Closereads: Philosophy with Mark and Wes

On "An Argument for the Identity Theory" (1966), which unlike U.T. Place who merely argued that minds could be brains, argues that minds must be brains, in all possible worlds. The argument appears functionalist: mental states are defined by their causal roles, and causality is naturally the realm of the physical, so mental causality makes most sense if it is a way of talking about physical causality. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. Subscribe to Closereads at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy; follow us there via the free tier to get many other episodes like this one ad free, or pay us to get part 2 and everything else we've recorded. (Alternatively, support both PEL and Closereads at patreon.com/partiallyexaminedlife for a nice combo deal.) The post Closereads: David Lewis on Mind-Brain Identity (Part One) first appeared on The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast.

On The Concept of Mind (1949), Ch. 6, "Self-Knowledge." Ryle is arguing against a Cartesian take on mind that he sees as over-intellectualizing. In this case, it is not the case that every conscious act is itself an object of an act of consciousness: Not all consciousness is self-conscious, and introspection itself must involve a layer of mentality (the act of self-consciousness) that is not itself the object of an act of consciousness. Read along with us, starting on p. 136 (PDF p. 199). Subscribe to Closereads at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy; follow us there via the free tier to get many other episodes like this one ad free, or pay us to get subsequent parts to this and everything else we've recorded. (Alternatively, support both PEL and Closereads at patreon.com/partiallyexaminedlife for a nice combo deal.) The post Closereads: Gilbert Ryle on Self-Knowledge (Part One) first appeared on The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast.

On "Are We Explaining Consciousness Yet" (2001), an article published with and commenting on papers by psychologists, neurologists, etc. on the state of consciousness studies at the time, featuring his newer metaphor for consciousness, "fame in the brain." Follow along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. Subscribe to Closereads at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy; follow us there via the free tier to get many other episodes like this one ad free, or pay us to get part 2 and everything else we've recorded. (Alternatively, support both PEL and Closereads at patreon.com/partiallyexaminedlife for a nice combo deal.) The post Closereads: Late Dennett on Consciousness (Part One) first appeared on The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast.

On "First Person Authority" (1984). What warrants our superior knowledge of our own mental states, as oppose to those of others? Why is this not obvious? Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. Subscribe to Closereads at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy; follow us there via the free tier to get many other episodes like this one ad free, or pay us to get part 2 and everything else we've recorded. (Alternatively, support both PEL and Closereads at patreon.com/partiallyexaminedlife for a nice combo deal.) The post Closereads: Donald Davidson on Self-Knowledge (Part One) first appeared on The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast.

How shall we break down the universe into basic types of things? Peirce has an idiosyncratic way of thinking about this problem and coming up with his division, revolving around the steps and presuppositions involved in predicating something. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. Subscribe to Closereads at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy; follow us there via the free tier to part two and many other episodes like this one ad free, or pay us to get parts 2-5 and everything else we've recorded. (Alternatively, support both PEL and Closereads at patreon.com/partiallyexaminedlife for a nice combo deal.) The post Closereads: Peirce’s New Categories (Part One) first appeared on The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast.

On "Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism" (2008). Strawson argues that physicalism should not just be taken as matter in motion. Instead, the physical is a broader category that includes not just chairs and molecules, but also "my experience of red." Yet he's not trying to say that experiences are just brain states; they clearly include qualia (what it's like to experience red). And he's also not just trying to solve the problem by redefining "physical" to include "mental" (though he is doing that). Instead, he's claiming that we have no warrant to claim that the properties of the physical are exhausted by what third-person science can investigate, and that we can't solve the mind-body problem unless we posit that (at least some) physical objects have a mental aspect. Sounds like Spinoza to us! Read along with us. Get subsequent parts of this ad-free at ⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠. You can choose to watch this on unedited video. The post Closereads: Galen Strawson on Panpsychism (Part One) first appeared on The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast.

On Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, sec. 551-559, which are sections assigned for but not actually covered on The Partially Examined Life ep. 394. We get more info on how The Enlightenment supposedly mischaracterizes faith, but also how faith sees The Enlightenment and what Hegel considers to be good points coming out of The Enlightenment's critique. Get more parts to this via patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. You can choose to watch this on video. The post Closereads: Hegel on Faith vs. The Enlightenment, aka PEL ep. 394 (Part Three) first appeared on The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast.

We read part of The Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), specifically the parts about Homer's epic as an allegory for the merely apparent triumph of modernism (capitalism, instrumental reason) over myth (savagery, magical thinking). Homer is odd for H&A because even stylistically, the epics present a mixture of cultures: They glorify violence, but their form is very ordered, and their very popularity makes them the first mass-culture products of the West. Throughout The Odyssey, Odysseus is in effect saying goodbye to the mythical world as he turns each challenge into a tool in his quest to get home. H&A use the episode with the Sirens as an allegory for how the workers are deafened to the call of anti-social myth (they have their work to do!), while the upper class can hear it but is helpless to actually act on it; like Odysseus tied to the mast, they too are strapped into the capitalist machine. Read along with us; Ch. 2, "Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment," starts on PDF p56 (p35), but we quickly backtrack to the first mention of Odysseus in Ch. 1 (the same essay we began previously) on PDF p46 (p25). Get more parts of this at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. You can choose to watch this on video. The post Closereads: Horkheimer & Adorno on The Odyssey (Part One) first appeared on The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast.

On Ch. 2 "The Honest Soul and the Disintegrated Consciousness" in Sincerity and Authenticity (1972). This chapter focuses on a reading of Diderot's Rameau's Nephew and what Hegel made of it in the Phenomenology, so it's essentially for us a second opinion re. what we've been talking about on The Partially Examined Life. Read along with us. Watch this as unedited video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠. The post Closereads: Lionel Trilling on Sincerity (Part One) first appeared on The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast.

On "Against Narrativity" (2004), where Galen (son of P.F.) argues that the prevalent philosophical and cultural camp is wrong. This objectionable camp (the Narratives) says that we understand our lives by telling ourselves a story about ourselves. Moreover, this is how we make meaning out of our lives, and how we thus behave ethically, taking responsibility for our past and future: how we have integrity. Galen rejects both the descriptive claim here (that this is how we all, or at least those of us functioning as designed, process our experience) and the moral claim (that ethical comportment requires that we experience our lives narratively. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠. The post Closereads: Galen Strawson Against Narrativity (Part One) first appeared on The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast.