Knowing Words Is Not Knowing Worlds

From 2019, "The Truth about Truth," is a philosophical essay that examines the complex and subjective nature of truth and reality, arguing against the concept of a single, objective Truth. The author adopts a non-cognitivist and emotivist perspective, suggesting that people are primarily driven to transmit beliefs (prescriptivism) for survival and community-building, rather than being motivated by objective truth. The essay outlines four main problems with the common assumption that scientific or philosophical inquiry moves humanity closer to an ultimate, approachable reality: specifically, a lack of reference to determine proximity to reality; uncertainty about whether new perceptions move us closer to or further from reality; the primacy of rhetoric in shaping our sense of truth; and the idea that communication intent only converges perception, not objective reality. Ultimately, the author concludes that since humans can only access reality through fallible senses, perception often becomes reality within a given group or meta-narrative. 👉 https://philosophics.blog/2019/12/28/the-truth-about-truth/

The source text presents an argument that even if metaphysical Truth exists objectively and independently of human minds (a position granted for the sake of analysis), it can only become normatively binding for people through rhetorical mediation. The core claim is that the transition from Ontology (what exists) to Authority (what obligates) requires essential steps like identification, description, justification, and ratification, all of which are fundamentally rhetorical processes. The author insists that this focus on access conditions is not relativism but a structural analysis showing that ethical frameworks cannot bypass interpretation and persuasion to generate concrete obligation, analogous to how potential energy must be converted to kinetic energy to perform work. Ultimately, ethical force emerges in the discursive space where claims are argued over, rather than descending fully formed from pure metaphysical ideals.https://philosophics.blog/

The source presents a speculative treatise on social ontology, proposing a framework termed "dialectical spiritual realism" (DSR) that reinterprets the Christian doctrine of the Trinity to model the ideal structure of a flourishing society. This framework defines social reality through the perichoretic, or mutually indwelling, relationship between three irreducible dimensions: Structure, Agency, and Ideology. The author analogically maps these to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, arguing that their interdependence constitutes the generative mechanism for social transformation, which is conceptualised as a secularised form of theosis (developmental movement towards participation in the Good). The text positions DSR as a normatively thickened extension of critical realism and a philosophical grounding for the principles of Catholic Social Teaching, offering a mechanism for analysing social change through the recognition of "structured real absence" (sin) and the emergence of resurrectional rupture (novel, dialectical change).Critique: https://philosophics.blog/2025/12/14/solidarity-as-a-local-moral-grammar/

The source is a critical response to a social and ethical framework proposed by "Otti Vogt," specifically his "Dialectical Spiritual Realist Social Ontology" (DSR). The author is engaging in a philosophical polemic, analysing Vogt's framework—which is grounded in participatory metaphysics, virtue ethics, and an objective Good—through the lenses of their own concepts: the Mediated Encounter Ontology (MEOW) and the Language Insufficiency Hypothesis (LIH). The central argument is that while Vogt's ontology is internally coherent and functions well within small, aligned groups, it is fundamentally unsustainable and fails to scale across diverse populations without generating power asymmetries and requiring compliance rather than genuine participation. The critique systematically examines how the framework encounters problems relating to semantic drift, interpretive authority, and the inherent power dynamics that emerge when ethical claims are grounded in an abstract, transcendent moral centre.http://philosophics.blog

The third segment in a series where I share my responses and rationale for the PhilPapers 2020 Survey. Question 3 asks about aesthetic value. What's my stance? 🧐 PhilPapers 2020 Survey: https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/papersMy responses on PhilPeople: https://philpeople.org/profiles/bry-willis/viewsLanguage philosopher Bry Willis writes on Philosophics Blog and other outlets.Blogs: http://philosophics.bloghttp://ridleypark.blogSpotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4D2iPKaFlzasy7Tv07DFVcPhilosophy & Anti-Enlightenment Project: https://zenodo.org/communities/antienlightenmentPhilPapers: https://philpeople.org/profiles/bry-willisSocials:https://x.com/Microglyphicshttps://mastodon.social/@microglyphicshttps://bsky.app/profile/microglyphics.bsky.socialhttps://www.instagram.com/microglyphicshttps://www.threads.com/@microglyphicshttps://www.tiktok.com/@microglyphicsAvatar character sourced from Bitmoji (https://www.bitmoji.com/). Other graphics content by Motion ArrayEditing Software: Davinci Resolve 20I use Davinci Resolve Speed Editor and Blackmagic Stream Deck+

The second segment in a series where I share my responses and rationale for the PhilPapers 2020 Survey. Question 2 asks about abstract objects. What's my stance? 🧐 PhilPapers 2020 Survey: https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/papersMy responses on PhilPeople: https://philpeople.org/profiles/bry-willis/viewsLanguage philosopher Bry Willis writes on Philosophics Blog and other outlets.Blogs: http://philosophics.bloghttp://ridleypark.blogSpotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4D2iPKaFlzasy7Tv07DFVcPhilosophy & Anti-Enlightenment Project: https://zenodo.org/communities/antienlightenmentPhilPapers: https://philpeople.org/profiles/bry-willisSocials:https://x.com/Microglyphicshttps://mastodon.social/@microglyphicshttps://bsky.app/profile/microglyphics.bsky.socialhttps://www.instagram.com/microglyphicshttps://www.threads.com/@microglyphicshttps://www.tiktok.com/@microglyphicsAvatar character sourced from Bitmoji (https://www.bitmoji.com/). Other graphics content by Motion ArrayEditing Software: Davinci Resolve 20I use Davinci Resolve Speed Editor and Blackmagic Stream Deck+

The first segment in a series where I share my responses and rationale for the PhilPapers 2020 Survey. Question 1 asks about à priori knowledge. What's my stance? 🧐 PhilPapers 2020 Survey: https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/papersMy responses on PhilPeople: https://philpeople.org/profiles/bry-willis/viewsLanguage philosopher Bry Willis writes on Philosophics Blog and other outlets.Blogs: http://philosophics.bloghttp://ridleypark.blogSpotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4D2iPKaFlzasy7Tv07DFVcPhilosophy & Anti-Enlightenment Project: https://zenodo.org/communities/antienlightenmentPhilPapers: https://philpeople.org/profiles/bry-willisSocials:https://x.com/Microglyphicshttps://mastodon.social/@microglyphicshttps://bsky.app/profile/microglyphics.bsky.socialhttps://www.instagram.com/microglyphicshttps://www.threads.com/@microglyphicshttps://www.tiktok.com/@microglyphicsAvatar character sourced from Bitmoji (https://www.bitmoji.com/). Other graphics content by Motion ArrayEditing Software: Davinci Resolve 20I use Davinci Resolve Speed Editor and Blackmagic Stream Deck+

Propensity, the speculative dystopian fiction book by Ridley Park, is available for free on Kindle from 12 – 16 December 2025. If you hear this after the 16th, the book will still be available – just not for free. If you have KindleUnlimited, it should be free there, too. Visit RidleyPark.Blog for more details and sample chapters. You can even listen to Chapter 1 of the audiobook version.

The provided text is an academic essay titled "Tatterhood and the Conferral Paradox: Self-Constituting Speech and the Limits of Enlightenment Recognition," written by independent scholar Bry Willis. The essay fundamentally examines the structural conditions under which speech can establish identity and argues that self-constitution requires prior authorisation from an "already-empowered Other." Willis uses the Norwegian fairy tale Tatterhood as a central case study, showing that the protagonist's transformative speech is only effective after a prince supplies an "initiating categorisation." The work synthesises philosophical concepts from Austin's felicity conditions, Hegel's recognition, Lacan's Symbolic Order, and Butler's citationality to formulate the "conferral paradox," which states that any system of authorisation must contain at least one entity whose authority is presupposed rather than conferred. Ultimately, the essay suggests that the inability of a subject to "speak first" exposes a conceptual closure inherent to the Enlightenment project of the autonomous subject.👉 https://philosophics.blog/2025/12/09/tatterhood/

The provided text presents a rigorous critical reading of the Norwegian fairy tale "Tatterhood," arguing that the story operates as a direct commentary on the ideological constraints placed upon women. The author contends that the protagonist’s exceptional abilities—including her fearless competence in resolving the central conflict—are rendered meaningless until she submits to normative standards of appearance. This analysis is starkly contrasted with a popular interpretation by Jonny Thomson, who frames the tale as a celebration of the prince's basic curiosity and the reward for asking questions. However, the author dismisses this positive view, asserting that the prince's inquiries function only as "aesthetic checkpoints" that mandate Tatterhood’s transformation and assimilation, rather than fostering genuine insight. Ultimately, the critique concludes that the story rewards narrative conformity over individual power, reinforcing the lesson that beauty is the compulsory requirement for social acceptance, irrespective of bravery or talent.👉 https://philosophics.blog/2025/12/10/tatterhood/