Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Department of Labor v. Sun Valley Orchards, LLC Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube Argued on Nov 10, 2026. Petitioner: Department of Labor,.Respondent: Sun Valley Orchards, LLC. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Sun Valley Orchards, a New Jersey farm, hires seasonal workers through the H-2A visa program. Under this program, the farm must provide certain benefits, such as safe housing and transportation, which it outlines in a “job order” that serves as a work contract. After an investigation into the 2015 growing season, the Department of Labor alleged that Sun Valley breached this contract by providing infested housing, failing to provide required kitchen access, and firing workers before their contracts ended. The Department of Labor used its own administrative law judges to order Sun Valley to pay over $550,000 in civil penalties and back wages. Sun Valley sued the government, arguing that Article III of the Constitution requires a federal court—rather than an executive agency—to decide cases involving monetary remedies for contract violations. The farm also contended that the specific federal law governing the H-2A program, 8 U.S.C. §1188(g)(2), does not grant the Department of Labor the power to conduct these types of in-house trials for money damages. After a federal district court dismissed Sun Valley’s lawsuit challenging the agency’s authority, the farm appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the Department of Labor cannot adjudicate these private contractual disputes in an internal administrative forum. Question May the Department of Labor legally use its own administrative proceedings to collect money from employers who violate worker contracts, or does the Constitution require such cases to be decided by a federal court?

Nielsen v. Watanabe Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube Argued on Nov 9, 2026. Petitioner: Francis Nielsen.Respondent: Kekai Watanabe . Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Kekai Watanabe was a federal detainee at the Federal Detention Center in Honolulu when, in July 2021, rival gang members attacked him during a prison riot. After staff restored order, prison officials documented his visible injuries and placed him on sick call. Later that day, Watanabe told correctional officers he had headaches and pain and asked to see medical staff. He eventually described his condition to Francis Nielsen, a staff nurse at the facility, who denied his request to go to the hospital. Officials gave Watanabe over-the-counter pain medication. Months later, doctors diagnosed Watanabe with a fractured coccyx with bone chips in surrounding soft tissue, and prison officials agreed to refer him to a specialist. Watanabe then filed a pro se lawsuit alleging that Nielsen and others violated his Eighth Amendment rights by denying him adequate medical care and refusing to send him to the hospital, seeking $3 million in damages and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed Watanabe’s complaint, holding that his claim arose in a new Bivens context distinct from Carlson v. Green because he had access to an alternative administrative remedy—the Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative Remedy Program—that the Supreme Court had not considered in Carlson, and because his non-fatal injury differed meaningfully from the fatal asthma emergency in Carlson. A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the availability of alternative remedies did not render the context new and that Carlson governed; the Ninth Circuit then denied rehearing en banc over eleven judges’ dissents. Question Can a federal prisoner sue prison officials for money damages under the Bivens doctrine for deliberate indifference to a non-life-threatening injury?

Hoffmann v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube Argued on Nov 9, 2026. Petitioner: Leonard W. Hoffmann.Respondent: WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. is a private natural gas company that holds a federal certificate authorizing it to use eminent domain to build and operate a natural gas pipeline. WBI used that authority to condemn an easement across ranchland in McKenzie County, North Dakota, owned by Leonard Hoffmann, Margaret Hoffmann, Denae Hoffmann, Rocky & Jonilla Farms, LLP, and Randall Stevenson. After roughly three years of litigation over the value of the taken property, the parties settled that question but expressly reserved the issue of whether the landowners could recover their attorney’s fees and litigation costs. The landowners argued that North Dakota law governed compensation and that state law entitles condemnees to recover those costs. WBI argued that federal law controlled and capped compensation at the constitutional minimum set by the Fifth Amendment, which does not include attorney’s fees. The district court agreed with the landowners, applied a federal choice-of-law framework, concluded that North Dakota law governed, and ordered WBI to reimburse the landowners $383,375.76 in fees and litigation expenses. WBI appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that private companies exercising eminent domain power under the Natural Gas Act stand in the federal government’s shoes and owe only the constitutional minimum of just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, expressly splitting with the Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits. Question When a private company uses the Natural Gas Act to seize someone’s land for natural gas infrastructure, does state law determine how much compensation the landowner receives?

Guerrero v. Johnson Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 4, 2026. Petitioner: Eric Guerrero.Respondent: Dexter Johnson. Advocates: William R. Peterson (for the Petitioner) Emily M. Ferguson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Jeremy Schepers (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Dexter Johnson kidnapped, raped, and murdered Maria Aparece in June 2006, years after the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing intellectually disabled people. At trial, Johnson’s own defense expert tested his IQ between 74 and 88, concluded he showed no obvious adaptive deficits, and opined that he was not intellectually disabled. Johnson was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in June 2007. Johnson did not raise an Atkins claim in his initial state habeas application or his initial federal habeas petition filed in 2011. Instead, he argued that the Atkins principles should extend to the mentally ill. In May 2013, the American Psychiatric Association published the DSM-5, which substantially revised intellectual disability diagnosis by de-emphasizing IQ score cutoffs and recognizing that individuals with scores above 70 could still qualify. Johnson's federal habeas petition was denied in August 2013—just months after the DSM-5’s publication. Johnson’s counsel, aware of the DSM-5, chose not to develop an Atkins claim, citing concerns about unfavorable Texas state court standards and his strategic focus on other claims. With an execution date set for 2019, Johnson obtained new expert evaluations under the DSM-5 standards; those experts diagnosed him as intellectually disabled. Johnson then sought authorization to file a successive federal habeas petition, arguing that the DSM-5 had made his Atkins claim newly viable and therefore “previously unavailable” during his earlier habeas proceedings. After the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit authorized the successive petition in 2019, the district court denied the State's motion to dismiss and found Johnson’s Atkins claim was previously unavailable under the Fifth Circuit’s “futility exception” from In re Cathey. The district court certified that ruling for interlocutory appeal, the Fifth Circuit accepted, and a panel affirmed in July 2025, reaffirming Cathey’s holding that a claim is not “previously available” unless it had “some possibility of merit” at the time of the earlier petition. The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by a 9-7 vote in January 2026. Question Does a claim rely on a “previously unavailable” new rule of constitutional law, permitting a successive habeas petition, when the prisoner could have raised a claim based on that rule in an earlier petition?

St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube Argued on Nov 3, 2026. Petitioner: St. Mary Catholic Parish, Littleton, Colorado.Respondent: Lisa Roy, in Her Official Capacity as Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Early Childhood. Advocates: Nicholas R. Reaves (for the Petitioners) Sarah M. Harris (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Helen Norton (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Colorado voters established the Universal Preschool Program (UPK) to provide free preschool services through a “mixed delivery system” of public and private providers. To receive state funds, providers must sign a nondiscrimination agreement that requires them to enroll students regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Two Catholic parishes and the Archdiocese of Denver sought to participate in the program but refused to sign the agreement. They argued that their religious tenets require them to consider the sexual orientation and gender identity of families during admissions to maintain their religious environment. The schools specifically challenged the program’s “preference system,” which uses an algorithm to match families with schools based on categories like sibling enrollment or congregation membership. They also highlighted a “temporary waiver” provision that allows the state to grant providers extra time to meet certain quality standards. The schools argued that these features create a system of “individualized exemptions” where the state exercises discretion to favor secular interests. Because the state allows these secular preferences while denying a religious exemption to the nondiscrimination rule, the schools contended the program unconstitutionally penalizes them for their religious character. The district court denied the schools’ request for a permanent injunction, ruling that the nondiscrimination requirement is a neutral and generally applicable law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed that decision, holding that the state’s program does not grant the type of unfettered discretion that would trigger strict scrutiny. Question Does a law lack general applicability under the Free Exercise Clause only if it permits unfettered discretion or secular exemptions, and does the rule against excluding religious institutions from public benefits apply only to explicit government bans on participation?

Maxwell v. Dinis Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube Argued on Nov 2, 2026. Petitioner: William Maxwell.Respondent: Sandra Dinis, Acting Warden. Advocates: Masha G. Hansford (for the Petitioner) Kevin J. Barber (for the Respondent supporting vacatur) Brian W. Barnes (Court-appointed amicus curiae for the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) William Maxwell is a federal prisoner housed at FCI Beaumont Low in Texas. In 2020, Maxwell asked prison officials to transfer him to a halfway house or home confinement, invoking several laws including the First Step Act's earned time credit provisions, which require the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to apply credits prisoners earn through participation in rehabilitation programs toward earlier placement in prerelease custody. The BOP responded only to Maxwell's request under the separate CARES Act and denied it, ignoring his First Step Act arguments entirely. After Maxwell pushed through the BOP's administrative grievance process — a process he contends the BOP actively obstructed by losing filings, failing to respond, and submitting a false declaration claiming he never raised First Step Act claims — he filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking transfer to a halfway house or home confinement based on his earned First Step Act time credits. The district court dismissed Maxwell's petition, ruling he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on his First Step Act claims. Maxwell appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which sua sponte affirmed dismissal on a different ground — holding under its own bright-line rule that because a favorable ruling would not automatically accelerate Maxwell's release from prison, a civil rights lawsuit, not a habeas petition, was the only proper vehicle for his claims. Question Can a federal prisoner use a habeas corpus petition to challenge the government's calculation of First Step Act time credits in order to seek an earlier transfer to a halfway house or home confinement?

Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, Georgia Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 2, 2026. Petitioner: Jasmine Younge.Respondent: Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, Georgia . Advocates: Eric Schnapper (for the Petitioner) Stephen J. Petrany (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In April 2019, Fulton County District Attorney Paul Howard — an elected official — hired Dr. Jasmine Younge as Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Policy and Programs at a salary of $120,282. Younge ranked third in the office's chain of command, reported exclusively to Howard, supervised more than thirty employees, and worked so closely with Howard that he described her as a "key member" and his "go-to person for almost everything." About two months into her tenure, Younge told Howard she was pregnant. After that announcement, Howard stopped meeting with Younge, excluded her from meetings, treated her dismissively, and reassigned some of her duties — then fired her two weeks later. Younge sued the Fulton County District Attorney's Office for pregnancy discrimination under Title VII. In its answer, the DA's Office raised several affirmative defenses but did not plead the Title VII personal-staff exemption — which excludes from Title VII's coverage persons chosen to serve on an elected official's "personal staff." The DA's Office did not recognize the exemption as relevant until it began preparing its summary judgment motion, after discovery had already closed. The district court allowed the DA's Office to raise the personal-staff exemption for the first time at summary judgment, finding no prejudice to Younge from the late assertion, and granted summary judgment to the DA's Office on that basis; Younge then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed. Question May a defendant raise an affirmative defense it never pleaded in its answer as the sole basis for a summary judgment motion — without seeking to amend its answer — and does it matter that the court's scheduling order deadline would have barred any such amendment?

Salazar v. Paramount Global Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube Argued on Oct 14, 2026. Petitioner: Michael Salazar.Respondent: Paramount Global, dba 247Sports. Advocates: Joshua I. Hammack (for the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Michael Salazar subscribed to an online newsletter from 247Sports.com in 2022, a website owned by Paramount Global that covers college sports recruiting. While logged into his Facebook account, Salazar watched videos on the 247Sports.com website. Paramount had installed Facebook’s tracking Pixel on the website, which collected and transmitted to Facebook information about Salazar’s video-viewing activity, including the video content name, its URL, and Salazar's Facebook ID. This disclosure allegedly occurred without Salazar’s knowledge or consent. In September 2022, Salazar filed a class action lawsuit against Paramount Global in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, claiming violations of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA). The district court denied Paramount’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing but granted its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, holding that Salazar was not a “consumer” under the VPPA because his newsletter subscription did not qualify as subscribing to audiovisual goods or services. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Question Does the phrase “goods or services from a video tape service provider,” as used in the Video Privacy Protection Act’s definition of “consumer,” refer to all of a video tape service provider’s goods or services or only to its audiovisual goods or services?

Beaird v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube Argued on Oct 13, 2026. Petitioner: Kendrick Jarrell Beaird.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Kevin Joel Page (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent, supporting vacatur) Anthony J. Dick (Court-appointed amicus curiae) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Kendrick Jarrell Beaird pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. During sentencing, the district court applied a penalty enhancement under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines because Beaird possessed a “large capacity magazine.” While the text of the Guidelines does not define that term, the accompanying official Commentary specifies that any magazine capable of holding more than 15 rounds triggers the increased penalty. Beaird possessed a magazine that held 17 rounds. He argued that the district court erred by relying on the Commentary to define a term missing from the actual Guidelines. This challenge focuses on the level of deference courts must grant to supplemental Commentary, especially when that Commentary expands the scope of sentencing enhancements beyond the written text of the Guidelines. The district court sentenced Beaird to 72 months in prison and three years of supervised release. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence, holding that prior circuit precedent foreclosed Beaird’s challenge to the court’s reliance on the Guidelines commentary. Question Does Stinson v. United States still correctly state the rule for deference that courts must give the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?

Department of the Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube Argued on Oct 7, 2026. Petitioner: Department of the Air Force.Respondent: Prutehi Guahan. Advocates: Sopan Joshi (for the Petitioners) Caroline A. Flynn (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The U.S. Air Force operates Andersen Air Force Base at the northern tip of Guam, adjacent to Tarague Beach—a coastal area that sits above Guam's sole-source drinking-water aquifer and serves as habitat for endangered sea turtles. Since 1982, the Air Force has disposed of hazardous waste munitions at Tarague Beach through open burning and open detonation (OB/OD) operations, a method that involves igniting or exploding ordnance in open air. Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Air Force must obtain a permit every three years from the Guam Environmental Protection Agency (Guam EPA), which has administered RCRA on the island since 1986. The Air Force has renewed that permit on a triennial cycle without interruption. When its most recent permit approached expiration in September 2021, the Air Force submitted a renewal application to Guam EPA in May 2021—without first preparing any environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The application described planned OB/OD operations for 2021 through 2024 and proposed restarting open burning, which had been inactive since at least the early 2000s. The Air Force conducted no environmental impact statement, no environmental assessment, and offered no public comment opportunity before committing to that plan. Guam EPA accepted the application, held a public comment period, and issued a preliminary notice neither approving nor denying the application while it reviewed public comments. Meanwhile, under RCRA's automatic-extension provision, the Air Force continued OB/OD operations under its 2018 permit while the renewal remained pending. Prutehi Litekyan filed suit in the District Court of Guam in January 2022, alleging that the Air Force violated NEPA by submitting its RCRA permit renewal application without conducting the required environmental review; the district court granted the Air Force's motion to dismiss on three grounds—lack of standing, absence of final agency action, and failure to state a claim—and Prutehi Litekyan timely appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed all three holdings. Question 1. When the federal government submits a permit application to continue disposing of hazardous waste, does that submission count as a final, reviewable government decision under federal law? 2. Before submitting that permit application, must the federal government first conduct the broad environmental review that federal law generally requires—even though the hazardous waste permitting process already includes its own, more limited environmental review?