The Biology of Moral Choice

This philosophical piece argues that the public's trust in science is often misplaced due to significant issues within research practices. The author contends that fields like nutritional science, psychology, and even medical science are prone to flawed methodology, including mistaking correlation for causation and relying on non-replicable studies. A central concern is the "reproducibility crisis," highlighting that many research findings, from economics to biology, cannot be consistently replicated, undermining the idea of a reliable scientific method. The article suggests that knowledge presented as scientific truth may instead be temporary fictions that expire rather than being disproven. Ultimately, it advocates for a more critical perspective, urging readers to question the blanket statement "trust the science" and recognise the limitations and biases inherent in various scientific disciplines.https://philosophics.blog/2025/05/09/trust-the-science-they-said-its-reproducible-they-lied/

This philosophical piece, written from the perspective of someone who has lived in both Los Angeles and New York City, satirically examines the perceived cultural narcissism and rivalry between these two major American cities. The author suggests that both L.A. and NYC suffer from a "Centre of the Universe Complex," believing themselves to be paramount and dismissing other parts of the country. L.A. is depicted as prioritising physical beauty and superficiality, even having a skewed rating system for attractiveness, while NYC is characterised by a focus on "hustle" and intellectual importance. The piece uses humour and hyperbole to highlight the self-importance and mutual disdain that define the relationship between the two cities.https://philosophics.blog/2024/11/27/the-narcissists-playbook/

This Goodreads review, attributed to Bry Willis, offers a scathing critique of Ayn Rand's novel Atlas Shrugged. The reviewer uses harsh and hyperbolic language to describe the book as an unpleasant and difficult reading experience, akin to torture. The characters are deemed wooden and preachy, serving only as mouthpieces for Rand's ideology, while the prose is criticised for being overblown and tedious. The review concludes with a single star rating, lamenting the inability to give a lower score and sarcastically suggesting the book's only appeal is to those seeking ideological extremes.https://www.goodreads.com/review/show/577226462

This source explores the concept of free will and its relationship to determinism, arguing that the prominence given to free will in philosophical debates reflects a bias. It critiques the idea of Causa Sui, or a self-caused cause, as necessary for true responsibility and thus free will. The author suggests that our actions stem from the way we are, a state for which we cannot be fundamentally responsible, drawing on arguments from philosophers like Galen Strawson. The piece concludes by examining quarantine justification theory as an alternative to punishment, proposing that actions, like those of a programmed robot, might be better understood as requiring containment rather than blame or retribution, highlighting the difficulty in justifying traditional incarceration models when individuals are not seen as ultimately responsible for their behaviour.https://philosophics.blog/2022/05/17/cows-are-suey/

This excerpt, part of a longer series, argues that the idea of free will is an illusion. The core of the argument is the "causa sui problem," suggesting that to be truly responsible for our actions, we would need to be the cause of ourselves, which is impossible. It posits that our choices and identity are products of genetics, environment, and experience, not conscious design. The text asserts that even acts of reflection or rebellion are conditioned responses, ultimately undermining the notion of self-authorship. Ultimately, it concludes that without being the origin of ourselves, we cannot be held ultimately responsible for our virtues or vices.https://philosophics.blog/2025/04/27/unwilling-steelman-part-v/

This segment discusses an argument against the criticism that AI is not "human enough" because it relies on heuristics rather than building "world models." The author contends that human cognition itself is largely based on messy, heuristic-driven processes and that the distinction between heuristics and models is false, suggesting heuristics are a form of model designed for efficiency under uncertainty. The text proposes that AI, like humans, can incorporate both fast, intuitive heuristic systems and slower, logical processing through modular design, mirroring the dual nature of human thinking. It ultimately concludes that future AI will be functional and effective precisely because it is becoming more like human cognition, which is not always perfectly rational but is nonetheless capable.https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/artificial-intelligence-stop-complaining-its-human-enough-bry-willis-qbufe

This segment explores the illusion of autonomy and the unreliability of judgment, arguing that individuals are not truly autonomous beings but rather products of their conditioning and internal states. It contends that evaluating others is inherently flawed as it's based on fleeting observations and the observer's own biased perception, which is also influenced by their temporary conditions. The author suggests that concepts like "knowing someone" and "good character" are myths, as identity is not fixed but is instead a constantly shifting inference reinforced by the inaccurate judgments of others. Ultimately, the text portrays social interaction and moral evaluation as a "feedback loop of false selves" and "mutual delusion", where individuals are misread and categorised by those who are themselves compromised.https://philosophics.blog/2025/04/25/unwilling-steelman-part-iv/

This text critiques the nature and role of scientific models, highlighting the views of statistician George Box and philosopher Hilary Lawson. It explains that Box is known for the idea that all models are flawed but some are still useful, a concept he expressed by stating that scientists must be aware of significant errors in their models. The piece then presents Lawson’s more radical perspective, suggesting that models don't require truth to be effective and are merely pragmatic tools for interacting with an inherently unknowable reality. The text uses the historical example of celestial spheres to illustrate how operational utility can trump factual accuracy, concluding that models are ultimately useful approximations or "lies that work" rather than representations of absolute truth.https://philosophics.blog/2025/04/25/unwilling-steelman-part-iv/

This segment argues against the concept of free will, suggesting that human behaviour and morality are not autonomously chosen but are instead the result of biological and environmental conditioning. It presents evidence from neuroscience studies, demonstrating that external stimulation can alter moral judgments without the individual's awareness. The author further contends that even our justifications for our actions are post-hoc rationalisations of outcomes determined by internal states, and that the judgments of others are equally subject to bias. Ultimately, the text posits that our sense of self and choice is an illusion, as both our decisions and the assessment of those decisions are dependent on changeable and often unrecognised factors.https://philosophics.blog/2025/04/24/unwilling-steelman-part-iii/

Bry Willis examines this philosophical text, a thought experiment known as The Death Lottery, presented by John Harris, which asks whether it is morally permissible to kill one innocent person to save the lives of three others through organ donation. The author critically assesses the inherent assumption that human life possesses inherent value, arguing that this concept is a human construct with theological origins, rather than an objective truth. The piece suggests that if we reject the notion of sacred value, the ethical dilemma presented by the lottery collapses. It further explores the anti-natalist perspective, which posits that existence is inherently negative, suggesting that saving lives in the lottery would actually increase suffering. Ultimately, the text proposes that the Death Lottery is not a true test of morality but rather a test of our willingness to accept unexamined, emotionally convenient premises about the value of life.https://philosophics.blog/2025/04/24/the-death-lottery-what-is-the-value-of-life/