOCK Oh, outstanding. That is one of the greatest developments that's happened to civil affairs in a long time, and there's a huge appetite out there to hear more about that, and I know you will definitely do that justice. I've had the pleasure of working with you. Some in the audience haven't. Let me tell everybody a little bit about you. Colonel Bradford Hughes is a 38 Gulf military government specialist, often likes to refer to himself as Brad. He is skilled at building partnerships, articulating a vision, and positioning value. As a former Master Army Aviator and UH -60 maintenance test pilot, he led multiple combat and humanitarian relief deployments across the world. Colonel Hughes serves as the government functioning specialty chief of the 351 Civil Affairs Command in Mountain View, California, where his team employs a civilian acquired skills and operates in the interagency intergovernmental environment to deepen the influence across the Pacific. He is also a certified gender advisor, leading efforts with the command to mainstream gender perspectives. into planning and operations. Just a quick reminder to the audience that all the remarks by Colonel Hughes and myself are solely ours. All right. Now, it's been several years since we have worked together. You apparently have been very busy there building an amazing functional specialty team at 351 and developing the 38 golf program. 00:02:50    BRADFORD HUGHES Yeah, for sure. And before we get started, I just wanted to take a moment and really thank the previous commanding general for the 351st Civil Affairs Command, Brigadier General Retired Chris Zubek. Yeah. His focus was getting civil affairs capabilities across the international dateline so we can execute in the Pacific. With our new CG, that's Brigadier General Brian Horton, I think we've achieved this. And we are working towards refining how we engage and truly leverage the value proposition of Army Reserve Civil Affairs. And also, I wanted to give a shout out to Colonel Chris Cray and his 364 Frontier Civil Affairs Brigade and his team's work with Pacific Frontier 24. 00:03:37    BRIAN HANCOCK Outstanding. Good things happening everywhere. The Pacific is the biggest place in DOPECON, the largest combatant command. And unfortunately, it's not full of countries that are all identical. In fact, they're all unique. So it's a very challenging problem set. Love to hear what's going on. I know we're going to be talking more about that. For those who are just tuning in, can you tell the audience a little bit about your role at 351 Civil Affairs Command as the functioning special team chief? You know, what's a duty day like for you? 00:04:10    BRADFORD HUGHES for you? I do consider myself an entrepreneur. I direct operations for an all on -demand helicopter charter company. We serve an interesting portfolio of clients from Tesla and University of Texas Athletics. There's another hookup for you, NASCAR, and even the San Antonio Spurs. I also do work as a technology transfer consultant where I provide clients with intellectual property management and we make market -based recommendations. I bring that up because the cross -cutting component really between my civilian and military roles is that I think I'm competent at identifying trends and seizing opportunity. And with that, the opportunity to advance civil affairs, the enterprise at every opportunity is incredibly important for myself into recruiting and retaining top talent. I like to think I function as a brand ambassador. I strive to build readiness by developing innovative opportunities that build cross -component, joint, and combined synergy. All efforts lead to continued refinement of the government function specialty team, FXSP interoperability across KCOM, music KPOC, and unified action partners. So together, that's what gives me great satisfaction. 00:05:31    BRIAN HANCOCK And that's a critical mission. I also love the way that you brought up the critical civilian skill sets that are required here. Whether it's large -scale combat operations, coin operations other than war, there is a desperate need for us to interface effectively with host nations, civil authority. That's where strategic victory lies. We'll talk a little bit more about that later. And you have just impeccable civilian credentials. I really wish on our board process that they would consider our civilian credentials as reservists, but perhaps something for human capital management in the future, but certainly they're essential for a 38 golf. Of course. 00:06:13    BRADFORD HUGHES And I think we'll talk a little bit about this towards the end, but getting back to the golf program, it's currently structured with multiple skill identifiers. There's 18 of them. that target specific skill sets nested within various government function specialty areas. So these can range from commerce to archivists, transportation, and everything in between. So the Gulf program is a Army Reserve program that complements the active component. And military government officers, yes, subject matter experts, they're technically qualified, their experience, and a little bit of the company line here. They advise, enable, and assist commanders, and importantly, direct civilian counterparts with stabilizing and providing governance expertise. One thing I've always stressed is I think that capability should reside at the KCOMs just based on strategic significance of the goals, but there is force structure down to the battalions. But again, we, the 351, we try to pull that capability up to the KCOMs. I think that's where we can truly leverage the expertise of the goals. 00:07:22    BRIAN HANCOCK Yeah, that makes sense to me. I know Brigadier General Zubik, who has recently departed, he developed a plan for digital reconnaissance, digital reachback, leveraging some of those capabilities at Echelon. So it makes sense to house things there, especially if there's a capability that can be delivered in time and space as required to all of the maneuvering elements. So that makes good sense to me. Let me ask you a little bit about this. I've had the pleasure, you know, working here at a four -star command. Lieutenant General Jody Daniels comes by periodically. Sometimes she does a town hall, and then she presents new information. One time she came out and talked about one of her recent publications, very, very interesting, a very accomplished senior leader. And one of the things that she's been saying is she wants our TPU, our troop program units in the reserve, to conduct novel training. And to experiment, she's not married to the traditional one weekend a month, two weeks a year type of battle assembly format. Now, I understand that you have done something with that at 351, that you've embraced that opportunity. Can you tell the audience a little bit about your efforts there? And, you know, if you're willing, share some results. 00:08:37    BRADFORD HUGHES Yeah, absolutely. And I will say that resource allocation, to me, is negatively impacting Campo 3 or Army Reserve culture. As I mentioned, the golf program, we recruit experts from across the country. And we may have somebody on the East Coast that's interested in what the 351 is doing in the Indo -Pacific AOR. But because of the reduction in resources, I think many are starting to feel a little bit underserved. And because of these reductions, we've acknowledged the challenges. And now we collectively, our team comes to Mountain View once per quarter. And we call that a traditional non -battle assembly approach. We feel that this approach may become the norm for both use of KPOP and really across the Army Reserve. And I could get into the blocking and tackling of it. We look at it as a three -legged stool organized around fiscal year quarters. So looking at the three months per quarter, month one, we come in for mandatory collective training. And that's where we come in for the non -negotiable. Training events. So thank ranges, ACFT, things where we need full -time support. And we have some of the non -negotiable FXSP events like heart training, disaster management, JAUC is through USAID. That's month one. We hit those non -negotiables. Month two, and I think collectively we learned coming out of the pandemic that individual readiness, professional development, things like that. are easier to accomplish at your home of record. It doesn't make sense to come to Mountain View to do an SGLV or DD93, PHAs, stuff like that. You can get after that at the house. Well, isn't IPSA supposed to make that go away? That's a good question. I will defer. I'm still waiting. I've got to defer to the human resources experts for that. While you're at the house, continuing education needed for professional credentialing, networking, knowledge building, all that stuff can be done at the house. Or research tasks. I think you spotlighted that a little bit. Initiatives or projects that we're trying to advance. And then quickly, the month three, we call it EPO driven. So an EPO is an exercise planning officer or NCO. And either he or she will make a determination on the location. We assign an EPO to an exercise or engagement, and it's that person's responsibility to do everything for theater entry to get that team downrange. So the EPO is going to make the call, hey, does that bring us to Mountain View? Yeah. Where we need full -time support or access to systems or maybe an alternate location to secure official passports. There may be SIF or Sarnet access someplace else other than Mountain View where it makes sense for the team. participating in whatever the exercise or engagement is to go there. Stakeholder coordination as examples. So three -legged stool broken down by fiscal year quarters. That's how we're getting after it. 00:11:48    BRIAN HANCOCK That makes sense. I was worried you're going to hit me with Colonel Lykes' ins ways and means on that stool there, but glad that it went in a different direction. And thanks also for mentioning the importance of the government passport. Many folks out there in the military, at least in Campo 3, don't have the opportunity to travel as far and wide as some of the civil affairs soldiers do. And many of the nations they're going to, a government passport is actually not required. But many countries, especially some of these small island nations in the Pacific, most of Africa, etc., you're not going to get there on a government mission without a government passport. And I know that you've cracked the code on how to get that. If an emergent mission comes up, I can send the team pretty fast, 00:12:32    BRADFORD HUGHES can't you? We can. And we cracked the code last year and then things change. I will tell you that the majority of team members have their passports, but then we'll get caught up short with a visa requirement. And suddenly we've got to expedite that in order to get the team down range. I will mention too, just as a cost savings measure, we'll also encourage team members to drill with neighboring units. National Guard in Arizona, they may be conducting an ACIT. We have soldiers who are close. They'll go there and execute. And it also allows us to broadcast the capabilities of the 38 Gulf, whether it's to the Guard, other compo three units, active duty. So we look at it as an opportunity for folks to showcase their expertise to a new audience. 00:13:18    BRIAN HANCOCK And that's fantastic. As you're well aware in civil affairs, we don't have lieutenant level positions. We're always having to take folks from an entry MLS and invite them to the team and get them to cross over. So it's fantastic that you're spreading, you know, evangelizing the awesome mission that we have. It's amazing when you tell people the things that you get to do at Battle Assembly as a civil affairs soldier versus the things that they do. Oftentimes the program just sells itself. Yeah, for sure. And I don't think the money situation is getting any better. 00:13:49    BRADFORD HUGHES don't think the money situation is getting any better. And we'll continue with this non -traditional BTA approach. It's working for us. And I really think it's going to be the new model. 00:13:59    BRIAN HANCOCK be the new model. Outstanding. I suspect we're going to see more of that from other units moving forward. Let's switch gears for a second. I know many of the folks in the audience are not aware of that secret gem for training we have in Combo 3, known as innovative readiness training. IRT. I understand that 351 Civil Affairs Command actually has been heavily involved in the IRT program and a number of missions. In fact, I believe your team has even won some awards for IRT missions. Can you tell the audience out there, what is an IRT mission? How do you access that? How do you find those opportunities? And who can participate? For instance, can U .S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs participate in IRT missions? Can non -civil affairs units who may be listening to this podcast, can they take advantage of IRT missions? 00:14:51    BRADFORD HUGHES I think IRT is open to the reserve component writ large, so COMPO2 and COMPO3. And I think, don't hold me to it, but I think it's also open to other reserve formations. So yeah, the Marine Corps could be a Navy Air Force. But it is a reserve activity. And the Office of Secretary of Defense, OSD, has established the Innovative Readiness Training Civil -Military Partnership Program. We call it IRT for short. And for us, civil affairs, it offers us to exercise government function specialty nets. You know, so the things we need to train on and enhance readiness. And like you mentioned, we first caught wind of IRT in 2020, so in the throes of the pandemic. And there was a community in the Illusion, specifically the community of Unalaska, that wanted to bring in civil affairs practitioners to do an assessment of their community. Kind of a commerce play. The community was divesting or wants to divest from fishing and also try to leverage the national security implications of that region. So we went there in 2020. And I appreciate the shout out. We did win an award that year for the Civ Military Partnership of the Year. And now we're back this year, FY24, and the Arctic and Russia, China, and the United States have considerable interest in the region and the expansion of northern sea realms. There's a nexus there for cooperation or a flashpoint for conflict. So that's why we're there. We're focused on the central importance of Alaska and the Aleutians. Right. The critical role of infrastructure and the grid power competition. And it's really being viewed through our lens as government function specialty practitioners. 00:16:44    BRIAN HANCOCK Speaking of conflict, while you were there, I seem to recall I saw a news article and also some imagery that. Russian naval units actually came into the territorial waters of the Aleutians there and forced our American shipping out of those waters so that they could conduct military exercises. So it seems like not only do multiple nations have interests there, some of them are burning pretty aggressive in that space. 00:17:22    BRADFORD HUGHES The activities by those players, our competitors, really have the community concerned and other stakeholders larger than Alaska, obviously. And we're there to provide them the direction. They're challenged with governance. It's just interesting in that region. It's very tribal. We were invited by the Kwajalein tribe. It's a native tribe in Alaska, and they collaborate with the city. So you've got the city and how it's organized, and then they also have a corporation. So they call it the Trilad. And from a governance perspective, we're there sharing best practices on how they can collaborate better. Mention private partner partnerships with respect to grant writing, finding financing, things like that for projects that they want to advance. We can help them. realize some of those things. So it's been interesting. We were back up there in February of this year. I went on that trip. And then we had two of our energy officers there last month. And as a matter of fact, we had a call yesterday. They're working, when I say they, the community on a interesting geothermal project that's tied to the Mercutian volcano. It's an active volcano. Part of the island chain. They want to tap into that. So if that Yeah. Geothermal project is built. You know, what does that mean for the Navy, for the Coast Guard? Would they be willing to establish more of a permanent presence? And that's something the community would like to see. 00:18:57    BRIAN HANCOCK community would like to see. Given the activity of adversaries in that region, which I suspect is going to continue to increase with the melting of the polar ice caps and that northern sea route is becoming more and more accessible, the Alaskan Coast Guard is overwhelmed. They have more. disasters and rescues than any state in the United States by a good majority, plus a greater coastline overall to manage when you include the outlying islands. So they're heavily tapped. They're probably not going to be in a position to stop aggressive navies. And you know why I love the army. I think we probably need some help from our friends in the Navy to keep our territorial borders safe there. 00:19:42    BRADFORD HUGHES The community is really trying to position themselves as an attractive basing option for the Navy. And then with just a little bit more color on the IRT program, I think what we're doing as civil affairs practitioners is unique. Typically, IRT, you'll see it on the southwest border. You'll see it on CONUS -based tribal lands. It's nurses, doctors administering vaccines, or there could be small engineering projects, think building a road. something like that. I think what we're doing, civil affairs, we're operating as a consultancy and we're providing in partial perspective that second set of eyes that the community is interested in to advance things that are important to know. 00:20:25    BRIAN HANCOCK that are important to know. Yeah, outstanding. I mean, there's always one of the areas I was kind of a little bit jealous of the National Guard because they got to do a lot of missions to support American citizens within our own territory. But in COMPO3, we have that same opportunity here. through the IRT program. And I know we're going to be hearing more about some of the successes of your team in that area in the years to come. Let's start with what every ground pounder loves to talk about, which is the role of the military in competition. I'm sure you saw February 10th, 2023, the joint staff published the joint concept for competing. This was actually a landmark document as it represents. one of the first publications in a DACA format, which recognizes the conflicts that the United States and our allies are actually in and will be in for the foreseeable future, rather than the World War II -style conflicts that we have built the force to win. Now, given the Joint Chief's Title X responsibility, one would expect a host of changes across doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, and education. personnel, facilities, and policy to come from this. What has actually happened is silence from the military community. Very little change has been initiated by this revolutionary document. The joint concept for competing recognizes that the strategy of our adversaries is to win without fighting. So, building large combat formations to go into blunt contact may not be the best investment if that is really their strategy. And when I think about this concept of win without fighting, I have flashbacks to that visual capital analysis video that you presented actually years ago at the Civil Affairs Association annual convention. In the video, it showed how through trade agreements, economic investment, etc., China was reshaping the global order in their favor. Do you remember that? 00:22:27    BRADFORD HUGHES Yeah, I do. It was innovation as a weapon system. And Brian, before we leave IRT, I've got to let the audience know that you were part of that initial engagement in 2020. And that award is just as much yours as it was the entire team. So if I hadn't, thank you again for that support. It's been a pleasure. Thank you. For sure. I'll try to frame my answer through a 38 golf lens and really. You talk about the future and as the army looks to the future and considers its ability to perform military government operations. So that's what we do as 38 golfs. The army has got to embrace a pool of golf personnel. This is important. We're civilian component oriented, culturally attuned and engagement focus. I like to consider it a cohort of experts with a strong understanding of stabilization activities. Yeah. And I think that gets back to the winning without fighting. Today's military government specialist has the tools required to help the army gain the critical governance support capacity it needs in the face of emerging challenges to the current global order and the geostrategic nature of our competition. And this is where I am building and pushing the team to advance this critical capability is where I hold great passion. And I recognize that this is the six inches in front of our face right now. And I think we've been successful. 00:23:51    BRIAN HANCOCK I know we're going to talk about some of those specific successes coming up. Continuing to talk about competition, we're going to be in competition 99 % of the time. Sure. We both know that 99 % of the military's resources, including the Army, is not directed towards competition. In competition, it's generally not acceptable to, you know, bomb folks. And the reality is, in the military, it's often easier to drop a JDAM on something than it is to send out a text or a tweet. That's something that I know we're working on. But if we're really going to compete, if we're going to defeat a strategy of winning without fighting, then we have to be able to inoculate civil populations to the type of mis - and disinformation, the type of propaganda, the type of shaping. the type of casus bellies used to invite war, and that's going to require a lot of non -lethal capabilities, including what we used to refer to as information -related capabilities. Within that construct, civil affairs is one of the few military capabilities that's actually optimized for non -lethal influence effects. But I certainly saw the latest R -Struck was published not long ago, and when I took a look at that, at least in the soft cuts, what I'm seeing is that the Army is continuing to buy up risk in competition by continuing its slow program of divestiture of civil affairs forces. We've lost, for instance, all of our Comp 1 civil affairs forces as of FY26. This seems to me to be a disconnect, actually, in building a force capable of defeating the enemy's actual strategy versus what we're resourcing. If you see a disconnect, Why do you think that is? 00:25:47    BRADFORD HUGHES You know, it's unfortunate that civil affairs is unfunded to the level it is. And I like to think of, I've got to remain positive. And I like to think of a value proposition, again, tying it back to the golf program, where we can realize that value proposition is building partner capacity. That is the vital tool for the U .S. to compete with great power adversaries. We are choosing to engage where adversaries do not. Security partnerships, alliances, as you just pointed out, they're unique and complex, adaptive systems. And you kicked off with this, especially with some of the smaller Pacific Island countries. We've been across COFA and we've seen that these countries display certain characteristics at the local level that are non -linear. Display system -wide emergent properties that our cohort, they have the systems -based expertise, we think at least, to implement building partner capacity through security cooperation, which contributes to the local and regional stability that we need to be successful in this period of competition. And it importantly adds credence to integrated deterrence. And that is the value proposition of the golf program. Civil affairs, again, we are obviously civil affairs practitioners. That's how I think we can be good partners and have meaningful impact. 00:27:16    BRIAN HANCOCK impact. I'll let you continue your thought in one second. And then, of course, I'm going to ask you about some examples of some of those real world missions that you're doing to these small nations. I know the audience wants to hear about that. It just seems to me, though, that we are very challenged institutionally as an organization to. 00:27:36    BRIAN HANCOCK understand what shaping is outside of lobbing artillery rounds. Because that's winning without fighting, right? That's Sun Tzu's bloodless ultimate victory. For sure. He is defeating the enemy first, then going to war, right? The non -lethal capabilities of which CA is in high demand, it's very popular, very well received by post nations and partners in most cases, is one of those few capabilities. And it allows us to do those invisible shaping fires of influence that lead to things like access basing and overflight that help us set the theater for conflict if it occurs, for robust alliances, which are very powerful at deterring aggression. If Ukraine had been in NATO, they wouldn't be attacked and in so much difficulty right now. It's fantastic for generation of goodwill. It makes economic sense. All of these things have a nexus in positive, non -lethal influence. Now, with that said, can you tell the audience, some of which are going to be folks who don't necessarily believe in influence, that they believe in hard power, what are some of the effects that you have seen from what amounts to non -lethal fires that you've been doing in DOPECOM to generate positive influence for the United States and for our allies. 00:29:09    BRADFORD HUGHES You know, I've got three recent engagements as of this calendar year to talk about, but I think where our team makes money is we're able to identify a community -based organization who they're... informal influencers and pick the country, right? And who's to say that when needed, one of these community -based organizations, they may have the ability to deliver results if ABO becomes an issue. I'm not saying that's the case. We're very vocal in some regards. And then we're meeting with ministers and others, but we're trying to build relationships across the spectrum. And you never really know when you might need to cash in that relationship. So I think that's important. 00:29:58    BRIAN HANCOCK Yeah, but you have to invest before you can reap, right? And I think that's what I'm hearing your civil affairs teams are doing out there in the field. For sure. 00:30:06    BRADFORD HUGHES And I think that also gets back to compo three, because we just stay on our positions a little bit longer. There's not as much churn as the active component sees. True. We're able to... build these relationships, right? It could be as simple as a phone call or a text or WhatsApp to a partner in the Philippines, a partner in Palau, like, hey, how's it going? And that's meaningful. It goes a long way and I think it goes further than a lot of people think.   00:00:52    BRIAN HANCOCK For sure, and I think that also gets back to Compo 3 because we just stay on our positions a little bit longer. There's not as much churn as the active component sees. We're able to build these relationships, right? It could be as simple as a phone call or a text or WhatsApp to a partner in the Philippines, a partner in Palau, like, hey, how's it going? And that's meaningful. It goes a long way and I think goes further than a lot of people think. Just checking in, keeping that relationship top of mind. 00:01:21    BRADFORD HUGHES top of mind. And I understand these missions go well beyond that, actually giving medical treatment, helping set up hospitals and clinics. building out governance capacity. And I'm sure you can give the audience many other examples of stuff your team's been involved in. Yeah, for sure. 00:01:38    BRIAN HANCOCK We have three team members right now in the Philippines. So we have our ag business team, 38 golf, six uniforms. So they're experts in ag business. And within that group, we have a veterinarian. who's working some animal husbandry issues in the Philippines, and we have some soil experts working with the Filipinos to increase yield. I'm not entirely sure what the crop is, but that's important and that's really meaningful. Absolutely. There's been an interesting mission regarding art repatriation. I don't want to get too deep into it, but there was some art looted. Monuments, man. Monuments, man. So we have a six -victor cohort, heritage preservation. There was some art that was looted during World War II that belongs to Okinawa. The art was discovered in the Boston area. Very long story short, we've repatriated it. And this is across all the KCOMs. This was driven by use of KPOC. But we are sending a practitioner back next week. For the repatriation ceremony, the artists landed in a museum in Okinawa, and the people there are excited to have this art come back. The FBI Arts Crime Division has been involved with this, the Air Force, and a host of others. And we're also sending teams back to Palau and the Marshall Islands to work on CTIP. That's countering trafficking in persons. That is a very important issue. For both these countries, I would put Micronesia in there as well to complete the three COVID nations. We send our lawyers there to talk the legalities of what CTIP is, how to prevent it, and we'll get down to local law enforcement strategies, things like that. But the CTIP training resonates with the people of these countries. Absolutely. This is very visible. 00:03:29    BRADFORD HUGHES very visible. It touches lives. It builds relationships. And when you look at business strategy, It's also a barrier to entry for our adversaries because they can't easily replicate those missions, can they? I'm glad you mentioned that. 00:03:45    BRIAN HANCOCK glad you mentioned that. We are choosing to engage where our adversaries are choosing not. 00:03:50    BRADFORD HUGHES Yeah. And that's outstanding. Let's talk a little bit more about United Action Partners. Part of that shaping I was talking about earlier is going to be building their capacity and capability, not only to inoculate them from mis and disinformation. but to help them weather the effects of climate change and build resiliencies so that they're less vulnerable to adversary coercion and many other things that can come their way. Now, I know you've been heavily involved in this both publicly and privately. I'm just going to make a wild guess that some of the things that we would have to do if we wanted to. continue to build those UAP relationships. We're going to have to start at home. We have to get us the right expertise. There just aren't enough 38 golfs to go around, as you mentioned, but we can expand the capability because the 38 golfs we do have are well -known and can help us foster constructive relationships and agreements with places like University of Fresno, which has an amazing agriculture school, a number of things, Texas A &M. very wide set of sciences there that could be made available to us. And once we have that kind of expertise behind the 38 golf teams, then we're able to expand into many of the relief opportunities that that community is going and humanitarian assistance disaster relief, which sadly is a growing business. There's more disasters than ever, every year, it seems. There are ever, ever greater needs that need to be filled. And then finally, it culminates in full -on bolstering of those foreign partners. Whether that could lead to ABO or anything else is open for debate, but it seems to me that the benefits are many. Now, what do you think about this? From your experience, how should we be going about building up our United Action partners? 00:05:43    BRIAN HANCOCK The way I'll answer this is to frame it again, start. portfolio missions. And these are the mission sets we use to amplify the value proposition of the team and our stabilizing impact. So if I'm going to do anything before I leave, beautiful. One thing is evolve our partnership with US Army Pacific Security Cooperation Division, specifically to drive our inclusion in campaign plan tasking mechanism. This is a challenge. We have been able to support Army Service component commands, 1st Corps and 8th Army. We have been active working with them. But our portfolio of mission sets, there's six or seven of them. Women, peace, and security is important to us. The innovative readiness training we discussed previously, the disaster response exercises in exchange, the injuries, great opportunity. We have a 38 Gulf 5 Yankee that's an emergency management expert. It's an opportunity to deploy those individuals. Our civil control lawfare programs, like the attorney working CTIP issues across COFA, we have really found tremendous value using our ILOs or international law officers to run trainings. And then I'm going to take this to the three -legged stool. When we're at home, not in Mountain View, the analytic capacity to... do country vulnerability assessments, providing a think tank -like service. We've done so recently for First Corps, for USER PAC. That is something that the 38 Golfs can immediately get around and get it deliverable out within the constraints of a battle assembly weekend. Found some value there. You were talking about the university partnerships, so supporting and advancing USER Cape Box partnership with academia and industry. That's the reachback capability that just really expands what the Gulfs can do. So you mentioned Fresno State, Texas A &M. We have bound by MOUs. Money's not exchanging hands. It's codified in tech. But we have MOUs with Notre Dame, Rice University, University of Wisconsin -Madison, the Milwaukee Water Council, and the Smithsonian. And we're working on others. But the reach back that those university partners give us, it's tremendous. 00:08:08    BRADFORD HUGHES And not only the knowledge that that represents, but I can only imagine the social and political networks that come with those field experts. You want to open doors. You want to get through bureaucracy. You want to get something done. That just sounds like an amazing resource. 00:08:25    BRIAN HANCOCK an amazing resource. It's huge. As a matter of fact, University of Wisconsin, Madison is hosting an event for our natural resources folk, and it'll be in the Madison area later this May. We have civil affairs practitioners really coming across the enterprise, active duty sending some. COPPA III is going to make up the lion's share of the attendees. But it's important, and it's a way for the universities as well, that relationship with civil affairs. It unlocks corporate money for them, which is important, and that's money we can also use to conduct trainings and then potentially deploy. university partners, experts in their own right, obviously, to engagements overseas. 00:09:08    BRADFORD HUGHES I want to put on my mad scientist hat here for a moment, you know, looking at this expertise that's aligned, looking at the complexity of the worldwide mission we have to conduct, which is progressively an urbanized space, and recognizing that there's a capability gap, not just a resource gap, but a capability gap here. The answer should be experimentation, right, and development of new capabilities through total Army analysis or small business innovation research, the various opportunities, grant writing, et cetera, that are out there. So looking at experimentation, I think one of the most important things we need to figure out how to do, and not just for the Army, but for the Department of Defense, for the military, and for our military partners as well, is We're very good at achieving tactical success on the battlefield. We win most engagements that we fight. The challenge is achieving strategic objectives. Strategic success is a little bit more elusive. So it's kind of like we play chess and we take a lot of pieces, but we don't get checkmate oftentimes, it seems. And so we spend a lot of the time and energy getting all those pieces off the board. But at the end of the day, if we don't get that strategic win, it calls some of that. sacrifice into question. That's why years ago, I was very excited when the Department of Defense stood up and funded the Army Futures Commander AFC. I waited for about a year for them to get going. And then I called up a friend that you and I both know, I know six, won't mention his name on the air. And I asked him, okay, I said, hey, can you tell me a little bit about, you know, all this funding we see? Can you tell me? What portion of that is reserved for less than lethal capabilities and experimentation? Now, I still remember his response to this day. It's either really good or really bad, right? He turned to me, he says, Brian, 95 % of everything we work on in Army Futures Command is instantly lethal. But given their enormous budget, I didn't give up, sir. I'm still excited by this. Because I realized that that 5 % remaining actually amounted to probably 10 times the entire budget of use of KPOC. So I was very excited by this. So then I tried to ask him, how do I get access to that 5 % that's been allocated for non -lethal capabilities? And the girl raises his hand and he says, hold on there. The remaining 5 % is reserved for the laser that guides the bomb that kills you. It's just so deflated. I was so deflated when I heard that. Now, that was years ago. And I suspect that this 06 was using a little bit of hyperbole, of course, when he was explaining all this. But fast forward to today, I know you've been working with Army Futures Command. You've got a number of initiatives underway and in some promising initiatives there. Is this still the case? Do we still have a huge resource gap in the R &D pipeline, at least as far as AFC goes, to develop these critical capabilities we need for competition? Is that so? And if it is so, why do you think that remains the case? 00:12:32    BRIAN HANCOCK That's a great question. And before I get to it, I do want to share that this past Friday, I had the opportunity to see Admiral. Craven speak at the University of Texas. So, you know, he's a former chancellor at UT back 2014, 2015. And as we all know, he is the consummate, been there, done that guy throughout his military career. What's interesting, and I don't think a lot of people know this, Army Futures Command is here in Austin, as are the seven defense ex -organizations. So think AFWERX, NAVWAR. DIU, Defense Innovation Unit. But Admiral McRaven, when he was at UT as chancellor, he was a big part of what got Futures Command to Austin, not necessarily standing it up. I think that was already in play, but getting that four -star command here into Central Texas. But to get to your question, I think one of the greatest threats to national security seems to be the utter lack of appreciation. An ability to adapt to other cultures and build partner capacity. Who is workshopping? People operations, cultural adaptation, informal network building, and partner force collaboration. Everything that we're talking about, call it winning without fighting. Civil affairs is getting after it, kind of ad hoc. Futures Command is not right now. And my challenge to Futures Command is... They need to look harder and consider a cross -functional team dedicated to the human terrain. I think that's the answer. It doesn't have to be a full -blown cross -functional team. I get it. Civil affairs isn't like future vertical lift, nano, precision fires. But I think there shouldn't be some money apportioned to what is incredibly important. We are working some initiatives. We have them cooking with the Army Applications Lab. So that's the lab portion or branch of teachers command. It's a little too early to reveal what we're trying to do, but just having proximity, whether it's the 95th CD brigade, the CD proponent, having proximity to future's command to talk. Some of these things I think is incredibly important. And that's what we're hoping to advance. And I will share with you and hear for the podcast back in school at the University of Texas Hookham, the LBJ School of Public Affairs. Congratulations. Yeah, thank you. Be careful what you wish for. Uh -oh. But my capstone is tackling exactly this. Would Features Command consider some sort of cross -functional team? Again, cross -functional team like dedicated to Army CA. So I'll put it in writing. 00:15:23    BRADFORD HUGHES So I'll 00:15:24    BRIAN HANCOCK put it in 00:15:25    BRADFORD HUGHES writing. We'll see where it goes. I hope so. In the past, I've had those conversations with the Civil Affairs Proponency. The reality is their budget is small and they're very focused on tactical soft missions. Sure. The project was of a magnitude larger than they could tackle at the time. I certainly hope that that bears fruit. We think about it. Winning a battle isn't too difficult. But when you want to win a war. And, you know, I'm not sure what our national defense budget is up to now, something like $850 billion, the single largest, most discretionary part of the budget. And for that price tag, we certainly want to win wars when we engage them. And the reality is that unless you are able to defeat the will of your adversaries so that they effectively give up, because there's so many asymmetrical capabilities, so many powerful small weapons these days, unless you defeat that will. which exists in the human space, not outer space, you're never going to get there. You're never going to get there. And we need to invest in that. We need to understand that. You know, I'm reminded of H .R. McMaster's book, Dereliction of Duty, which I'm going through a second time now. And he talked about the Ivy League thinking that was happening in LBJ's administration at that time, where they assumed that the North Vietnamese had the same mental models, the same penchant for risk, were the same type of rational actor as Americans were, and they could, through the fallacy of mirroring, which we try and avoid in intelligence, which is assuming the enemy is just like us and will respond as we think they will or as we would, and they think as we think, they continued this policy of graduated pressure, oblivious to the fact that the enemy's penchant for risk was, Off the chart relative to ours and that their commitment to communist revolution and ideals was what was shaping everything for them. And there was no understanding or effort to understand that. And you know what happened in Vietnam, of course, that the results were disastrous. So how do we avoid that again? Will AFC help us, sir? Or are you going to have to go out and start a private consulting company and we'll tackle it from that angle? 00:17:50    BRIAN HANCOCK The private consulting company is always in the cards. So 2014 -15, the SCA proponent, they were working on something interesting. It was the IMSG, the Institute for Military Security Governance. And it kind of went back by the wayside. We're looking to potentially dust that off. And there's a lot of good stuff in IMSG. And that may be a foot in the door. to get closer to futures command? 00:18:23    BRADFORD HUGHES I certainly hope so. I know that TRADOC OEC, which has had some capabilities in this space, has been downsized a little bit. So definitely a little bit concerned with the future, not pessimistic on the future, but definitely concerned. We can correct the course if we can raise the message to the right audience. And I'm hoping through our combined efforts, we'll eventually get there. We've got a few minutes left. I did want to talk a little bit more about the functional specialty teams. Many of the people dialing in or listening in have access, either through reachback or they're in civil affairs formations themselves and can reach out and touch some FXSP members and interact with 38 Golfs. Let's talk best practices. How can they best employ their 38 Golfs and their functional specialty? Just for one, Quick example, back in 2020, at that time, you and I did some experimentation, actually, where we took the PhD little expertise that you had sitting in the FXSP, and I took myself and some of our civil analytics people sitting in the civil information management team, and we created a fusion organization. situation, the functional specialist teams, they collected all the relevant mission data because of their expertise and ability to know where to look and how to capture that. And then they analyzed and categorized it using their subject matter analysis and expertise. We then took it in the SIEM team, we normalized it, combined it with other data sets to make the N larger, perform some quantitative analysis, and then ended up producing some data. visualizations that were designed for military decision makers, which highlighted progress, managed critical information requirements, mission instates, et cetera. And we tested this together in RIMPAC 2020, and it seemed to work out pretty well. So that's one way that FXSPs can't be utilized in conjunction with a SIM or a CKI cell. But that was a few years ago. You've been at this business for a while. What are some of your other recommendations to the community on how they can effectively employ their FXSP formations to maximize that return on investment? 00:20:38    BRIAN HANCOCK Yeah, I'm glad you brought up Grimpact 2018. That was like a distant dream, but it was pretty exciting working with you and seeing the 351 deploy at that scale to Fort Island. I think it was a resounding success. As much as I hate to say it, what we've become good at within the 351 that I think sets us apart is we are good at spending other people's money. So if you want to engage the FXSP, if you have a customer that comes with money, irrespective of what the need is, the fact that travel can be covered, that's significant. Like I said, I hate to mention that, but it is the reality that we currently operate under. 00:21:27    BRADFORD HUGHES But it's still a win -win, though, because when you calculate the return on investment relative to the input dollars, I think it's pretty clear folks are getting their money on what they're spending. They're buying quality. I mean, the work I'm seeing from functional specialists is being printed in military review. I mean, this is the top journal in the country for military experts. 00:21:49    BRIAN HANCOCK We're chasing those that have money. There's a couple of interesting things that we're working on now. The portfolio items that I listed previously, most of that does come with lines of accounting. And that's what we need in order to travel. We always own the annual training, but we're looking for those travel dollars. But as of late this year, through Defense Security Cooperation Agency, through Institute for Security Governance, those folks... have a need to bring 38 golfs downrange with them. So ISG, I think, is under the umbrella of the Naval Postgraduate School. And through ISG, there's some things that we're going to try to do. Think some of the pieces of security. Think governance. There may be some commerce involved. Bring a golf in a support capacity to help with those experts as a block of instruction is delivered. I think an exciting... potential engagement for us. I was on a call last week with CA Puconet, the 95th CA Brigade was on the call and all the supported battalions. Through what's called section 333, it's an authority that the active duty CAS has access to. It's going to be a building partner capacity type play, but it enables them to potentially reach out to a Western forces and bring whatever that flavor of 38 Gulf is that they need, bring them with them. And what's been a challenge for the active component is accessing compo three. So we try to make it as easy as possible. The rules and regulations behind the RV reserve, if you're not in it, it is just confusing. You know, you got 15 days of AT, you can't do this, you can't do that. But if we can make it easy for them, hey, call Hughes, call Hancock. We need somebody for two or three days, probably longer than that. We need somebody for some stretch of time, less than 15 days to go down range and engage in whatever their area of expertise is. That's attractive to the active component. We make it even easier for them. We're talking passports, theater entry. Those are pipeline requirements that our golfs have to have met, right? To be considered, we call it readiness level one, meaning you are ready to go out the door. You've got to have all that stuff ready to go. If we get the call from The 97th, in our case, in Indo -PACOM, we need somebody in Papua New Guinea with some of the 38 Sierra governance officers. We're ready to go. 00:24:02    BRADFORD HUGHES are pipeline 00:24:19    BRIAN HANCOCK New Guinea with some of the 38 Sierra governance officers. We're ready to go. So I think if we can get there with them, it could be interesting. 00:24:29    BRADFORD HUGHES I can't wait. You know, not only is that an amazing offer to our active COMPO -1 forces and to those nation and to... the country teams and the other players that are involved. And I know many of us have worked for some of these NGOs as well that are on the ground and have good relationships there as well. Sure, a win across the board, but this is also exciting for civil affairs soldiers. When you're at the water cool after coming back from doing reserve duty, what does the average reservist going to talk about? And then compare it to what the folks on your team can talk about, right? It just seems like a great high impact way to do time in the military. And it's a talent management tool for sure. Yeah. Okay, just a couple minutes left. I'd like to end by just talking a little bit more about the developments within the 38 Gulf, kind of where we are with that program. Years ago, when it was started, there was no direct commission program. And honestly, there wasn't a really good progression pyramid for folks coming in. mid or perhaps even early in their military career to serve a whole career and have a progression path to keep moving forward within that space. I understand there's been some changes. Can you just update the community? You know, where is the 38 golf program today? I'm sure there's many folks who listen to the types of things that your team does, who'd be interested in joining. Where is that program today? And how can folks who are interested in this, join this exciting career field. 00:26:08    BRIAN HANCOCK career field. And Brian, jump in if you want me to expound on anything here. So there are currently three ways to enter the program. You can branch transfer. And that's what I did. I was a career conventional army aviator, felt the pull into CA and generated a 38 goals packet. I was boarded and then I branched transferred into civil affairs. So we get A lot of folks that way. Again, they're coming, they're already in uniform and they're coming from other branches. An exciting development is we are now starting to commission enlisted members who may have an advanced degree and they're going to receive a commission as a captain, assuming they successfully negotiate. So that is a great opportunity for enlisted members. And we've just seen several get made. I think, you know, one or two as of late. Right. I think what's exciting for this audience is the direct commission program. So there are experts out there. And I like to say we're looking for unicorns, titans of industry, people that can really make a difference. They're great Americans and they're coming in off the street. They're receiving a commission as a captain, but based on what kind of degrees you hold and things like that, 00:27:08    SPEAKER_00 So there 00:27:22    BRIAN HANCOCK based on what kind of degrees you hold and things like that, you could come in as a major or even a lieutenant colonel, only seen major, but lieutenant colonel is not. of the realm of the possible. But what's interesting though, is those folks come in, they still have to be willing. Now you're part of the army. There's some non -negotiable trainings that you have to go through. We call it the direct commission course. That's six weeks at Fort Benning and then a host of other things to get you mission ready. But we want those unicorns, those folks that want to give back, come in as a 38 golf and truly make a difference. I really want to put, stop this again. I mentioned the power of the network. I think we're bringing in experts, but we're also bringing in their network. Right. For example, I'm a 38 Gulf Foxtrot. I'm a transportation officer. I can engage in aviation operations. I can talk about risk, revenue, and safety. Do I know a lot about road, rail, or maritime infrastructure? No, but I know who to call. Right. And - Just in time. That's what - Yeah. Yeah. It's that network. Right. So - We're leveraging as a 38 golf program broadly the respective networks across the cohort. And that's really what gives us power. And a last thing I wanted to mention here is I think it's helpful for golfs coming in to think of themselves as it's almost like the warrant officer, if you will. So warrant officers in aviation or working intelligence systems, they're kind of just doing one thing, right? That's their military track. And I think that's the, although nobody really says it, I think that's the intent behind the golf program, right? You're coming in as an energy expert, right? That's kind of what you're going to do throughout your career. And I think if you come at it with that frame of mind, 00:29:17    BRADFORD HUGHES frame of mind, that's helpful. Right. You know, I especially think some of those senior people that you were alluding to, and I'm glad that you mentioned that because there's not a lot of places in the army. where those more senior folks who are patriotic, who want to have an adventure. We live so long with modern medicine. Most folks have three whole careers now. This is an opportunity for those folks. I'm getting a little bit older. And one of the reasons I do the podcast is because I have a desire. I've been spending my whole life accumulating knowledge and experience. I figure at least 2 % of it's useful. I want to give it back. But I give it back to the community. Right. Those folks that you mentioned would be willing to as well. And we bumped into, you know, congressmen and other folks that we work with in civil affairs who were attracted to that. So depending on where you are at your walk in life, don't look at yourself and say, well, you know, I'm over 40. I couldn't possibly join the military. Well, that's not true at all. There are opportunities for those who want to serve the nation and who want to serve the people of the world because we go out and to where they are, persistent forward, helping them in their native environment. And I think ultimately we probably learn more than they do from that exchange, but it is an awesome thing to do. And I will tell you that our pacing threat. The Chinese, they don't fear our military so much. They have a plan to deal with that. May not be tomorrow. But what they absolutely cannot replicate and are always concerned about is our ability to build alliances, to build partnerships, to make friends. People want to work with us. And the 38 golf program is part of that ambassadorial flow. Well said. So I really appreciate you coming on the show today. Do you have any final thoughts you want to share? 00:29:39    SPEAKER_00 an opportunity 00:31:04    BRIAN HANCOCK Hey, Lieutenant Colonel Hancock, I appreciate your time today. It was fun to reminisce about some of the things that we did together from IRT in 2020, and then who can forget RIMPAC 2018. Those were good times for sure, but truly appreciate your time. And please know, and for the audience, the 38 Golf Program is really, I'm passionate about it. I think it moves the needle for Arming Reserve Civil Affairs. It's truly an important program. 00:31:36    BRADFORD HUGHES Thank you very much for your time. Colonel Hughes, really appreciate you coming on and giving the audience some information that is in high demand. I know we'll be hearing from you again, hopefully, when you pin your first star. I pray for that. And luckily, you'll be moving forward and in our position to be able to shape some of these things that we talked about. Thank you for coming on the show. Thank you very much. All right. Bye -bye. See you. 00:32:02    Close Thanks for listening. If you get a chance, please like and subscribe and rate the show on your favorite podcast platform. Also, if you're interested in coming on the show or hosting an episode, email us at capodcasting at gmail .com. I'll have the email and CA Association website in the show notes. And now, most importantly, to those currently out in the field, working with a partner nation's people or leadership to forward U .S. relations, thank you all for what you're doing. This is Jack, your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes. One CA podcast.  

Brian Hancock hosts Brad Hughes in a two-part discussion on how Civil Affairs and the 38G civil society programs are helping the U.S. in its foreign policy outreach in the Pacific. This is part one of two.    Brad Hughes Bio: https://www.linkedin.com/in/bradfordhughes/ Brian Hancock Bio: https://www.linkedin.com/in/brian-j-hancock/ One CA is a product of the civil affairs association  and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership. We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.  To contact the show, email us at CApodcasting@gmail dot com or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org Special thanks to DrSaxLove for the sample of "Nearness of You." Found on Cocktail Party - 40s Music. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dvH-nbindvk ------ Credits Sponsor: Civil Affairs Association Host: Brian Hancock Showrunner / editor: Jack Gaines --- 00:00:07    Introduction Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at capodcasting at gmail dot com. or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www .civilaffairsassos .org. I'll have those in the show notes. 00:00:47    BRIAN HANCOCK Welcome to One Civil Affairs Podcast. I'm Lieutenant Colonel Brian Hancock, and I'll be your host for the session. Today we have with us Colonel Bradford Hughes to discuss innovative training for civil affairs functional specialty teams, or FXSP. building partner capacity, and military governance experimentation. Colonel Hughes, welcome to the show. 00:01:07    BRADFORD HUGHES It is great to be here, and I am excited to talk about the civil affairs and specifically initiatives with the 38 Golf Program. 00:01:16    BRIAN HANCOCK Oh, outstanding. That is one of the greatest developments that's happened to civil affairs in a long time, and there's a huge appetite out there to hear more about that, and I know you will definitely do that justice. I've had the pleasure of working with you. Some in the audience haven't. Let me tell everybody a little bit about you. Colonel Bradford Hughes is a 38 Gulf military government specialist, often likes to refer to himself as Brad. He is skilled at building partnerships, articulating a vision, and positioning value. As a former Master Army Aviator and UH -60 maintenance test pilot, he led multiple combat and humanitarian relief deployments across the world. Colonel Hughes serves as the government functioning specialty chief of the 351 Civil Affairs Command in Mountain View, California, where his team employs a civilian acquired skills and operates in the interagency intergovernmental environment to deepen the influence across the Pacific. He is also a certified gender advisor, leading efforts with the command to mainstream gender perspectives. into planning and operations. Just a quick reminder to the audience that all the remarks by Colonel Hughes and myself are solely ours. All right. Now, it's been several years since we have worked together. You apparently have been very busy there building an amazing functional specialty team at 351 and developing the 38 golf program. 00:02:50    BRADFORD HUGHES Yeah, for sure. And before we get started, I just wanted to take a moment and really thank the previous commanding general for the 351st Civil Affairs Command, Brigadier General Retired Chris Zubek. Yeah. His focus was getting civil affairs capabilities across the international dateline so we can execute in the Pacific. With our new CG, that's Brigadier General Brian Horton, I think we've achieved this. And we are working towards refining how we engage and truly leverage the value proposition of Army Reserve Civil Affairs. And also, I wanted to give a shout out to Colonel Chris Cray and his 364 Frontier Civil Affairs Brigade and his team's work with Pacific Frontier 24. 00:03:37    BRIAN HANCOCK Outstanding. Good things happening everywhere. The Pacific is the biggest place in DOPECON, the largest combatant command. And unfortunately, it's not full of countries that are all identical. In fact, they're all unique. So it's a very challenging problem set. Love to hear what's going on. I know we're going to be talking more about that. For those who are just tuning in, can you tell the audience a little bit about your role at 351 Civil Affairs Command as the functioning special team chief? You know, what's a duty day like for you? 00:04:10    BRADFORD HUGHES for you? I do consider myself an entrepreneur. I direct operations for an all on -demand helicopter charter company. We serve an interesting portfolio of clients from Tesla and University of Texas Athletics. There's another hookup for you, NASCAR, and even the San Antonio Spurs. I also do work as a technology transfer consultant where I provide clients with intellectual property management and we make market -based recommendations. I bring that up because the cross -cutting component really between my civilian and military roles is that I think I'm competent at identifying trends and seizing opportunity. And with that, the opportunity to advance civil affairs, the enterprise at every opportunity is incredibly important for myself into recruiting and retaining top talent. I like to think I function as a brand ambassador. I strive to build readiness by developing innovative opportunities that build cross -component, joint, and combined synergy. All efforts lead to continued refinement of the government function specialty team, FXSP interoperability across KCOM, music KPOC, and unified action partners. So together, that's what gives me great satisfaction. 00:05:31    BRIAN HANCOCK And that's a critical mission. I also love the way that you brought up the critical civilian skill sets that are required here. Whether it's large -scale combat operations, coin operations other than war, there is a desperate need for us to interface effectively with host nations, civil authority. That's where strategic victory lies. We'll talk a little bit more about that later. And you have just impeccable civilian credentials. I really wish on our board process that they would consider our civilian credentials as reservists, but perhaps something for human capital management in the future, but certainly they're essential for a 38 golf. Of course. 00:06:13    BRADFORD HUGHES And I think we'll talk a little bit about this towards the end, but getting back to the golf program, it's currently structured with multiple skill identifiers. There's 18 of them. that target specific skill sets nested within various government function specialty areas. So these can range from commerce to archivists, transportation, and everything in between. So the Gulf program is a Army Reserve program that complements the active component. And military government officers, yes, subject matter experts, they're technically qualified, their experience, and a little bit of the company line here. They advise, enable, and assist commanders, and importantly, direct civilian counterparts with stabilizing and providing governance expertise. One thing I've always stressed is I think that capability should reside at the KCOMs just based on strategic significance of the goals, but there is force structure down to the battalions. But again, we, the 351, we try to pull that capability up to the KCOMs. I think that's where we can truly leverage the expertise of the goals. 00:07:22    BRIAN HANCOCK Yeah, that makes sense to me. I know Brigadier General Zubik, who has recently departed, he developed a plan for digital reconnaissance, digital reachback, leveraging some of those capabilities at Echelon. So it makes sense to house things there, especially if there's a capability that can be delivered in time and space as required to all of the maneuvering elements. So that makes good sense to me. Let me ask you a little bit about this. I've had the pleasure, you know, working here at a four -star command. Lieutenant General Jody Daniels comes by periodically. Sometimes she does a town hall, and then she presents new information. One time she came out and talked about one of her recent publications, very, very interesting, a very accomplished senior leader. And one of the things that she's been saying is she wants our TPU, our troop program units in the reserve, to conduct novel training. And to experiment, she's not married to the traditional one weekend a month, two weeks a year type of battle assembly format. Now, I understand that you have done something with that at 351, that you've embraced that opportunity. Can you tell the audience a little bit about your efforts there? And, you know, if you're willing, share some results. 00:08:37    BRADFORD HUGHES Yeah, absolutely. And I will say that resource allocation, to me, is negatively impacting Campo 3 or Army Reserve culture. As I mentioned, the golf program, we recruit experts from across the country. And we may have somebody on the East Coast that's interested in what the 351 is doing in the Indo -Pacific AOR. But because of the reduction in resources, I think many are starting to feel a little bit underserved. And because of these reductions, we've acknowledged the challenges. And now we collectively, our team comes to Mountain View once per quarter. And we call that a traditional non -battle assembly approach. We feel that this approach may become the norm for both use of KPOP and really across the Army Reserve. And I could get into the blocking and tackling of it. We look at it as a three -legged stool organized around fiscal year quarters. So looking at the three months per quarter, month one, we come in for mandatory collective training. And that's where we come in for the non -negotiable. Training events. So thank ranges, ACFT, things where we need full -time support. And we have some of the non -negotiable FXSP events like heart training, disaster management, JAUC is through USAID. That's month one. We hit those non -negotiables. Month two, and I think collectively we learned coming out of the pandemic that individual readiness, professional development, things like that. are easier to accomplish at your home of record. It doesn't make sense to come to Mountain View to do an SGLV or DD93, PHAs, stuff like that. You can get after that at the house. Well, isn't IPSA supposed to make that go away? That's a good question. I will defer. I'm still waiting. I've got to defer to the human resources experts for that. While you're at the house, continuing education needed for professional credentialing, networking, knowledge building, all that stuff can be done at the house. Or research tasks. I think you spotlighted that a little bit. Initiatives or projects that we're trying to advance. And then quickly, the month three, we call it EPO driven. So an EPO is an exercise planning officer or NCO. And either he or she will make a determination on the location. We assign an EPO to an exercise or engagement, and it's that person's responsibility to do everything for theater entry to get that team downrange. So the EPO is going to make the call, hey, does that bring us to Mountain View? Yeah. Where we need full -time support or access to systems or maybe an alternate location to secure official passports. There may be SIF or Sarnet access someplace else other than Mountain View where it makes sense for the team. participating in whatever the exercise or engagement is to go there. Stakeholder coordination as examples. So three -legged stool broken down by fiscal year quarters. That's how we're getting after it. 00:11:48    BRIAN HANCOCK That makes sense. I was worried you're going to hit me with Colonel Lykes' ins ways and means on that stool there, but glad that it went in a different direction. And thanks also for mentioning the importance of the government passport. Many folks out there in the military, at least in Campo 3, don't have the opportunity to travel as far and wide as some of the civil affairs soldiers do. And many of the nations they're going to, a government passport is actually not required. But many countries, especially some of these small island nations in the Pacific, most of Africa, etc., you're not going to get there on a government mission without a government passport. And I know that you've cracked the code on how to get that. If an emergent mission comes up, I can send the team pretty fast, 00:12:32    BRADFORD HUGHES can't you? We can. And we cracked the code last year and then things change. I will tell you that the majority of team members have their passports, but then we'll get caught up short with a visa requirement. And suddenly we've got to expedite that in order to get the team down range. I will mention too, just as a cost savings measure, we'll also encourage team members to drill with neighboring units. National Guard in Arizona, they may be conducting an ACIT. We have soldiers who are close. They'll go there and execute. And it also allows us to broadcast the capabilities of the 38 Gulf, whether it's to the Guard, other compo three units, active duty. So we look at it as an opportunity for folks to showcase their expertise to a new audience. 00:13:18    BRIAN HANCOCK And that's fantastic. As you're well aware in civil affairs, we don't have lieutenant level positions. We're always having to take folks from an entry MLS and invite them to the team and get them to cross over. So it's fantastic that you're spreading, you know, evangelizing the awesome mission that we have. It's amazing when you tell people the things that you get to do at Battle Assembly as a civil affairs soldier versus the things that they do. Oftentimes the program just sells itself. Yeah, for sure. And I don't think the money situation is getting any better. 00:13:49    BRADFORD HUGHES don't think the money situation is getting any better. And we'll continue with this non -traditional BTA approach. It's working for us. And I really think it's going to be the new model. 00:13:59    BRIAN HANCOCK be the new model. Outstanding. I suspect we're going to see more of that from other units moving forward. Let's switch gears for a second. I know many of the folks in the audience are not aware of that secret gem for training we have in Combo 3, known as innovative readiness training. IRT. I understand that 351 Civil Affairs Command actually has been heavily involved in the IRT program and a number of missions. In fact, I believe your team has even won some awards for IRT missions. Can you tell the audience out there, what is an IRT mission? How do you access that? How do you find those opportunities? And who can participate? For instance, can U .S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs participate in IRT missions? Can non -civil affairs units who may be listening to this podcast, can they take advantage of IRT missions? 00:14:51    BRADFORD HUGHES I think IRT is open to the reserve component writ large, so COMPO2 and COMPO3. And I think, don't hold me to it, but I think it's also open to other reserve formations. So yeah, the Marine Corps could be a Navy Air Force. But it is a reserve activity. And the Office of Secretary of Defense, OSD, has established the Innovative Readiness Training Civil -Military Partnership Program. We call it IRT for short. And for us, civil affairs, it offers us to exercise government function specialty nets. You know, so the things we need to train on and enhance readiness. And like you mentioned, we first caught wind of IRT in 2020, so in the throes of the pandemic. And there was a community in the Illusion, specifically the community of Unalaska, that wanted to bring in civil affairs practitioners to do an assessment of their community. Kind of a commerce play. The community was divesting or wants to divest from fishing and also try to leverage the national security implications of that region. So we went there in 2020. And I appreciate the shout out. We did win an award that year for the Civ Military Partnership of the Year. And now we're back this year, FY24, and the Arctic and Russia, China, and the United States have considerable interest in the region and the expansion of northern sea realms. There's a nexus there for cooperation or a flashpoint for conflict. So that's why we're there. We're focused on the central importance of Alaska and the Aleutians. Right. The critical role of infrastructure and the grid power competition. And it's really being viewed through our lens as government function specialty practitioners. 00:16:44    BRIAN HANCOCK Speaking of conflict, while you were there, I seem to recall I saw a news article and also some imagery that. Russian naval units actually came into the territorial waters of the Aleutians there and forced our American shipping out of those waters so that they could conduct military exercises. So it seems like not only do multiple nations have interests there, some of them are burning pretty aggressive in that space. 00:17:22    BRADFORD HUGHES The activities by those players, our competitors, really have the community concerned and other stakeholders larger than Alaska, obviously. And we're there to provide them the direction. They're challenged with governance. It's just interesting in that region. It's very tribal. We were invited by the Kwajalein tribe. It's a native tribe in Alaska, and they collaborate with the city. So you've got the city and how it's organized, and then they also have a corporation. So they call it the Trilad. And from a governance perspective, we're there sharing best practices on how they can collaborate better. Mention private partner partnerships with respect to grant writing, finding financing, things like that for projects that they want to advance. We can help them. realize some of those things. So it's been interesting. We were back up there in February of this year. I went on that trip. And then we had two of our energy officers there last month. And as a matter of fact, we had a call yesterday. They're working, when I say they, the community on a interesting geothermal project that's tied to the Mercutian volcano. It's an active volcano. Part of the island chain. They want to tap into that. So if that Yeah. Geothermal project is built. You know, what does that mean for the Navy, for the Coast Guard? Would they be willing to establish more of a permanent presence? And that's something the community would like to see. 00:18:57    BRIAN HANCOCK community would like to see. Given the activity of adversaries in that region, which I suspect is going to continue to increase with the melting of the polar ice caps and that northern sea route is becoming more and more accessible, the Alaskan Coast Guard is overwhelmed. They have more. disasters and rescues than any state in the United States by a good majority, plus a greater coastline overall to manage when you include the outlying islands. So they're heavily tapped. They're probably not going to be in a position to stop aggressive navies. And you know why I love the army. I think we probably need some help from our friends in the Navy to keep our territorial borders safe there. 00:19:42    BRADFORD HUGHES The community is really trying to position themselves as an attractive basing option for the Navy. And then with just a little bit more color on the IRT program, I think what we're doing as civil affairs practitioners is unique. Typically, IRT, you'll see it on the southwest border. You'll see it on CONUS -based tribal lands. It's nurses, doctors administering vaccines, or there could be small engineering projects, think building a road. something like that. I think what we're doing, civil affairs, we're operating as a consultancy and we're providing in partial perspective that second set of eyes that the community is interested in to advance things that are important to know. 00:20:25    BRIAN HANCOCK that are important to know. Yeah, outstanding. I mean, there's always one of the areas I was kind of a little bit jealous of the National Guard because they got to do a lot of missions to support American citizens within our own territory. But in COMPO3, we have that same opportunity here. through the IRT program. And I know we're going to be hearing more about some of the successes of your team in that area in the years to come. Let's start with what every ground pounder loves to talk about, which is the role of the military in competition. I'm sure you saw February 10th, 2023, the joint staff published the joint concept for competing. This was actually a landmark document as it represents. one of the first publications in a DACA format, which recognizes the conflicts that the United States and our allies are actually in and will be in for the foreseeable future, rather than the World War II -style conflicts that we have built the force to win. Now, given the Joint Chief's Title X responsibility, one would expect a host of changes across doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, and education. personnel, facilities, and policy to come from this. What has actually happened is silence from the military community. Very little change has been initiated by this revolutionary document. The joint concept for competing recognizes that the strategy of our adversaries is to win without fighting. So, building large combat formations to go into blunt contact may not be the best investment if that is really their strategy. And when I think about this concept of win without fighting, I have flashbacks to that visual capital analysis video that you presented actually years ago at the Civil Affairs Association annual convention. In the video, it showed how through trade agreements, economic investment, etc., China was reshaping the global order in their favor. Do you remember that? 00:22:27    BRADFORD HUGHES Yeah, I do. It was innovation as a weapon system. And Brian, before we leave IRT, I've got to let the audience know that you were part of that initial engagement in 2020. And that award is just as much yours as it was the entire team. So if I hadn't, thank you again for that support. It's been a pleasure. Thank you. For sure. I'll try to frame my answer through a 38 golf lens and really. You talk about the future and as the army looks to the future and considers its ability to perform military government operations. So that's what we do as 38 golfs. The army has got to embrace a pool of golf personnel. This is important. We're civilian component oriented, culturally attuned and engagement focus. I like to consider it a cohort of experts with a strong understanding of stabilization activities. Yeah. And I think that gets back to the winning without fighting. Today's military government specialist has the tools required to help the army gain the critical governance support capacity it needs in the face of emerging challenges to the current global order and the geostrategic nature of our competition. And this is where I am building and pushing the team to advance this critical capability is where I hold great passion. And I recognize that this is the six inches in front of our face right now. And I think we've been successful. 00:23:51    BRIAN HANCOCK I know we're going to talk about some of those specific successes coming up. Continuing to talk about competition, we're going to be in competition 99 % of the time. Sure. We both know that 99 % of the military's resources, including the Army, is not directed towards competition. In competition, it's generally not acceptable to, you know, bomb folks. And the reality is, in the military, it's often easier to drop a JDAM on something than it is to send out a text or a tweet. That's something that I know we're working on. But if we're really going to compete, if we're going to defeat a strategy of winning without fighting, then we have to be able to inoculate civil populations to the type of mis - and disinformation, the type of propaganda, the type of shaping. the type of casus bellies used to invite war, and that's going to require a lot of non -lethal capabilities, including what we used to refer to as information -related capabilities. Within that construct, civil affairs is one of the few military capabilities that's actually optimized for non -lethal influence effects. But I certainly saw the latest R -Struck was published not long ago, and when I took a look at that, at least in the soft cuts, what I'm seeing is that the Army is continuing to buy up risk in competition by continuing its slow program of divestiture of civil affairs forces. We've lost, for instance, all of our Comp 1 civil affairs forces as of FY26. This seems to me to be a disconnect, actually, in building a force capable of defeating the enemy's actual strategy versus what we're resourcing. If you see a disconnect, Why do you think that is? 00:25:47    BRADFORD HUGHES You know, it's unfortunate that civil affairs is unfunded to the level it is. And I like to think of, I've got to remain positive. And I like to think of a value proposition, again, tying it back to the golf program, where we can realize that value proposition is building partner capacity. That is the vital tool for the U .S. to compete with great power adversaries. We are choosing to engage where adversaries do not. Security partnerships, alliances, as you just pointed out, they're unique and complex, adaptive systems. And you kicked off with this, especially with some of the smaller Pacific Island countries. We've been across COFA and we've seen that these countries display certain characteristics at the local level that are non -linear. Display system -wide emergent properties that our cohort, they have the systems -based expertise, we think at least, to implement building partner capacity through security cooperation, which contributes to the local and regional stability that we need to be successful in this period of competition. And it importantly adds credence to integrated deterrence. And that is the value proposition of the golf program. Civil affairs, again, we are obviously civil affairs practitioners. That's how I think we can be good partners and have meaningful impact. 00:27:16    BRIAN HANCOCK impact. I'll let you continue your thought in one second. And then, of course, I'm going to ask you about some examples of some of those real world missions that you're doing to these small nations. I know the audience wants to hear about that. It just seems to me, though, that we are very challenged institutionally as an organization to. 00:27:36    BRIAN HANCOCK understand what shaping is outside of lobbing artillery rounds. Because that's winning without fighting, right? That's Sun Tzu's bloodless ultimate victory. For sure. He is defeating the enemy first, then going to war, right? The non -lethal capabilities of which CA is in high demand, it's very popular, very well received by post nations and partners in most cases, is one of those few capabilities. And it allows us to do those invisible shaping fires of influence that lead to things like access basing and overflight that help us set the theater for conflict if it occurs, for robust alliances, which are very powerful at deterring aggression. If Ukraine had been in NATO, they wouldn't be attacked and in so much difficulty right now. It's fantastic for generation of goodwill. It makes economic sense. All of these things have a nexus in positive, non -lethal influence. Now, with that said, can you tell the audience, some of which are going to be folks who don't necessarily believe in influence, that they believe in hard power, what are some of the effects that you have seen from what amounts to non -lethal fires that you've been doing in DOPECOM to generate positive influence for the United States and for our allies. 00:29:09    BRADFORD HUGHES You know, I've got three recent engagements as of this calendar year to talk about, but I think where our team makes money is we're able to identify a community -based organization who they're... informal influencers and pick the country, right? And who's to say that when needed, one of these community -based organizations, they may have the ability to deliver results if ABO becomes an issue. I'm not saying that's the case. We're very vocal in some regards. And then we're meeting with ministers and others, but we're trying to build relationships across the spectrum. And you never really know when you might need to cash in that relationship. So I think that's important. 00:29:58    BRIAN HANCOCK Yeah, but you have to invest before you can reap, right? And I think that's what I'm hearing your civil affairs teams are doing out there in the field. For sure. 00:30:06    BRADFORD HUGHES And I think that also gets back to compo three, because we just stay on our positions a little bit longer. There's not as much churn as the active component sees. True. We're able to... build these relationships, right? It could be as simple as a phone call or a text or WhatsApp to a partner in the Philippines, a partner in Palau, like, hey, how's it going? And that's meaningful. It goes a long way and I think it goes further than a lot of people think.   00:00:52    BRIAN HANCOCK For sure, and I think that also gets back to Compo 3 because we just stay on our positions a little bit longer. There's not as much churn as the active component sees. We're able to build these relationships, right? It could be as simple as a phone call or a text or WhatsApp to a partner in the Philippines, a partner in Palau, like, hey, how's it going? And that's meaningful. It goes a long way and I think goes further than a lot of people think. Just checking in, keeping that relationship top of mind. 00:01:21    BRADFORD HUGHES top of mind. And I understand these missions go well beyond that, actually giving medical treatment, helping set up hospitals and clinics. building out governance capacity. And I'm sure you can give the audience many other examples of stuff your team's been involved in. Yeah, for sure. 00:01:38    BRIAN HANCOCK We have three team members right now in the Philippines. So we have our ag business team, 38 golf, six uniforms. So they're experts in ag business. And within that group, we have a veterinarian. who's working some animal husbandry issues in the Philippines, and we have some soil experts working with the Filipinos to increase yield. I'm not entirely sure what the crop is, but that's important and that's really meaningful. Absolutely. There's been an interesting mission regarding art repatriation. I don't want to get too deep into it, but there was some art looted. Monuments, man. Monuments, man. So we have a six -victor cohort, heritage preservation. There was some art that was looted during World War II that belongs to Okinawa. The art was discovered in the Boston area. Very long story short, we've repatriated it. And this is across all the KCOMs. This was driven by use of KPOC. But we are sending a practitioner back next week. For the repatriation ceremony, the artists landed in a museum in Okinawa, and the people there are excited to have this art come back. The FBI Arts Crime Division has been involved with this, the Air Force, and a host of others. And we're also sending teams back to Palau and the Marshall Islands to work on CTIP. That's countering trafficking in persons. That is a very important issue. For both these countries, I would put Micronesia in there as well to complete the three COVID nations. We send our lawyers there to talk the legalities of what CTIP is, how to prevent it, and we'll get down to local law enforcement strategies, things like that. But the CTIP training resonates with the people of these countries. Absolutely. This is very visible. 00:03:29    BRADFORD HUGHES very visible. It touches lives. It builds relationships. And when you look at business strategy, It's also a barrier to entry for our adversaries because they can't easily replicate those missions, can they? I'm glad you mentioned that. 00:03:45    BRIAN HANCOCK glad you mentioned that. We are choosing to engage where our adversaries are choosing not. 00:03:50    BRADFORD HUGHES Yeah. And that's outstanding. Let's talk a little bit more about United Action Partners. Part of that shaping I was talking about earlier is going to be building their capacity and capability, not only to inoculate them from mis and disinformation. but to help them weather the effects of climate change and build resiliencies so that they're less vulnerable to adversary coercion and many other things that can come their way. Now, I know you've been heavily involved in this both publicly and privately. I'm just going to make a wild guess that some of the things that we would have to do if we wanted to. continue to build those UAP relationships. We're going to have to start at home. We have to get us the right expertise. There just aren't enough 38 golfs to go around, as you mentioned, but we can expand the capability because the 38 golfs we do have are well -known and can help us foster constructive relationships and agreements with places like University of Fresno, which has an amazing agriculture school, a number of things, Texas A &M. very wide set of sciences there that could be made available to us. And once we have that kind of expertise behind the 38 golf teams, then we're able to expand into many of the relief opportunities that that community is going and humanitarian assistance disaster relief, which sadly is a growing business. There's more disasters than ever, every year, it seems. There are ever, ever greater needs that need to be filled. And then finally, it culminates in full -on bolstering of those foreign partners. Whether that could lead to ABO or anything else is open for debate, but it seems to me that the benefits are many. Now, what do you think about this? From your experience, how should we be going about building up our United Action partners? 00:05:43    BRIAN HANCOCK The way I'll answer this is to frame it again, start. portfolio missions. And these are the mission sets we use to amplify the value proposition of the team and our stabilizing impact. So if I'm going to do anything before I leave, beautiful. One thing is evolve our partnership with US Army Pacific Security Cooperation Division, specifically to drive our inclusion in campaign plan tasking mechanism. This is a challenge. We have been able to support Army Service component commands, 1st Corps and 8th Army. We have been active working with them. But our portfolio of mission sets, there's six or seven of them. Women, peace, and security is important to us. The innovative readiness training we discussed previously, the disaster response exercises in exchange, the injuries, great opportunity. We have a 38 Gulf 5 Yankee that's an emergency management expert. It's an opportunity to deploy those individuals. Our civil control lawfare programs, like the attorney working CTIP issues across COFA, we have really found tremendous value using our ILOs or international law officers to run trainings. And then I'm going to take this to the three -legged stool. When we're at home, not in Mountain View, the analytic capacity to... do country vulnerability assessments, providing a think tank -like service. We've done so recently for First Corps, for USER PAC. That is something that the 38 Golfs can immediately get around and get it deliverable out within the constraints of a battle assembly weekend. Found some value there. You were talking about the university partnerships, so supporting and advancing USER Cape Box partnership with academia and industry. That's the reachback capability that just really expands what the Gulfs can do. So you mentioned Fresno State, Texas A &M. We have bound by MOUs. Money's not exchanging hands. It's codified in tech. But we have MOUs with Notre Dame, Rice University, University of Wisconsin -Madison, the Milwaukee Water Council, and the Smithsonian. And we're working on others. But the reach back that those university partners give us, it's tremendous. 00:08:08    BRADFORD HUGHES And not only the knowledge that that represents, but I can only imagine the social and political networks that come with those field experts. You want to open doors. You want to get through bureaucracy. You want to get something done. That just sounds like an amazing resource. 00:08:25    BRIAN HANCOCK an amazing resource. It's huge. As a matter of fact, University of Wisconsin, Madison is hosting an event for our natural resources folk, and it'll be in the Madison area later this May. We have civil affairs practitioners really coming across the enterprise, active duty sending some. COPPA III is going to make up the lion's share of the attendees. But it's important, and it's a way for the universities as well, that relationship with civil affairs. It unlocks corporate money for them, which is important, and that's money we can also use to conduct trainings and then potentially deploy. university partners, experts in their own right, obviously, to engagements overseas. 00:09:08    BRADFORD HUGHES I want to put on my mad scientist hat here for a moment, you know, looking at this expertise that's aligned, looking at the complexity of the worldwide mission we have to conduct, which is progressively an urbanized space, and recognizing that there's a capability gap, not just a resource gap, but a capability gap here. The answer should be experimentation, right, and development of new capabilities through total Army analysis or small business innovation research, the various opportunities, grant writing, et cetera, that are out there. So looking at experimentation, I think one of the most important things we need to figure out how to do, and not just for the Army, but for the Department of Defense, for the military, and for our military partners as well, is We're very good at achieving tactical success on the battlefield. We win most engagements that we fight. The challenge is achieving strategic objectives. Strategic success is a little bit more elusive. So it's kind of like we play chess and we take a lot of pieces, but we don't get checkmate oftentimes, it seems. And so we spend a lot of the time and energy getting all those pieces off the board. But at the end of the day, if we don't get that strategic win, it calls some of that. sacrifice into question. That's why years ago, I was very excited when the Department of Defense stood up and funded the Army Futures Commander AFC. I waited for about a year for them to get going. And then I called up a friend that you and I both know, I know six, won't mention his name on the air. And I asked him, okay, I said, hey, can you tell me a little bit about, you know, all this funding we see? Can you tell me? What portion of that is reserved for less than lethal capabilities and experimentation? Now, I still remember his response to this day. It's either really good or really bad, right? He turned to me, he says, Brian, 95 % of everything we work on in Army Futures Command is instantly lethal. But given their enormous budget, I didn't give up, sir. I'm still excited by this. Because I realized that that 5 % remaining actually amounted to probably 10 times the entire budget of use of KPOC. So I was very excited by this. So then I tried to ask him, how do I get access to that 5 % that's been allocated for non -lethal capabilities? And the girl raises his hand and he says, hold on there. The remaining 5 % is reserved for the laser that guides the bomb that kills you. It's just so deflated. I was so deflated when I heard that. Now, that was years ago. And I suspect that this 06 was using a little bit of hyperbole, of course, when he was explaining all this. But fast forward to today, I know you've been working with Army Futures Command. You've got a number of initiatives underway and in some promising initiatives there. Is this still the case? Do we still have a huge resource gap in the R &D pipeline, at least as far as AFC goes, to develop these critical capabilities we need for competition? Is that so? And if it is so, why do you think that remains the case? 00:12:32    BRIAN HANCOCK That's a great question. And before I get to it, I do want to share that this past Friday, I had the opportunity to see Admiral. Craven speak at the University of Texas. So, you know, he's a former chancellor at UT back 2014, 2015. And as we all know, he is the consummate, been there, done that guy throughout his military career. What's interesting, and I don't think a lot of people know this, Army Futures Command is here in Austin, as are the seven defense ex -organizations. So think AFWERX, NAVWAR. DIU, Defense Innovation Unit. But Admiral McRaven, when he was at UT as chancellor, he was a big part of what got Futures Command to Austin, not necessarily standing it up. I think that was already in play, but getting that four -star command here into Central Texas. But to get to your question, I think one of the greatest threats to national security seems to be the utter lack of appreciation. An ability to adapt to other cultures and build partner capacity. Who is workshopping? People operations, cultural adaptation, informal network building, and partner force collaboration. Everything that we're talking about, call it winning without fighting. Civil affairs is getting after it, kind of ad hoc. Futures Command is not right now. And my challenge to Futures Command is... They need to look harder and consider a cross -functional team dedicated to the human terrain. I think that's the answer. It doesn't have to be a full -blown cross -functional team. I get it. Civil affairs isn't like future vertical lift, nano, precision fires. But I think there shouldn't be some money apportioned to what is incredibly important. We are working some initiatives. We have them cooking with the Army Applications Lab. So that's the lab portion or branch of teachers command. It's a little too early to reveal what we're trying to do, but just having proximity, whether it's the 95th CD brigade, the CD proponent, having proximity to future's command to talk. Some of these things I think is incredibly important. And that's what we're hoping to advance. And I will share with you and hear for the podcast back in school at the University of Texas Hookham, the LBJ School of Public Affairs. Congratulations. Yeah, thank you. Be careful what you wish for. Uh -oh. But my capstone is tackling exactly this. Would Features Command consider some sort of cross -functional team? Again, cross -functional team like dedicated to Army CA. So I'll put it in writing. 00:15:23    BRADFORD HUGHES So I'll 00:15:24    BRIAN HANCOCK put it in 00:15:25    BRADFORD HUGHES writing. We'll see where it goes. I hope so. In the past, I've had those conversations with the Civil Affairs Proponency. The reality is their budget is small and they're very focused on tactical soft missions. Sure. The project was of a magnitude larger than they could tackle at the time. I certainly hope that that bears fruit. We think about it. Winning a battle isn't too difficult. But when you want to win a war. And, you know, I'm not sure what our national defense budget is up to now, something like $850 billion, the single largest, most discretionary part of the budget. And for that price tag, we certainly want to win wars when we engage them. And the reality is that unless you are able to defeat the will of your adversaries so that they effectively give up, because there's so many asymmetrical capabilities, so many powerful small weapons these days, unless you defeat that will. which exists in the human space, not outer space, you're never going to get there. You're never going to get there. And we need to invest in that. We need to understand that. You know, I'm reminded of H .R. McMaster's book, Dereliction of Duty, which I'm going through a second time now. And he talked about the Ivy League thinking that was happening in LBJ's administration at that time, where they assumed that the North Vietnamese had the same mental models, the same penchant for risk, were the same type of rational actor as Americans were, and they could, through the fallacy of mirroring, which we try and avoid in intelligence, which is assuming the enemy is just like us and will respond as we think they will or as we would, and they think as we think, they continued this policy of graduated pressure, oblivious to the fact that the enemy's penchant for risk was, Off the chart relative to ours and that their commitment to communist revolution and ideals was what was shaping everything for them. And there was no understanding or effort to understand that. And you know what happened in Vietnam, of course, that the results were disastrous. So how do we avoid that again? Will AFC help us, sir? Or are you going to have to go out and start a private consulting company and we'll tackle it from that angle? 00:17:50    BRIAN HANCOCK The private consulting company is always in the cards. So 2014 -15, the SCA proponent, they were working on something interesting. It was the IMSG, the Institute for Military Security Governance. And it kind of went back by the wayside. We're looking to potentially dust that off. And there's a lot of good stuff in IMSG. And that may be a foot in the door. to get closer to futures command? 00:18:23    BRADFORD HUGHES I certainly hope so. I know that TRADOC OEC, which has had some capabilities in this space, has been downsized a little bit. So definitely a little bit concerned with the future, not pessimistic on the future, but definitely concerned. We can correct the course if we can raise the message to the right audience. And I'm hoping through our combined efforts, we'll eventually get there. We've got a few minutes left. I did want to talk a little bit more about the functional specialty teams. Many of the people dialing in or listening in have access, either through reachback or they're in civil affairs formations themselves and can reach out and touch some FXSP members and interact with 38 Golfs. Let's talk best practices. How can they best employ their 38 Golfs and their functional specialty? Just for one, Quick example, back in 2020, at that time, you and I did some experimentation, actually, where we took the PhD little expertise that you had sitting in the FXSP, and I took myself and some of our civil analytics people sitting in the civil information management team, and we created a fusion organization. situation, the functional specialist teams, they collected all the relevant mission data because of their expertise and ability to know where to look and how to capture that. And then they analyzed and categorized it using their subject matter analysis and expertise. We then took it in the SIEM team, we normalized it, combined it with other data sets to make the N larger, perform some quantitative analysis, and then ended up producing some data. visualizations that were designed for military decision makers, which highlighted progress, managed critical information requirements, mission instates, et cetera. And we tested this together in RIMPAC 2020, and it seemed to work out pretty well. So that's one way that FXSPs can't be utilized in conjunction with a SIM or a CKI cell. But that was a few years ago. You've been at this business for a while. What are some of your other recommendations to the community on how they can effectively employ their FXSP formations to maximize that return on investment? 00:20:38    BRIAN HANCOCK Yeah, I'm glad you brought up Grimpact 2018. That was like a distant dream, but it was pretty exciting working with you and seeing the 351 deploy at that scale to Fort Island. I think it was a resounding success. As much as I hate to say it, what we've become good at within the 351 that I think sets us apart is we are good at spending other people's money. So if you want to engage the FXSP, if you have a customer that comes with money, irrespective of what the need is, the fact that travel can be covered, that's significant. Like I said, I hate to mention that, but it is the reality that we currently operate under. 00:21:27    BRADFORD HUGHES But it's still a win -win, though, because when you calculate the return on investment relative to the input dollars, I think it's pretty clear folks are getting their money on what they're spending. They're buying quality. I mean, the work I'm seeing from functional specialists is being printed in military review. I mean, this is the top journal in the country for military experts. 00:21:49    BRIAN HANCOCK We're chasing those that have money. There's a couple of interesting things that we're working on now. The portfolio items that I listed previously, most of that does come with lines of accounting. And that's what we need in order to travel. We always own the annual training, but we're looking for those travel dollars. But as of late this year, through Defense Security Cooperation Agency, through Institute for Security Governance, those folks... have a need to bring 38 golfs downrange with them. So ISG, I think, is under the umbrella of the Naval Postgraduate School. And through ISG, there's some things that we're going to try to do. Think some of the pieces of security. Think governance. There may be some commerce involved. Bring a golf in a support capacity to help with those experts as a block of instruction is delivered. I think an exciting... potential engagement for us. I was on a call last week with CA Puconet, the 95th CA Brigade was on the call and all the supported battalions. Through what's called section 333, it's an authority that the active duty CAS has access to. It's going to be a building partner capacity type play, but it enables them to potentially reach out to a Western forces and bring whatever that flavor of 38 Gulf is that they need, bring them with them. And what's been a challenge for the active component is accessing compo three. So we try to make it as easy as possible. The rules and regulations behind the RV reserve, if you're not in it, it is just confusing. You know, you got 15 days of AT, you can't do this, you can't do that. But if we can make it easy for them, hey, call Hughes, call Hancock. We need somebody for two or three days, probably longer than that. We need somebody for some stretch of time, less than 15 days to go down range and engage in whatever their area of expertise is. That's attractive to the active component. We make it even easier for them. We're talking passports, theater entry. Those are pipeline requirements that our golfs have to have met, right? To be considered, we call it readiness level one, meaning you are ready to go out the door. You've got to have all that stuff ready to go. If we get the call from The 97th, in our case, in Indo -PACOM, we need somebody in Papua New Guinea with some of the 38 Sierra governance officers. We're ready to go. 00:24:02    BRADFORD HUGHES are pipeline 00:24:19    BRIAN HANCOCK New Guinea with some of the 38 Sierra governance officers. We're ready to go. So I think if we can get there with them, it could be interesting. 00:24:29    BRADFORD HUGHES I can't wait. You know, not only is that an amazing offer to our active COMPO -1 forces and to those nation and to... the country teams and the other players that are involved. And I know many of us have worked for some of these NGOs as well that are on the ground and have good relationships there as well. Sure, a win across the board, but this is also exciting for civil affairs soldiers. When you're at the water cool after coming back from doing reserve duty, what does the average reservist going to talk about? And then compare it to what the folks on your team can talk about, right? It just seems like a great high impact way to do time in the military. And it's a talent management tool for sure. Yeah. Okay, just a couple minutes left. I'd like to end by just talking a little bit more about the developments within the 38 Gulf, kind of where we are with that program. Years ago, when it was started, there was no direct commission program. And honestly, there wasn't a really good progression pyramid for folks coming in. mid or perhaps even early in their military career to serve a whole career and have a progression path to keep moving forward within that space. I understand there's been some changes. Can you just update the community? You know, where is the 38 golf program today? I'm sure there's many folks who listen to the types of things that your team does, who'd be interested in joining. Where is that program today? And how can folks who are interested in this, join this exciting career field. 00:26:08    BRIAN HANCOCK career field. And Brian, jump in if you want me to expound on anything here. So there are currently three ways to enter the program. You can branch transfer. And that's what I did. I was a career conventional army aviator, felt the pull into CA and generated a 38 goals packet. I was boarded and then I branched transferred into civil affairs. So we get A lot of folks that way. Again, they're coming, they're already in uniform and they're coming from other branches. An exciting development is we are now starting to commission enlisted members who may have an advanced degree and they're going to receive a commission as a captain, assuming they successfully negotiate. So that is a great opportunity for enlisted members. And we've just seen several get made. I think, you know, one or two as of late. Right. I think what's exciting for this audience is the direct commission program. So there are experts out there. And I like to say we're looking for unicorns, titans of industry, people that can really make a difference. They're great Americans and they're coming in off the street. They're receiving a commission as a captain, but based on what kind of degrees you hold and things like that, 00:27:08    SPEAKER_00 So there 00:27:22    BRIAN HANCOCK based on what kind of degrees you hold and things like that, you could come in as a major or even a lieutenant colonel, only seen major, but lieutenant colonel is not. of the realm of the possible. But what's interesting though, is those folks come in, they still have to be willing. Now you're part of the army. There's some non -negotiable trainings that you have to go through. We call it the direct commission course. That's six weeks at Fort Benning and then a host of other things to get you mission ready. But we want those unicorns, those folks that want to give back, come in as a 38 golf and truly make a difference. I really want to put, stop this again. I mentioned the power of the network. I think we're bringing in experts, but we're also bringing in their network. Right. For example, I'm a 38 Gulf Foxtrot. I'm a transportation officer. I can engage in aviation operations. I can talk about risk, revenue, and safety. Do I know a lot about road, rail, or maritime infrastructure? No, but I know who to call. Right. And - Just in time. That's what - Yeah. Yeah. It's that network. Right. So - We're leveraging as a 38 golf program broadly the respective networks across the cohort. And that's really what gives us power. And a last thing I wanted to mention here is I think it's helpful for golfs coming in to think of themselves as it's almost like the warrant officer, if you will. So warrant officers in aviation or working intelligence systems, they're kind of just doing one thing, right? That's their military track. And I think that's the, although nobody really says it, I think that's the intent behind the golf program, right? You're coming in as an energy expert, right? That's kind of what you're going to do throughout your career. And I think if you come at it with that frame of mind, 00:29:17    BRADFORD HUGHES frame of mind, that's helpful. Right. You know, I especially think some of those senior people that you were alluding to, and I'm glad that you mentioned that because there's not a lot of places in the army. where those more senior folks who are patriotic, who want to have an adventure. We live so long with modern medicine. Most folks have three whole careers now. This is an opportunity for those folks. I'm getting a little bit older. And one of the reasons I do the podcast is because I have a desire. I've been spending my whole life accumulating knowledge and experience. I figure at least 2 % of it's useful. I want to give it back. But I give it back to the community. Right. Those folks that you mentioned would be willing to as well. And we bumped into, you know, congressmen and other folks that we work with in civil affairs who were attracted to that. So depending on where you are at your walk in life, don't look at yourself and say, well, you know, I'm over 40. I couldn't possibly join the military. Well, that's not true at all. There are opportunities for those who want to serve the nation and who want to serve the people of the world because we go out and to where they are, persistent forward, helping them in their native environment. And I think ultimately we probably learn more than they do from that exchange, but it is an awesome thing to do. And I will tell you that our pacing threat. The Chinese, they don't fear our military so much. They have a plan to deal with that. May not be tomorrow. But what they absolutely cannot replicate and are always concerned about is our ability to build alliances, to build partnerships, to make friends. People want to work with us. And the 38 golf program is part of that ambassadorial flow. Well said. So I really appreciate you coming on the show today. Do you have any final thoughts you want to share? 00:29:39    SPEAKER_00 an opportunity 00:31:04    BRIAN HANCOCK Hey, Lieutenant Colonel Hancock, I appreciate your time today. It was fun to reminisce about some of the things that we did together from IRT in 2020, and then who can forget RIMPAC 2018. Those were good times for sure, but truly appreciate your time. And please know, and for the audience, the 38 Golf Program is really, I'm passionate about it. I think it moves the needle for Arming Reserve Civil Affairs. It's truly an important program. 00:31:36    BRADFORD HUGHES Thank you very much for your time. Colonel Hughes, really appreciate you coming on and giving the audience some information that is in high demand. I know we'll be hearing from you again, hopefully, when you pin your first star. I pray for that. And luckily, you'll be moving forward and in our position to be able to shape some of these things that we talked about. Thank you for coming on the show. Thank you very much. All right. Bye -bye. See you. 00:32:02    Close Thanks for listening. If you get a chance, please like and subscribe and rate the show on your favorite podcast platform. Also, if you're interested in coming on the show or hosting an episode, email us at capodcasting at gmail .com. I'll have the email and CA Association website in the show notes. And now, most importantly, to those currently out in the field, working with a partner nation's people or leadership to forward U .S. relations, thank you all for what you're doing. This is Jack, your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes. One CA podcast.  

Today, we welcome Curtis Fox, author of Hybrid Warfare: The Russian Approach to Strategic Competition & Conventional Military Conflict, which is hot off the presses and in stores now.  We discuss the book's concepts and how they apply to current events. This is part one of two, so sit back, enjoy and come back next week for part two.  Link to Biography: https://www.linkedin.com/in/curtis-fox-mba-pmp-59b74223/ One CA Podcast aims to inspire people interested in working on-ground to forward U.S. foreign policy.  We bring in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences and recommendations for working the "last three feet" of foreign relations. ​Have a story to tell? Email us to either speak or guest-host at: [email protected] One CA Podcast is a product of the Civil Affairs Association: https://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/  Today's music is from the Disney film COCO and is a tribute to Ana Ofelia Murguia, whom I once met at a San Diego Latin Film Festival. Ana passed away this week at age 90, so this episode's music is her tribute. See you next week. Murguia: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/01/movies/ana-ofelia-murguia-coco-dead.html Link to music: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aJfoPUOUWBw --- Transcript for Episode I&II Introduction Welcome to the One CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. One CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at [email protected]. or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org. I'll have those in the show notes. 00:00:41 CURTIS FOX This is Curtis Fox. 00:00:43 JACK GAINES Curtis! Jack Gaines, how you doing? 00:00:45 CURTIS FOX Doing good, man. You're very punctual. 00:01:07 JACK GAINES Russia and Syria is a great example of a combination of, as you say, hybrid operations evolving into the full scale kinetic operations. 00:01:35 JACK GAINES For the listeners? Sure. I can't even pronounce them. And I did read them, but it would be better for you to describe them. I mean, 00:01:42 CURTIS FOX I mean, I tell you what, I speak Russian and they're still hard for me to pronounce. Maybe the first term we can go into is Maskarovka, because this is one of the Russians' favorite terms. And that literally just translates to camouflage. This is the hidden hand approach that the Russians have in history done so well. They don't want these things to be directly attributable to Moscow. 00:02:06 CURTIS FOX Just literally means activity. And what they mean by that is all of the little things that you do in the background to try to frustrate a target nation's institutions from responding to the intervention that you're conducting. You do not want them to be able to get forces in the field. Preferably, you'd have them stay in their barracks. And you want to set up blockades that frustrate public transit and encourage people to stay in their homes. Or maybe come out in mass protest, preferably in front of city hall or a police station so the political apparatus is frozen. And then vignettes at most is surprise. But it's surprise of, you know, like speedy movement. And what they mean by that is if they can use soft forces to rapidly deploy and establish some sort of a foothold on a limited number of key objectives. then they need the rapid maneuver of heavy ground forces to entrench those gains. This was the secret sauce that did so well in the Crimean annexation back in 2014. So the VDV, the Russian Airborne Services, those are really the elite trigger pullers of the Russian armed forces. And once a number of Spetsnaz battalions had advanced far enough up roads and blackaded positions coming into the peninsula, The VDB immediately used a number of secured local airstrips to move in forces in mass. And they spread rapidly throughout the peninsula and secured all those gains. 00:03:43 JACK GAINES You know, it kind of reminds me of Bosnia and Kosovo during the conflict and how it has resulted in Kosovo having a Bosnian shadow government in part of the border towns. 00:03:53 CURTIS FOX There's some real similarities in the way Russia continues to manipulate and maintain influence in Georgia. and the Serbian approach in Bosnia. That's probably where they get a lot of these ideas from. If you look at Georgia, there's an autonomous enclave called South Asatia, and then another one called the Bukazia, which is right up on the coast of the Black Sea. And the Russians would have us believe that these enclaves had ethnic Russians in them, that they would have you believe that they don't want anything to do with that government. And they want to remain segmented off and autonomous from the country with no trade and political independence. 00:04:33 JACK GAINES I remember Lithuania had that issue, too. They were arguing that there are Russians in Lithuania that want nothing to do with Lithuania. I remember them posing the same argument there. So it must be a form of foothold mentality where they're saying, look, these are our people. 00:04:49 CURTIS FOX Sure. Yeah. Vladimir Putin actually talks about it as a genuine tragedy that these are Russian citizens that have been scattered across the globe and isolated from the government in their mother country. Never really offers so many resources to come home if it's really that big of a tragedy. And they don't seem to want to migrate to Russia on their own dime. But this being a civil affairs podcast, it's probably also worthy to point out something the Russians do very well. is they figure out what influencers have their hands on which buttons. They're very good at understanding which individuals have access to what information and which individuals run X, Y, and Z departments and who would it be good to make friends with. 00:05:36 JACK GAINES Right. They have good influence operations. They know how to map people and their networks and reach. So your book is really large. 00:05:44 JACK GAINES book is really large. 00:05:48 JACK GAINES And I appreciate it. I mean, it's what, 500 pages? 00:05:52 CURTIS FOX I tell you what, my publisher made me take out three appendices and an additional chapter. I actually wrote a chapter. It was a comparative glance on U .S. doctrine to highlight how is the Russian apparatus, the political apparatus, how do they actually create authorizations for these interventions? And then, you know, how do they actually deploy military force? from the available units that they have in SOF. And then I compared that to how we would do it in the United States. So that whole chapter was removed. And then I had separate appendices on the Soviet arsenal that Russia inherited in 1991, including the nuclear ordinance. 00:06:35 JACK GAINES Huge maintenance cost. Oh, my gosh. 00:06:37 CURTIS FOX my gosh. And then I had an appendice on the state procurement programs, GPV 2020 and 2027. And I go through. All the hardware that they've been purchasing over the last 10, 12 years, you know, for Army, Navy, Air Force, Strategic Rocket Forces. 00:06:53 JACK GAINES So are you going to push those into a second book or are you going to make those online dependencies for people who just want to learn more about it? 00:07:01 CURTIS FOX So those are on the website right now. You can actually go read those. And, you know, if you're, I mean, you need to be an Uber nerd to get into them. But if you want to know which electronic warfare systems Moscow is running in Ukraine right now, it's all there. 00:07:15 JACK GAINES Well, if I'm uber lazy, could you send me the link so I can post it on the website? 00:07:19 CURTIS FOX For you, anything. 00:07:20 JACK GAINES I'll put it in the show notes. That way people can check it out. 00:07:23 CURTIS FOX I'd love to pivot from that and talk to you a little bit about some of the units that they actually need to execute these strategies. And the reason it's such a relevant conversation is because a lot of these units have been hollowed out now in the current war, the Russo -Ukrainian War. Oh, 00:07:41 JACK GAINES wow. 00:07:44 CURTIS FOX has taken such extraordinary casualties that it was combat ineffective by the end of last year. 00:07:51 JACK GAINES Is it kind of like that old saying about soft? The best time to train a soft person is 10 years ago? The best time to train a new VZV person is 10 years ago? Is that what they're facing right now? 00:08:03 CURTIS FOX It's a little bit of that. The other issue that they're running into is they just have nobody they can recruit into the ranks. They have an inverted demographic. in their country, and so they just have no healthy young people that can serve as soldiers. So they can go through and round up the homeless, and they can go through the prisons, and they can round those people up. They have a vicious, vicious narcotics crisis in Russia, and they can put people who are addicted to substances in the armed forces, and you can throw those people in as cannon fodder, but they don't perform the soft mission very well. And they certainly don't make good elite light infantry. So they're in a real pickle as far as deploying elite forces go. And you need those elite units to conduct hybrid warfare. So maybe that's a good starting point. 00:08:51 JACK GAINES Are they recruiting other people than the White Caucus people from the steppes so they don't have a race issue that's also blocking it? 00:09:01 CURTIS FOX It's entirely possible if they get desperate enough that, yeah, they'll start channeling them into elite units. I don't really have any direct evidence that they wouldn't have put people from an Asian disposition into, you know, let's say the 10th Spetsnaz Brigade. 00:09:14 JACK GAINES Right. 00:09:15 CURTIS FOX But the big one to watch are the Chechens. The ruling family in Chechnya is allied with Vladimir Putin, and they're very willing to contribute troops. But one of the unspoken realities about that is that the more Chechens are organized into, you know, the Volstok and Zapad battalions and pushed into foreign wars. The fewer Chechens there are at home to cause trouble for Moscow. And there are other ethnicities that start getting uppity. Moscow will absolutely adopt similar tactics. 00:09:46 JACK GAINES Sure. Now, the trick is, though, the surviving Chechens that are battle -hardened to come back to Chechnya, what's the risk that they'll flip the nation back towards independence? 00:09:56 CURTIS FOX It's definitely on Putin's mind. But the goal is, first off, those individuals are loyal to the family and basically rules Chechnya through a puppet governor, let's say. It operates almost as an autonomous vassal state. And so they would first have to fight their own people. And then the second issue is that Moscow has absolutely no qualms about sending a special missions unit down there to round somebody up in their home. I mean, you can go to their Wikipedia page and they're open and honest about saying they still conduct operations in Chechnya all the time. 00:10:35 JACK GAINES Actively hunting people down. Actively hunting people down. 00:10:37 CURTIS FOX people down. And they're on the southern end of Chechnya. And those guys will have no problem going up there and getting them. Okay. 00:10:45 JACK GAINES Okay. So it's dangerous, but it's unlikely. It's less likely right now. Yeah. Unless Russia comes out of this Ukraine conflict so battered that everyone starts seeing the blood in the water. Right. 00:10:57 CURTIS FOX The one thing that could create a real separatist movement in Chechnya is if Kardarov and his cronies decide that they're just going to switch allegiances. Sure. If he decides that Putin is weak or that serving Moscow is no longer in the family interest, that would change everything. 00:11:14 JACK GAINES Okay. So we were talking about the development and evolution of hybrid warfare. 00:11:20 CURTIS FOX Yeah, yeah. We got a little off track. 00:11:24 JACK GAINES That's okay. We'll just play as is. It's fine. 00:11:27 CURTIS FOX Well, and, you know, Chechnya is a good place to start for this because the first and second Chechen wars were so taxing on Russian and international standing and resources and manpower and so embarrassing for Moscow that they realized they needed to come up with another way to do this. They needed a way that would limit their investment, limit their risks, limit their attribution, and let's say stack the deck in their favor so it was more likely that they could slant the outcome to victory. 00:11:57 JACK GAINES And they've had a long term intelligence practice. And so do you think that a lot of their successes in intelligence were just incorporated into a more military style that they just weaponized it a little bit more? to what we want, our desires for Russia. 00:12:29 CURTIS FOX Russia. So let me kind of outline the framework here, I guess, and I think I'll answer your question. Sure. There is a ruling class in Russia of about 200 individuals. Right. Those 200 individuals, they call themselves Slovy. Most of them were educated during the Soviet era. The education system collapsed when the Soviet Union collapsed and it was never rebuilt. And so their talent pool that is constantly getting smaller and dwindling. A lot of these guys are into their mid -70s now. Some of them, like Sergei Lavrov, came from the Foreign Service, but a lot of them are simply KGB men like Putin. 00:13:08 JACK GAINES So these aren't long -term families of Russia? No. They're not the Vanderbilts. 00:13:14 CURTIS FOX Yeah, they're not oligarchs, for sure. They're only oligarchs in the fact that they wield in fun. 00:13:19 JACK GAINES Yeah. 00:13:20 CURTIS FOX Basically, the promise that Vladimir Putin made to the Russian elites when they started this project, when he came to power as president, was that, look, if you back me, everybody's going to do very well. We will all get wealthy. But if you oppose me, that's a great way to die. 00:13:37 JACK GAINES Here, let me prove it. Here's an example over here. 00:13:40 CURTIS FOX And he is not the return of Joseph Stalin. He is not that powerful. He is Russia's most important power broker. Sure. He gained power by playing all of these different factions off one another. Sure. A lot of the oligarchs that, you know, were Russian Soviet officials that seized state assets after the Soviet Union collapsed. Right. And that's where they got their money. Those individuals are outside the rule and click, but they absolutely realize if they oppose the rule and click, they could wake up in the morning, you know, slip on some bullets in the shower and that'll be. 00:14:15 CURTIS FOX So hybrid warfare, it evolved simply because the people that make decisions in Russia understand how military intelligence works to a certain extent. And they know how military intelligence is supposed to support active combat. They're basically strategic reconnaissance assets for each brigades in particular are Russian military district. So think of Marine Force Recon or maybe the 75th Ranger Regiment. Their job is to fill first and foremost an information role, an intelligence role. And they all actually report up to the GRU, which is the Military Intelligence Service. And the GRU is actually the Russians. Most effective intelligence agency. It's the only one that wasn't catastrophically reorganized after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It's insulated from all of those post -Soviet shakeups. And so they've maintained a steady course as an institution. Then the SVR, the Foreign Intelligence Service, which is kind of like the Russian MI6. So the GRU is traditionally responsible for planning these interventions. They plan the Russo -Georgian War. They plan the annexation of Crimea. They're probably planned. They weren't Donbass. And we know they planned Syria. And they did pretty well in planning all those things because that's their job. 00:15:37 JACK GAINES And it's also because they're an intelligence organization. They handle people. They have networks of sources in the country that they, whether by pay or by patriotism or other methods, they have them in their pockets. it makes it easy to move from just what we think of as intelligence as just passively collecting and reporting for other people to decide, to actually manipulating the environment so that it is open to the type of operation you want to achieve, or even to achieve a foreign policy goal without operations. So I could see how that would build into hybrid warfare. 00:16:17 CURTIS FOX I think you're hitting the nail on the head. So, you know, when they need to remind a former Soviet Republic, let's just say, you know, Georgia, you know, it will be the GRU that will collect the information for the general staff and then organize, should be to Moscow, a limited deployment of military forces to, you know, stand up some kind of a militia in a place like South Australia. 00:16:44 CURTIS FOX The GRU will have their coordinating information campaign to create a narrative for the intervention. Something along the lines of ethnic Russians are being brutalized. Vladimir Putin's regime has an obligation to act to protect its citizens abroad. The GRU will manufacture passports and distribute them to people in a place like Transnistria. That is the basis of hybrid warfare. Once they can create a little bit of maneuver room and enough political chaos, that's when they can actually start inserting elite forces and then perhaps stand up some proxy forces that can frustrate local military and police. And then if needed, they can accelerate and surge in the VDV to solidify their gains. 00:17:32 JACK GAINES I've also seen where Russia also starts integrating with local criminals. Sure. Pay them off or bring in gangs to support them. 00:17:40 CURTIS FOX No, I definitely wouldn't put it past them. They will do that. I think that they're mostly concerned about making sure that the local junta stays loyal and there are real consequences for junta that stabs them in the back. 00:17:55 JACK GAINES Right. The Russians have done a pretty successful job of pushing the French out of Algeria and the Sahel. And some recent operations, because a lot of those look very much like hybrid operations to support a strong man in those countries taking power. 00:18:11 CURTIS FOX I talk a little about that in chapter one. First off, the Soviets were very eager to conduct what we might consider hybrid operations in Africa. Their operatives, they always claimed that these were Russians that were on vacation, which is preposterous. And if they're not Russians, then they're Cuban proxies, places like Angola or Namibia. But the Russians are falling in on a Soviet tradition. 00:18:36 JACK GAINES Do you want to talk a little bit about how hybrid operations is used pre -conflict or how it's used to maintain control of a population? Where would you like to go next? 00:18:49 CURTIS FOX I think where I'd really like to go is to emphasize that what we're calling hybrid operations in a lot of ways is very similar to NATO doctrine in terms of preparatory activities. The term we use in the United States often is pre -crisis activities, which is a civil affairs specialty. You know, go into country, make friends, assess infrastructure, special forces. does this a lot. We're conducting joint training missions and helping them construct counterterrorism task forces. The next piece of that, though, is war is becoming imminent. And that's where we start conducting operational preparation of the environment. And that's where we actually start figuring out how would we put forces in countries, maybe starting with SOF, and then how would SOF prepare the battle space for the introduction of heavy ground forces? This is part of what the Russians do so well in hybrid warfare. And the final piece is what we would call advanced force operations, which means war has been declared and we now have to facilitate the movement of SOF into country now. And there has to be preliminary engagement and targeting in order to allow the units that need to go kinetic to be kinetic the moment they arrive on the ground, which means we need advanced forces to do all the intelligence work. in order to build those target packages beforehand. And that's the real heavy lifting secret sauce that the Russians did so well in the Crimean annexation. The difference is that the joint force commander in the United States can't just call the State Department and say, I need you to come up with a framework of sanctions so that it ties into this messaging campaign in order to support the actions that we're executing on the ground. In Moscow, the economics and the diplomatic initiatives and the information campaign are all coordinated, and they're coordinated in a way where they're supposed to complement one another so that you get this whole -of -government holistic approach to crisis management, let's say. And that's the real difference. 00:21:01 JACK GAINES You're saying that they do a better job of integrating the political culture, economic, and military information aspects of an operation. 00:21:10 CURTIS FOX Their system is not as big. That might be the best way to say it. And Vladimir Putin can just wave his wand and tell people this is what's going to happen. And so that's a piece of it. Yes. There's no congressional deliberation. There's no consulting of the big eight committee. 00:21:27 JACK GAINES Sure. No NSC knife rights. 00:21:28 CURTIS FOX rights. 00:21:31 CURTIS FOX Yeah. Their goal is to coordinate all those things so that they complement one another. We're absolutely capable. withering sanctions on any country in the world and cutting off a country from the dollar is the kiss of death. 90 % of the global transactions are conducted in the dollar. But we don't coordinate that with ground operations. We are developing a common lexicon around irregular warfare in the United States where essentially we're saying that these are actions that are meant to compete for the goodwill and influence of the population itself. Sure. 00:22:09 JACK GAINES How do you see the U .S. and its Western allies mitigating, managing, responding to Russian hybrid operations? 00:22:19 CURTIS FOX I think Jim Mattis actually gave us the answer. And, you know, during the assault on Dior al -Zor in Syria, the Wagner mercenaries, they were coordinating mechanized force that included main battle tanks, and they were maneuvering on this outpost. And there were a number of U .S. soft personnel at that outpost. And they used existing deconfliction to tell them, hey, like you're coming across the Euphrates River. You're entering American zone. Stop. And it was Gerasimov himself who actually told Mattis that, no, those aren't Russian guys. Those aren't our guys. We can't control them. We don't know what they're doing. And Mattis had authorized days before a massive rack and stack of air power. at the disposal of those units on the ground. And the moment that he got a confirmation from Grasmap that those aren't Russian troops, he said, all right, well, they're all going to die. And they were pounded to death. The New York Times reported something like 200 Wagner mercenaries dying in that assault. And what the Russians wanted was for U .S. civilian leadership to waffle and to worry that we could be killing Russians, we could be starting a war, we have to be careful. But the recipe for success here is to give them no ambiguity as to what your response is going to be if they violate a red line. And then to stack the assets up as necessary to follow through on your ultimatum. So you tell them, look, if you cross this line, we're going to hammer you. And when they cross it, you hammer them. But let's say for the Russian troll farms, right? These are run by the GRU and they're meant to turn the temperature up in Western politics. The first piece is that we actually do have the capability to a certain extent to shut those farms down. If I were advising a policymaker, I would tell them that we need to think about using that to shut those farms down as needed. and identifying the people that are participating in those farms because they are disruptive. You know, democracies need to be able to function. I will also say that, I mean, this is a modern variation of a tactic that the Russians have been using. They've always been prying a crowbar into fissures between the European powers and frustrating their political process for centuries, specifically to make sure that there's never going to be a coalition that's actually strong enough to march east towards Russia. 00:24:51 JACK GAINES Okay. We're going to cut the episode there, but stay tuned next week for the exciting conclusion of Curtis Fox and hybrid warfare. 00:25:11 JACK GAINES Okay. Thanks for listening. If you get a chance, please like and subscribe and rate the show on your favorite podcast platform. Also, if you're interested in coming on the show or hosting an episode, email us at [email protected]. I'll have the email and CA Association website in the show notes. And now, most importantly, to those currently out in the field working with a partner nation's people or leadership to forward U.S. relations, thank you all for what you're doing. This is Jack, your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes of One CA Podcast. 00:00:04 Part II Introduction Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at [email protected]. or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org. I'll have those in the show notes.   00:01:17 CURTIS FOX Yes, I think so. I will say I don't call out Syria specifically as a hybrid war. It has hybrid -ish characteristics. But it was almost a hybrid war. It lacks Aktivnost, Venezovnost, and Maskarovka. Sure. 00:01:42 CURTIS FOX I mean, I tell you what, I speak Russian, and they're still hard for me to pronounce. Maybe the first term we can go into is Maskarovka, because this is one of the Russian's favorite terms. And that literally just translates to camouflage. This is the hidden hand approach that the Russians have in history done so well. They don't want these things to be directly attributable to Moscow. Activnost just literally means activity. And what they mean by that is all of the little things that you do in the background to try to frustrate. So you see it as Israel has tried to work with them as a governing body,you see it as Israel has tried to work with them as a governing body, or do you see it as Israel has ignored them as a governing body? 00:02:17 CURTIS FOX to work with them as a 00:02:22 CURTIS FOX body? Preferably, you'd have them stay in their barracks. And you want to set up blockades that frustrate public transit and encourage people to stay in their homes, or maybe come out and mass protest. preferably in front of city hall or a police station. If you look through the complications, you can actually find points and solutions. 00:02:43 CURTIS FOX find points and solutions. Surprise. But it's surprise of, you know, like speedy movement. And what they mean by that is if they can use soft forces to rapidly deploy and establish some sort of a foothold on a limited number of key objectives. then they need the rapid maneuver of heavy ground forces to entrench those gains. This was the secret sauce that did so well in the Crimean annexation back in 2014. So the VDV, the Russian Airborne Services, those are really the elite trigger pullers of the Russian armed forces. And once a number of Spetsnaz battalions had advanced far enough up roads and blackaded positions coming into the peninsula, The VDB immediately used a number of secured local airstrips to move in forces in mass. And they spread rapidly throughout the peninsula and secured all those gains. 00:03:53 CURTIS FOX There's some real similarities in the way Russia continues to manipulate and maintain influence in Georgia. and the Serbian approach in Bosnia. That's probably where they get a lot of these ideas from. If you look at Georgia, there's an autonomous enclave called South Asatia, and then another one called the Bukazia, which is right up on the coast of the Black Sea. And the Russians would have us believe that these enclaves had ethnic Russians in them, that they would have you believe that they don't want anything to do with that government. And they want to remain segmented off and autonomous from the country with no trade and political independence. 00:04:48 CURTIS FOX Sure. Yeah. Vladimir Putin actually talks about it as a genuine tragedy that these are Russian citizens that have been scattered across the globe and isolated from the government in their mother country. Never really offers so many resources to come home if it's really that big of a tragedy. And they don't seem to want to migrate to Russia on their own dime. But this being a civil affairs podcast, it's probably also worthy to point out something the Russians do very well. is they figure out what influencers have their hands on which buttons. They're very good at understanding which individuals have access to what information and which individuals run X, Y, and Z departments and who would it be good to make friends with. 00:05:51 CURTIS FOX I tell you what, my publisher made me take out three appendices and an additional chapter. I actually wrote a chapter. It was a comparative glance on U .S. doctrine to highlight how is the Russian apparatus, the political apparatus, how do they actually create authorizations for these interventions? And then, you know, how do they actually deploy military force from the available units that they have in SOF? And then I compared that to, you know, how we would do it in the United States. So that whole chapter was removed. And then I had separate appendices on the Soviet arsenal that Russia inherited in 1991, including the nuclear ordinance. Oh, my gosh. And then I had an appendice on the state procurement programs, GPV 2020 and 2027. And I go through. All the hardware that they've been purchasing over the last 10, 12 years, you know, for Army, Navy, Air Force, Strategic Rocket Forces. 00:07:00 SPEAKER_03 But I also see Russia exporting the strategy. It seems like Iran is pulling strings for the Houthis to do upper -level trade -style operations. And they've got Hezbollah doing some forms of operations in support of Hamas. To me, 00:07:01 SPEAKER_02 see Russia 00:07:01 CURTIS FOX exporting the strategy. It seems 00:07:06 CURTIS FOX the Houthis to do upper -level trade 00:07:12 CURTIS FOX they've got Hezbollah doing some forms 00:07:17 SPEAKER_03 me, it seems like Russian style of hybrid warfare has been exported to... Demonstrate almost a black mirror to the U .S. goals of stability and trade by creating conditions that are always unstable, 00:07:19 CURTIS FOX style of 00:07:23 CURTIS FOX almost a black mirror to the U .S. goals of stability and trade by creating conditions that are always unstable, are always right at a low level of conflict that allows for a lot of criminality. 00:07:32 SPEAKER_03 always right at a low level of conflict that allows for a lot of criminality. And that opened that country region up to influence and Arnold Garck's taking advantage of resources and having a strong man in power. It seems like that notion has been exported. 00:07:38 CURTIS FOX that opened that country region up 00:07:43 CURTIS FOX Garck's taking advantage of resources and having a strong man in power. 00:07:48 SPEAKER_02 like that notion has been 00:08:03 CURTIS FOX It's a little bit of that. The other issue that they're running into is they just have nobody they can recruit into the ranks. They have an inverted demographic in their country, and so they just have no healthy young people that can serve as soldiers. So they can go through and round up the homeless, and they can go through the prisons, and they can round those people up. They have a vicious, vicious narcotics crisis in Russia, and they can put people who are addicted. to substances in the armed forces, and you can throw those people in this can of fodder. And that level of threat might actually create conditions for Iran to allow. 00:08:34 SPEAKER_03 And that level of threat might actually create conditions for Iran to allow. And they certainly don't make good elite light infantry. 00:08:38 CURTIS FOX allow. And they certainly don't make good elite light infantry. So they're in a real pickle as far as the point of these forces going. Now, your one example with Syria and the Wagner group charging against the special forces camp, 00:08:44 SPEAKER_03 point of these forces going. Now, your one example with Syria and the Wagner group charging against the special forces camp, one thing that you brought up, and that is that the response was obvious and painful. 00:08:46 CURTIS FOX and the 00:08:50 CURTIS FOX camp, one 00:08:57 SPEAKER_03 Does that mean that when we see hybrid operations going on, not only do we have to counter the operation, but we have to kind of embarrass Russians for doing it? 00:09:01 CURTIS FOX do we have to counter the operation, but we have to kind of embarrass Russians for doing it? I don't really have any direct evidence that they wouldn't have put people from an Asian disposition into, you know, let's say the 10th Spetsnaz Brigade. But the big one to watch are the Chechens. The ruling family in Chechnya is allied with Vladimir Putin. Very willing to contribute troops. But one of the unspoken realities about that is that the more Chechens are organized into the Vostok and Zapad battalions and pushed into foreign wars, the fewer Chechens there are at home to cause trouble for Moscow. And there are other ethnicities that start getting uppity. Moscow will absolutely adopt similar tactics. 00:09:57 CURTIS FOX It's definitely on Putin's mind. But the goal is, first off, those individuals are loyal to the family. And Putin basically rules Chechnya through a puppet governor, let's say. It operates almost as an autonomous vassal state. And so they would first have to fight their own people. And then the second issue is that Moscow has absolutely no qualms about sending. a special missions unit down there to round somebody up in their home. I mean, you can go to their Wikipedia page and they're open and honest about saying they still conduct operations in Chechnya all the time. 00:10:37 CURTIS FOX Actively hunting people down and they're on the southern end of Chechnya and those guys will have no problem going up there and getting them. 00:10:48 SPEAKER_02 It's less likely right now. 00:10:56 CURTIS FOX Right. The one thing that could create a real separatist movement in Chechnya is if Kardarov and his cronies decide that they're just going to switch allegiances. If he decides that Putin is weak or that serving Moscow is no longer in the family interest, that would change everything. 00:11:20 SPEAKER_02 Yeah, yeah. We're a little off track. 00:11:26 CURTIS FOX Sure. Well, and, you know, Chechnya is a good place to start for this because the first and second Chechen wars were so taxing on Russian international standing and resources and manpower and so embarrassing for Moscow that they realized they needed to come up with another way to do this. They needed a way that would limit their investment, limit their risks, limit their attribution. And let's say stack the deck in their favor. So it was more likely that they could slam the outcome to victory. 00:12:08 SPEAKER_03 Like so many people tied to their chair. That is. 00:12:29 CURTIS FOX Yes. So let me kind of outline the framework here, I guess, and I think I'll answer your question. There is a ruling class in Russia of about 200 individuals. Those 200 individuals, they call themselves Slovy. Most of them were educated during the Soviet era. The education system collapsed when the Soviet Union collapsed and it was never rebuilt. And so their talent pool that is constantly getting smaller and dwindling. A lot of these guys are into their mid -70s now. Some of them, like Sergei Lavrov, came from the Foreign Service, but a lot of them are simply KGB men like Putin. 00:13:11 CURTIS FOX No. Yeah, they're not oligarchs, for sure. They're only oligarchs in the fact that they wield influence. Basically, the promise that Vladimir Putin made to the Russian elites when they started this project. when he came to power as president, was that, look, if you back me, everybody's going to do very well. We will all get wealthy. But if you oppose me, that's a great way to die. 00:13:40 CURTIS FOX And he is not the return of Joseph Stalin. He is not that powerful. He is Russia's most important power broker. He gained power by playing all of these different factions off one another. A lot of the oligarchs that were Russian Soviet officials that seized state assets after the Soviet Union collapsed, and that's where they got their money. Those individuals are outside the rule and click, but they absolutely realize if they oppose the rule and click, they could wake up in the morning and slip on some bullets in the shower, and that'll be the end of them. 00:14:15 CURTIS FOX So hybrid warfare. It evolved simply because the people that make decisions in Russia understand how military intelligence works to a certain extent, and they know how military intelligence is supposed to support active combat. They're basically strategic reconnaissance assets for each brigades, in particular, our Russian military district. So think of Marine Force Recon or maybe the 75th Ranger Regiment. Well, here's a question for you. 00:14:47 SPEAKER_03 a question for you. Could they muster a credible threat against Europe? Because I was just talking to the GRU, 00:14:50 CURTIS FOX Because I was just talking to the GRU, which is the Military Intelligence Service. And the GRU is actually the Russians' most effective intelligence agency. I was talking to Albert Augustino of 5th Corps, and it seems that the army is going towards more large division -on -division type of training. 00:15:00 SPEAKER_03 I was talking to Albert Augustino of 5th Corps, and it seems that the army is going towards more large division -on -division type of training. 00:15:07 CURTIS FOX -on -division type of 00:15:09 SPEAKER_03 And I was asking, of course, a fight. You believe that that actual 600 ,000 military force could actually become a viable threat to Europe? 00:15:19 CURTIS FOX So the GRU is traditionally responsible for planning these interventions. They planned the Russo -Georgian War. They planned the annexation of Crimea. They probably planned the war in Donbass. And we know they planned Syria. And they did pretty well in planning all those things because that's their job. 00:16:17 CURTIS FOX Exactly. I think you're hitting the nail on the head. So, you know, when they need to remind a former Soviet Republic, let's just say, you know, Georgia, you know, it will be the GRU that will collect the information for the general staff and then organize, should be to Moscow, a limited deployment of military forces to stand up some kind of a militia in a place like Southwest Asia. And the GRU will have their coordinating information campaign to create a narrative for the intervention. 00:16:44 CURTIS FOX GRU will have their coordinating information campaign to create a narrative for the intervention. 00:16:51 SPEAKER_03 And that's 500 pages to get to that point. 00:16:52 CURTIS FOX 500 pages to get to that point. Vladimir Putin's regime has an obligation to act to protect its citizens abroad. The GRU will manufacture passports and distribute them to people in a place like Transnistria. That is the basis of hybrid warfare. Once they can create a little bit of maneuver around enough political chaos, that's when they can actually start inserting elite forces and then perhaps stand up some proxy forces that can frustrate local military and police. And then if needed, they can accelerate and surge in the VDV to solidify their gains. You know, 00:17:31 SPEAKER_03 know, it's funny. I was just arguing that use of KPOC needs to take the 95th and create an active duty element within. use of CAPOC, make it both a hybrid command corps that has active duty and reserves. 00:17:40 CURTIS FOX corps that has active duty and reserves. They will do that. And start just running CA as its own element versus tied into SOF. 00:17:44 SPEAKER_03 And start just running CA as its own element versus tied into SOF. 00:17:46 CURTIS FOX its own element versus tied into SOF. And there are real consequences for junta that stabs in the back. Yeah. 00:18:11 SPEAKER_02 Yeah, and the CA community, they're all usually with masters or doctorates, 00:18:12 SPEAKER_03 and the CA community, they're 00:18:13 CURTIS FOX all usually 00:18:15 SPEAKER_03 with masters 00:18:15 CURTIS FOX or doctorates, and they are usually traveling the world. 00:18:16 SPEAKER_03 doctorates, and they are usually traveling the world. So I can't talk down. 00:18:17 CURTIS FOX traveling the world. So I can't talk down. You know, their operatives, they always claimed that these were Russians that were on vacation, which is just preposterous. And if they're not Russians, then they're Cuban proxies, places like Angola or Namibia. But the Russians are falling in on a Soviet tradition. 00:18:48 SPEAKER_03 Right. That's half my career. 00:18:49 CURTIS FOX I think there's a home for civil affairs outside of Assad. And I think that civil affairs should create a functional specialty that focuses on post -work stabilization and reconstruction. 00:18:51 SPEAKER_03 think there's a home for civil affairs outside of Assad. And I think that civil affairs should create a functional specialty that focuses on post -work stabilization and reconstruction. 00:19:01 CURTIS FOX and reconstruction. I was just listening to Petraeus, and he was discussing how when he was in Iraq, 00:19:03 SPEAKER_03 was just listening to Petraeus, and he was discussing how when he was in Iraq, he was listening to the... to the plans for the campaign, and he's like, well, where's the post -conflict stabilization and reconstruction plan? And I just kind of waved him off, and he's like, well, that's pretty important. And I've heard other people say the same thing. What does Charlie Wilson say, that we suck at the endgame? But that's a market gap. That's a market gap that civil affairs, if they were to go to the 59 school and become planners and focus just on the post -conflict operations and stabilization... 00:19:09 CURTIS FOX plans for the campaign, and he's like, well, where's the post -conflict stabilization and reconstruction plan? And I just kind of waved him off, and he's like, well, that's pretty important. And I've heard other people say the same thing. What does Charlie Wilson say, that we suck at the endgame? But that's a market gap. 00:19:30 CURTIS FOX and focus just on the post -conflict operations and stabilization... 00:19:35 SPEAKER_03 It would actually create values that the CA component would then build out. 00:19:35 CURTIS FOX actually create values that the CA component would then build out. 00:19:37 SPEAKER_03 would then build 00:19:40 CURTIS FOX This is part of what the Russians do so well in hybrid warfare. And the final piece is what we would call advanced force operations, which means war has been declared, and we now have to facilitate the movement of SOF into country now. And there has to be preliminary engagement and targeting. Right. You know, it's one thing that I've learned to respect about Peace Corps is that they send their people out, 00:20:05 SPEAKER_03 it's one thing that I've learned to respect about Peace Corps is that they send their people out, and it's their force of personality that helps them survive. 00:20:08 CURTIS FOX they send their people out, and it's their force of personality 00:20:10 SPEAKER_03 it's their force of personality that helps them survive. And I think that if we had that same notion where we're training people in blunt force, but if we had them do foreign missions where they just had to... survive off their wits and their ability to build relations. 00:20:12 CURTIS FOX them survive. 00:20:16 CURTIS FOX notion where we're training people in blunt force, but if we had them do foreign missions where they just had to... survive off their wits and their ability to build relations. That would shift the thinking from tactical to relational conflict management, as well as how to go past force management to how do we build partners and allies so that they can also be with us in achieving a foreign policy objective. 00:20:26 SPEAKER_03 would shift the thinking from tactical to relational conflict 00:20:27 CURTIS FOX from tactical to relational conflict management, as well as how to go past force management to how do we build partners and allies so that they can also be with us in achieving 00:20:31 SPEAKER_03 management, as well as how to go past force management to ahow do we build partners and allies so that they can also be with us in achieving a foreign policy objective. 00:20:41 CURTIS FOX a foreign policy objective. So anyway, we're gunning down two hours, so I'm going to let you go. another so that you get this whole of government holistic approach. Exciting conclusion of Curtis Fox and hybrid warfare. 00:20:48 SPEAKER_03 gunning down two hours, so I'm going to let you go. 00:20:56 SPEAKER_03 conclusion of Curtis Fox and hybrid warfare. 00:20:57 CURTIS FOX of Curtis Fox and hybrid warfare. And that's the real difference. 00:21:09 CURTIS FOX Yeah. First off their, their system is, it's not as big. Thanks for listening. If you get a chance, please like, subscribe and rate the show on your favorite podcast platform. 00:21:13 SPEAKER_03 for listening. If you get a chance, please like, subscribe and rate the show on your favorite podcast platform. Also, if you're interested in coming on the show or hosting an episode, email us at capodcasting at gmail .com. 00:21:21 CURTIS FOX if you're interested in coming 00:21:21 SPEAKER_02 on the show or 00:21:22 CURTIS FOX hosting an episode, email us at capodcasting at gmail .com. 00:21:27 SPEAKER_03 I'll have the email and CA Association website in the show notes. 00:21:29 SPEAKER_02 CA Association website in the show notes. 00:21:31 SPEAKER_03 And now, most importantly, to those currently out in the field working with a partner nation's people or leadership to forward U .S. 00:21:31 SPEAKER_02 now, most 00:21:33 CURTIS FOX currently out in the 00:21:36 CURTIS FOX or leadership to forward U .S. relations, thank you all for what you're doing. This is Jack, your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes once CA podcasts are conducted in the dollar. 00:21:42 SPEAKER_03 is Jack, your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes once 00:21:46 CURTIS FOX CA podcasts are conducted in the dollar. 00:21:47 SPEAKER_03 CA podcasts are conducted 00:21:49 CURTIS FOX But we don't coordinate that with ground operations. We are developing a common lexicon around irregular warfare. In the United States, we're essentially saying that these are actions that are meant to compete for the goodwill and influence of the population itself. 00:22:19 SPEAKER_02 I think Jim Mattis actually gave us the answer. 00:22:20 CURTIS FOX Mattis actually gave us the answer. And, you know, during the assaults on Dior al -Zor in Syria, the Wagner mercenaries, they were coordinating mechanized force that included main battle tanks, and they were maneuvering on this outpost. And there were a number of U .S. soft personnel at that outpost, and they used existing deconfliction to tell them, hey, like, you're coming across the Euphrates River, you're entering American zone, stop. It was Gerasimov himself who actually told Mattis that, no, those aren't Russian guys. Those aren't our guys. We can't control them. We don't know what they're doing. And Mattis had authorized days before a massive rack and stack of air power at the disposal of those units on the ground. And the moment that he got a confirmation from Gerasimov that those aren't Russian troops, he said, all right, well, they're all going to die. And they were pounded to death. The New York Times reported something like 200 Wagner mercenaries dying in that assault. And what the Russians wanted was for U .S. civilian leadership to waffle and to worry that we could be killing Russians, we could be starting a war, we have to be careful. But the recipe for success here is to give them no ambiguity as to what your response is going to be if they violate a red line. And then to stack the assets up as necessary to follow through on your ultimatum. So you tell them, look, if you cross this line, we're going to hammer you. And when they cross it, you hammer them. But let's say for the Russian troll farms, right? These are run by the GRU and they're meant to turn the temperature up in Western politics. The first piece is that we actually do have the capability to a certain extent to shut those farms down. If I were advising a policymaker, I would tell them that we need to think about using that to shut those farms down as needed and identifying the people that are participating in those farms because they are disruptive. You know, democracies need to be able to function. I will also say that, I mean, this is a modern variation of a tactic that the Russians have been using. They've always been prying a crowbar into fissures between the European groups. powers and frustrating their political process for centuries, specifically to make sure that there's never going to be a coalition that's actually strong enough to march east towards Russia.