135 - How the Marines Prepared for Guadalcanal | Operation Watchtower Explained

This is the first in a major series of podcasts looking at the Battles of Guadalcanal.  This is an interview with Dave Holland.     This episode looks at: Guadalcanal's strategic significance Terrain and Climate of Guadalcanal Development of Marine Amphibious Doctrine Combat experience within the 1st Marine Division Strength and structure of a Marine Division US intelligence preparation before the landings Japanese intelligence and intentions US decision to land on Guadalcanal and Tulagi Operation Shoestring Dave is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcananal with the Australian Federal Police.  He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front.

This is the final episode of three in our series from our interview with Retired Colonel John Antal discussing his research into contemporary combat and how technology is changing the modern battlefield. John makes a series of great points during the interview: Modern War Is Fought in a Transparent Battlespace Visibility through drones, sensors, and AI means traditional massing of forces is now lethal. You must deceive and disrupt enemy sensors or be destroyed. Masking Should Be a Principle of War Masking = multi-domain deception to confuse enemy ISR. Use decoys, optical/thermal camouflage, and emission control—make the enemy see what you want them to see. Camouflage and Concealment Are Critically Neglected Western armies (incl. U.S. and Australian) have virtually no meaningful camouflage training. Without drones for perspective or thermal checks, soldiers can't learn what the enemy sees. Command Posts Are Death Traps Tents and Winnebago-style mobile HQs are vulnerable to drone and artillery strikes. Forces must restructure command posts: smaller, distributed, better masked, and mobile. Infiltration Is the Primary Tactic of Modern War Seen in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, and Gaza, infiltration bypasses strongpoints and succeeds in high-transparency environments where massing is suicidal. Mobile Phones Kill Units Civilian phones constantly emit signals. Unless militaries ban personal devices or deploy secure comms, they invite precision targeting. Drones Are the Machine Guns of the 21st Century Drones must be ubiquitous, especially at the squad level. But to manage this, armies need a dedicated drone corps—trained, maintained, and operationalised like any combat arm. Resilience Beats Exquisite Systems Over-reliance on billion-dollar platforms (e.g., B-2s, F-35s) is a strategic risk. Operation Spiderweb Cheap drones can destroy exquisite systems. Forces must be able to take hits and continue fighting. Training Is Outdated and Unrealistic Many exercises simulate conventional war (e.g., Desert Storm) rather than dispersed, dark, denied environments. We fall to the level of our training—not rise to our expectations. Leaders Must Prepare for First Strike and Distributed Ops The enemy will hit first. Western forces must train to disperse, operate without emissions, reassemble fast, and strike with real-time decision-making. The key: agility, initiative, and survivability. Check out the show notes for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

This is the second episode of our interview with Retired Colonel John Antal discussing his research into contemporary combat and how technology is changing the modern battlefield. We discuss the lessons learnt from 2nd Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine and recent Israeli battles and how technology is changing the modern battlefield. Check out the show notes for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

How is the modern battlefield changing? What role is technology like Artificial Intelligence, drones, precision strike and electronic warfare changing command and control, ISR and combined arms? This is the first of 3 episodes with retired Colonel John Antal, who has studied 2nd Nagorno-Karabakh, recent Israeli battles and the war in Ukraine. Check out the show notes for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

This is the second of a two-part series looking at the origin story of the PLA Navy.  This episode looks at the crucial Kinmen and Hainan Islands campaigns. This is an interview with Dr Toshi Yoshihara, an expert in the history of China's Navy. How was each campaign planned and executed? What were the results for the Chinese Navy? What did the PLA Navy learn from these campaigns? How have these early littoral manoeuvre campaigns shaped the PLA today? We discuss the roles of  Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Xiao Jinguang, in these early important battles for China.   Check out the show notes for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

How did Field Marshall Slim innovate in the Burma Campaign?  This is a look at military innovation through necessity that developed key capabilities for the 14th Army to defeat the Japanese forces in the Burma theatre. We discuss: Slim's innovation overcame critical resource shortages in Burma. Developed aerial resupply, air evacuation, and improvised naval logistics. Used teakwood barges to cross rivers with tanks. Created monsoon-proof airfields with hessian and tar. Strong advocate of Special Forces—mobilized Force 136 and Karen levies. Outmanoeuvred Japanese by leveraging terrain and logistics. Fought against Generals Aida, Mutaguchi, and Kimura. Trained the Indian Army in combined arms warfare. Built floating bridges across vast rivers like the Chindwin. Crossing the Irrawaddy. Led with humility and authenticity, known to Indian troops as “Uncle Bill.” This interview is the third part of a 3-part series with Dr Robert Lyman, the expert on the Burma Campaign and Field Marshall Sir William Slim. Check out the show notes for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

How did Slim rebuild the 14th Army after it's 1,000 mile withdrawal from Burma? We look at how lessons were learnt and doctrine was developed to forge an Army capable of taking on the Japanese.  We discuss the important question - what makes an Army officer a good trainer of soldiers. This interview is the second part of a 3 part series with Dr Robert Lyman, the expert on the Burma Campaign and Field Marshall Sir William Slim. Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

The withdrawal from Burma was almost 1,000 miles in 100 days and yet Slim, as commander of Burma Corps, maintained his optimism throughout the operation. We look at Slim's early career and background to study his optimism and resilience in the face of an overwhelmingly poor tactical situation. This interview is the first part of a 3 part series with Dr Robert Lyman, the expert on the Burma Campaign and Field Marshall Sir William Slim. Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

This episode looks at the care of the wounded on the Kokoda Track. What level of care did sick and wounded soldiers receive? Why was the medical planning still being conducted whilst the Battle of Isurava was in progress? What was the issue with medical logistics and how were casualties to be casevaced from the battlefield? We listen to the story of CAPT Stan Bissett as he describes how his brother Butch was wounded just north of Isurava and later died of his wounds.  Medical care was provided under the most difficult conditions, in the jungle, in steep terrain and during the withdrawal.  Important lessons for the planning and execution for the treatment of wounded during combat.  This episode continues our Kokoda Campaign Podcast series.  Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.